Holding

The phrase "for the time being" is to be given its general, indefinite‑time meaning, making the Punjab Civil Services Rules, as amended, ipso facto applicable to Chandigarh services, thereby setting the maximum age limit at 35 years.

Summary

The Union Territory of Chandigarh issued a 1996 notification for recruitment of Assistant District Attorney/Law Officer fixing the maximum age limit at 30 years. Respondent Rajesh Kumar Basandhi, aged 33, was rejected and challenged the decision, contending that the Punjab Civil Services Rules, amended in 1996, raised the age limit to 35 years and that the phrase "for the time being" in the Chandigarh service rules incorporates such subsequent amendments. The Central Administrative Tribunal held that the amendment applied ipso facto, directing the appellant to consider the respondent for appointment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of "for the time being" and held that it carries its general, indefinite‑time sense, so the conditions of service of the Punjab Civil Services as they exist at the time of application—including later amendments—apply to Chandigarh services. Consequently, the maximum age limit is 35 years and the Tribunal's order stands.

Issues considered

The proper interpretation of the phrase "for the time being" in the Union Territory of Chandigarh Employees (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1992.
Whether subsequent amendments to the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989 automatically apply to recruitment in the Union Territory of Chandigarh without a separate adoption.
Whether the proviso containing "from time to time" influences the meaning of the main provision.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 309

Subjects

service lawage limitinterpretation of statutesfor the time beingCentral Administrative TribunalPunjab Civil Services RulesUnion Territory of ChandigarhArticle 309

Judgment

A UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH AND ORS.
v.
RAJESH KUMAR BASANDHI AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003
B
[BRIJESH KUMAR AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.]

SERVICE LAW:

Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989-Rule 7A-Union-Territory of
C Chandigarh Employees (Conditions ofService) Rules, 1992-Recruitment-
Maximum Age Limit-Notification for recruitment of Assistant District
Attorney/Law Officer issued by appellant under the Rules of 1992 fixing
maximum age limit as 30 years-Notification challenged contending that
the maximum age limit is 35 years under the Punjab Rules in view of
D amendment in 1996-Challenge upheld by Tribunal-On appeal, held, the
amended Punjab Rules are ipso facto applicable to the conditions of
service under the provisions of the 1992 Rules-Hence, the maximum age
limit is 35 years.

E WORDS AND PHRASES :

'For the time being'-Meaning of

Appellant issued a notification in May 1996 under the Union
F Territory of Chandigarh Employees (Conditions of Service) Rules,
1992 for recruitment to the post of Assistant District Attorney/Law
Officer. The maximum age limit fixed was 30 years as on 1.1.1996.
Respondent 1, who was aged 33 years, applied for the post. The
application of respondent I was rejected by the appellant on the
ground that the age of the respondent I was beyond the maximum age
G limit. Respondent I challenged the rejection before Central
Administrative Tribunal contending that the maximum age limit is 35
years in view of amendment made in 1996 to the Punjab Civil Services
Rules, 1989. The Tribunal, by interim order, allowed respondent 1 to
appear in the examination and selecti11n process and stayed the
H declaration of the final result of respondent 1.
452
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH v. R.K. BASANDHI 453

The appellant contended before the Tribunal, that the amendments A
made to the Punjab Rules would not be ipso facto, applicable for
recruitment to the Union Territory of Chandigarh unless such
amendments were adopted by the administration; that the Punjab
Rules as stood on 13.1.1992, which prescribed the maximum age limit
as 30 years and were adopted, would alone be applicable to the Union B
Territory; and that the subsequent amendments were not applicable
since they were not adopted by the administration.

