Supreme Court of India

UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH & ORS.versusJAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE & ANR.

Citation: 2023 INSC 804
Decided: 6 September 2023
Disposal: Dismissed
Bench: VIKRAM NATH

Holding

The Court held that the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, read harmoniously with the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997, obliges the authorities to allot the Plough symbol to J&K National Conference, and the High Court’s direction under Article 226 is valid and enforceable.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered an appeal by the Union Territory of Ladakh and related authorities against a High Court order that directed them to recognise the "Plough" symbol for the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (J&K NC) in the upcoming Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) elections. J&K NC argued that, as a recognised State Party in the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir, it was entitled to the reserved symbol despite the bifurcation of the state and the lack of a formal recognition in Ladakh. The Court examined the applicability of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 and the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997, concluding that the 1968 Order provides a guideline for symbol allocation and that no statutory impediment existed to grant the Plough symbol to J&K NC. It held that the High Court’s direction was within its constitutional writ jurisdiction and essential to ensure a free and fair election. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, the High Court’s interim order upheld, and a fresh notification for the LAHDC elections was ordered, granting the exclusive use of the Plough symbol to J&K NC.

Issues considered

The applicability of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 to local body elections in the Union Territory of Ladakh.
Whether the Union Territory of Ladakh could lawfully deny the Plough symbol to J&K National Conference despite its prior recognition as a State Party in the former State of Jammu & Kashmir.
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct the allocation of an election symbol in the circumstances.
Whether the delay in the election process barred judicial intervention at the stage of the penultimate election phase.

Legislation cited

Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968s. 10, s. 10(A), s. 12, s. 9
Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997s. 12, s. 13

Subjects

Election symbolsLadakh Autonomous Hill Development CouncilArticle 226Judicial reviewBasic structure doctrinePolitical party recognitionElection lawSymbol allocation

Judgment

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 68 : 2023 INSC 804

CASE DETAILS

UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH & ORS.
v.
JAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 5707 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
[VIKRAM NATH AND AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: High Court whether justiﬁed in dismissing the
appeal ﬁled by appellants and upholding the interim order of Single Judge
directing them to notify the symbol allotted to Respondent no.1 (R1) and
allow the candidates set up by it to contest in the then-upcoming General
Elections of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, Kargil on
the reserved election symbol (plough) already allotted to it.
Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 –
Paragraphs 9, 10, 10(A), 12 – Denial of the Plough symbol to respondent
no.1 – Impropriety:
Held: R1 was before the concerned authorities, well in time, by
impugning the Notiﬁcation dtd. 26.07.2023 which denied it the Plough
symbol – Appellants sitting on the representation of R1, went ahead and
notiﬁed the elections on 02/05.08.2023 – R1’s request for allotment of the
Plough symbol was bonaﬁde, legitimate and just, because in the erstwhile
State of Jammu and Kashmir (which included the present Union Territory
of Ladakh), it was a recognized State Party having been allotted the Plough
symbol – Upon bifurcation of the erstwhile State of J&K and the creation
of two new Union Territories, the Union Territory of J&K and the Union
Territory of Ladakh, though the ECI had not notiﬁed R1 as a State Party
for the Union Territory of Ladakh, it cannot be simpliciter that R1 was not
entitled for the allotment of plough symbol – Also, there was no conﬂict
with any other stakeholder as the Plough symbol was neither a symbol
exclusively allotted to any National or State Party nor one of the symbols
shown in the list of free symbols – Thus, there was and is no impediment in
68
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND 69
KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE

such symbol being granted to R1 – In the absence of anything contrary in any
rule framed for conduct of the elections in question, relating to allotment of
symbols, the provisions of the 1968 Order can be relied upon as a guideline
to exercise of executive power of like nature – On a harmonious reading
of Paragraphs 9, 10, 10(A) and 12, under the terms of the 1968 Order, the
request of R1 is not bereft of justiﬁcation – In view of the 1968 Order, the
appellants’ discretion was not unbridled, rather, it was guided by the 1968
Order – R1 is entitled to the exclusive allotment of the Plough symbol for
candidates proposed to be put up by it – Orders of the High Court were in
aid of the electoral process, no fault therewith – Entire election process set
aside – Fresh Notiﬁcation be issued – Appeal dismissed with costs – Ladakh
Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997 – ss.12, 13 – Constitution
of India – Article 226 – Election Laws. [Paras 21, 23, 27-30, 37, 40 and 44]
Constitution of India – Powers of Supreme Court and High Courts,
part of Basic Structure:
Held: Powers of Supreme Court and the High Courts vested under
the Constitution cannot be abridged, excluded or taken away, being part of
the Basic Structure of the Constitution. [Para 16]
Alternative remedy – No bar for exercise of writ jurisdiction –
Ladakh Autonomous Hill Devel-opment Councils Act, 1997 – s.13:
Held: The availability of alternative eﬃcacious remedy is no bar to
the exercise of high prerogative writ jurisdiction – s.13, 1997 Act does not,
and cannot, impede a Constitutional Court from proceeding further – High
Court was not precluded from issuing a direction of the nature issued by
it, more so when such direction does not violate any statutory provision –
Constitution of India – Election Laws. [Para 16]
Practice and Procedure – Inter-departmental communications –
Reliance upon:
Held: Inter-departmental communications are in the process of
consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis
to claim any right – In the present case, it was rightly contended that the
Legal Opinion by the Law Department remains internal advice, and advice
alone, and the same would not create/confer any right in favour of R1 –
Elections – Administrative Law. [Para 17]
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Power to direct for actions,
in rare and exceptional situation, not mentioned in the provisions
concerned – Discussed.
Elections – Election authority, to be independent of any
extraneous inﬂ uence:
Held: Elections to any oﬃce/body are required to be free, fair and
transparent – Elections lie at the core of democracy – The authority
entrusted by law to conduct such elections is to be completely in-
dependent of any extraneous inﬂuence/consideration – In the present
case, the Union Territory of Ladakh not only denied R1 the Plough
symbol, but even upon timely intervention by the Single Judge, left no
stone unturned not only to resist but also frustrate a cause simply by
eﬄux of time. [Para 22]
Elections – Power of Supreme court to bring back status quo
ante:
Held: Plea of the Appellants that no relief be granted to R1 due
to the election process having reached the penultimate stage, rejected
– Having chosen to not comply with successive orders of the High
Court which were passed well in time, such as not to stall/delay the
notiﬁed election schedule, the Appellants cannot be permitted to plead
that interference by Supreme Court at this late juncture should not
be forthcoming – No litigant should have even an iota of doubt or
misimpression that just because of systemic delay or the matter not
being taken up by the Courts resulting in eﬄux of time the cause would
be defeated, and the Court would be rendered helpless to ensure justice
to the party concerned – This Court can even turn the clock back, if the
situation warrants such dire measures – Powers of this Court, if need
be, to even restore status quo ante are not in the realm of any doubt, as
held in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Aurnachal
Pradesh Legislative Assembly reported as [2016] 6 SCR 1 – Though,
Nabam Rebia has been referred to a Larger Bench in Subhash Desai v.
Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra however, the questions
referred to the Larger Bench do not detract from the aforesaid power and
furthermore, mere reference to a larger Bench does not unsettle declared
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND 71
KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE

law – Constitution of India – Practice and Procedure – Reference to larger
Bench does not unsettle declared law. [Paras 31 and 32]
Practice and Procedure – High Courts not deciding cases on
the ground that the leading judgment of Supreme Court on subject
concerned is either referred to a larger Bench or a review petition
relating thereto is pending – High Courts refusing deference to
judgments as a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its correctness
– Law laid down:
Held: High Courts will proceed to decide matters on the basis of the
law as it stands – It is not open, unless speciﬁcally directed by Supreme
Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a review petition, as the case
may be – It is also not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment
by stating that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench – Further,
in any case, when faced with conﬂicting judgments by Benches of equal
strength of Supreme Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by
the High Courts – Judicial Discipline. [Para 35]
Judgments/Orders – Interpretation of:
Held: By way of certain pronouncements, principles relating to
elections to Parliament, State Assemblies and Municipalities have been
extended to other arenas as well – However, interpretation of judgments
is always to be made with due regard to the facts and circumstances of the
peculiar case concerned – In the present case, having looked at Articles
243-O, 243ZG and 329 it is concluded that no bar hit the High Court, even
on principle – Elections – Constitution of India – Articles 243-O, 243ZG
and 329. [Para 36]
Elections – Election process started – Interference by
Constitutional Courts:
Held: The self-imposed restraint by the Courts as a general
principle in election matters, to the extent that once a notification
is issued and the election process starts, the Constitutional Courts,
under normal circumstances are loath to interfere, is not a contentious
issue – But where issues crop up, indicating unjust executive action
or an attempt to disturb a level-playing field between candidates
and/or political parties with no justifiable or intelligible basis, the
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

