Supreme Court of India
UNIVERSITY OF DELHIversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 1389
- Decided
- 17 December 2019
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the 916‑day delay was not justified by sufficient cause and therefore the appeal was dismissed as time‑barred.
Summary
The University of Delhi challenged the conversion of land acquired for the Delhi Metro project into a residential housing scheme, filing a writ petition that was dismissed for delay and laches. The University later filed a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) 916 days after the writ petition’s disposal, seeking condonation of the delay on the ground of public interest and procedural complexities. The High Court refused to condone the delay, and the University appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the extensive delay could be justified as "sufficient cause" and considered the impact of laches and the accrued rights of the respondents, including DMRC and the private builder. It concluded that the University’s explanations—Vice‑Chancellor vacancy and Executive Council deliberations—were not convincing, and that condoning such a long delay would prejudice the respondents and contravene public interest. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as time‑barred, upholding the lower courts' orders.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of the University of Delhi's explanation for the 916‑day delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal.
- Whether the doctrine of laches applies to both the original writ petition and the subsequent appeal.
- Whether public interest considerations can justify condonation of an inordinate delay.
- Whether the change of land use from public to residential purpose is legally permissible.
- The effect of the accrued rights of the respondents on the decision to condone delay.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI
- Delhi University Act, 1922s. 21
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 5
Subjects
delaylachescondonation of delaylimitationpublic interestland acquisitionchange of land useDelhi Metro Rail Corporationuniversity autonomymaster plan
Judgment
[2019] 16 S.C.R. 1259 1259
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-9489 of 2019)
DECEMBER 17, 2019 B
[R. BANUMATHI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Delay/Laches:
Writ petition – By Delhi University – Challenging change in C
use of the land acquired for Delhi Metro Rail project – Petition
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches – Letters Patent
appeal filed after delay of 916 days – Division Bench dismissed
the appeal, on the ground of delay refusing to condone the delay
– Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: In the facts of the case, the
explanation for the inordinate delay is not convincing as the same D
is not reasonable – Considering the accrued right of the opposite
party, condonation of such delay would be contrary to public
interest – Therefore, writ petition as well as LPA were rightly
dismissed on the ground of delay.
Condonation of delay – Criteria for – Held: By and large a E
liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of
delay – Consideration for condonation of delay would not depend
on the status of the party such as Government or the public body
– Condonaton of long delay should not be automatic – While
considering condonation of delay, routine explanation is not
F
enough, but it should be in the nature of indicating ‘sufficient
cause’ to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of
each case.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. By and large, a liberal approach is to be taken G
in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for
condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party
namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a
different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to
render even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case
the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the H
1259
1260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party
is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while
considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would
not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating
“sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the
backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by
B the Courts based on the fact situation.[Para 20] [1274-H; 1275-
A-C]
2. The delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916
days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only
if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot
C be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire
explanation, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of
limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart
when there is such a long delay and there is no proper
explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as
to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an
D appeal. In addition, there was delay and laches in filing the writ
petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal
had arisen. [Para 21] [1275-E-F]
3. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916
days is twofold, i.e. the non-availability of the Vice- Chancellor
E due to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-
Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive
Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said
process had caused the delay. The reasons, as stated, do not
appear very convincing since the situation was of availing the
appellate remedy and not the original proceedings requiring such
F deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the proceedings
which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant, after due
deliberation. Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor who was at the
helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecuted and
disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office till
G 28.10.2015, for about six months which was a long enough period
as compared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal. In that
circumstance when the said Vice-Chancellor who had prosecuted
the writ petition was available, the submission of the appellant
that unseen hands are likely to have prevented the filing of the
appeal also cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason sought to
H be put forth about the decision required to be taken by the
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1261
Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just the A
matter of filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition an affidavit
was filed referring to Resolution No.56 and 173 of Academic
Council and Executive Council authorising for filing writ
petition. When the writ petition was filed based on such
authorisation and the stand of the appellant, as the writ petitioner
was put forth and had failed in the writ petition, it cannot be B
accepted that the appellant with all the wherewithal was unable
to file the appeal, that too when the same Vice-Chancellor was
available for six months after dismissal of the writ petition.