By its final judgment, the Tribunal held that the amendments to
the Punjab Rules made subsequent to 13.1.1992 shall also be applicable
for recruitment to the posts in Union Territory and that the maximum C
age limit is 35 years in view of the amendment and directed the
appellant to declare the result of respondent 1 and consider his case
for appointment. The Tribunal relied on the proviso to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh Employees (Conditions of Services) Rules,
1992 wherein expression 'from time to time' has been used in reference D
to the revision of scales of pay of the employees and held that the
expression is also applicable to the main provision where the phrase
'for the time being' is used.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E
HELD: 1. Under the proviso to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
Employees (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1992, the Administrator
would be competent to bring the scale of pay at par from time to time
with that of Punjab Services. The Administrator is supposed to do
something positive as he is made competent to bring about the parity F
of scale of pay. But conspicuously, this provision is not there in the
main provision which provides for other conditions of service of
Chandigarh Administration; which shall be the same as for the time
being applicable to the members of the Punjab Services. It is not
provided that it would be competent for the Administrator to apply
the same conditions of service, as on the contrary provided in the G
proviso in respe~t of revision of scales of pay from time to time; but
only the Administrator will be competent to do it. Whatever be the
conditions of service for Punjab Services at the time they are to be
applied, the same would, ipso facto, apply to Chandigarh Services
without anything further to intervene for its applicability. [463-B-E) H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 2.1 The mere fact that notification was issued on 13.1.I 992 will
not change the position if it were to be interpreted that the phrase "for
the time being" was for a single time. The appellant having itself given
effect to the rules amended after 1.4.1991, cuts against its own
argument to say that amendment subsequent to 1.4.1991 would not be
B applicable unless specifically adopted by the Union Territory of
Chandigarh. It may not be open for the appellant to pick one
amendment in the Punjab Rules and implement the same and refuse
to apply the other amendment. It is clear that no adoption of the
amended provision was necessary and by assigning the general meaning
to the expression 'for the time being' it would be applicable without
C being specifically adopted by the Chandigarh Administration. The
general meaning of the phrase "for the time being" seems to be
reasonable since the position as existing at the time the rule is applied
that would be taken into account unless the context may indicate
otherwise. (464-F-H, 465-A)
D
Jivendra Nath Kaul v. Collector/District Magistrate & Anr.. (1992)
3 sec 576, referred to.
2.2 A perusal of the meaning of the expression 'for the time being'
by different authors, based on decided cases indicates that it cannot
E be said that it must in every case indicate a single period of time. It
may be for indefinite period of time depending upon the context in
which the phrase is used. It is also evident that generally it denotes
indefinite period of time, meaning thereby, the position as existing at
the time of application of the rules, may be amended or un-amended.
p Therefore, to come to a conclusion as to whether it is for one time or
for indefinite period of time, the context, purpose and the intention of
the use of the phrase will have to be seen and examined. [460-F, GI

Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Ed. - published by Sweet and
Maxwell Ltd. London); Law Dictionary by Dr. A.R. Gupta (1979 Ed. -
G published by Eastern Law House); Law Lexicon by T.P. Mukherjee (1989
Ed.); Venkataramaiys 's Law Lexicon "Legal Maxims" as revised by Justice
MC Desai (Znd Edition - 1966 Reprint); Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha
Aiyar (2nd Edition - Reprint 2000), referred to.

H 2.3 The words 'from time to time' used in the proviso cannot be
UNION TERRITORY OFCHANDIGARH 1·. R.K. BASANDHI [BRIJESH KUMAR, J] 455

read into the main provision but it does not take away the meaning A
which is generally assignable to the phrase 'for the time being' as used
in the main provision. There has to be some special or tangible
circumstance or context in which it may be said that the meaning to
be assigned to the expression 'for the time befog' would be other than
the general meaning and the phrase would mean for a single time. If B
the main provision is read without reading its proviso alongwith it,
there is no reason for not assigning the meaning of the phrase 'for the
time being' as generally understood for indefinite period of time. There
is nothing to indicate which may restrict the general meaning to mean
that it was only for one time. Hence it was not at all necessary for the C
Tribunal to seek assistance from the words used in the proviso 'from
time to time' to interpret the meaning of the phrase 'for the time being'
used in the main provision. [462-F-H, 463-A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2731 of
1997. J)

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.10.96 of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh in O.A. No. 527-CH of 1996.

Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.
E
In-person for Respondent No. I.

Ms. Arnita Gupta and Ms. Neelam Tiwari for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
BRIJESH KUMAR, J. : The Union Territory of Chandigarh has
preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 25.10.1996
passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh bench allowing
the 0.A. filed by the respondent Rajesh Kumar Basandhi, directing the G
present appellant, inter alia to consider his case for appointment to the post
of Assistant District Attorney/Law Officer.

The whole case hinges upon the meaning and the interpretation of the
expression "for the time being" as used in the Union Territory of
Chandigarh Emloyees (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1992 (hereinafter to H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A be called as 'the Rules'), framed in exercise of power under Article 309
of the Constitution of India. The question arose in the background of a
notification of vacancies for recruitment to the post of Assistant District
Attorney/Law Officer. Apart from other qualifications as laid down in the
advertisement dated 16.5.1996, the age limit was required to be between
B 21-30 years as on the 1st day of January 1996. The respondent No. I
applied as one of the candidates for the post. There is no dispute about the
fact that he was then aged 33 years that is to say beyond the maximum
age limit as provided in the notification for filling up of the vacancies.
Hence, his application was not entertained. He approached the Central
C Administrative Tribunal and by means of an interim order, he was allowed
to appear in the examination and the selection process but final result was
not to be declared.

The case of the respondent Shri Rajesh Kumar Basandhi, who
appeared in person, is that as per the rules applicable, the maximum age
D limit is 35 years but on the other hand according to the appellant it is 30
years. The Central Administrative Tribunal ultimately found that the
maximum age limit is 35 years, therefore it directed to declare the result
of the respondent and to consider his case for appointment to the post of
Assistant District Attorney/Law Officer.

E The Union Territory of Chandigarh was constituted on 1.11.1966
under the provisions of the States Reorganization Act. By means of a
notification dated 1.11.1966 issued by Govt. of India, Ministry of Home
Affairs, in exercise of its power conferred under the proviso to Article 309
of the Constitution of India, the Administrator of Union Territory of
F Chandigarh was authorized to exercise the power to make rules in regard
to method of recruitment to the Central Civil Services under his
administrative control in connection with the affairs of the Union Territory
of Chandigarh. In the year 1992 by yet another Notification dated January
13, 1992 issued under Article 309 of the Constitution the President framed
G Conditions of Service of Union Territory of Chandigarh Employees Rules,
1992. It took effect from April I, 1991. The Rules of 1966 in so far
inconsistent with the provisions of 1992 Rules were repealed. The Rules
of 1992 provided as follows :

"Conditions of service of persons appointed to the Central
H Civil Services and posts under the administrative control of
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH 1·. R.K. BASANDHI [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 457

Administrator.- The conditions of service of persons appointed A
to the Central Civil Services and posts in Groups A, B, C and D
under the administrative control of the Administrator of Union
Territory of Chandigarh shall, subject to any other provision made
by the President in this behalf, be the same as the conditions of
services of persons appointed to corresponding posts in Punjab B
Civil Services and shall be governed by the same rules and orders
as are for the time being applicable to the latter category of
persons.

Provided that in the case of persons appointed to the services and C
posts under the administrative control of the Administrator,
Chandigarh so far as they are drawing pay on the rates admissible
to the corresponding categories of employees of the Government
of Punjab, it shall be competent for the Administrator to revise
their scales of pay from time to time so as to bring them at par
with the scales of pay which may be sanctioned by the Government D
of Punjab from time to time to the corresponding categories of
employees."
(Emphasis supplied)

According to the above provisions, persons appointed to the services of the E
Union Territory of Cjmndigarh, their conditions of service shall be
governed by the same rules and orders as applicable for the time being to
the corresponding posts in the Punjab Civil Services. So far Scales of pay
is concerned it is provided that the Administrator will be competent to
revise the same from time to time so as to bring it at par with scales of F
pay of Punjab Services.