Constitutional Courts are required, nay they are duty-bound, to step
in – Constitution of India. [Para 37]
Elections – Authorities concerned using their powers relating
to elections arbitrarily – Misconceived notion that eventually, after
elections are over and when such decisions/actions are challenged, by
sheer passage of time, irreversible consequences would have occurred,
and no substantive relief could be fashioned – Taken note of:
Held: Such conduct by authorities may seriously compel the Court to
have a comprehensive re-think, as to whether the self-imposed restrictions
may need a more liberal interpretation, to ensure that justice is not only done
but also seen to be done, and done in time to nip in the bud any attempted
misadventure. [Para 39]
Elections – Importance of symbol in an electoral system, especially
one allotted to a political party – Discussed.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala,
(1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj
Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1 : [1976] SCR 347; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union
of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : [1981] 1 SCR 206; L Chandra Kumar v. Union
of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186; Kalpana Mehta v. Union
of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1; Rojer Mathew v. South Indian
Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC 1 : [2019] 16 SCR 1; Nabam Rebia and Bamang
Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Aurnachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016)
8 SCC 1 : [2016] 6 SCR 1 – followed.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595; Madhya
Pradesh State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jahan Khan,
(2007) 10 SCC 88 : [2007] 9 SCR 715; Maharashtra Chess Association v.
Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 285 : [2019] 10 SCR 304; Radha Krishan
Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771; Godrej Sara
Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Oﬃcer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC
Online SC 95; Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi, 2022 SCC online SC 1118; High
Court of Tripura v. Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee, (2019) 16 SCC 663 : [2019] 2
SCR 692; Aish Mohammad v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC Online SC 736;
Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608 : [2009] 11 SCR
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND 73
KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE

1015; Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321 : [2012]
3 SCR 826; National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017)
16 SCC 680 : [2017] 13 SCR 100; Shri Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission
of India, New Delhi, (1972) 4 SCC; All Party Hill Leaders’ Conference,
Shillong v. Captain W A Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161 : [1978] 1 SCR 393;
Edapaddi K Palaniswami v. TTV Dhinakaran, (2019) 18 SCC 219 : [2019]
3 SCR 200 – relied on.
Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra,
2023 SCC Online SC 607; State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism
Corporation Limited (2018) 3 SCC 585; N P Ponnuswami v. Return-ing
Oﬃcer, Namakkal Constituency, 1952 SCR 218; Durga Shankar Mehta v.
Thakur Raghuraj Singh, (1955) 1 SCR 267; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
Ahmad Ishaue, (1955) 1 SCR 1104; Narayan Bhaskar Khare (Dr) v. Election
Commission of India, 1957 SCR 1081; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : [1978] 2 SCR 272; Lakshmi Charan
Sen v. A K M Hassan Uzzaman, (1985) 4 SCC 689 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR
493; Indrajit Barua v. Election Commission of India, (1985) 4 SCC 722 :
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 225; Election Commission of India v. Shivaji, (1988)
1 SCC 277 : [1988] 1 SCR 878; Digvijay Mote v. Union of India, (1993) 4
SCC 175 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 553; Boddula Krishnaiah v. State Election
Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 3 SCC 416 : [1996] 3 SCR 687;
Anugrah Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1996) 6 SCC 303 : [1996]
5 Suppl. SCR 719; Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2000)
8 SCC 216 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 34; Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal
Corporation, Ahmedabad, (2006) 8 SCC 352 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 45; West
Bengal State Election Commission v. Communist Party of India (Marxist),
(2018) 18 SCC 141; Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(2020) 6 SCC 548 : [2019] 14 SCR 704; Laxmibai v. Collector, (2020) 12
SCC 186 : [2020] 2 SCR 880; State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, (2021)
8 SCC 401 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5707 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.08.2023 of the High Court of
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in LPA No.151 of 2023.
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

A1 : Union Territory of Ladakh through its Chief Secretary
A2: Chief Election oﬃcer, UT of Ladakh
A3: District Election Oﬃcer (Kargil)
A4: Administrative Secretary, Election Department, UT of Ladakh
R1: Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, through its General
Secretary
R2 : Election Commission of India
Appearances:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, K.M. Nataraj, A.S.G., Piyush
Beriwal, Rajat Nair, Shailesh Madiyal, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Vinayak
Sharma, Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Advs. for the
Appellants.
S.D. Sanjay, Sr. Adv., Shariq J Reyaz, Syed Ahmed Saud, Daanish
Ahmed Syed, Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jameel Husain, Aqib Baig, Mohd.
Shahib, M/s. Shakil Ahmad Syed, Akshat Agrawal, Akshay Amritanshu,
Advs. for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUDGMENT
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order dated
14.08.2023 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) rendered
by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and
Ladakh at Srinagar (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) dismissing
Letters Patent Appeal No.151 of 2023 ﬁled by the Appellants and upholding
the interim order of a learned Single Judge dated 09.08.2023 in Writ Petition
(Civil) No.1933 of 2023.
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 75
NATIONAL CONFERENCE [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]

BRIEF FACTS:
4. The controversy involved in this lis is the non-allocation of the
Plough symbol to the writ petitioner, the Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference/Respondent No.1 herein (hereinafter referred to as “R1”) for its
candidates to contest the then-upcoming General Elections of the Ladakh
Autonomous Hill Development Council, Kargil (hereinafter referred to as
the “LAHDC”). In view of the urgency in the matter, the learned Single
Judge passed an interim order on 09.08.2023, the operative portion whereof
at Paragraph 11 reads as under:
“11. Keeping in view that the upcoming General Election of Ladakh
Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) stands announced,
the petitioner-party is directed to approach the oﬃce of the respondents
1 to 3 & 5, for notifying the reserved symbol (plough) already allotted
to it and respondents 1 to 3 & 5 shall notify the symbol allotted to
petitioner-party in terms of Paragraphs 10 and 10(A) of Election
Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, and allow the
candidates set up by the petitioner-party to contest on the reserved
election symbol (plough) already allotted to the party.”
5. Aggrieved, the Appellants moved the learned Division Bench of
the High Court by preferring an appeal, which after hearing was dismissed
vide Impugned Judgment on 14.08.2023.
SUBMISSION BY THE APPELLANTS:
6. Mr. K. M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General (hereinafter
referred to as the “ASG”) for the Appellants submitted that the learned
Single Judge and the learned Division Bench of the High Court have
issued directions contrary to law. It was submitted that both orders have
been passed on an erroneous assumption that the provisions of Election
Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 (hereinafter referred
to as the “1968 Order”), would be applicable in elections to the LAHDC.
Learned ASG canvassed that this is not the correct legal position as the
LAHDC election is being conducted by the Election Authority of the Union
Territory of Ladakh constituted under Rule 5 of The Ladakh Autonomous
Hill Development Councils (Election) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to
as the “1995 Rules”). It was contended that the Election Commission of
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

India (hereinafter referred to as the “ECI”) is empowered to hold elections
to the Parliamentary and State Assembly constituencies and for the present
LAHDC elections, the ECI does not exercise any authority. Thus, the learned
ASG submitted that any reference to the provisions of the 1968 Order is
misplaced.

