Holding

The bequest to the testator’s sons was a vested interest that vested at the testator’s death, entitling the appellant to her husband’s one‑fifth share in the properties of Schedules A, B, D and C.

Summary

Usha Subbarao, the widow of B.N. Subbarao (one of five sons of Dr. N.S. Nanjundiah), claimed a one‑fifth share in the properties left by her father‑in‑law under a 1935 will. The will divided the estate into Schedules A, B, C and D, gave management rights to the testator’s wife, and stipulated that sons could demand partition upon attaining majority, with certain properties to be partitioned after the wife’s death. The trial court held the legacy vested at the testator’s death, but the Karnataka High Court reversed, treating the sons’ interest as contingent and limiting the appellant’s claim to Schedule C only. The Supreme Court examined whether the bequest to the sons was a vested or contingent interest, interpreting the expressions “my surviving children” and “her surviving children” and applying Sections 119 and 120 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act. It held that the bequest was a vested interest that vested at the testator’s death, making the appellant entitled to her husband’s one‑fifth share in Schedules A, B and D as well as Schedule C. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s decision.

Issues considered

The date of vesting of the legacy to the testator’s sons – whether it was a vested or contingent interest.
Interpretation of the terms “my surviving children” and “her surviving children” in the will.
Effect of the condition of attaining majority on the vesting of the bequest.
Whether the postponement of enjoyment and the use of income for maintenance affect the nature of the interest.

Legislation cited

Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 119, s. 120
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 19, s. 21

Subjects

Will constructionVested interestContingent interestSuccessionIndian Succession ActTransfer of Property ActPartitionLegal representativeSurviving childrenDate of vesting

Judgment

A USHA SUBBARAO
v.
B.E. VISHVESWAR.!AH AND ORS.

JULY 8, 1996
B
[S.C. AGRAWAL AND G.T. NANA VAT!, JJ.]

Indian Succession Act, 1925-Sections ll9, 120-Tramfer of Prope1ty
Act, 1882--Sec. 19-Date of vesting of legacy-Detennination of-Distinction
C between a vested interest and contingent interest.
Wills--Constmction of---lntention to be asce1tained from words used
keeping in view sun·ounding circunzscances, position of testator, his family
relationship-Will must be read as a whole.

D Appellant filed a suit claiming 1/5 share of her deceased husband i11
the properties left by her father-in-law, on the basis of a Will. The testato1r
had died in 1938 leaving behind his wife and five sons. The appellant was
the wife of one of the testator's son who died in 1954 without leaving any
issue an1l testator's wife died in 1959. In the Will the immovable and
movable properties of the testator were specified in fonr groups specified
E in Schedules 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' attached with the Will. At the time when
the Will was executed all the five sons of the testator were minors and the
eldest son, the husband of the appellant, was aged 12 years. in the Will,
the testator's wife was vested with the management of all the properties
specified in Schedules 'A', 'B' and 'D' but she had no power to dispose of
F any of those properties by sale, gift, will, mortgage or hypothecation. She
was entitled to take the produce of the land and nse the same for the
maintenance of herself and her children, also to use the .interest, dividend
and income of the properties for the same purpose and she could withdraw
from the thrift deposit account of the child not more than Rs. 300 for
Upanayanams and not more than Rs. 500 for marriage of the child where
G upanayanams and marriages were to be performed for the children during
their minority and income from other sources of his property was insuffi·
cient to meet the expenses. As regards partition of the properties, it was
provided that if any of the sons after attaining the age of majority demands
partition during the life time of his mo1ther, he would be entitled to get his
H share of the thrift deposit account in the Bank, standing in his name as
106
USl-IASUllBARAOv. B.E. VISHVESWAR!AH 107

mentioned in Schedule 'C' and in properties mentioned in Schedule 'A' and A
in properties specified in Schedule 'D' and after the life time of the testator
and his wife, all the properties mentioned in Schedules 'A' , 'B' and 'D'
shall be divided equally among his surviving children and aller sons of the
testator attain the age of majority, the income from the properties in the
name of testator's wife, mentioned in Schedule 'B' only shall be used by
her, for her maintenance and the said properties shall be liable to partition
B
alter the demise of testator's wife among 'her surviving children'.

The appellant's case was that the respective shares in the various
properties of the testator vested in the five sons of the testator as per the
Will, on the death of the testator and that after the death of her husband, C
the appellant was entitled to the share in the properties that had vested in
him prior to his death in accordance llith the Will. The suit was decreed
in full by the trial Court, holding that the succession opened on the death
of the testator by virtue of which all the sons of the testator became entitled
to equal shares in the properties and the recital in the Will that the D
partition should take place amongst the snrviving children after the death
of testator's wife was really intended to refer to the children surviving the
testator. This finding was reversed In appeal. The High Court held that
right was given to the children surviving the testator to demand partition
aller the death of the testator subject to the conditions imposed in the Will E
and in the absence of such demand, the division was to take place after
the death oftheir mother among the children surviving her and that since
after attaining majority appellant's husband did not demand partition
during his life and his mother continued to manage the properties during
her life time and since appellant's husband had already expired when his
mother died, it could not be held that he had a right, title or interest in
F
the 1iroperties except to demand partition by metes and bounds which
specified event did not happen during the life time of testator's mfe and,
therefore, the appellant could not claim any right in respect of properties
specified in Schedules 'A! , 'B' and 'D', but she was held entitled to her
husband's interest in Schedule 'C' properties. The High Court construed G
the expression 'my surviving children' to mean the children of the testator
who survive the testator's \life and held that after her death only the
children surviving her could claim partition in respect of the premises
mentioned in Schedules 'A', 'B' and 'D'. This appeal had been filed against
the judgment of the High Court. H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The appellant urged that in the Will the testator had deliberately
used two different expressions, viz., 'her surviving children' while dealing
with the division of properties mentioned in Schedule 'B' after the demise
of his llife and the expression 'my surviving children' while dealing >1ith
the division of properties n1entioned in Schedules 'A', 'B' and 'D' after the
death of his wife and that the expression 'my surviving children' must
B
mean the children surviving the testator, while the expression 'her surviv-
ing children' must mean children surviving his wife and that all the
children surviving the testator were entitled lo their share in the properties
mentioned in Schedules 'A', 'B' and 'D' after the death of testator's >1ife.