The Punjab Civil Services Rules were framed in 1989 and Rule 7A
prescribed the maximum age limit as 30 years for recruitment to the post
of Assistant District Attorney/Law Officer. An amendment was made in
the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989 in the year 1994 according to which G
the maximum age for technical posts was raised to 33 years. Thereafter,
came yet another amendment in the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989 in
1996, increasing the maximum age limit to 35 years. In this view of the
position, according to the respondent, his candidature could not be defeated
on the ground that he was over age. The case of the appellant however is H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that amendment made to the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989 would not
be ipso facto applicable for recruitment to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
unless such amendments were also adopted by the administration of the
Union Territory of Chandigarh. This having not been done, the Rules of
Punjab Civil Services, 1989 as stood on 13.1.1992 at the time the
B Notification was issued, for applying those rules, for the services of
employees of Union Territory of Chandigarh, would alone be applicable
and not the subsequent amendments unless specifically adopted.

The Tribunal while holding that the amendment to the Punjab Civil
Services Rules, 1989 made subsequent to January 13, 1992 shall also be
C applicable for recruitment to the posts in Union Territory of Chandigarh,
relied upon the aforesaid proviso to 1992 Rules, wherein the term "from
time to time" has been used in reference to the revision of scales of pay
of the employees of Chandigarh Administration and it has been held that
the expression "from time to time" used in the proviso shall also apply to
D the main provision itself. The Tribunal has then relied upon the meaning
of the term "for the time being" as given in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary
(3rd Ed.) published by Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. London. The Tribunal also
took note of the fact that the requirement of two years experience of
practice at the Bar as introduced in the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989
E on 24. 12.1991 was given effectto in the notification issued for recruitment
for Law Officer/Assistant District Attorney. If that is so, the subsequent
amendment made in 1996 shall also be applicable raising the age to 35
years. ...
It may be pertinent at this stage to see the meaning of the phrase "for
F the time being" as given in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as quoted in
the judgment of the Tribunal. It reads as follows :

"The phrase 'for the time being' may according to its context,
mean the time present, or denote a single period of time; but its
general sense is that of time indefinite, and refers to an indefinite
G state of facts which will arise in the future, and which may (and
probably will) vary from time to time"

The respondent also refers to the Law Dictionary by Dr. A.R. Gupta 1979
Ed. Published by Eastern Law House and the phrase 'for the time being',
H has been indicated therein to mean as follows :
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH 1·. R.K. BASANDHI [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 459

"Time Being. The phrase "for the time being" may, according to A
its context may mean the time present or denote a single period
of time; but its general sense is that of time indefinite and refers
to an indefinite state of facts which will arise in the future and
which may vary from time to time. Re Gunter's Settlement Trusts,
1949 Ch. 502."
B
In the Law Lexicon by T.P. Mukherjee 1989 Ed. the phase "for the
time being in force" has been indicated to mean as under :

"For the time being in force - The expression "any other
enactment for the time being in force" means any legislation C
enacted whether before or after the imposition of the tax by the
corporation. The general sense of the phrase "for the time being"
is that of time indefinite and refers to indefinite state of facts
which will arise in future and which may vary from time to time.
[See Constitution of India Art. 265] D. Kasturchandji v. State, D
AIR (1967) M.P. 268 at 274; 1966 Lab. L.J. 1143: 1967 M.P.L.J.
47.