7. Learned ASG, further, contended that Paragraphs No. 9, 10 and
10(A) of the 1968 Order speak of restrictions on the allotment of symbols
reserved for State Parties in States where such parties are not recognized;
concession to candidates set up by a State Party at elections in other States or
Union Territories, and; concession to candidates set up by an un-recognized
party which was earlier recognized as a National or State Party, respectively.
Thus, it was his categoric stand that such concession can be only for the
purposes of Parliamentary and State Assembly elections, and not for the
election in question.

8. Learned ASG submitted that the reference by the ECI in its
communication dated 18.07.2023 to R1, that it can avail the concession
under Paragraph 10 of the 1968 Order can neither confer any right on R1,
nor compel the Election Authority of the Union Territory of Ladakh to
allow the prayer of R1, as made in the Writ Petition before the High Court.
With regard to the opinion of the Law Department of the Appellant No.1,
as quoted in the communication of the District Election Oﬃcer (District
Magistrate), Kargil in his communication dated 12.07.2023 to the Chief
Electoral Oﬃcer, Union Territory of Ladakh, the same at best was only
advisory but not binding as it is for the Election Authority of the Union
Territory of Ladakh to independently consider such request.

9. He submitted that none of the candidates, who have ﬁlled up and
submitted their nomination forms, have either sought the Plough symbol
or indicated in the relevant column that they were candidates of R1 and on
this score alone, at this stage, R1 was not entitled to any indulgence by this
Court.
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 77
NATIONAL CONFERENCE [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]

10. He summed up his arguments by stating that, as of now1, the process
of elections had already been set in motion. Learned ASG pointed out that
ﬁling of the nomination forms had begun from 16.08.2023 and reached
the penultimate stage since the last date of withdrawal of nominations
(26.08.2023) had already elapsed. It was stated that now only polling
remained to be held on 10.09.2023 and in this view of the matter, this Court
may set aside the Impugned Order.
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1:
11. Learned counsel for R1 submitted that the orders of the learned
Single Judge dated 09.08.2023 and the learned Division Bench dated
14.08.2023 are self-speaking and have dealt in detail with the contentions of
the Appellants and the same have been negated on cogent legal and factual
grounds. It was submitted that there should not have been, in the ﬁrst place,
any issue with the Appellants in granting the Plough symbol for the reason
that R1 is the incumbent ruling party in the LAHDC, and was entitled to the
Plough symbol, since the same was neither part of the list of free symbols
nor allotted to any other National or State Party, so recognized, either by
the ECI or by the Election Authority for the Union Territory of Ladakh. It
was submitted that a completely partisan and arbitrary approach had been
adopted by the Appellants in denying their preferred symbol (Plough) for
oblique reasons to deny a level-playing ﬁeld between candidates. It was
further submitted that the Plough symbol was well-known to the electorate
since decades as being exclusively associated with R1, the denial of the same
is clearly intended to cause unjustiﬁed prejudice. It was stated that undue
advantage would accrue to the remaining candidates/parties contesting the
LAHDC elections.
12. He urged the Court to take note of the fact that despite the learned
Single Judge having passed directions well before the commencement of
even the ﬁling of nominations, upheld by the learned Division Bench, which

1 This Court’s order dated 01.09.2023 is quoted for ready reference:
‘Application for impleadment is rejected.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
Judgment reserved.
List the matter for pronouncement on 06.09.2023.’
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

again, was before the starting of the nomination process, and despite there
being a contempt case pending before the learned Single Judge, which was
adjourned on prayer made by the Appellants, citing the pendency of the
present appeal, the Appellants had not complied with the orders of the High
Court. In this backdrop, submitted learned counsel, to take a stand before
this Court that now due to eﬄux of time, no relief can be granted to R1,
was clear dishonest conduct. It was submitted that this Court would not let
a just cause be defeated only because of delay occasioned by the other side
and the Appellants cannot take the advantage of such delay caused by them
to the detriment of R1’s bonaﬁde, legitimate and genuine claim.
13. Learned counsel submitted that allotment of symbols by the
Appellants to the National Parties and free symbols shown in the Notiﬁcation
for the present elections clearly shows that the same are in conformity
with the 1968 Order. Thus, he submitted, the Appellants are precluded
from blowing hot and cold that they cannot and should not be permitted to
selectively, as per their whims and fancies, decide as to which provisions
under the 1968 Order would be applicable and which provisions would not.
It was submitted that a harmonious reading of Paragraphs 9, 10, 10(A) as
also 12 of the 1968 Order would indicate beyond doubt that in the absence
of anything to the contrary, the Appellants were required to be guided by
the 1968 Order in toto, which was also the indication in the letter written
by the ECI to R1 and the same view was taken by the Law Department in
its Legal Opinion to the Appellants.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
14. The relevant Paragraphs of the 1968 Order, attention to which was
drawn by the learned ASG and the learned counsel for R1, are set out below:
“9. Restriction on the allotment of Symbols reserved for State
parties in States where such parties are not recognised.— A symbol
reserved for a State party in any State—
(a) shall not be included in the list of free symbols for any other
State or Union territory, and
(b) shall not be reserved for any other party which subsequently
becomes eligible, on fulﬁlment of the conditions speciﬁed in paragraph
6, for recognition as a State party in any other State:
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 79
NATIONAL CONFERENCE [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]

Provided that nothing contained in clause (b) shall apply in
relation to a political party, for which the Commission has, immediately
before the commencement of the Election Symbols (Reservation and
Allotment) (Amendment) Order, 1997, already reserved the same
symbol which it has also reserved for some oth-er State party or parties
in any other State or States.
10. Concessions to candidates set up by a State party at elections
in other States or Union territories.— If a political party, which is
recognised as a State party in some State or States, sets up a candidate
at an election in a constituency in any other State in which it is not a
recognised State party, then such candidate may, to the exclusion of all
other candidates in the constituency, be allotted the symbol reserved
for that party in the State or States in which it is a recognised State
Party, notwithstanding that such symbol is not speciﬁed in the list of
free symbols for such other State or Union territory, on the fulﬁlment
of each of the following conditions, namely:—
(a) that an application is made to the Commission by the said
party for exclusive allotment of that symbol to the candidate set up
by it, not later than the third day after the publication in the Oﬃcial
Gazette of the notiﬁcation calling the election;
(b) that the said candidate has made a declaration in his
nomination paper that he has been set up by that party at the election
and that the party has also fulﬁlled the requirements of clauses (b),
(c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 13 read with paragraph 13A in respect
of such candidate; and
(c) that in the opinion of the Commission there is no reasonable
ground for refusing the application for such allotment: Provided that
nothing contained in this paragraph shall apply to a candidate set up
by a State party at an election in any constituency in a State in which
that party is not a State Party and where the same symbol is already
reserved for some other State Party in that State.
10A. Concession to candidates set up by an unrecognized party
which was earlier recognized as a National or State party.– If a
political party, which is un-recognized at present but was a recognized
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