c The questions raised for consideration in this appeal related to
construction of the Will to determine the date when the bequest made in
favour of the sons of the testator under the Will vested in the legatees.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
D
HELD : 1.1. For the purpose of determining the date of vesting of
the interest in the bequest it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction
bet\veen a vested interest and a contingent interest. An interest is said to
be a vested interest when there is immediate right of present enjoyment or
a present right for future enjoyment. An interest is said to be contingent
E if the right of enjoyment is made dependent upon some event or condition
which may or may not happen. On the happening of the event or condition
a contingent interest becomes a vested interest. The Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 as well as the Indian Succession Act, 1925 recognise this distinc-
tion between a vested interest and a contingent interest. By virtue of
F Section 119, in a case where beciuest is of a vested interest and by the terms
of the bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the
thing bequeathed, the right to receive it at the proper time becomes vested
in the legatee on testator's death and in the event of the death of the legatee
without having received the legacy the said right to receive it passes to the
legal representatives of the legatee. This is, however, subject to a contrary
G intention being expressed in the Will. But in the case of a contingent
bequest, Section 120 prescribes that the legacy vests in the legatee only
after the happening or not happening or the contingency which means that
in the event of the legatee dying prior to happening of that contingency no
interest passes to his legal representatives. Although the question whether
H the interest created. is a vested or contingent interest is dependent upon
USHASUBBARAOv. B.E. VISHYE3WARIAH 109

the intention to he gathered from a comprehensive view of all the terms of A
the document creating the interest, the court while construing the docu·
ment has to approach the task of construction in such cases with a bias
in favour of vested interest unless the intention to the contrary is definite
and clear. Where there is doubt as to the time of vesting, the presumption
is in favour of the early vesting of the gift and, accordingly, it vests at the
B
testator's death or at the earliest moment after that date which is possible
in the context. In the instant case according to the Will the right to
separate enjoyment of the share in respect of properties mentioned at
items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of Schedule "A" as well as properties mentioned in
Schedules 11 C11 and "D" was available to each of the sons of the testator and
on his attaining the age of majority and that the right to separate enjoy- C
ment of the bequest relating to share in property mentioned at item No. 1
of Schedule "A" and properties mentioned in Schedule "B" was available
only after the death of testator's wife. But even during the period the right
to separate enjoyment was not available to the legatees the income from
the properties was available for the maintenance of the legatees, their D
education, their Upanayanams and marriages as '''ell as for maintenance
of testator's wife. The Explanations in Section 19 of the Transfer of
Property Act and Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act incorporate the
rule that where enjoyment of the property is postponed but the present
income thereof is to be applied for the donee the gift is vested and not
contingent. In the instant case, the income from the properties was to be E
used partly for the maintenance, education, Upanayanams and marriages
of the legatees and partly for the maintenance of their mother. Since the
legatees, as sons, were under an obligation to maintain their mother, it
must be held that entire income from the properties was to be applied for
the benefit of the legatees and in accordance with the rule, the bequest in F
favour of the legatees must be held to be a vested interest. Where a
condition can be fairly read as postponing merely the right of possession
or of obtaining payment, transfer or conveyance, so that there is an
express or implied distinction between the time of vesting and time of
enjoyment, the gift is held to be vested at the earlier date if the rest of the
G
context allows. But where the postponement of the gift is on account of
some qualification attached to the donee, the gift is p1ima facie contingent
1
on his qualification being acquired. A gift to a person "af "ir', "as soon
,

asn, 'Whenn or nprovidedn he attains a certain age, without further context
to govern the meaning o~.· the words, is contingent and vests only on the
attainment of the required age, this being a quality or description which H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the donee must in general possess in order to claim under the gift. But if
the words of a gift express a distinction between the gift itself and the
event denoting the time of payment, division or transfer, and this time is
the attainment by the donee of the age of twenty-one years or other age
or is any other event n·hich, assun1ing the requisite duration of life must
B necessarily happen at a determinable time, then p1ima facic the gift is not
contingent in respect of that event. The testator alter making the bet1urst
in favour of the legatees had given the direction that a son on attaining
majority could demand partition according to the prevailing Hindu Law
in force at that time to get his portion in items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Schedule
1
'An and the thrift deposit standing in his name as mentioned in Schedule
c 11
"C as \Veil as his portion in the properties specified in Schedule l!D". This
was a case where the testator had made a distinction between the gift itself
and the event denoting the tin1e of pa)ntent, division or transfer, viz.,
attaining the age of majority. It faUs in the same category as illustration
(ii) to Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act and must be held to he
D bequest of vested interest in respect of these properties. The direction in
the Will excluding the property at item No. 1 of Schedule "A" and the
properties mentioned in Schedule "B" for partition during the life time
of testator's wife would be entitled to reside in the house at item No. 1 ,,f
Schedule nA" and to use the incon1e from the properties mentioned in
E Schedule "B" for her own maintenance if she lives separate from any of
the major sons, only created a limited life interest in the said properties
in her favour and it did not have the effect of rendering the bequest in
respect of those properties as a conltingent bequest and it continued to be
a bequest of a vested interest in those properties. The expressions "my
surviving children" and "her sun ivi.ng children" must, therefore, be con-
1

