Holding

The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence established a complete and unbroken chain of facts that excluded any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, thereby upholding the conviction under Sections 302 and 32 of the IPC.

Summary

The deceased, Saista Khatoon, was the second wife of appellant No.1 (Usman Mian) and step‑daughter of appellants No.2 and No.3, who were hostile to the marriage. She was found dead on the verandah of the appellants' house with visible injuries; the appellants attempted to bury the body and fled when police arrived. The defence claimed she had been ill and fell near a well, sustaining fatal injuries, but the trial court rejected this, finding the medical evidence inconsistent with the post‑mortem report. Convicted under Section 302 read with Section 32 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment, the appellants appealed, arguing that the circumstantial evidence did not form a complete chain, especially against appellant No.1. The Supreme Court restated the principles governing circumstantial evidence, held that the totality of circumstances – injuries, abscondence, hurried burial, motive, and falsity of the defence plea – formed a complete, unbroken chain that excluded any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and therefore upheld the conviction. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to establish a complete chain of circumstances proving the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the defence's claim of accidental death due to a fall near the well creates reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the medical evidence and convicting the accused under Sections 302 and 32 of the IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 32

Subjects

circumstantial evidencemurderSection 302 IPCSection 32 IPCabscondencemedical evidencechain of circumstancesproof beyond reasonable doubt

Judgment

USMAN MIAN AND ORS. A
v.
STA TE OF BIHAR

OCTOBER 4, 2004

[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860

Conviction based on circumstantial evidence-Principles restated-
Deceased found to have injuries-Not explained properly-Attempt by
appellants to bury the body hurriedly-Plea falsified-Appellants absconding-
Held, circumstances sufficient to convict the accused-Though falsity ofdefence
plea not enough to convict, it provides additional link to substantiate
prosecution case.

The deceased was married to appellant no. 1. Appellants 2 and 3 were
D
her step-sons and they were not happy with the marriage. After two
months of the marriage deceased started sending information that the
appellants used to vex and torture her and had even given threat to kill
her. The days prior to the occurrence RH (PW-3), the younger brother of
the informant had met her when she asked him to take her lest she might E
be killed by the appellants. On getting the information about the death of
his sister, PW-IO alongwith PW-4, PW-8, PW-3, his sister and PW-7 went
to the house of the appellants in village Nasirpur and saw the dead body
of the deceased lying on a cot on the southern verandah of the house. The
body was covered by cloth. By that time several persons of the two villages, F
namely, Chatarghat and Nasirpur had gathered there. Marks of scratches
and bluish stain on the neck and black stain on the right pareital region
were visible. On a suspicion after seeing the said marks that the deceased
had been killed by her husband and her step-sons, i.e. present appellant,
a complaint was lodged. Appellants were absconding from their house.
They were pressing hard to bury the dead body but on seeing the police G
party they fled away.

The accused defended the trial to the effect that the deceased was ill
for 3 to 4 days prior to the date of occurrence and had grown very weak.
She has come to fetch water from the well that night and received injuries
21 H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A when she fell down, became unconscious and subsequently died. The trial
court found the accused persons guilty by relying on the circumstances
which.were highlighted, holding that the circumstances were sufficient to
bring home the accusations disbelieving the evidence of DW-1.

In appeal the High Court upheld the order of trial court and held
B that there was no infirmity in the judgment of the trial court.
. On appeal to this Court, it was contended that the case rests on
cfrcumstantial evidence that even if the circumstances are accepted in toto,
they do not form a complete chain of circumstances and, therefore, could
C not have been relied upon for holding the accused-appellants guilty, and
that the materials relied upon by the prosecution, do not bring home the
accusation so far as appellant No.I.

Respondent-State supported the judgment of the courts below and
sub~itted that well reasoned and well discussed judgments of the courts
D below have clearly established guilt of the accused persons and no
interference is called for.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1. For a crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime
E must be seen to have been committed and must, in all circumstances be
proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the Court those
persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by
circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact ofjactum probandum may
be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from factum
probans, that is the evidentiary facts. To put it differently, circumstantial
F evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various
other facts which are so closely associated with the fact iii issue which taken
together form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the
principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. [27-8, CJ ·

2. Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the
G inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and
circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the
accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances from which
an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved .
beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected
H with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.
USMANMIAN v. STATEOFBIHAR 23
Where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances A
the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the
innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any
reasonable doubt. 127-D, E, F, GJ

Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1977) SC 1063; Eradu v. State
of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, B
AIR (1983) SC 446; State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, AIR (1985) SC 1224;
Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350; Ashok Kumar
Chatterjee v. State of MP., AIR (1989) SC 1890 and Bhagat Ram v. State of
Punjab, AIR (1954) SC 621, referred to.