National or State party in any State or Union territory not earlier
than six years from the date of notiﬁcation of the election, sets up
a candidate at an election in a constituency in any State or Un-ion
territory, whether such party was earlier recognized in that State or
Union territory or not, then such candidate may, to the exclusion of all
other candidates in the constituency, be allotted the symbol reserved
earlier for that party when it was a recognized National or State party,
notwithstanding that such symbol is not speciﬁed in the list of free
symbols for such State or Union territory, on the fulﬁllment of each
of the following conditions, namely:––
(a) that an application is made to the Commission by the said
party for the exclusive allotment of that symbol to the candidate set up
by it, not later than the third day after the publication in the Oﬃcial
Gazette of the notiﬁcation calling the election;
(b) that the said candidate has made a declaration in his
nomination paper that he has been set up by that party at the election
and that the party has also fulﬁlled the requirements of clauses (b),
(c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 13 read with paragraph 13A in respect
of such candidate; and
(c) that in the opinion of the Commission there is no reasonable
ground for refusing the application for such allotment:
Provided that nothing contained in this paragraph shall apply to
a candidate set up by the said party at an election in any constituency
in a State or Union territory where the same symbol is already reserved
for some other National or State party in that State or Union Territory.
xxx
12. Choice of symbols by other candidates and allotment
thereof.—(1) Any candidate at an election in a constituency in any
State or Union territory, other than—
(a) a candidate set up by a National Party; or
(b) a candidate set up by a political party which is a State Party
in that State; or
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 81
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(c) a candidate referred to in paragraph 10 or paragraph 10A;
shall choose, and shall be allotted, in accordance with the provisions
hereafter set out in this paragraph, one of the symbols speciﬁed as
free symbols for that State or Union territory by notiﬁcation under
paragraph 17.
(2) Where any free symbol has been chosen by only one candidate
at such election, the returning oﬃcer shall allot that symbol to that
candidate and to no one else.
(3) Where the same free symbol has been chosen by several
candidates at such election, then—
(a) if of those several candidates, only one is a candidate
set up by an unrecognised political party and all the rest are
independent candidates, the returning oﬃcer shall allot that free
symbol to the candidate set up by the unrecognised political party,
and to no one else; and, if, those several candidates, two or more
are set up by diﬀerent unrecognised political parties and the rest
are independent candidates, the returning oﬃcer shall decide by
lot to which of the two or more candidates set up by the diﬀerent
unrecognised political parties that free symbol shall be allotted,
and allot that free symbol to the candidate on whom the lot falls,
and to no one else:
Provided that where of the two or more such candidates set up
by such diﬀerent unrecognized political parties, only one is, or was,
immediately before such election, a sitting member of the House of the
People, or, as the case may be, of the Legislative Assembly (irrespective
of the fact as to whether he was allotted that free symbol or any other
symbol at the previous election when he was chosen as such member),
the returning oﬃcer shall allot that free symbol to that candidate, and
to no one else;
(b) if, of those several candidates, no one is set up by any
unrecognised political party and all the independent candidates, but
one of the independent candidates is, or was, immediately before such
election a sitting member of the House of the People, or, as the case
may be, of the legislative Assembly, and was allot-ted that free symbol
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

at the previous election when he was chosen as such member, the
Returning Oﬃcer shall allot that free symbol to that candidate, and
to no one else; and
(c) if, of those several candidates, being all independent
candidates, no one is, or was, a sitting member as aforesaid, the
returning oﬃcer shall decide by lot to which of those independent
candidates that free symbol shall be allotted, and allot that free
symbol to the candidates on whom the lot falls, and to no one else.”
15. Sections 12 and 13 of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill
Development Councils Act, 19972 (hereinafter referred to as the
“1997 Act”) read as under:
“12. Disputes regarding elections. – (1) No election shall be
called in question except by an election petition presented in such
manner as may be prescribed and before such authority as may be
appointed by Government, from time to time, by notiﬁcation in the
Government Gazette:
Provided that no person below the rank of a District Judge
shall be appoint-ed for the purpose of this section.
(2) No election shall be called in question except on any one
or more of the following grounds, namely: –
(a) that on the date of his election the returned candidate was
not qualiﬁed or was disqualiﬁed, to be chosen to ﬁll the seat in the
Council;
(b) that a corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the
consent of the returned candidate or his election agent.
Explanation: — For the purposes of this section “corrupt
practice” shall mean any of the corrupt practices speciﬁed in section
132 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act,
1957;

2 This repealed The Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1995
(President’s Act No.1 of 1995).
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 83
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(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected;
(d) that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the
returned candidate has been materially aﬀected–
(i) by any improper acceptance of any nomination; or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interest of the returned
candidate by an agent other than his election agent; or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote; or
(iv) by the reception of any vote which is void; or
(v) by any non-compliance with provisions of this Act or of any rules
or orders made thereunder.
(3) At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the
authority appoint-ed under sub-section (1) shall make an order–
(a) dismissing the election petition; or
(b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates
to be void; or
(c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates
to be void and the petitioner or any other candidates to have been
duly elected.
(4) If a petitioner in addition to calling in question the election of
a returned candidate makes a declaration that he himself or any other
candidate has been duly elected and the authority under sub-section
(1) is of opinion that–
(a) in fact the petitioner or such other candidate has received
the majority of valid votes; or
(b) but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate by corrupt
practice the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained
the majority of the valid votes,
the authority as aforesaid shall, after declaring the election of
the returned candidate to be void declare the petitioner or such other
candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected.
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

13. Procedure for election disputes. – The procedure provided
in the Code of Civil Procedure, Samvat 1977 in regard to suits shall
be followed by the authori-ty appointed under section 12 as far as it
can be made applicable in the trial and disposal of an election petition
under this Act.”
16. It requires no reiteration that the powers of this Court and the
High Courts vested under the Constitution cannot be abridged, excluded or
taken away, being part of the Basic Structure of our Constitution. Reference
need only be made to decisions in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalvaru v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Nehru
Gandhi v Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; Minerva Mills Ltd. v Union of
India, (1980) 3 SCC 625; L Chandra Kumar v Union of India, (1997) 3
SCC 261 and more recently, to Kalpana Mehta v Union of India, (2018)
7 SCC 1 and Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC
1, all of which were rendered by a Bench of 5 or more learned Judges.
Section 12 of the 1997 Act need not detain us. Insofar as Section 13 of the
1997 Act is concerned, it is by now too well-settled that the availability of
alternative eﬃcacious remedy is no bar to the exercise of high prerogative
writ jurisdiction, in the light of various decisions, including but not limited
to, State of Uttar Pradesh v Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595; Madhya
Pradesh State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. v Jahan
Khan, (2007) 10 SCC 88; Maharashtra Chess Association v Union of
India, (2020) 13 SCC 285. Even on the anvil of Radha Krishan Industries
v State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771, Section 13 of the 1997
Act does not, and cannot, impede a Constitutional Court from proceeding
further. We do not wish to multiply established authorities on the point but
would add the very recent Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v Excise and Taxation
Oﬃcer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95 to the list
enumerated above.
17. At the threshold, it is noted that the ECI deals with the conduct of
elections to the Parliament, the State Legislative Assemblies and the State
Legislative Councils. The Union Territory of Ladakh does not currently have
a Legislative Assembly. The last election to the Parliamentary constituency
was held in the year 2019. That said, ﬁrst things ﬁrst. The Legal Opinion
by the Law Department remains internal advice, and advice alone, and as
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 85
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such, the learned ASG was correct in contending that the same would not
create/confer any right in favour of R1. In Mahadeo v Sovan Devi, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 1118 (where one of us, Vikram Nath, J. was part of the
coram), the Court, after considering various case-laws, held that “It is
well settled that inter-departmental communications are in the process of
consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis
to claim any right. …”
18. In Kalpana Mehta (supra), Hon. Dipak Misra, C.J.I., with whom
4 learned Judges concurred, stated:
“40. While focussing on the exercise of the power of judicial
review, it has to be borne in mind that the source of authority is the
Constitution of India. The Court has the adjudicating authority to
scrutinise the limits of the power and transgression of such limits.
The nature and scope of judicial review has been succinctly stated in
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [Union of India v. Raghub-ir Singh,
(1989) 2 SCC 754] by R.S. Pathak, C.J. thus : (SCC p. 766, para 7)
“7. … The range of judicial review recognised in the superior
judiciary of India is perhaps the widest and the most extensive known
to the world of law. … With this impressive expanse of judicial power,
it is only right that the superior courts in India should be conscious of
the enormous responsibility which rest on them. This is specially true
of the Supreme Court, for as the highest Court in the entire judicial
system the law declared by it is, by Article 141 of the Constitution,
binding on all courts within the territory of India.”
And again: (SCC p. 767, para 11)
“11. Legal compulsions cannot be limited by existing legal
propositions, be-cause there will always be, beyond the frontiers of the
existing law, new areas inviting judicial scrutiny and judicial choice-
making which could well aﬀect the validity of existing legal dogma.
The search for solutions responsive to a changed social era involves
a search not only among competing propositions of law, or competing
versions of a legal proposition, or the modalities of an inde-terminacy
such as “fairness” or “reasonableness”, but also among propositions
from outside the ruling law, corresponding to the empirical knowledge
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