F strued in the same sense. The \\-'ords "surviving children 11 normally mean
children sun iving the testator. The said expression in a .particular context
1

could also mean the children surviving testator's wife. The expression has
to be given a meaning which is in consonance with the other parts of tl1e
Will. Reading the Will as a whok and keeping in view the direction
G enabling a son on attaining majority to seek partition of his share in
properties at items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Schedule 'A' as well as the properties
specified in Schedule 'D' it could not be said that the expression "surviving
children" in the context of division of properties mentioned in Schedules
•A', 'B' and 'D' '\\'as not used in 111ormal sense to mean the children
H surviving the testator. The Will could not be construed as creating a
contingent interest ia the sons of the testator so as to postpone the date
USHASUBBARAOv. 13.E. VISHVESWARIAH [S.C.AGRAWAL,J.) 111

of vesting of the legacy till after the death of their mother. On a proper A
construction the Will must be construed as containing a bequeath of a
vested interest in favour of the sons sunriving the testator which means
that the legacy vested in the legatees, including the husband of the
appellant, at the time of testator's death and after the death of her
husband, the appellant was entitled tu claim the one-fifth .share of her B
husband in properties mentioned in Schedules "A", "B" and ".D" in addition
to properties mentioned in Schedule "C" viz. the thrift deposits standing
in the name of the appellant's husband in the Bank. [116-F-G, 118-G-H,
119-A-C, 121-C-F, 122-B-H, 123-C-H, 124-F-H, 125-A-F]

1.2. For purpose of construction of Wills the intention has to be c
ascertained from the words used keeping in view the surrounding cir-
cumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship and the
Will must be read as a whole. [119-G]

Rajes Kanta Roy v.Santi Devi, [1957] SCR 77; Gnanamha/Ammal v. D
T. Raju Ayyar and Others., [1950] SCR 949 and Navneet Lal Alias Rangi v.
Gola.ti and Others, [1976] 2 SCR 924, relied on.

Rewun Pe1;md v. Radha Beeby, (1846) 4 M.I.A. 137 and Bhagabati v.
Kalicharan, (1911) 38 I.A. 54, referred to.
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9062 of
1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.94 of the Karnataka High
Court in R.FA. No. 593 of 1985.
F
V. Gopalaih and E.C. Vidya Sagar for the Appellant.

K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. Special leave granted.

This appeal by the plaintiff arises out of a suit wherein the appellant
claimed 1/5 share of her deceased husband in the properties left by her
father-in-law, Dr. N.S. Nanjundiah, on the basis of a Will executed by Dr. H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS j 1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Nanjun<liah on March 13, 1935. The said suit was decreed in full by the
trial court. But on appeal, lhe Karnataka High Court, by the judgment
<lated April 15, 1994, has set aside the said judgment of the trial court in
respect of properties mentioned in Schedules 1'A11 ) nsrr and TTD 11 to the said
Will and has confined the decree to properties mentioned in Schedule ''C"
B to the Will. The questions that ft1ll for consideration in this appeal relate
to construction of the Will.

Dr. N.S. Nanjun<liah (hereinafter referred to as 'the testator') died
on July 28, 1938 leaving behind his wife Smt. Na<liga Nanjamma and five
sons, B.N. Subba Rao, B.N. Shankar Rao, B.N. Visweswaraiah, B.N. Rama
C Rao and B.N. Ganesh. The appellant is the wife of B.N. Subba Rao who
died on February 21, 1954 without leaving any issue. Smt. Nadiga Nanjam-
ma died on March 28, 1959. After the death of Sml. Nadiga Nanjamma,
the appellant filed the suit !,>iving rise lo this appeal.

D As indicated earlier, in the Will dated March 13, 1935 the immovable
and moveable properties of the testator were specified in four groups
specified in Schedules "A", "B", "C" and "D" allaehed w.ilh the Will.
Schedule "A" consists of four items of immoveable properties, Item No. 1
is house No. 318, 3rd Road, Margosa Avenue, Malleswaram, Bangalore
City and items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are agricultural lands. Schedule "B" consists
E of shares and securities standing in the name of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma.
Schedule "C" consists of thrift deposit accounts in the Bank of Mywre
Limited standing in the names of five sons of the testator. Schedule "D"
consists of shares and securities and fixed deposits in banks. The relevant
parts of the Will dated March 13, 1935 are set out as under :
F
"During my life time I will be in charge and management of my
properties. After my life time, if my wife Nadiga Nanjamma should
survive me, she the said Nadiga Nanjamma shall be in charge and
ma11agemenl of all my properties given in Schedule A, B, C and
D together with their accretions and together with my properties
G acquired by me in future. My wife, the abovementioned Nadiga
Nanjamma will have no power to dispose of any of these properties
mentioned in Schedules A, B, C and D by sale, gift, will, mortgage
or hypothecation. She the said Nadiga Nanjamma is. entitled to
take the produce of the lands mentioned in A Schedule and use
H the same for the maintenance of herself and her children. She the
USHASUBBARAOv. B.E.VISHVESWARIAH[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 113

said Nadiga Nanjamma also entitled to use the interest dividends A
and incomes of the properties mentioned in B and D Schedules
for the same.purpose .
•
With regard to the house (Item No. 1 of the A Schedule) my
wife, the abovenamed Nadiga Nanjamma and her children are
entitled to live in that house during the life time of my wife, and B
the said house should not be partitioned during my wife, Nadiga
Nanjamma's life time.