Hence the reasons put forth cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Para 22] [1275-H; 1276-A-E]
C
4. That apart, the approval from the Executive Council was
obtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the appeal was ultimately
filed on 01.03.2018 after an year from the said date which only
indicates the casual approach which is now sought to be
overcome with the plea of public interest despite there being
no explanation for the delay at every stage. It is true that every D
day’s delay need not be explained with such precision but the
fact remains that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very
much necessary. [Para 23] [1276-F-G]
5. In the present matter, the land was converted to
residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC had E
invited bids and public auction was conducted on 28.07.2008
which ought to have awakened the appellant for the first time
since the fact of conversion of the land into residential
development was in public domain even if is assumed that the
earlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on the approval
F
request of DMRC are internal process and not be known to the
appellant. [Para 26] [1277-E]
6. Despite the writ petition having been filed belatedly in
respect of certain actions which had commenced in the year 2005
and even though the writ petition was filed after obtaining
approval of the Executive Council, no steps were taken to file G
the writ appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition.
In such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and
laches cannot be ignored. [Para 27] [1277-G-H; 1278-A]
7. Though contention is put forth that the delay is required
to be condoned since public interest is involved, the nature of H
1262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A the proceedings that have taken place thus far would indicate
that the matter has been examined at different stages in the
earlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant was
assailing the action of the respondents were to be examined on
merits, they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting
the matter before the Court. [Para 27] [1278-B-C]
B
8. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the
well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the
opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather
than taking note of the hardship that would be caused to
respondent No.13, what is necessary to be taken note is the
C manner in which respondent No.11 – DMRC has proceeded in
the matter. The respondent No.11-DMRC is engaged in
providing the public transport and for the said purpose the
Government through policy decision has granted approval to
generate resources through property development and in that
D regard the development is taken up. Pursuant thereto the
respondent No.11 has received a sum of Rs.218.20 crores from
respondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008. The said
amount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro rail
service to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if at this
stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the
E lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the
matter, it would also be contrary to public interest. [Para 28]
[1278-D-F]
9. Therefore, not only the Single Judge was justified in
holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches
F but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA
on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the
orders do not call for interference. [Para 29] [1278-F-G]
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Katiji
& Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 : [1987] 2 SCR 387 ; M/s
G Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District
Board, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 : [1992] 2
SCR 155 – distinguished.
Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media India
Limited & Anr. (1992) 3 SCC 563 ; Adil Singh v. Union
H of India (2010) 171 DLT 748 – referred to.
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1263
Case Law Reference A
(2010) 171 DLT 748 referred to Para 6
[1987] 2 SCR 387 distinguished Para 17
[1992] 2 SCR 155 distinguished Para 18
(1992) 3 SCC 563 referred to Para 20 B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-
9489 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2018 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.M. No. 8654 of 2018 in L.P.A. No.
C
89 of 2018.
Tushar Mehta, SG, A.N.S. Nadkarni, ASG, Mohan Parasaran,
Ramji Srinivasan, Aman Sinha, Shyam Divan, Gurukrishna Kumar,
R. Venkataramani, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Mohinder Rupal,
Prasanna S., Anurag Ojha, Vishnu Kumar, Shantanu Singh, Pravesh
D
Thakur, Ms. Nupoor Sinha, Goutham Shivshankar Tarun Johri, S.S.
Rebella, Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, D.L. Chidananda, Prabudh Singh, Arvind
Kumar Sharma, Raj Bahadur, Mahesh Agarwal, Abhinav Agrawal,
Anirudh Bhatia, Rohan Talwar, E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Binu Tamta,
Praveen Swarup, Smarhar Singh, Ashutosh Thakur, Advs. for the
appearing parties. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. S. BOPANNA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred by the appellant-University F
of Delhi through its Registrar to challenge the common judgment and
order dated 29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to
condone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to challenge the
judgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the learned Single Judge had
dismissed the W.P (C) No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.
G
3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to the
decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short) who had allowed
respondent no.13-M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd. to construct a high-rise
multistory group housing society in the control zone of Zone-C in the
University campus, without any height restriction. The construction H
1264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A permission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the, “DMRC” for short) by
permitting segregation of 2 hectares as a separate entity from the total
3 hectares of land, acquired for the metro station.