The expression may refer either to a particular point of time
or to several periods of time and the interpretation that is to be
adopted in any particular case must depend upon the context in E
which the expression occurs (See Defence oflndia Act, 1939, Sec.
19(1)(g) E.J. Film Studio v. P.K. Mukherjee, AIR (1954) Cal. 41
at 43"

And in Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon "Legal Maxims", as revised F
by Justice M.C. Desai (2nd Ed.) 1966 (Reprint), the meaning of the phrase
"for the time being" is given as follows :

"For the time being - The words "for the time being" are capable
of different interpretations according to the context; for example,
they might be used with a context showing clearly that they were G
intended to point one single period of time; and a case was put
of a person intending to give a promissory note to a company, and
giving it to the secretary "for the time being", meaning clearly the
person who appeared to be the secretary at the particular time
when the note become payable. It might be according to the H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A context, that the same words would apply to a succession of
periods. Take the common case of petition for payment of
dividends to the rector to certain parish "for the time being"
which, of course would point not to single period but a succession
of periods - Ellison v. Thomas, [1862] 31 L.J. Ch. 867 at p. 869.

B The general sense of the phrase "for the time being" is that of time
indefinite, and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise
in future and which may vary from time to time. - See Ellison
v. Thomas, (1862) 31 L.J. Ch. 867; D. Kasturchandjiv. State, AIR
(1967) M.P. 268 at P. 274; 1967 M.P. L.J. 47 at P. 55; 1966 Jab
c L.J. 1143"

We also find that in Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Ed.,
Reprint 2000, the expression "time being" has been indicated to mean :

"Time being, - The phrase "for the time being" may according
D
to its context mean the time present or denote a single period of
time, but its general sense is that of time indefinite, and refers to
an indefinite state of facts which will arise in the future, and which
may (and probably will) vary from time to time. (Ellison v.
Thomas, 31 L.J. Ch.867; 32, L.J. Ch.32; Coles v. Pack, L.R.5
E C.P. 65)

A perusal of the meaning of the expression "for the time being" by
different authors, based on decided cases makes it clear that it cannot be
said that it must in every case indicate a single period of time. It may be
F for indefinite period of time depending upon the context in which the
phrase is used. It is also evident that generally it denotes indefinite period
of time, meaning thereby, the position as existing at the time of application
of the rules, may be amended or un-amended. Therefore, to come to a
conclusion as to whether it is for one time or for indefinite period of time,
G the context, purpose and the intention of the use of the phrase will have
to be seen and examined.

The learned counsel for the appellant has heavily relied upon a
decision reported in (1992) 3 Supreme Court Cases 576 -Jivendra Nath
Kaul v. Collector/District Magistrate and Anr., more particularly, on the
H observations made at Page 579 where it has been observed :
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH 1·. R.K. BASANDHI [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 461

".... we are of the view that the High Court Judgment in Bhaiya A
La/1 case does not lay down correct law. The High Court has not
given natural meaning to the expressions contained in sub-s. (I 2)
.· and sub-s.(13) of Section 87A of the Act. The only meaning which
can be given to the expression "half of the number of the members
of the Board" is the members as existed on the date of its B
constitution. The total number of members on the date of
composition of Municipal Board, Mugal Sarai was 16 and as such
notwithstanding the removal of member/members, the motion of
no confidence could only be passed if the motion was supported
by more than 8 votes .. ".
c
It is further observed :

"Similarly the High Court fell into grave error by not appreciating
the plain meaning of the words "for the time being" in sub-section
13 of Section 87-A of the Act. "For the time being" means at the D
moment or existing position. These words indicate the actual
membership in existence on the date of motion of no confidence.
The High Court on the basis of strain reasoning has given an
interpretation which does not flow from the simple language of
sub-sections (12) and (13) of Section 87A of the Act".
E
For appreciating the abo.ve position, it would be necessary to look
to sub-sections (12) and (13) of Section 87A of the Act, which reads as
follows :

"(12) 'The motion shall be deemed to have been carried only when F
it has been passed by a majority of more than half of the total
number of members of the Board'.

(13) 'If the motion ..... which shall not be less than one-half of the
total number of members of the Board for the time being, no G
notice of any subsequent motion of no-confidence in the same
president shall be received until after the expiry of a period of
twelve months from the date of the meeting'."