Mr. C. Nagappa, B.A., L.L.B., Advocate Lakshmi Vilas
Agrahar, Mysore, one of the Executors and Trustees of this Will, C
shall be in possession of the lands viz., items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the
A Schedule, during the minority of .my children. The abovemen-
tioned Mr. C. Nagappa shall make arrangements for the cultivation
of the said lands, for the collection of produce therefrom, for the
payment of Kandayam over same and for the delivery of all
produce from the lands to my wife, the abovementioned Nadiga D
Nanjamma and her children.

The properties mentioned in the B Schedule stand in the name
of my wife, the abovesaid Nadiga Nanjamma. The income from
these properties, as stated above, shall be used for the main-
E
tenance, education, Upanayanam and marriage of my children,
during their minority. After may sons attain the age of majority,
the income from the properties mentioned in the B Schedule only
shall be used by my wife, the abovenamed Nadiga Nanjamma, for
her own maintenance if she Jives separate from any of major sons.
The properties of the said B Schedule shall be liable to partition F
after the demise of my wife, the abovenamed Nadiga Nanjamma,
among her surviving children.

With regard to the properties given in the C Schedule, that is,
thrift deposits at the Bank of Mysore, Bangalore City, they shall G
be the property of each of my children on whose respective names
those deposits have been made, after they attain their age of
majority. Where Upanayanams and marriages arc to be performed
for my children, if the income from other sources of my property
are found insufficient to meet the expenses, my \Vife the
abovenamed Nadiga Nanjamma is entitled to withdraw from the H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A respective deposits not more than rupees three hundred only (Rs.
300) for each Upanayanam and not more than Rupees five
hundred only (Rs. 500) (for each marriage), during the minority
of my children.

With regard to the properties mentioned in Band D Schedules,
B the investments, that is, stock and shares, may have to be altered
in some cases either by conversion or by encashment and for the
payment of further calls on some of the shares; my wife the
abovenamed Nadiga Nanjamma is entitled only to transact the
operations of conversion encashment or payment of further calls
c on shares, as the case may be, and she the abovenamed Nadiga
Nanjamma has also powers to reinvest the same in suitable
securities, when necessary, through the Bank of Mysore Limited,
Bangalore City but the corpus in each case shall remain in tact.
Only the interest, dividend of other incomes of the above shares
etc. might be used by my wife for the maintenance of herself and
D her children as staled above.

After any of my sons attain the age of majority if he, the major
son, demands partition during the life time of my wife, the said
Nadiga Nanjamma, he is entitled to get for his share the thrift
E deposit in the Bank of Mysore Limited, Bangalore City, standing
in his name as mentioned in C Schedule, and also to get his portion
in items 2, 3 and 4 of the A Schedule and his portion in D Schedule
of properties, with the exception of item 1 of A Schedule, the
partition being determined according to the prevailing Hindu Law
in force 1t that time. After the life time of both myself and my
F
wife, the said Nadiga Nanjamma, all the properties mentioned in
A, Band D Schedules shall be divided equally among my surviving
children. 11

At the time when the said Will was executed all the five sons of the
G testator were minors and the eldest son, B.N. Subba Rao, the husband of
the appellant, was aged 12 years. It appears that there was considerable
difference between the age of the testator and his wife. At the time of
execution of the Will, the testator was aged about 53 years while his wife,
Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma was aged 28 years. In the Will the testator made
H the following provision regarding guardianship of the minor sons :
USHASUBBARAOv. B.E. VISIWESWARIAH [S.C.AGRAWAL,J.j 115

"If some of my sons happen to be still minors at the time of the A
demise of myself and my wife, the said Nadiga Nanjamma, my
major sons shall be the guardians and Managers of the Minor sons'
persons and properties. If all my sons, however, happened to be
minors at the demise of myself and my wife, the abovenamed
Nadiga Nanjamma, I appoint the following gentlemen as Guar-
B
dians during my children's minority :

(1) Mr. C. Nagappa, B.A., L.L.B., Advocate, Lakshmivila5
Agrahar, Mysore.

(2) Mr. B Srik!nta Rao, No. 9, 3rd Road, Chamarajpet Bangalore
City.
c
(3) Mr. B. Ramaswariah, Retired School Master, No. 2, Sunkalpet,
Bangalore City.