4. The principal contentions of the appellant-University on the
B merits of the challenge were as follows:
a) the permission sought by Respondent No. 13 (namely,
M/s Young Builders Private Limited) for the proposed
construction of a group housing society on the land
originally owned by the Ministry of Defence in the
University enclave is violative of the MPD-2021 and is
C against the larger public interest, given the fact that the
project site in question and its vicinity are within the
North Campus of the University and that it contains
various historical and archaeological buildings, apart
from it being the centre of higher education and
D advanced learning; and
b) the change in the character of the subject land is
impermissible in law, since the land having been acquired
for public purpose for construction of the metro rail
project, has suddenly been diverted to private
commercial use and auctioned to private builder for
E building a group housing society in a manner contrary
to the purpose and charter of incorporation of the Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC)
c) The restriction on certain developments for Metro Station
prescribed under Master Plan of Delhi – 2021 (‘MPD’
F for short) was also a contention raised by the writ
petitioner which imposed ban on construction of high-
rise buildings in the control zone of the Delhi University.
The location of various ladies’ hostels of the University
in close vicinity of the proposed construction site was
highlighted as an important privacy concern. The
G impediment to access of thousands of students, teachers
at the entrance of the University was the other main
contention raised in the writ petition.
5. On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that after
construction of the University Metro Station, 2 hectares of land
H remained surplus and the housing project was intended to generate
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1265
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
revenue for the DMRC as per the policy of the Government. The formal A
application made to the authorities for change of land use and approval
secured for conversion of the land for residential use, was also
highlighted by the DMRC.
6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire sequence
refused to entertain the writ petition of the University including on the B
ground of delay and laches. In the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Court
however observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and
implementation of the Master Plan and, necessary approvals have been
taken from various statutory authorities for the housing project. It was
also observed that the change in the land use from “public” to
“residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High Court’s C
Division Bench Judgment in Adil Singh vs. Union of India (2010) 171
DLT 748. According to the Writ court, since it was a policy decision
taken by the Government body and since the appellant-University has
failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide in the decision
making by the authority, interference of the Court with the policy
D
decision, would not be justified.
7. It is the case of the appellant that following the dismissal of
the writ petition and being concerned about the future use of the subject
land, the University Authorities constituted a Committee to recommend
the appropriate course of action to be taken by the University. The
Committee’s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated to have been laid E
before the Executive Council of the University and after due
consideration of the report and the judgment of the learned Single Judge,
the Executive Council of the University through their resolution dated
28.02.2017/07.03.2017 decided to prefer an intra-Court Appeal in the
High Court.
F
8. While the above deliberations were on, accessibility concern
to the University’s Metro Station area was raised under the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by persons with disabilities. The
University also received a report on preventive measures to be taken
in the accident-prone area of the Metro Station. With these and other
projection, the appeal in LPA No.89/2018 came to be filed on 01.03.2018 G
after a delay of 916 days, together with the C.M.No.8654/2018 for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
9. The delay of 916 days caused in preferring the Appeal was
explained in the application seeking delay condonation and the rejoinder
to the reply to said application to the following effect; H
1266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A (i) Non-convening of Executive Council and delay
occasioned due to non-availability of Vice-Chancellor.
The case in the present LPA is different from other
routine litigation preferred or contested by the appellant.
It is the only case where, the approval from the
Executive Council of the University of Delhi was
B required to be taken and before such approval, various
deliberations preceded so as to appraise the Executive
Council of the different shades of the subject matter.
Being a statutory body, an adherence to the just method
of decision making requires consultations with affected
C departments of the University itself and therefore, the
final say in the matter rests with the Executive Council
which is constituted under Section 21 of the Delhi
University Act, 1922. The Council includes the senior
most Deans, democratically elected representatives of
teachers, the Visitor’s nominee, the Registrar, and the
D Vice-Chancellor.
(ii) The judgment of learned Single Judge was sent by the
Counsel representing the University quite late and it was,
then, place before the Legal Cell of the University for
examining the matter. After going through the
E voluminous paper book, it was opined that the matter
be referred to the Vice-Chancellor for consideration and
pursuant thereto, a meeting was held, wherein it was
decided that the matter needs to be dealt with
holistically, having regard to all the issues decided and
connotations thereof. The issue could not be taken up
F for consideration as the post of Vice- Chancellor had
fallen vacant w.e.f. 28.10.2015 and could be considered
only after the new Vice-Chancellor had assumed office
and taken stock of things. On 10.03.2016, the new
Vice-Chancellor joined the office and in order to ensure
democratic functioning of the University, he decided to
G
constitute a Committee comprising of senior faculty
persons representing different sections of the University.