or ac-cepted values of present time and place, relevant to the dispensing
of justice within the new parameters.”
The aforesaid two passages lay immense responsibility on
the Court pertain-ing to the exercise of the power keeping in view
the accepted values of the pre-sent. An organic instrument requires
the Court to draw strength from the spirit of the Constitution. The
propelling element of the Constitution commands the reali-sation of
the values. The aspiring dynamism of the interpretative process also
expects the same.
41.This Court has the constitutional power and the authority
to interpret the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory
provisions. The conferment of the power of judicial review has a great
sanctity as the constitutional court has the power to declare any law as
unconstitutional if there is lack of competence of the legislature keeping
in view the ﬁeld of legislation as provided in the Constitution or if a
provision contravenes or runs counter to any of the fundamental rights
or any constitutional provision or if a provision is manifestly arbitrary.
42. When we speak about judicial review, it is also necessary
to be alive to the concept of judicial restraint. The duty of judicial
review which the Constitution has bestowed upon the judiciary is not
unfettered; it comes within the conception of judicial restraint. The
principle of judicial restraint requires that Judges ought to decide cases
while being within their deﬁned limits of power. Judges are expected
to interpret any law or any provision of the Constitution as per the
limits laid down by the Constitution.
43. In S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand [S.C. Chandra v. State
of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897] , it has
been ruled that the judiciary should exercise restraint and ordinarily
should not encroach into the legislative domain. In this regard, a
reference to a three-Judge Bench decision in Suresh Seth v. Indore
Municipal Corpn. [Suresh Seth v. Indore Municipal Corpn., (2005)
13 SCC 287] is quite instructive. In the said case, a prayer was made
before this Court to issue directions for appropriate amendment in the
M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Repelling the submission, the
Court held that it is purely a matter of policy which is for the elected
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 87
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representatives of the people to decide and no directions can be issued
by the Court in this regard. The Court further observed that this Court
cannot issue directions to the legislature to make any particular kind of
enactment. In this context, the Court held that under our constitutional
scheme, Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign
power to enact law and no outside power or authority can issue a
direction to enact a particular kind of legislation. While so holding, the
Court referred to the decision in Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India [Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v.
Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] wherein it
was held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular
law and similarly when an executive authority exercises a legislative
power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated
authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to
enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated
authority.
44. Recently, in Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy [Census
Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC 796 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)
589] , the Court, after referring to Premium Granites v. State of T.N.
[Premium Granites v. State of T.N., (1994) 2 SCC 691] , M.P. Oil
Extraction v. State of M.P.[M.P. Oil Extrac-tion v. State of M.P., (1997)
7 SCC 592] , State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao An-dolan [State of M.P.
v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ)
875] and State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga [State of Punjab v.
Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 4 SCC 117 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1021] ,
held : (R. Krishnamurthy case [Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy,
(2015) 2 SCC 796 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 589] , SCC p. 809, para 33)
“33. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is clear as
noonday that it is not within the domain of the courts to embark
upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise and
acceptable or whether a better policy could be evolved. The court
can only interfere if the policy framed is absolutely capri-cious or
not informed by reasons or totally arbitrary and founded ipse dixit
of-fending the basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In
certain mat-ters, as often said, there can be opinions and opinions
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

but the court is not ex-pected to sit as an appellate authority on an
opinion.”
45. At this juncture, we think it apt to clearly state that the judicial
restraint cannot and should not be such that it amounts to judicial
abdication and judicial passivism. The Judiciary cannot abdicate the
solemn duty which the Constitution has placed on its shoulders i.e. to
protect the fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under Part
III of the Constitution. The constitutional courts cannot sit in oblivion
when fundamental rights of individuals are at stake. Our Constitu-
tion has conceived the constitutional courts to act as defenders
against illegal in-trusion of the fundamental rights of individuals.
The Constitution, under its aegis, has armed the constitutional courts
with wide powers which the courts should exercise, without an iota of
hesitation or apprehension, when the fundamental rights of individuals
are in jeopardy. Elucidating on the said aspect, this Court inVirendra
Singh v. State of U.P. [Virendra Singhv. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 447]
has observed : (AIR p. 454, para 34)
“34. … We have upon us the whole armour of the Constitution and
walk from henceforth in its enlightened ways, wearing the breastplate of its
protecting pro-visions and ﬂashing the ﬂaming sword of its inspiration.”
46. While interpreting fundamental rights, the constitutional
courts should remember that whenever an occasion arises, the courts
have to adopt a liberal approach with the object to infuse lively spirit
and vigour so that the fundamental rights do not suﬀer. When we say
so, it may not be understood that while interpreting fundamental rights,
the constitutional courts should altogether depart from the doctrine
of precedents but it is the obligation of the constitutional courts to act
as sentinel on the qui vive to ardently guard the fundamental rights of
individuals bestowed upon by the Constitution. The duty of this Court,
in this con-text, has been aptly described in K.S. Srinivasan v. Union
of India [K.S. Srinivasan v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 419] wherein
it was stated : (AIR p. 433, para 50)
“50. … All I can see is a man who has been wronged and I can see
a plain way out. I would take it.”
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 89
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47. Such an approach applies with more zeal in case of Article 32 of
the Constitution which has been described by Dr B.R. Ambedkar as “the
very soul of the Constitution — the very heart of it — the most important
Article”. Article 32 enjoys special status and, therefore, it is incumbent
upon this Court, in matters under Article 32, to adopt a progressive
attitude. This would be in consonance with the duty of this Court under
the Constitution, that is, to secure the inalienable fundamental rights of
individuals.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. The observations afore-referred are in perfect sync with what is
expected of Constitutional Courts. They are not restricted only to Articles 32
or 226 of the Constitution but lay down a talisman of sorts.
20. The learned ASG also submitted that the Appellants were entitled to
take an independent decision. This goes against their stand before the learned
Division Bench. If we were to agree with this, the obvious import, then,
would be that the Appellants were required to take a decision independently.
As noted in Paragraphs 5 and 11 of the Impugned Judgment, the Appellants
contended that the ECI was the competent authority to allot symbols and
not the Election Authority. What then was the reason for the Appellants to
shift stands? When read in conjunction with the ﬁnding at Paragraph 13 of
the Impugned Judgment the Appellants’ acts leave no shred of doubt in our
minds, that circumstances forcing this Court to intercede have arisen. Let
us for a moment, however, consider that the Appellants, as now sought to
be projected, were entitled to arrive at an independent decision. Yet, such
decision could not be whimsical, arbitrary or capricious. It would necessarily
have to be: (a) in accordance with lawful discretion; (b) reasonable, and; (c)
equitable and just. The Court would indicate that a genuine request, in the
attendant facts, could not have been turned down only on the ground that
there was no provision for the same, when such request could be acceded to
(i) without any violation of law, and; (ii) is within the jurisdictional domain
and capacity of the authority concerned, and; (iii) does not prejudice any
other stakeholder, and; (iv) does not militate against public interest.
21. The High Court, being a Constitutional Court, is not, by any stretch
of imagination, precluded from issuing a direction of the nature issued by it
in the instant case, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