(4) Mr. M.B. Varadarajengar, Advocate, Sultanpet, Bangalore D
City, and

(5) Mr. B.R. Subba Rao, Tutor, University College, residing at No.
1493, Kothwal Ramanna Street, Mysore.TT

The case of the appellant is that the respective shares in the various
properties of the testator vested in the five sons of the testator as per the E
Will, on the death of the testator and that after the death of her husband,
B.N. Subba Rao, the appellant is entitled to the share in the properties that
had vested in him prior to his death in accordance with the Will. The trial
court, namely, the XVII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, by his
judgment dated February 4, 1985, accepted the said plea of the appellant F
and held that the succession opened on the death of the testator by virtue
of which all the sons of the testator became entitled to equal shares in the
properties and the recital in the Will that the partition should take,place
amongst the surviving children after the death of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma
is really intended to refer to the children surviving the testator. The said G
view of the trial court has been reversed by the High Court in appeal by
the impugned judgment. The High Court has held that right was given to
·the children surviving the testator to demand partition after the death of
the testator subject to the conditions imposed in the Will and in the
absence of such a demand, the division was to take place after the death
of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma among the children surviving Smt. Nadiga H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Nanjamma. The High Court further held that since after attaining major:ity
B.N. Subba Rao did not demand partition during his life and Smt. Nadiga
Nanjamma continued to manage the properties during her life time and
since B.N. Subba Rao had already expired when Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma
died, it could not be held that B.N. Subba Rao had a right title or interest
B in the properties except to demand partition by metes and bounds which
specified event did not happen during life time of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma.
On that view the High Court held that the appellant could not claim any
right in respect of properties specified in Schedules 11 An , .,,Bn and D but
11
,

she was held entitled to her husband's interest in Schedule "C" properties.

C In view of the said decision of the High eourt it is necessary to
determine the date when the bequest made in favour of the sons of the
testator under the Will vested in the legatees. If it is found that the legacy
vested in the legatees on the death of the testator, the appellant, as the
legal representative of one of the legatees who died after the death of the
D testator, would be entitled to claim the interest of her deceased husband
as per the said bequest. But if it is found that the bequest was to vest in
the legatees only after the death of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma, the appellant
would uot be entitled rn claim any interest because her husband had
pre-deceased Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma.

E For the purpose of determining the date of vesting of the interest in
the bequest it is necessary to bear in mind the Jistinction between a vested
interest and a contingent interest. An interest is said to be a vested interest.
when there is immediate right of present enjoyment or a present right for
future enjoyment. An interest is said to be contingent if the right of
F enjoyment is made dependent upon some event or condition which may or
may not happen. On the happening of the event or condition a contingent
interest becomes a vested interest. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as
well as the Indian Succession Act, 1925 recognise this distinction between
a vested interest and a contingent interest. Vested interest has been thus
defined in Section 19 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 :
G
"Section 19. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein
is created in favour of a person without specifying the time when
it is to take effect, or in terms specifying that it is to take effect
forthwith or on the happening of an event which must happen,
H such interest is vested, unless a contrary intention appears from
USHASUBBARAOv. B.E. VISINESWARIAH [S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 117

the terms of the transfer. A
A vested interest is not <lefeated by the death of the transferee
before he obtains possession.

Explanation. - An intention that an interest shall not be vested
is not to be inferred from a provision whereby the enjoyment B
thereof is postponed, or whereby a prior inters! in the same
property is given or reserved to some other person, or whereby
income arising from the property is directe<l to be accumulated
until the time of enjoyment arrives, or from a provision that if a
particular event shall happen the interest shall pass to another
person. 11
c
Contingent interest is defined in Section 21 of the said Act in the
following terms :

"Section 21. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein D
is created in favour of a person lo take effect only on the happening
of a specified uncertain event, on if a specified uncertain event
shall not happen, such person thereby acquires a contingent inter-
est in the property. Such interest becomes a vested interest, in the
former case, on the happening of the event, in the latter, when the
happening of the event becomes impossible. E
Exception. - Where, under a transfer of property, a person
becomes entitled to an interest therein upon attaining a particular
age, and the transferor also gives to him absolutely the income to
arise from such interest before he reaches that age, or directs the
income or so much thereof as may be necessary to be applic<l for F
his benefit, such interest is not contingent. 11

In the Indian Succession Act provision with regard to date of vesting
of a legacy when payment or possession is postponed is contained in
Section 119 which provides as follows : G

"Section 119. Date of Vesting of legacy when payment or possession
postponed. - Where by the terms of a bequest the legatee is not
entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, a right
to receive it al the proper time shall, unless a contrary intention
appears by the will, become vested in the legatee on the testator's H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A death and shall pass to the legatees representatives if he dies before
that time and without having received the legacy, and in such cases
the legacy is from the testator's death said to be vested in interest.

Explanation: An intention that a legacy to any person shall not
become vested in interest in !nm is not lo be inferred merely from
B a provision whereby the payment or possession of the thing be-
queathed is postponed, or whereby a prior interest therein is
bequeathed to some other person, or whereby the income arising
from the fund bequeathed is directed to be accumulated until the
time of payment arrives, or from a provision that, if a particular
c event shall happen, the legacy shall go over to another person."

Section 120 of the Indian Succession Act makes the following
provision for date of vesting when legacy is contingent upon specified
uncertain event :

D "Section 120. Date of vesth1g u-·hen legacy contingent upon specified
uncC1tain event. - (1) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified
uncertain event shall happen does not vest until that event happens.

(2) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall
not happen does not vest until the happening of that event becomes
E impossible.

(3) Jn either case, until the condition has been fulfilled, the interest
of the legatee is called contingent.