3. The trial court has elaborately dealt with the medical evidence C
and has found that the doctor's opinion was not honest being inconsistent
with the objective _finding as contained in the post mortem report. One
important feature, which has been rightly taken note of by the courts
below, is that though initially the accused persons were present, when
grievance was made before the police that the case was one of murder and D
not accidental death, the accused person has absconded. Another feature,
which has been rightly tak~n note of by the courts below, is that there
was an attempt to bury the dead body hurriedly. The appellants were the
inmates of the house of the deceased. Evidence of the defence witness DW-
1, who was examined to substantiate the plea that the deceased has fallen
down near the. well has been discarded. Though falsity of the defence plea E
is not enough to bring home. The accusations, it provides additional link
to substantiate prosecution's accusations. Circumstances highlighted by
the trial court, are sufficient to bring home the accusation as has been
rightly held by the trial court and the High Court against the appellants.
130-C, D, E, F) F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
587 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.98 of the Patna High Court in
Crl.A.No. 424 of 1986. G
U.U. Lalit, Zki Ahmad Khan and Irshad Ahmad for the Appellants.

B.B. Singh and Kumar Rajesh Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Three appellants filed the present appeal
questioning correctness of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench· of the
Patna High Court upholding their conviction for offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 32 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC') and the sentence of imprisonment for life as imposed by Learned
B Sessions Judge, Gaya, Bihar in Sessions Trial No. 145of1983. It was pointed
out that during pendency of the appeal before this Court appellant No.2 has
died and therefore appeal stands abated so far as he is concerned. y

The prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows : ·

C Kalamuddin and Alauddin Mian of village Nasirpur informed Ishteaq
Ahmed (PW-10) and other members of the prosecution party at their house
in village Chatarghat in the early morning hours on 6.3.1981 that Saista
Khatoon (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') has expired. He was told
that some guests had come to the deceased's house; after serving meal to
them she went to bed. In the midnight her cries were heard and subsequently
D it was learnt that she had died.

On getting the above information, Ishteaq Ahmed (PW- I 0) (informant
of the case) along with his father Anwarrul Haque (PW-4), mother Nafisa
Khatoon (PW-8), brother Rashid Hussain (PW-3), sister (not examined) and
aunt Hasmat Khatoom (PW-7) proceeded to the house of the appellants in
E village Nasirpur reaching there at about 7 a.m. They saw the dead body of
Saista Khatoon lying on a cot on the southern verandah of the house. The
body was covered by cloth. By that time several persons of the two villages,
namely, Chatarghat and Nasirpur had gathered there. They were talking in
whispered tone that Saista Khatoon had been killed. With a view to have the
F last glimpse of the deceased the cloth from her face was removed. Marks of
scratches and bluish stain on the neck and blacken stain on the right parental
region were visible. The prosecution party after seeing the said marks became
suspicious that the deceased had been killed by her husband and her step-
sons i.e. present appellants.

G In the fardeyan which Ishteaq Ahmed (PW-10) lodged in the evening
at 6 p.m. in the courtyard of appellants' house, he further mentioned that
deceased had been married to appellant no. I Usman Mian on 8th March,
1980. Appellants Abrar Ahmed and Iftekhar Ahmed, who were her step-sons
were not happy with the marriage. After two months of the marriage deceased
H started sending information that the appellants used to vex and torture her.
USMANMIAN v. STATEOFBIHAR[PASAYAT,J.] 25
'
•. ;I.
Once or twice they had even given threat to kill her. Ten days prior to the A
occurrence Rashid Hussain (PW-3), the younger brother of the infonnant had
met her when she asked him to take her lest she might be killed by the
appellants. The informant further mentioned that the appellants were
absconding from their house. They were pressing hard to bury the dead body
but on seeing the police party they fled away.
B
On the basis of the above said fardbeyan Chandauti P.S. Case No.34/
81 was registered on 6.3 .1981. The investigation was undertaken and on
completion thereof charge sheet was submitted against the appellants. The
accused persons pleaded innocence and faced trial.

The accused persons as is evident from the trend of cross examination
c
and suggestions put to the prosecution witnesses and evidence of DW I,
Shuail Ahmed took stand to the effect that the deceased was ill for 3 to 4
days prior to the date of occurrence and had grown very weak. She has come
to fetch water from the well in the fateful night and received injuries when
she fell down, became unconscious and subsequently died. In order to further D
its accusations prosecution examined 11 witnesses. Ishteaq Ahmed (PW-10)
was the informant and the brother of the deceased. Rashid Hussain (PW-3)
was her brother and PWs. 4 and &, Anwarrul Haque and Nafisa Khatoon were
her father and mother respectively. Post Mortem was conducted by Dr.
Kapildeo Prasad (PW-9).
E
It is to be noted that during the examination of the accused persons
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the
'Code ')they denied the presence of the dead body in the verandat of the
house.

The trial court found the accused persons guilty by relying on the F
circumstances which were highlighted. It is to be noted that the case rested
on substantial evidence and there was no eye witness. Trial court came to
hold that the circumstances were sufficient to bring home the accusations,
disbelieving the evidence of DW-1.

In appeal the High Court examined the evidence on record in detail and
G
came to hold by the impugned order that there was no infirmity in the judgment
of the trial Court.

In support of the appeal, Mr. U.U. Lalit learned senior counsel, submitted
that the case rests "'n circumstantial evidence. Even if the circumstances ·are H'
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A accepted in toto, they do not fonn a complete chain of circumstances and,
therefore, could not have been relied upon for holding the accused-appellants
guilty. In any event, according to him, the materials relied upon by the
prosecution, do not bring home the accusation so far as appellant No.!-
Usman Mian is concerned.