when such direction does not violate any statutory provision. In High Court
of Tripura v Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee, (2019) 16 SCC 663, this Court
had answered, in the aﬃrmative, as to the power of the High Courts under
Article 226 to direct for actions, in a rare and exceptional situation, which
do not ﬁnd mention in the provisions concerned. Noticing and relying upon
High Court of Tripura (supra), in Aish Mohammad v State of Haryana,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 736, we held:
“24. Moreover, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) found no
ground to interfere with the adverse remarks yet granted liberty to the
appellant to move for expunction thereof. The learned Civil Court erred
in assuming that it had the power to do so, in the absence of any such
provision in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. There may be cases where
a High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India
or this Court in exercise of its constitutional powers may speciﬁcally
direct for fresh consideration of a representation, even in the absence of
speciﬁc provisions. In High Court of Tripura v. Tirtha Sarathi Mukher-jee,
(2019) 16 SCC 663, the question that arose was whether, in the absence
of a statutory provision, a writ petitioner could seek re-evaluation of
examination an-swer scripts? Answering, this Court held:
“20. The question however arises whether even if there
is no legal right to demand re-valuation as of right could there
arise circumstances which leave the Court in any doubt at all. A
grave injustice may be occasioned to a writ applicant in certain
circumstances. The case may arise where even though there is no
provision for re-valuation it turns out that despite giving the correct
answer no marks are awarded. No doubt this must be conﬁned to a
case where there is no dispute about the correctness of the answer.
Further, if there is any doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favour
of the examining body rather than in favour of the candidate. The
wide power under Article 226 may continue to be available even
though there is no provision for re-valuation in a situation where
a candidate despite having giving correct answer and about which
there cannot be even the slightest manner of doubt, he is treated as
having given the wrong answer and consequently the candidate is
found disentitled to any marks.
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 91
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21. Should the second circumstance be demonstrated to be
present before the writ court, can the writ court become helpless
despite the vast reservoir of power which it possesses? It is one thing
to say that the absence of provision for re-valuation will not enable
the candidate to claim the right of evaluation as a matter of right and
another to say that in no circumstances whatsoever where there is no
provision for re-valuation will the writ court exercise its undoubted
constitutional powers? We reiterate that the situation can only be ra-
re and exceptional.”
(emphasis supplied)”
(emphasis supplied by us via bolding)
22. Elections to any oﬃce/body are required to be free, fair and transparent.
Elections lie at the core of democracy. The authority entrusted by law to hold/
conduct such elections is to be completely independent of any extraneous
inﬂuence/consideration. It is surprising that the Union Territory of Ladakh
not only denied R1 the Plough symbol, but even upon timely intervention by
the learned Single Judge, has left no stone unturned not only to resist but also
frustrate a cause simply by eﬄux of time.
23. A detailed dive into the sequence of events is apposite. R1 was before
the concerned authorities, by way of representation, well in time, and much
before even the Notiﬁcation dated 02/05.08.2023 was published, by impugning
the Notiﬁcation dated 26.07.2023 which denied it the Plough symbol. R1 had
moved the ECI, which opined, by way of communication dated 18.07.2023
that the ECI does not allocate any symbol for local body elections as the same
falls within the domain of the State Election Commission concerned. The
ECI stated that as there is no Legislative Assembly in the Union Territory of
Ladakh and the 1968 Order does not provide for recognition to parties in a
Union Territory without a Legislative Assembly, R1 could not be recognised
in the Union Territory of Ladakh. However, it was further noted that as R1 is a
recognized State Party in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir with its
reserved symbol being the Plough, it could avail concession under Paragraph
103 of the 1968 Order.

3 Already extracted supra.
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

24. On 15.05.2023, the ECI updated its Notiﬁcation dated 23.09.2021
specifying the names of recognised National and State Parties and the list
of free symbols where R1 was again recognised as a State Party, though
for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir only. On 31.05.2023, R1
made a representation to the Appellant No.2 seeking recognition as a State
Party and for the allotment of the Plough symbol to it for all elections in the
Union Territory of Ladakh. Appellant No.2 forwarded the said representation
to Appellant No.3 for comments. On 07.06.2023, Appellant No.3 advised
Appellant No.2 to approach the ECI. On 08.06.2023, R1 sought recognition
as a State Party in the Union Territory of Ladakh and allotment of the Plough
symbol.
25. On 07.07.2023, R1 represented to Appellant No.2 seeking
recognition as a State Party in the Union Territory of Ladakh with the Plough
symbol. Appellant No.2 forwarded the said representation to Appellant No.3
on 11.07.2023 and sought comments thereon. On 12.07.2023, Appellant
No.3 wrote to Appellant No.2, incorporating the opinion of the Law
Department, which was in favour of R1. Appellant No.3 indicated that R1
can be recognised and provided reserved symbol for LAHDC elections by
the Administration of Union Territory of Ladakh under the relevant rules.
26. No action was taken and no order was passed pursuant to Appellant
No.3’s communication dated 12.07.2023 to Appellant No.2. Then, the
Election Department of the Union Territory of Ladakh issued a Notiﬁcation
on 26.07.2023 notifying the list of reserved and free symbols, in terms of
the ECI’s Notiﬁcation dated 15.05.2023. R1 approached the High Court
on 29.07.2023 challenging the notiﬁcation dated 26.07.2023 and seeking a
mandamus to notify the Plough symbol as its reserved symbol for elections
to LAHDC. The Writ Petition being pending, on 05.08.2023, the Election
Department of the Union Territory of Ladakh notiﬁed the schedule of
elections to constitute the 5th LAHDC, Kargil. In such background, an
interim order came to be passed by the learned Single Judge and aﬃrmed
by the learned Division Bench.
27. This Court notes, with concern, that the Appellants, while sitting
on the representation of R1, went ahead and notiﬁed the elections on
02/05.08.2023. We are unable to appreciate such conduct. This recalcitrance
to decide in time speaks volumes. Instances like these raise serious questions.
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28. Having considered the matter in extenso, the Court does not ﬁnd
any merit in the present appeal. The request for allotment of the Plough
symbol by R1 was bonaﬁde, legitimate and just, for the plain reason that
in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (which included the present
Union Territory of Ladakh), it was a recognized State Party having been
allotted the Plough symbol. Upon bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Jammu
and Kashmir and the creation of two new Union Territories, namely the
Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh,
though the ECI had not notiﬁed R1 as a State Party for the Union Territory
of Ladakh, it cannot be simpliciter that R1 was not entitled for the allotment
of plough symbol to it, in the factual background. What is also clear is that
the Appellants are attempting to approbate and reprobate, which this Court
will not countenance.
29. In the present case, there is no conﬂict with any other stakeholder
for the reason that the Plough symbol is neither a symbol exclusively allotted
to any National or State Party nor one of the symbols shown in the list of
free symbols. Thus, there was and is no impediment in such symbol being
granted to R1. This is also fortiﬁed in the factual setting of the Plough
symbol being the reserved symbol for R1 in the erstwhile State of Jammu
and Kashmir and even for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, as
it now exists, where the same symbol stands allotted to it.
30. The contention of the learned ASG for the Appellants that the
Plough symbol cannot be allotted, neither has been supported by any reason
nor any legal impediment to such grant has been shown. In the absence of
anything contrary in any rule framed for conduct of the elections in question,
relating to allotment of symbols, the provisions of the 1968 Order can safely
be relied upon, at the very least, as a guideline to exercise of executive power
of like nature. Thus, a harmonious reading of Paragraphs 9, 10, 10(A) and
12 would clearly indicate that under the terms of the 1968 Order, the request
of R1 is not bereft of justiﬁcation. At the cost of repetition, the Court would
indicate that nothing substantive has been shown to this Court to indicate
that allotment of the Plough symbol would in any way be an infraction or
go against the public interest.
31. Another major issue canvassed by the learned ASG on behalf of the
Appellants, to the eﬀect that no relief be granted to R1 due to the election
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