I. 1970 All. L.J. 36 H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A A perusal of the above provision clearly indicates that different
phraseology has been used in the two sub-sections. In sub-s.(12) the
expression "for the time being" has not been used. On the other hand it
says that motion would be deemed to have been carried by majority of more
than half of the total number of members. This has been taken to mean
B the total strength of the members of the Board irrespective of subsequent
removals, if any. But for the purpose of sub.s.(13) where the expression
"for the time being" has been used, would mean the existing position at
the moment; that is to say actual number of members in existence on the
date of motion of no confidence. Thus the actual number of existing
C members may fluctuate or vary from time to time, i.e. one half of the total
number of members for the time being would subsequently may also vary
depending on the fact as to how many members are actually there when
the motion ofno confidence was moved. This position which emerges from
the above decision, in our view, does not advance the case of the appellant
in any manner. Rather it would be in support of the meaning of the phrase
D "for the time being" to the effect that in general sense, of time indefinite
and refers to state of facts which would arise in future and may very from
time to time.

We may then examine the reasoning which has been given by the
E Central Administrative Tribunal to hold that meaning of the expression "for
the time being" would be as may vary from time and not for one single
time. For this purpose help was sought from the expression used in the
proviso "from time to time" in respect of the revision of pay scale. It is
true, as rightly canvassed before us that these words used in the proviso
cannot be read in the main provision but it, in no way takes away the
F meaning which is generally assignable to the phrase "for the time being"
as used in the main provisions. There has to be some special or tangible
circumstance or context in which it may be said that the meaning to be
assigned to the expression "for the time being" would be other than the
general meaning and the phrase would mean for a single time. If we read
G the main provision without reading its porviso alongwith it, there is no
reason for not assigning the meaning of the phrase "for the time being"
as generally understood for indefinite period of time, as also held by this
Court in the case of Jivendra Nath Kaul (supra). There is nothing to
indicate which may restrict the general meaning to mean that it was only
H for one time. We are therefore of the view that it was not at all necessary
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH r. RK. BASANDHI [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 463

for the Tribunal to seek assistance from the words used in the proviso "from A
time to time" to interpret the meaning of the phrase "for the time being"
used in the main provision.

- On the other hand, a close reading of the whole provision will
indicate a different position altogether. In the proviso it is said " .. .it shall B
be competent for the Administrator to revise their scales of pay from time
to time so as to bring them at par with the scales of pay which may be
sanctioned by the Govt. of Punjab ... ". That is to say, the Administrator
would be competent to bring scale of pay at par form time to time with
that of Punjab Services. The Administrator is supposed to do something
positive as he is made competent to bring about the parity in scale of pay. C
But conspicuously, this provision is not there in the main provision which
provides for other conditions of service of employees of Chandigarh
Administration; which shall be the same as for the time being applicable
to the members of the Punjab Services. It is not provided that it would be
competent for the Administrator to apply the same conditions of service, D
as on the contrary provided in the proviso in respect of revision of scales
of pay from time to time; but only the Administrator will be competent
to do it. Whatever be the conditions of service for Punjab Services at the
time they are to be applied, the same would, ipso facto, apply to
Chandigarh Services without anything further to intervene for its E
applicability.