The terms of reference of the Five-member Committee
were, to recommend the course of action to the
University in the light of the dismissal of the Writ Petition
H filed by the University in the DMRC matter.
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1267
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
(iii) On 11.11.2016, the above constituted Committee gave A
its Report.Based on the Report of the five-member
Committee, it was decided by the Competent Authority
that the subject matter of the present case be referred
to the Executive Council of the University for its final
decision. In the Executive Council meeting held on
28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item was B
again discussed in the Executive Council meeting held
on 7.3.2017 (continued meeting), where the members
of the Council referred to the earlier discussions and
decisions of both the Academic Council and the
Executive Council with respect to the same matter and C
it was decided unanimously to prefer an Appeal against
the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 27.04.2015
after adequate preparation.
(iv) In the meanwhile, reservation was strongly put forth by
the disabled students and faculty in the light of the
D
proposed project by the private builder at the very main
entrance of the University of Delhi. Such
representations were received from individuals as well
as groups which the University had to consider and
were therefore forwarded to the Equal Opportunity Cell
for consideration. The Equal Opportunity Cell, University E
of Delhi, which looks after the welfare of disabled
students and others, in the light of the new enactment
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016,
analyzed the probable outcome. After detailed
deliberations, the Equal Opportunity Cell submitted its
Report on 28.04.2017 which was brought to the notice F
of Competent Authorities for their consideration. The
Report was considered at various levels of the
University including the Office of the Dean, Student
Welfare, the Department of legal affairs, the Office of
the Proctor, the Engineering Department, and the
G
Department of Environmental Studies. Holding
discussions and deliberations among these bodies and
considering their inputs involved further time and it
involved co-ordination and interaction with various
authorities and stake holders. All this exercise involved
a further period of five to six months before a H
1268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A considered opinion could be generated by the University
of Delhi. Hence the representations and the Report of
the Equal Opportunity Cell could be finally considered
by the University of Delhi around the end of year 2017.
(v) In the interregnum, the accidents occurred at Chhatra
B Marg in December 2017 led to the need for the
preparation of a Report by the Office of the Proctor of
the University dated 05.02.2018 wherein the Proctor
recommended the area to be declared as accident prone.
Both the Reports - one by the Equal Opportunity Cell
and the other by the Office of Proctor — were sent to
C the Counsel concerned who was holding the brief for
the preparation of the Appeal memorandum.
Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the draft
appeal and petition was prepared which was thereafter
got vetted and settled by the Senior Counsel. The
finalized Appeal was thereafter again considered at the
D highest level at the University to take the final decision,
which entailed some time. On 01.03.2018, the LPA was
filed before the Delhi High Court.
10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was however
not accepted and the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.10.2018
E dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay without considering the merits
of the appeal. Thus, aggrieved the appellant-University has filed this
appeal.
11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant submits that the implication of the rejection of the writ petition
F and the LPA without considering the substantial contention raised by
the University on merits would cause grave injury to the public
institution. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the University
Authorities have been pursuing the issue with due diligence but decision
had to be taken after consultation with all the stakeholders and therefore,
the delay in preferring the LPA should not be attributed to any inaction,
G much less a deliberate inaction. The endeavor of the Courts according
to Shri Parasaran should be to do substantial justice to the parties by
deciding the matters on merits but in the present case, neither the
learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court had
considered the merit of the contention raised by the appellant-University.
Shri Parasaran argues that the expression “sufficient cause” is elastic
H enough to enable the courts to apply the law of limitation in a meaningful
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1269
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
manner. He also projects that since the builders are yet to start their A
construction, the delayed filing of the LPA should not have resulted in
non-consideration of the contention on merits, as major public interest
issues have been raised in the present matter. The learned Senior
Counsel argues that important questions effecting public interest cannot
be defeated on technical objection, inasmuch as the proposed site for
construction was originally owned by the Defence Ministry and the land B
was acquired for public purpose at public expense but is now sought
to be given over to a private builder, for a profit oriented motive. The
said contentions are also supplemented by Shri R. Venkataramani and
Shri Ramji Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocates.
12. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel representing C
the applicants/intervenors submits that six girl hostels are located near
to the project site and if high rise apartments are allowed to be
constructed, the privacy of the hostel residents would be compromised.
Ms. Arora also refers to the letter dated 25.10.1943 of the Joint
Secretary, Government of India, Department of Education addressed
to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi conveying the decision of the D
Government of India to ensure that no tall buildings are erected inside
the Delhi University Campus and also the necessity of protecting
University area, as an enclave. The Senior Counsel then refers to the
Zonal Development Plan for Zone-”C” (Civil Lines Zone) of the DDA
as approved by the Ministry of Urban Development to point out that E
the authorities have recognized the existence of number of old historical
buildings of the colonial period within the Delhi University Campus and
effort should be made to convert the Delhi University into an integrated
Campus with restriction on tall buildings.
13. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for respondent
No.13- M/s Young Builders would at the outset contend that though F
the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has referred to the merits
of the case, keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of the
High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay and laches,
that aspect of the matter would require consideration at the threshold.
He would assert that the delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay of G
more than two and a half years and in such event the principle of
applying the usual test for “sufficient cause” would not arise as it is
not merely the number of days requiring condonation but also amounts
to laches in filing the writ petition, as well as the LPA. Mere contention
that the proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest would
not advance the case inasmuch as the learned Single Judge having H
1270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A adverted to all these aspects has arrived at the conclusion that the petition
suffers from laches in addition to there being no merit and in such
circumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by 916 days the
Division Bench was justified in its conclusion. It is pointed out that the
said delay of 916 days is as against the period of 30 days which is
allowed in law for filing the LPA. It is contended that the cause of
B action if any should be construed on 23.09.2005 when the area was
converted into residential, but the writ petition was filed only on
07.05.2012 and despite the writ petition having been disposed of on
27.04.2015 the LPA was filed only on 01.03.2018 after a delay of 916
days. The reason assigned that a decision to file the LPA could not be
C taken as the office of Vice-Chancellor had fallen vacant also cannot
be accepted since such vacancy arose only on 28.10.2015 while the
writ petition had already been disposed of on 27.04.2015 and there
was sufficient time to file the LPA if they had the intention to do so.
The learned Senior Counsel further refers to the large number of cases
that was filed on behalf of the University during the said period. It is
D contended that while considering condonation of delay the prejudice that
would be caused to the opposite side is also one of the aspects to be
considered. If that situation is kept in view, in the instant case the
request for proposal in favour of the respondent No.13 was notified on
23.06.2008 and the Letter of Acceptance was issued on 13.08.2008
and the lease being for 90 years, already 11 years have passed and by
E such belated proceedings the project is prejudicially hampered. The
respondent No.13 has already spent Rs.233 crores being the lease
amount paid to the DMRC and also for securing appropriate approvals.
It is contended that the respondent No.13 had to face earlier litigation
as well which has been taken note by the learned Single Judge and the
F respondent cannot be exposed to such repeated litigations.
14. Shri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General appearing
on behalf of respondent No.11-DMRC, has contended that the Ministry
of Urban Development as a matter of Policy of the Government of
India had permitted the DMRC to generate its own resources through
G property development and has accordingly permitted to carry out
property development on the land transferred to it by the Government.
In such event when the DMRC has taken such steps not only in the
instant case but also in several other projects, any interference at this
stage more particularly when there is belated challenge of the present
nature, it would have a serious impact on the projects undertaken. It
H was submitted that due to certain changes affected in the manner in
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1271
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
which the Metro Rail Project was to be implemented there was some A
excess land which has been put to use to generate resources for the
project and in that regard when there is a contractual relationship with
respondent No.13 if the much belated petition is entertained at this stage,
there would be a great financial impact which is also a loss to the public
exchequer and in such event the public interest would be better served
by not condoning the delay in such matters. Moreover, it is not a case B
of mere delay in filing the LPA but is a serious case of laches. It is
also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition itself was
filed after 7-8 years and in such event if the discretionary orders passed
in the writ jurisdiction is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court,
it would set a bad precedent. C
15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor General
would also refer to the aspect of delay and laches and supplement the
arguments advanced by the learned Solicitor General. He would further
contend that the Union of India being the owner of the land which was
acquired does not have objection for the project and in such event
interference at the instance of the appellant herein would not be justified. D
Ms. Binu Tamta, learned Counsel submitted in support of the contentions
raised by the respondents.
16. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel in reply to
the said contention would reiterate the contentions put forth relating to
the explanation of delay and would contend that the conclusion of the E
learned Single Judge that the writ petition was hit by laches is fallacious
inasmuch as the respondent No.13 themselves had filed a writ petition
raising certain disputes with regard to the limit of FAR through the
Notification dated 20.01.2005 and such challenge by the respondent
No.13 had come to an end on 18.05.2011 and the NOC etc. were
obtained subsequently, after which the writ petition was filed by the F
appellant herein in the year 2012. Hence the delay and laches has been
explained and it is not a case of negligence. It is contended that the
stand of the DMRC that it would be put to financial loss cannot be
accepted at this point since the question as to whether they would be
liable to pay interest or not are matters which would have to be
G
considered in appropriate proceedings. Hence, he contends that the
High Court ought to have condoned the delay and the matter should
have been considered on its merits.
17. Though we have exhaustively referred to the pleadings and
the contentions of the parties, including contentions put forth on merits,
the same is only for completeness and to put the matter in perspective H
1272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A before considering the issue relating to delay and laches. In the instant
case, considering that the Division Bench of the High Court has
dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days, that aspect of
the matter would require consideration at the outset and the facts on
merits is noted to the limited extent to find out whether in that
background the public interest would suffer. The learned Senior
B Counsel for the appellant in order to impress upon this Court the
principle relating to consideration of “sufficient cause” for condonation
of delay and the factors that are required to be kept in view, has relied
on the decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
& Anr.vs. Katiji & Ors., 1987(2) SCC 107 wherein it is held as
hereunder:
C
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay
by enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other than
an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
D court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
or making the application within such period.] of the Indian
Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”.
The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
E meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that
being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.
It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But
the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the
other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is
F adopted on principle as it is realized that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause
G of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause
would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
H hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1273
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
be applied in a rational common-sense pragmatic A
manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
to have vested right in injustice being done because of
B
a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit
by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on C
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there
was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of D
the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking
condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant.
The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants,
including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is
no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the E
“State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact
experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery
(no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-
F
pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any
event, the State which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The
courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of G
the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has
to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end
in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the
approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts
of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied
that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High H
1274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore,
set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the
High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on
merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both
the sides.”
B 18. Further the decision in the case of M/s Dehri Rohtas Light
Railway Company Ltd. Vs. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992)
2 SCC 598 is relied upon, wherein this Court has indicated the real test
to determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to Court before
a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable
to any laches or negligence.
C 19. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on the
other hand, has relied upon the decision in the case of Postmaster
General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. 1992 (3)
SCC 563 wherein it is held as hereunder:
“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
D condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
E making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
F reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/
years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
G and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
20. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through
H the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1275
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The A
consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status
of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply
a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render
even- handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation
of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the
adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in B
perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay,
the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature
of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend
on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully
by the Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra)
C
the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in
focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration
therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking
condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days
pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits
regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per D
cent.
21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing
the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be
made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot
be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation
E
noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of
limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when
there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches
would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a
party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instant
facts not only the delay and laches in filing the appeal is contended on F
behalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but it
is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the writ
petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal had
arisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to those
aspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made in
the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a conclusion as to G
whether the High Court was justified.
22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days
is twofold, i.e. the non-availability of the Vice- Chancellor due to
retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-Chancellor, also
that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and a decision H
1276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A was taken to file the appeal and the said process had caused the delay.
The reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the situation
was of availing the appellate remedy and not the original proceedings
requiring such deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the
proceedings which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant
herein, after due deliberation. Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor who
B was at the helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecuted
and disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office till
28.10.2015, for about six months which was a long enough period as
compared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal. In that
circumstance when the said Vice-Chancellor who had prosecuted the
writ petition was available, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel
C
for the appellant that unseen hands are likely to have prevented the
filing of the appeal also cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason
sought to be put forth about the decision required to be taken by the
Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just the matter
of filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition an affidavit was filed
D referring to Resolution No.56 and 173 of Academic Council and
Executive Council authorising for filing writ petition. When the writ
petition was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of the
appellant, as the writ petitioner was put forth and had failed in the writ
petition, it cannot be accepted that the appellant with all the wherewithal
was unable to file the appeal, that too when the same Vice-Chancellor
E was available for six months after dismissal of the writ petition. Hence
the reasons put forth cannot in our opinion constitute sufficient cause.