process having reached the penultimate stage, unfortunately, has also to be
noted to be rejected. Having chosen, with eyes open, to not comply with
successive orders of the learned Single Judge and the learned Division
Bench, both of which were passed well in time, such as not to stall/delay
the notiﬁed election schedule, the Appellants cannot be permitted to plead
that interference by us at this late juncture should not be forthcoming.
32. The Court would categorically emphasize that no litigant should
have even an iota of doubt or an impression (rather, a misimpression) that
just because of systemic delay or the matter not being taken up by the Courts
resulting in eﬄux of time the cause would be defeated, and the Court would
be rendered helpless to ensure justice to the party concerned. It would not
be out of place to mention that this Court can even turn the clock back,
if the situation warrants such dire measures. The powers of this Court, if
need be, to even restore status quo ante are not in the realm of any doubt.
The relief(s) granted in the lead opinion by Hon. Khehar, J. (as the learned
Chief Justice then was), concurred with by the other 4 learned Judges, in
Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh
Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 is enough on this aspect. We know
full well that a 5-Judge Bench in Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary,
Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607 has referred Nabam
Rebia (supra) to a Larger Bench. However, the questions referred to the
Larger Bench do not detract from the power to bring back status quo ante.
That apart, it is settled that mere reference to a larger Bench does not unsettle
declared law. In Harbhajan Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608,
a 2-Judge Bench said:
“15. Even if what is contended by the learned counsel is correct,
it is not for us to go into the said question at this stage; herein cross-
examination of the witnesses had taken place. The Court had taken
into consideration the materials available to it for the purpose of
arriving at a satisfaction that a case for exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 319 of the Code was made out. Only because the correctness
of a portion of the judgment in Mohd. Shaﬁ [(2007) 14 SCC 544 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : (2007) 4 SCR 1023 : (2007) 5 Scale 611]
has been doubted by another Bench, the same would not mean that
we should wait for the decision of the larger Bench, particularly
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 95
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when the same instead of assisting the appellants runs counter to
their contention.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In Ashok Sadarangani v Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321, another
2-Judge Bench indicated:
“29. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh case [Harbhajan Singh
v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135], the
pendency of a reference to a larger Bench, does not mean that all other
proceedings involving the same issue would remain stayed till a decision
was rendered in the reference. The reference made in Gian Singh case
[(2010) 15 SCC 118] need not, there-fore, detain us. Till such time as the
decisions cited at the Bar are not modiﬁed or altered in any way, they
continue to hold the ﬁeld.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. On the other hand, when it was thought proper that other Benches of
this Court, the High Courts and the Courts/Tribunals below stay their hands,
the same was indicated in as many words, as was the case in State of Haryana
v G D Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited, (2018) 3 SCC 5854 :
“9. Taking all this into consideration, we are of the opinion that
it would be appropriate if in the interim and pending a ﬁnal decision
on making a reference (if at all) to a larger Bench, the High Courts
be requested not to deal with any cases relating to the interpretation
of or concerning Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013. The Secretary General will urgently communicate this order to the
Registrar General of every High Court so that our request is complied with.
10. Insofar as the cases pending in this Court are concerned, we
request the Benches concerned dealing with similar matters to defer the
hearing until a deci-sion is rendered one way or the other on the issue
whether the matter should be referred to a larger Bench or not. Apart from

4 The reference was eventually answered in Indore Development Authority v
Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129.
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

anything else, deferring the con-sideration would avoid inconvenience to
the litigating parties, whether it is the State or individuals.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. We are seeing before us judgments and orders by High Courts not
deciding cases on the ground that the leading judgment of this Court on this
subject is either referred to a larger Bench or a review petition relating thereto
is pending. We have also come across examples of High Courts refusing
deference to judgments of this Court on the score that a later Coordinate
Bench has doubted its correctness. In this regard, we lay down the position
in law. We make it absolutely clear that the High Courts will proceed to
decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It is not open, unless
speciﬁcally directed by this Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a
review petition, as the case may be. It is also not open to a High Court to
refuse to follow a judgment by stating that it has been doubted by a later
Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced with conﬂicting judgments by
Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier one which is to
be followed by the High Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench in National
Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 6805 . The
High Courts, of course, will do so with careful regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.
36. We are conscious that, by way of certain pronouncements, some
of which are alluded to in this judgment, the Court extended principles
relating to elections to Parliament, State Assemblies and Municipalities to
other arenas as well. Indicatively, the interpretation of judgments is always
to be made with due regard to the facts and circumstances of the peculiar
case concerned6. We have looked at Articles 243-O, 243ZG and 329 of the
Constitution, and conclude that no bar hit the High Court, even on principle.
Apart from the judgments expressly considered and dealt with, hereinbefore
and hereinafter, we have perused, out of our own volition, the decisions,
inter alia, of varying Bench-strength of this Court in N P Ponnuswami
v Returning Oﬃcer, Namakkal Constituency, 1952 SCR 2187; Durga

5 See Paragraphs 27 and 28 in the report on this point.
6 Sanjay Dubey v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 INSC 519 @ Paragraph 18.
7 Where the Court held that “The discussion in this passage makes it clear that the word
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 97
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Shankar Mehta v Thakur Raghuraj Singh, (1955) 1 SCR 267; Hari Vishnu
Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104; Narayan Bhaskar
Khare (Dr) v Election Commission of India, 1957 SCR 1081; Mohinder
Singh Gill v Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Lakshmi
Charan Sen v A K M Hassan Uzzaman, (1985) 4 SCC 689; Indrajit Barua
v Election Commission of India, (1985) 4 SCC 722; Election Commission
of India v Shivaji, (1988) 1 SCC 277; Digvijay Mote v Union of India,
(1993) 4 SCC 1758 ; Boddula Krishnaiah v State Election Commissioner,
Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 3 SCC 416; Anugrah Narain Singh v State of
Uttar Pradesh, (1996) 6 SCC 303; Election Commission of India v Ashok
Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216; Kishansing Tomar v Municipal Corporation,
Ahmedabad, (2006) 8 SCC 352; West Bengal State Election Commission
v Communist Party of India (Marxist), (2018) 18 SCC 141; Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam v State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 6 SCC 548; Laxmibai
v Collector, (2020) 12 SCC 186, and last but not the least, State of Goa v
Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, (2021) 8 SCC 4019. On scrutiny, in combination
with the timelines and facts of the matter herein, we are sure that the High
Court did not falter.
37. We would indicate that the restraint, self-imposed, by the Courts
as a general principle, laid out in some detail in some of the decisions
supra, in election matters to the extent that once a notiﬁcation is issued
and the election process starts, the Constitutional Courts, under normal
circumstances are loath to interfere, is not a contentious issue. But where
issues crop up, indicating unjust executive action or an attempt to disturb
a level-playing ﬁeld between candidates and/or political parties with no
justiﬁable or intelligible basis, the Constitutional Courts are required, nay
they are duty-bound, to step in. The reason that the Courts have usually

“election” can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process
which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have
an important bearing on the result of the process.”, with respect to Article 329(b) of
the Constitution.
8 Where, apropos Article 324 powers of the ECI, this Court held “However, it has to be
stated this power is not unbridled. Judicial review will still be permissible, over the
statutory body exercising its functions aﬀecting public law rights.”
9 Where the learned 3-Judge Bench has considered a catena of the precedents relevant
to the issue(s) before it.
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

maintained a hands-oﬀ approach is with the sole salutary objective of
ensuring that the elections, which are a manifestation of the will of the
people, are taken to their logical conclusion, without delay or dilution
thereof. In the context of providing appropriate succour to the aggrieved
litigant at the appropriate time 10, the learned Single Judge acted rightly.
In all fairness, we must note that the learned ASG, during the course of
arguments, did not contest the power per se of the High Court to issue
the directions it did, except that the same amounted to denying the
Appellants their discretion. As stated hereinbefore, we are satisﬁ ed that
in view of the 1968 Order, the Appellants’ discretion was not unbridled,
and rather, it was guided by the 1968 Order.
38. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge, further expounded
by the learned Division Bench, leaves no doubt that the relief sought by
R1 was required to be granted and, accordingly, the same was granted by
the High Court. The stark factor which stares us in the face is that well
before and well in time, by way of the writ petition, R1 had approached
the Court of ﬁrst instance (the learned Single Judge), for the reliefs, which
have been found due to them ultimately, and upheld by the Appellate
Court (the learned Division Bench). It is the Appellants, who by virtue of
sheer non-compliance of the High Court’s orders, be it noted, without any
stay, can alone be labelled responsible for the present imbroglio. These
stark facts cannot be broadly equated with other hypothetical scenarios,
wherein the facts may warrant a completely hands-oﬀ approach.
39. This case constrains the Court to take note of the broader
aspect of the lurking danger of authorities concerned using their powers
relating to elections arbitrarily and thereafter, being complacent, rather
over-conﬁdent, that the Courts would not interfere. The misconceived
notion being that in the ultimate eventuate, after elections are over,
when such decisions/actions are challenged, by sheer passage of time,
irreversible consequences would have occurred, and no substantive relief
could be fashioned is just that – misconceived. However, conduct by
authorities as exhibited herein may seriously compel the Court to have
a comprehensive re-think, as to whether the self-imposed restrictions