Exception. Where a fond is bequeathed to any person upon his
F attaining a particular age, and the will also gives to him absolutely
the income to arise from the fund before he reaches that age, or
directs the income, or so much of it as may be necessary, to be
applied for his benefit, the bequest of the fund is not contingent. 11

G By virtue of Section 119, in a case where bequest is of a vested
interest and by the terms of the bequest the legatee is not entitled to
immediate possession of the thbg bequeathed, the right to receive it at the
proper time becomes vested in the legatee on testator's death and in the
event of the death of the legal ee without having received the legacy the
said right to receive it passes to the legal representatives of the legatee.
H This is, however, subject to a contrary intention being expressed in the Will.
USHASUBBARAOv. B.E. VISHVESWARIAH [S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 119

But in the case of a contingent bequest, Section 120 prescribes that the A
legacy vests in the legatee only after the happening or not happening of
the contingency which means that in the event of the legatee dying prior
to happening of that contingency no interest passes to his legal repre-
sentatives. Although the question whether the interest created is a vested
or a contingent interest is dependent upon the intention to be gathered
from a comprehensive view of all the terms of the document creating the B
interest, the court while construing the document has to approach the task
of construction in such cases \vith a bias in favour of vested interest unless
the intention to the contrary is definite and clear. (See : Rajes Kanta Roy
v. Santi Devi, [1957] SCR 77, at p. 90). As regards Wills the rule is that
1

c
'where there is doubt as to the time of vesting, the presumption is in favour
of the early vesting of the gift and, accordingly, it vests at the testator's
death or at the earliest moment after that dale which is possible in the
context." (See : Halsbwy's Law of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 50, para 589 at
p. 395).

In order to determine whether the appellant can claim any right in D
the properties of the testator, it is, therefore, necessary to examine the
nature of the bequest that \Vas made by the testator in favour of his five
sons including the deceased husband of the appellant. If it is found that
the bequest is .jn the nature of vested interest, it would vest in the husband
of the appellant on the death of the testator and after the death of her
husband the appellant, as his legal representative, would be entitled lo E
claim her husband's interest in the properties. But in case the bequest is
found to be in the nature of a contingent interest which was to vest in the
legatees only after the death of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma, the appellant
would not be entitled to claim any interest in the properties since her
husband had predeceased Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma. F
We must, therefore, construe the will to find out the interest of the
testator in this regard. With regard to construction of Wills the law is well
settled that intention has be ascertained from the words used keeping in
view the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family G
relationship and that the Will must be read as a whole. (Sec : Gnanambal
Ammal v. T. Raju Ayyar and Others, [1950] SCR 949, al p. 955; Navneet
Lal Alias Rangi v. Gokul and Others, [1976] 2 SCR 924, at pp. 927, 928. If
the Will is thus read, it is found that under the Will Sml. Nadiga Nanjamma
was vested \Vith the management of all the properties specified in
Schedules "A'', "B'' and "D" but she had no power to dispose of any of those H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A properties by sale, gift, Will, mortgage or hypothecation. She was entitled
to take the produce of the lands mentioned at items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in
Schedule "A" and use the same for the maintenance of herself and her
children. She was also entitled to use the interest, di\1dends and income
of the properties mentioned in Schedules "B" and "D" for the same
purpose. With regard to properties mentioned in Schedule "C", the testator
B
has directed that where Upanayanams and marriages were to be per-
formed for the children during their minority and income from other
sources of his property was insufficient to meet the expenses, Smt. Nadiga
Nanjamma could withdraw from the thrift deposit account of the said child
not more than Rs. 300 for Upanayanam and not more than Rs. 500 for
c marriage of the child. As regards properties mentioned in Sehedulcs"B"
and "D", it was provided that Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma was entitled only to
transact the operations of conversion, encashment or payment of further
calls on shares, as the case may be 1 and she had also po\vcr to reinvest the
same in suitable securities but the corpus in each case had lo be kept intact
D and only the interest, dividend or other incomes of said shares could be
used by her for the maintenance of herself and children as stated above.
ith regard to the house n1cntioncd al item No. l of Schedule '1A 11 , it was
\\1

directed that Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma and the children were entitled to live
in it during the life time of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma and that it would not
be partitioned during her life time. As regards the lands mentioned at
E items Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Schedule "A" , it was provided that during the
minority of the children Shri C. Nagappa, Advocate and one of the
Executors and Trustees of the Will, shall be in possession of the lands and
shall make arrangements for the cultivation of the said lands, for the
collection of produce therefrom, for the payment of kandayam over same
F and for tbc delivery of all produce from the lands to Smt. Nadiga Nanjam-
ma and her children. As regards partition of the properties, it was
provided that if any of the sons after attaining the age of majority demands
partition during the life time of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma, he would be
entitled to get his share of the thrift deposit account in the Bank of Mysore
Limited, Bangalore City, standing in his name as mentioned in Schedule
G "C" and he would also to get his portion in properties mentioned at items
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Schedule "A" and his portion in properties specified in
Schedule "D" with the exception of the property mentioned at item No. 1
of Schedule "A" and that the partition would be determined according to
the prevailing Hindu law in force at that time. It was further provided that
H after the life time of the testator and his wife, Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma, all
USHASUl3BARAOv. B.E.VISHVESWARIAHjS.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 121

the properties n1entioned in Schedules nA", nB 11 and 11 11 D 11 shall be divided A
equally among "my surviving children". With regard to properties men-
tioned in Schedule "B'', it is slated in the Will thal the said properties
stood in the name of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma and that income from those
properties shall be used for the maintenance, education, Upanayanam and
marriage of children, during their minority and after sons of the testator
B
attain the age of ID£\jority, the incon1e from the properties n1cntione<l in
schedule "B" only shall be used by Smt: Nadiga Nanjamma, for her own
maintenance if she lives separate from any of major sons and that the said
properties shall be liable to partition after the demise of Smt. Nadiga
Nanjam1na among 11 bcr surviving children 11 •
c
Thus according to the Will the right to separate of the share in
respect of properties mentioned al items Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of Schedule "A"
as well as properties mentioned in Schedules "C" and "D". was available to
each of the sons of the testator on his attaining the age of majority and that
the right to separate enjoyment of the bequest relating to share in the D
property mentioned at item No. l of Schedule "A" and properties men-
tioned in Schedule "B" was available only after the death of Smt. Nadiga
Nanjamma. But ever during the period the right to separate enjoyment was
not available to the legatees the income from the properties was available
for the maintenance of the legatees, their education, their Upanayanams
and marriages as well for maintenance of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma. E