23. That apart, as rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the
LPA, the approval from the Executive Council was obtained on
28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018
F after an year from the said date which only indicates the casual approach
which is now sought to be overcome with the plea of public interest
despite there being no explanation for the delay at every stage. It is
true that as held in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day’s
delay need not be explained with such precision but the fact remains
that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very much necessary.
G The Division Bench apart from noticing these aspects had also noted
that the learned Single Judge too found the writ petition to be hit by
delay and laches.
24. In that backdrop, a perusal of the order dated 27.04.2015
passed by the learned Single Judge would indicate that the learned Single
H Judge in para – 65 of the order with reference to his earlier observation
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1277
[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]
has arrived at the categorical conclusion that the petition suffers from A
laches and has been filed with delay of 7-8 years. The learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant while seeking to dispel such conclusion by
the learned Single Judge contended that the respondent No. 13
themselves had filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the restricted
FAR and the said writ petition was disposed only on 18.05.2011 and
the need for the appellant herein to file the writ petition arose only B
thereafter. The said contention is also not acceptable if the entire
sequence is noticed.
25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact that the
Respondent No. 13 being aggrieved by the decision of DDA had filed
a petition bearing W.P. No.3135/2010 assailing the letter dated C
19.08.2009 and the same was disposed of only on 18.05.2011 but the
appellant cannot take shelter under the same to explain the laches. This
is because much water had flown under the bridge before the said
development and those events ought to have triggered action from the
appellant in challenging, more so when there were other litigations
relating to the same subject, as noticed in the order of the learned Single D
Judge.
26. In the present matter, the land was converted to residential
use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC had invited bids and public
auction was conducted on 28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened
the appellant herein for the first time since the fact of conversion of E
the land into residential development was in public domain even if is
assumed that the earlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on the
approval request of DMRC are internal process and not be known to
the appellant. In fact, the learned Single Judge while taking note of
the challenge raised by the appellant herein has also taken note of an
earlier petition bearing W.P (C) No.8675/2011 filed by the Association F
of Metro Commuters wherein also the residential development was an
issue, which came to be dismissed by order dated 14.02.2011. Similarly,
another petition in W.P(C) No.6624-6625/2012, though challenging the
acquisition was filed, the same was also dismissed. Thereafter the writ
petition of the appellant filed in the year 2012 was pending till it was
disposed on 27.04.2015. G
27. Despite the writ petition having been filed belatedly in respect
of certain actions which had commenced in the year 2005 and even
though the writ petition was filed after obtaining approval of the
Executive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ appeal for 916
days after disposal of the writ petition. In such circumstance, the H
1278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R.
A cumulative effect of the delay and laches cannot be ignored. The
decisions referred by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant noted
Supra cannot, therefore, be applied in the present facts and circumstance
inasmuch as the consideration hereunder was not merely the explanation
for the delay of few days in filing the appeal. Though contention is
put forth that the delay is required to be condoned since public interest
B is involved, the nature of the proceedings that have taken place thus
far would indicate that the matter has been examined at different stages
in the earlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant was
assailing the action of the respondents were to be examined on merits,
they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the matter before
the Court.
C
28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well
accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party
cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note of
the hardship that would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended
by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note is
D the manner in which the respondent No.11 – DMRC has proceeded in
the matter. The respondent No.11- DMRC is engaged in providing the
public transport and for the said purpose the Government through policy
decision has granted approval to generate resources through property
development and in that regard the development as earlier indicated, is
taken up. Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a sum
E of Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far back as in the year
2008. The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providing
metro rail service to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if at
this stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the lackadaisical
manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it would
also be contrary to public interest.
F
29. Therefore, taking into consideration all these aspects of the
matter, we are of the opinion that not only the learned Single Judge
was justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay
and laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA
on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders do
G not call for interference.
30. Accordingly, the appeals being devoid of merits stand
dismissed with no order as to costs. All pending applications shall stand
disposed of.
H Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.
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