10 B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413 @ Paragraph 50.
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 99
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may need a more liberal interpretation, to ensure that justice is not
only done but also seen to be done, and done in time to nip in the bud
any attempted misadventure. We refrain from further comment on the
Appellants, noting the pendency of the contempt proceeding.
40. As made clear by us in the foregoing paragraphs, the situation
emanating herein is, in a manner of speaking, unprecedented. With a
sense of anguish, it would not be wrong to say that the instant judgment
has been invited upon themselves by the Appellants. The orders of the
High Court, in our considered opinion, were in aid of the electoral
process, and no fault can be found therewith.
41. The learned ASG’s submission that nobody representing R1 had
ﬁled his/her nomination form, by the last date notiﬁed, is inapposite,
inasmuch as in the position existing, no candidate/representative aﬃliated
with R1 could have ﬁlled up the form as the Plough symbol was neither
a reserved symbol nor a free symbol, and thus, could not have been
opted for by any candidate when ﬁling the nomination form. The serious
consequence was that R1’s identity as a political party was eclipsed,
right before the election to the LAHDC, where it was the incumbent
party in power.
42. This Court has previously bestowed consideration on the
importance of the symbol in an electoral system, especially one allotted
to a political party. Taking note of the 3-Judge Bench decision in Shri
Sadiq Ali v Election Commission of India, New Delhi, (1972) 4 SCC
664, another Bench of 3 learned Judges in All Party Hill Leaders’
Conference, Shillong v Captain W A Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161 put
it thus:
“29. For the purpose of holding elections, allotment of symbol
will ﬁnd a prime place in a country where illiteracy is still very
high. It has been found from experience that symbol as a device
for casting votes in favour of a candidate of one’s choice has
proved an invaluable aid. Apart from this, just as people devel-
op a sense of honour, glory and patriotic pride for a ﬂag of one’s
country, simi-larly great fervour and emotions are generated for
a symbol representing a po-litical party. This is particularly so in
a parliamentary democracy which is con-ducted on party lines.
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

People after a time identify themselves with the symbol and the
ﬂag. These are great unifying insignia which cannot all of a sudden,
be eﬀacced.11”
(emphasis supplied)
43. Placing reliance on Shri Sadiq Ali (supra), a 2-Judge Bench
summed up as under, in Edapaddi K Palaniswami v TTV Dhinakaran,
(2019) 18 SCC 219:
“39. We say so because the eﬃcacy of having a common
symbol for a polit-ical group has been underscored in Sadiq Ali v.
Election Commissionof India [Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of
India, (1972) 4 SCC 664] . In para 21 of the said judgment, this Court
observed thus : (SCC pp. 674-75)
“21. … It is well known that overwhelming majority of the
electorate are il-literate. It was realised that in view of the handicap
of illiteracy, it might not be possible for the illiterate voters to cast
their votes in favour of the candidate of their choice unless there
was some pictorial representation on the ballot paper itself whereby
such voters might identify the candidate of their choice. Symbols were
accordingly brought into use. Symbols or emblems are not a peculiar
fea-ture of the election law of India. … The object is to ensure that
the process of election is as genuine and fair as possible and that no
elector should suﬀer from any handicap in casting his vote in favour
of a candidate of his choice. Alt-hough the purpose which accounts
for the origin of symbols was of a limited character, the symbol of
each political party with the passage of time acquired a great value
because the bulk of the electorate associated the political party at
the time of elections with its symbol. …”
(emphasis supplied)
And again in paras 40 and 41 it is observed thus : (Sadiq Ali case
[Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664] , p. 682)

11 Maintained as appearing in the SCC version available on SCC OnLine; should be read
as ‘eﬀaced’.
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 101
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“40. … It would, therefore, follow that Commission has been
clothed with plenary powers by the abovementioned Rules in the
matter of allotment of sym-bols. … If the Commission is not to be
disabled from exercising eﬀectively the plenary powers vested in it
in the matter of allotment of symbols and for issuing directions in
connection therewith, it is plainly essential that the Commission should
have the power to settle a dispute in case claim for the allotment of the
symbol of a political party is made by two rival claimants. … Para 15
is intended to eﬀectuate and subserve the main purposes and objects of
the Symbols Order. The paragraph is designed to ensure that because
of a dispute having arisen in a political party between two or more
groups, the entire scheme of the Symbols Order relating to the allotment
of a symbol reserved for the political party is not set at naught. …
The Commission is an authority created by the Constitution and
according to Article 324, the superintendence, direction and control
of the elec-toral rolls for and the conduct of elections to Parliament
and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the oﬃce of
President and Vice-President shall be vested in the Commission. The
fact that the power of resolving a dispute be-tween two rival groups
for allotment of symbol of a political party has been vest-ed in such
a high authority would raise a presumption, though rebuttable, and
provide a guarantee, though not absolute but to a considerable extent,
that the power would not be misused but would be exercised in a fair
and reasonable manner.
41. … Article 324 as mentioned above provides that
superintendence, direc-tion and control of elections shall be vested
in Election Commission. …”
(emphasis supplied)
40. This decision in Sadiq Ali [Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission
of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664] has been followed in Kanhiya Lal Omar
v. R.K. Trivedi [Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628]
and in para 10 thereof, the Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 635-36)
“10. It is true that till recently the Constitution did not expressly
refer to the existence of political parties. But their existence is
implicit in the nature of democratic form of Government which
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 12 S.C.R.

our country has adopted. The use of a symbol, be it a donkey or an
elephant, does give rise to a unifying eﬀect amongst the people with
a common political and economic programme and ultimately helps
in the establishment of a Westminster type of democracy which we
have adopted with a Cabinet responsible to the elected representatives
of the people who constitute the Lower House. The political parties
have to be there if the present system of Government should succeed
and the chasm dividing the political parties should be so profound that
a change of administration would in fact be a revolution disguised
under a constitutional procedure. It is no doubt a paradox that while
the country as a whole yields to no other in its corporate sense of unity
and continuity, the working parts of its political system are so organised
on party basis — in other words, “on systematised differences
and unresolved conﬂicts”. That is the essence of our system and it
facilitates the setting up of a Government by the majority. Although
till recently the Constitution had not expressly referred to the existence
of political parties, by the amendments made to it by the Constitution
(Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 there is now a clear recognition
of the political parties by the Constitution. The Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution which is added by the above Amending Act acknowledges
the existence of political parties and sets out the circumstances when a
member of Parliament or of the State Legislature would be deemed to
have defected from his political party and would thereby be disqualiﬁed
for being a member of the House concerned. Hence it is diﬃcult to say
that the reference to recognition, registration, etc. of political parties
by the Symbols Order is unauthorised and against the political system
adopted by our country.”
(emphasis supplied)”
(emphasis supplied by us via bolding)
44. For reasons aforesaid, the entire election process, initiated pursuant to
Notiﬁcation dated 02.08.2023 issued by the Administration of Union Territory
of Ladakh, Election Department, UT Secretariat, Ladakh, under S.O.53
published vide No.Secy/Election/2023/290-301 dated 05.08.2023 stands set
aside. A fresh Notiﬁcation shall be issued within seven days from today for
elections to constitute the 5th Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council,
UNION TERRITORY OF LADAKH v. JAMMU AND KASHMIR 103
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Kargil. R1 is declared entitled to the exclusive allotment of the Plough symbol
for candidates proposed to be put up by it.
45. Accordingly, this appeal stands dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh) to be deposited in the Supreme Court Advocates on Record
Welfare Fund. The same be done within two weeks, and receipt evincing proof
thereof be ﬁled with the Registry of this Court within a week thereafter. IAs
170883/2023, 170885/2023 and 174512/2023 be treated as formally allowed.
46. Two further consequences ﬂow:
(a) Writ Petition (Civil) No.1933 of 2023 pending at the High Court at
Srinagar is also disposed of in the above terms.
(b) CCP(S) No.340 of 2023, statedly listed next on 08.09.2023 before
the learned Single Judge, survives. The same be proceeded with
expeditiously, in accordance with law, considering the present judgment.

Headnotes prepared by: Appeal dismissed.
Divya Pandey

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