B Learned counsel appearing for the State on the other hand supported
the judgment of the courts below and submitted that well reasoned and well
discussed judgments of the courts below have clearly established guilt of the
accused persons and no interference is called for.

C The circumstances which were pressed into service by the prosecution
are as follows:

(I) Saista Khatoon was the second wife of Appellant No. I Usman
Mian @ Ghaso Mian and step-mother of appellant No. 2 Iftekhar Mian Ahmed
and appellant No. 3 Abrar Ahmed. This is, in fact, admitted,
D (2) Saista Khatoon died at her husband's house. This also is admitted.

(3) The dead body was found kept on a cot at a verandah of appellant's
house.

(4) The dead body was covered with cloth when the prosecution
E witnesses reached the place.
(5) The body bore marks of injuries.

(6) The appellants wanted to hurriedly bury the dead body.

F (7) Saista Khatoon was ill-treated by the appellants, particularly appellant
nos. 2 & 3.

(8) She was carrying pregnancy of two months at the time of her death.

(9) The possible birth of a male child was likely to affect the extent of
G inheritance of appellant nos. 2 and 3.
(10) The appellants particularly, appellant nos. 2 and 3 had a very
strong motive to kill the deceased.

( 11) When the police reached the place, the appellants were found to
H
USMAN MIAN v. STATE OF BIHAR [PASAYAT, J.] 27

be absconding. A
Out of these circumstances some were of general nature. Circumstances
(5) (6) and (l l) are important. Circumstances 7, 9 and IO are additional
factors in relation to appellant nos. 2 and 3.

Before analysing factual aspects it may be stated that for a crime to be B
proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been committed
and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct ocular evidence by
examining before the Court those persons who had seen its commission. The
offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact or
factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences
drawn fromfactum probans, that is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently, C
circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of
evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact
in issue which taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which
the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed.
D
It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests
squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified
only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other
person. [See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1977) SC 1063, Eradu
v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of E
Karnataka, AIR (1983) SC 446, State of UP. v. Sukhbasi, AIR (1985) SC
1224, Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (I 987) SC 350 and Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of MP., AIR (I 989) SC 1890]. The circumstances
from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected F
with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In
Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR (1954) SC 621 it was laid down that
where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the
cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the
innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable
~~ G
We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga
Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996] IO SCC 193, wherein it has been observed
thus:
28 SUPREME COURT RBPORTS [2004) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

·A "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should
be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature.
Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should
be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
B guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence."

In Pr:zdala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR (1990) SC 79 it was laid
down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence
must satisfy. the following tests:

C (I) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to
be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
pointing towards guilt of the accused;
{3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so
D
complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within
all human probability the crime was committed by the accused
and none else; and

(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must
be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis
E than that of guilt of the accused and such evidence should not
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be
inconsistent with his innocence."

In State of UP. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) Cr!. LJ l l 04 it was
F pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence
and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one
in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the
circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and
the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only
with the hypothesis of guilt.
G
Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book 'Wills' Circumstantial Evidence'
(Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the
case of circumstantial evidence: ( l) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal
inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected
with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party
H
)
USMANMIAN v. STATEOFBJHAR[PASAYAT,J.] 29

who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) A
in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence
must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify
the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other
reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) ifthere be any reasonable B
doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of ri~ht to be acquitted.

There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial

- evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to
circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.

In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of MP., AIR (1952) SC 343
Q
it was observed thus:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully D
established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the
circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and
they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of
evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for E
a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must
be such as to show that within all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused." ·

A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622. Therein, while dealing F'
with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the
prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in
the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions
precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on
circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are : G·
(I) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned
must or should and not may be established;

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should
not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be ofa conclusive nature and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
B be proved; and·
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the.
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
c
It is to be noted that the trial court has elaborately dealt with the
medical evidence and has found that the doctor's opinion was not honest
being inconsistent with the objective finding as contained in the post mortem
report. One important feature, which has been rightly taken note of by the
courts below, is that though initially the accused persons were present, when
D grievance was made before the police that the case was one of murder and
not accidental death, the accused person has absconded. Another feature,
which has been rightly taken note of by the courts below, is that there was
an attempt to bury the dead body hurriedly. The appellants were the inmates
of the house of the deceased. Evidence of the defence witness DW-1, who
E was examined to substantiate the plea that the deceased has fallen down near
the well has been discarded, and in our view rightly. Though falsity of the
defence plea is not enough to bring the home accusations, it provides additional
link to substantiate prosecution's accusations. In State of Karnataka v.
Lakshmanaiah, [1992] Supp 2 SCC 420, conduct of accused's abscondence
from the date of occurrence till his arrest was considered to be a vital
F circumstance.

Circumstances highlighted by the trial court, as noted above, are
sufficient to bring home the accusation as has been rightly held by the trial
court and the High Court against the appellants.

G Above being the position, we do not find any infirmity in the conclusions
arrived at, by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, to warrant any
interference.

The appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.

H V.M. Appeal dismissed.