The Explanations in Section 1.9 of the Transfer of Property Act and
Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act incorporate the rule that where
enjoyment of the property is postponed but the present income thereof is
to be applied for the donee the gift is vested and not contingent. In Rajes F
Kanta Roy v. Santi Devi, (supra) this Court has pointed out that this rule
operates normally where the entire income is applied for the benefit of the
donee. In that case, however, under the terms of the settlement the entire
income was not available to the donees for their actual use but only a
portion thereof was available and the balance was to be used for discharge G
of debts. It was held that since the donees were sons of the settlor who
were under an obligation to discharge his debts out of the properties which
devolve upon them, the balance of the income which was meant to be
ar.plied for the discharge of the debts was also an application of the income
for the benefit of the donees and, therefore, the entire income is to be
applied for the benefit of the donees. Similarly, in the instant case, we find H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that the income from the properties was lo be used partly for the main-
tenance, education, Upanayanams and marriages of the legatees and partly
for the maintenance of their mother, Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma. Since the
legatees, as sons, were under an obligation to n1aintain their mother, it must
be held tlrnt the entire income from the the properties was to be applied
for the benefit of the legatees and in accordance with the rule referred to
B
above, the bequest in favour of the legatees must be held to be of a vested
interest.

Does the said bequest cease to be a bequest for a vested interest
for the reason that the right to separate enjoyment in respect of his share
C in the properties mentioned at item' Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Schedule "A" and
the properties specified in Schedules "C" and "D" is not available till the
legatee obtains majority and the right to separate enjoyment of his share
in the property mentioned at item No. 1 in Schedule "A" and the properties
specified in Schedule "B" is not available during the life time of Smt. Nadiga
D Nanjamma ? In our opinion, this question must be answered in the nega-
tive. Under the English law where a condition can be family read as
postponing merely the right of possession or of obtaining payment, transfer
or conveyance, so that there is an express or implied distinction between
the time of vesting and time of enjoyment, the gift is held to be vested at
E the earlier date if the rest of the context allows. But where the postpone-
ment of the gift is on account of some qualification attached to the donee,
the gift is prima facie contingent on his qualification being acquired. A gift
to a person nat ir 'as soon as '\vhen'' or providedl! he attains a certain
11
, '
1 1
,
1 11
,
11

age, without further context to govern the meaning of the words, is contin-
F gent and vests only on the attainment of. the required age, this being a
quality or description which the donee must in general possess in order to
claim under the gift. But if the words of a gift express a distinction between
the gift itself and the event denoting the lime of payment, division or
transfer, and this time is the attainment by the donee of the age of
twenty-one years or other age or is any other event which, assuming the
G requisite duration of life, must necessarily happen at a determinable time,
then prima facie the gift is not contingent in respect of that event. (See :
Ha/sbury's Laws of England, 4tlr Edn., Vol. 50, paras 591, 592 and 604, at
pp. 396, 397, 405. The same is the position in India and it has been
succinctly brought out in illustration (ii) to Section 119 and illustration (ii)
H to Section 120 of the Indian Succession Act. The said illustrations are as
USHASU1313ARA0v. B.E. VISHVESWAR!AH IS.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 123

un<ler: A

11!ustration (ii) lo Section 119

"(ii) A bequeaths to B 100 rupees, to be paid to him upon his
attaining the age of 18. On A's <lealh the legacy becomes vested
in interest in B. 11 B

Illustration (ii) to Section 120

"(ii) A sum of money is bequeathed lo A "in case he shall attain
the age of 18," or "when he shall attain the age of 18." A's interest
in the legacy is contingent until the condition is fulfilled by his
c
11
attaining that age.

In the present case, the testator in the Will has not used words similar
to those contained in illustration (ii) lo Section 120. The testator after
making the bequest in favour of the legatees has given the direction that a D
son on attaining majority could demand partition according to the prevail-
ing Hindu law in force at that time to get his portion in items Nos. 2, 3 and
4 in Schedule "A" and the thrift deposit standing in his name as mentioned
in Schedule "C" as well as his portion in the. properties specified in
Schedule "D". This is a case where the testator has made a distinction
between the gift itself and the event denoting the time of payment, division
E
or transfer, viz., attaining the age of majority. It falls in the same category
as illustration (ii) to Section 119 of The Indian Succession Act and must
be held to be a bequest of vested interest in respect of these properties.