The intention of the appellant also does not appear to be to confine
the meaning of the phrase "for the time being" to a single time which would
be demonstrated by the fact that in the notification issued for recruitment,
one of the conditions was that the candidate should have experience of two F
years at the Bar. This condition was introduced by amendment to Section
87A on 24.12.1991 that is to say the amendment in the rule regarding two
years experience was included in the requirement of eligibility. A specific
query was made from the learned counsel for the appellant on the point,
namely, in what manner the amendment in the relevant provision regarding G
two years practice was given effect to in the notification for recruitment,
the learned counsel answered that the said amendment had been made
before the issuance of the notification making the Punjab Rules applicable
to the persons appointed in the service of Union Territory of Chandigarh.
To be more specific the case of the appellant is that the provision of the H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Punjab Rules was amended on 24.12.1991 introducing the condition of
two years practice at the Bar whereas the notification was issued by the
Chandigarh Administration subsequently i.e. on 13.1.1992 therefore
amended position of the Punjab Rules till that date namely 13.1.1992 was
incorporated in the notification for recruitment. But it would be pertinent
B to point out that it was conveniently skipped by the appellant to notice that
Punjab Rules were made applicable with effect from 1.4.1991 though the
notification to that effect was issued on 13.1.1992. The consequence of
giving effect to the notification dated 13.1.1992 w.e.f. 1.4.1991 would be
that Punjab Rules as existing on 1.4.1991 would be applicable. If the
C argument of the appellant is accepted that the phrase "for the time being"
was applicable for only one time and not for future amendments, Punjab
Rules, as existed on 1.4.199 I alone would apply without taking note of the
subsequent amendment in the rules i.e. as made on 24.12.91 regarding
requirement of two years practice. But the appellant did not adhere to that
position which is being canvassed now but in the notification for recruitment
D the position as brought about by amendment in the Punjab Rules as on
24.12.1991 was incorporated and given effect to. The appellant cannot
have it both ways. Once having given effect to the notification dated
13.1.1992 with effect from l.4.I991 it should have adhered to the rules
as existed on 1.4.1991 if it wanted to say that the phrase "for the time
E being" was meant for a single time and not for future varying situation and
amendments. Thus the stand taken by the appellant becomes self-
contradictory to its own conduct in incorporating the rule as amended on
24.12.1991 i.e. subsequent to 1.4.1991 with effect from which date the
Punjab Rules were made applicable to the services of the Union Territory
F of Chandigarh. The mere fact that notification was issued on 13 .1.1992 will
not change the position if it were to be interpreted that the phrase "for the
time being" was for a single time. The appellant having itself given effect
to the rules amended after 1.4.1991, cuts against its own argument to say
that amendment subsequent to 1.4.1991 would not be applicable unless
specifically adopted by the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It may not be
G open for the appellant to pick one amendment in the Punjab Rules and
implement the same and refuse to apply the other amendment. It is clear
that no adoption of the amended provision was necessary and by assigning
the general meaning to the expression "for the time being" it would be
applicable withoqt being specifically adopted by the Chandigarh
H Administration. The general meaning of the phrase "for the time being"
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH '" R.K. BASANDHI [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 465

seems to be reasonable since the position as existing at the time the rule A
is applied that would be taken into account unless of course context may
indicate otherwise. We find no such context by reason of which we may
assign meaning to the phrase other than the meaning understood in general
sense that such an expression is indefinite in time and refers to state of facts
which may arise and exist at the time rule is applied which may vary at B
different times. The same meaning as generally understood has also the
approval of the decision of this Court in Jivendra Nath Kaul (supra).

Learned counsel for the appellant informs and submits that on
declaration of the result it was found that the merit of the respondent is
low and he stands no chance for appointment looking to the number of C
vacancies available. In this connection the respondent submitted that he has
already challenged the result of the selection on certain grounds which is
subject matter of another case pending before the Tribunal. The fact that
proceedings challenging the result is pending before the Tribunal is not
denied, we therefore refrain from making any comment in that regard D
except that in case number of vacancies available was less than the position
of the respondent in order of merit, in that event question of appointment
may arise only in case of a favourable decision of the Tribunal on the
petition of the respondent challenging the result of the selection and not
otherwise.
E
In view of the discussion held above, we are of the view that no
interference is called for in the order passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal. The appeal lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed. The stay
order granted by this Court on 7.4.1997 at the time of granting leave is
discharged. F
Costs easy.

B.S. Appeal dismissed.