Similarly, the direction in the Will excluding the property at item No. F
1 of Schedule "A" and the properties mentioned in Schedule "B" for
partition during the life time of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma and that Smt.
Nadiga Nanjamma would be entitled to reside in the house at item No. 1
of Schedule "A" and to use the income from the properties mentioned in
Schedule "B" for her own maintenance if she lives separate from any of the G
major sons, only creates a limited life interest in the sai~ properties in
favour of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma and it does not have the effect of
rendering the bequest in respect of those properties as a contingent be-
quest and it continues to be a bequest of a vested interest in those
properties. Reference in this Context may be made to the decision of the
Privy council in Rewun persad vRadha Beeby, (1846) 4 M.I.A. 137, where H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the testator gave his wife a life estate and after her death one moiety of
the estate to his brother and the other moiety to his two sons. The brother
and one of the sons died during the life time of the widow. It was held that
as the share of the sens were vested the widow of the pre- deceased son
was entitled to succeed to her hsband's share. Similarly, in Bhagabati v.
B Ka/icharan, (1911) 38 I.A. 54, the bequest was to the mother for life, then
to the wife for her life and then to the nephews. The Privy Council rejected
the contention that there was no vesting in the nephews until the death of
the survivor of the mother and the widow and held that the nephews were
intended to take a vested and transmissible interest on the death of the
testator though their possession and enjoyment were postponed. The same
C position is reiterated in illustrat:ion (iii) to Section 119 which reads as
under:

Illustration (iii) to Section 119

''(iii) A fund is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to B.
D On. the testator's death the legacy to B becomes vested in interest
in B. 11

The High Court has referred to following direction by the testator in
the Will :

E "After the life time of both myself and my wife, the said N adiga
Nanjamma, all the properties mentioned in A, B and D Schedules
shall be divided equally among my surviving children."

The High Court has construed the expression "my surviving children"
F to mean the children of the testator who survive Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma
and has held that after the death of Smt. Nanjamma only the children
surviving Smt. Nanjamma could claim partition in respect of the premises
mentioned in Schedules 'A), 'B' and 'D'. ·

The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that in the Will the
G testator has deliberately used two different expressions, viz., "her surviving
children" while dealing with the division of properties mentioned in
Schedule 'B' after the demise of Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma and the expression
"my surviving children" while dealing with division of properties mentioned
in Schedules 'A' , 'B' and 'D' after the death of Smt. Nanjamma. The
H submission is that the expression "my surviving children" must mean the
USHASUBBARAOv. B.E. VISHVESWARIAH [S.C.AGRAWAL,l.J 125

11
children surviving the testator, while the expression 11 her surviving chi1dren A
must mean children surviving Smt. Nanjamma and that all the children
surviving the testator are entitled to their share in the properties mentioned
in Schedules 'A', 'B' and 'D' after the death of Smt. Nanjamma. In our
opinion, nothing much can be made out of the difference in phraseology
because if the expression "my surviving children" is construed to mt:an the B
children surviving the testator and the expression "her surviving children"
is construed to mean the children surviving Smt. Nanjamma, there will arise
a contradiction in the Will in so far as partition of Schedule "B" properties
is concerned because at one place it is mentioned that 11 propcrties of
Schedule 'B' shall be liable to partition after the demise of my \vifc, the
abovementioned Nadiga Nanjamrna, among her surviving children 1nean- 1
',
c
ing thereby that the said properties were divisible among the children
surviving Smt. Nanjamma, while at another place in the Will, it is stated
the "after the life time of both myself and my wife, the said Smt. Nadiga
Nanjamma, all the properties mentioned in A, B and D Schedules shall be
divided equally among my surviving children, meaning thereby that the D
properties in Schedules 11 ATI, nB" and 1'D" were divisible among the children
11
surviving the testator. The expressions 11my surviving children" and her
surviving children11 must, therefore, be construed in the same sense. The
words nsurviving chil<lren11 normally mean children surviving the testator.
The said expression in a particular context could also mean the children E
surviving Smt. Nadiga Nanjamma. The expression has to be given a mean-
ing which is in consonance with the other parts of the Will. Reading the
Will as a whole and keeping in view the direction enabling a son on
attaining majority to seek partition of his share in properties at items Nos.
2, 3 and 4 in Schedule 'A' as well as the properties specified in Schedule F
'D' it cailnot be said that the expression nsurviving children11 in the context
of division of properties mentioned in Schedules 'A', 'B' and 'D' was not
used in the normal sense to mean the children surviving the testator.

We are unable to read the Will as indicating a contrary intention to G
make a departure from the rule regarding vesting of the legacy as contained
in Section 119 of the Act. In our opinion, the Will cannot be construed ~s
creating a contingent interest in the some of the testator so as to postpo,ne
the date of vesting of the legacy till after the death of Smt. Nadiga
Nanjamma. On a proper construction the Will must be construed as
> containing a bequeath of a vested interest in favour of the sons surviving H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS jl996J SUPP. 3 S.CR.
·-
A the testator which means that the legacy vested in the legatees, including
the husband of the appellant, at the time of testator's death and after the
death of her husband, the appellant is entitled to claim the one-fifth share
11 11
of her husband in properties rncntiuned in Schedule "A", "B" and D in
11
addition to properties mentioned in Schedule CI! viz, the thrift deposits
B standing in the name of the appellant's husband in the Bank of Mysore
Ltd.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the
High Court is set aside to the extent it denies the appellant one-fifth share
in the properties mentioned in Schedules "A", ''B' and ''D" and it is held
C that apart from the share in properties· mentioned in Schedule "C", the
appellant is also entitled to one- fiflh share in the properties mentioned in
Schedules A 8 and nD as held by the trial court. There is no order as
11 11
, '
1 11 11

to costs.

R.A. Appeal allowed.