Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the petitioner was guilty of criminal breach of trust against the finance company and cheating against the purchaser, and reduced the sentence to one year and six months simple imprisonment.

Summary

The petitioner obtained a loan of Rs.3,00,000 from Shriram Transport Finance Company to purchase a vehicle, defaulted on repayments and allegedly forged documents to clear the hypothecation and sell the vehicle to a third party. The trial court convicted him under sections 406, 420, 468, 465 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing him to rigorous and simple imprisonment with fines; the conviction was affirmed by the appellate and high courts. On review, the Supreme Court examined the evidence, including handwriting expert reports, and found that the petitioner failed to prove repayment of the loan and that the forged documents were indeed fabricated. The Court also clarified that the petitioner could be convicted under both sections 406 (criminal breach of trust) and 420 (cheating) because the offences were committed against two different victims – the finance company and the purchaser. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upheld the convictions, and reduced the sentence to one year and six months of simple imprisonment, to run concurrently.

Issues considered

Whether the petitioner is guilty of offences under sections 406, 420, 468, 465 and 471 IPC.
Whether a conviction under both sections 406 and 420 can stand simultaneously in the same set of facts.
Whether the petitioner successfully proved repayment of the loan and thereby negated the charges of forgery and cheating.
Whether the sentences imposed by the lower courts require modification.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 406, s. 420, s. 465, s. 468, s. 471

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the petitioner is guilty of committing offences u/ss.406, 420, 468, 465 and 471 IPC, and if so, whether the sentences imposed on him by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court and High Court call for interference. Headnotes† Penal Code, 420, 468, 465, 471 – Petitioner failed to repay the loan obtained to purchase a vehicle – Allegation that petitioner forged documents and sold the vehicle to one S – FIR registered – Trial Court found petitioner guilty of offences u/ss.406, 468, 465, 420, and 471 of IPC

Subjects

Criminal breach of trustCheatingVehicleLoanDefault in repayment of loanForgeryFabrication of documentsSentencing

Judgment

[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2265 : 2024 INSC 1060

V.D. Raveesha
v.
The State of Karnataka
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 980 of 2024)
22 October 2024
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the petitioner is guilty of committing offences u/ss.406,
420, 468, 465 and 471 IPC, and if so, whether the sentences
imposed on him by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate
Court and High Court call for interference.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 468, 465, 471 – Petitioner failed
to repay the loan obtained to purchase a vehicle – Allegation
that petitioner forged documents and sold the vehicle to one
S – FIR registered – Trial Court found petitioner guilty of offences
u/ss.406, 468, 465, 420, and 471 of IPC – Criminal Appeal was
dismissed by the Appellate Court – Criminal Revision filed by
the petitioner was also dismissed – Correctness:
Held: The accused has not denied availment of the loan from the
Company and the subsequent sale of the vehicle made in favour
of S – The petitioner has taken the stand that the documents
are genuine and not forged and/or fabricated, when the entire
evidence, both oral as well as documentary, clearly reveal to the
contrary – There is no record, whatsoever, forthcoming to show
that the accused had repaid the loan – Had the petitioner actually
paid back the loan, it could have been demonstrated by bringing
before the Courts documents to indicate that money was transferred
from his account/source to the financier-Company – This has not
been done – For the purposes of establishing the petitioner’s guilt,
there was sufficient and reliable material, which rightly the Courts
below have believed and relied upon – Thus, no infirmity in the
same having been found, the conviction needs no interference –
In the interest of justice, sentenced reduced to one year and six
months’ simple imprisonment. [Paras 12, 18, 19]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 and s.420 – Difference between
criminal breach of trust and cheating – Discussed.

* Author
2266 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 and s.420 – Whether the petitioner,
in the instant case, can be convicted both u/ss.406 and s.420
of IPC:
Held: On an overall conspectus of the factual aspects juxtaposed
with the evidence on record, as regards fulfilment of the ingredients
of ss.406 and 420 of the IPC, at first sight, it may appear that the
petitioner cannot be convicted both u/ss.406 and 420 of the IPC,
but, in the present case, on a proper consideration of the issue in its
entirety, there is a fine distinction inasmuch as, there are two different
persons against whom the petitioner has committed the respective
offences under the Sections supra – Evidently the petitioner is guilty
of offence committed against the Company punishable u/s.406 of the
IPC and also, of offence committed against M (PW4 and husband
of purchaser S) punishable u/s.420 of the IPC. [Para 21]

Case Law Cited
Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2024]
8 SCR 670 : (2024) 10 SCC 690 – relied on.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Criminal breach of trust; Cheating; Vehicle; Loan; Default in
repayment of loan; Forgery; Fabrication of documents.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No. 980 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.10.2023 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLRP No. 653 of 2020

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Rahul Kaushik, Sr. Adv., Anil C Nishani, Keshav Murthy, Jayram,
Vishwesh R Murnal, M/s. Krishna & Nishani Law Chambers.
Advs. for the Respondent:
V. N. Raghupathy, Raghavendra M. Kulkarni.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2267

V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka

Judgment / Order of the S.upreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

The present petition impugns the Final Judgment and Order dated
11.10.2023 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘High Court’) in Criminal Revision Petition No.653/2020,
whereby the High Court confirmed the Judgment and Order dated
25.08.2020 passed in Criminal Appeal No.29/2018 by the learned
VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Appellate Court’) which had affirmed the conviction
recorded and sentence awarded to the petitioner, by the learned
Additional Senior Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tumakuru
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) vide Judgment and Order
dated 26.04.2018 in C.C.No.1218/2012.

FACTUAL OVERVIEW:
2. The petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘accused’) had
purchased a vehicle bearing Registration No.KA-41-2298 by
obtaining financial assistance of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs)
from M/s Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Company’). A Loan-cum-Hypothecation Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agreement’) was entered into between
the accused and the Company whereby the above-mentioned
vehicle was hypothecated in favour of the Company and the same
was duly notified/marked in the Registration Certificate of the said
vehicle. Though the accused had paid one or two instalments, but
thereafter, he defaulted and despite several requests, the accused
did not make further payments. Accordingly, since as per the terms
of the Agreement, the vehicle could be seized by the Company,
on 18.02.2011, the concerned Branch Manager of the Company
seized the vehicle and took it to the police station. At that time,
it was revealed that the petitioner, without repaying the loan of
Rs.2,95,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Ninety-Five Thousand) had forged
and created (i) receipt no. AD 0873936 for having repaid the loan
2268 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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amount; (ii) No-Objection Certificate, and; (iii) Form No.35 purported
to have been issued by the Company, by forging the signatures
of the authorized signatories and had also sold the vehicle to one
Savithramma. In short, it was alleged that the petitioner, without
discharging the entire loan liability due towards the Company, sold
off the vehicle by producing forged documents before the Regional
Transport Office (hereinafter referred to as ‘RTO’) and getting the
hypothecation cleared.
3. On the basis of these allegations, the Company’s Branch Manager
lodged complaint leading to lodging of First Information Report
bearing Crime No.34/2011 on 18.02.2011 under Sections 4061, 4202
and 4683 read with 344 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘IPC’). On 16.11.2011, Chargesheet was filed
against the petitioner under Sections 406, 468, 420, 465 and 471
of IPC in the case registered as C.C. No.1218/2012 before the
Trial Court.
4. Before the Trial Court, the prosecution examined PW1 to PW13 and
got marked Ex. P1 to Ex. P32 and got exhibited one Compact Disc
as M.O.1. The petitioner chose not to lead any defence evidence
on his behalf, except producing a document marked as Ex. D1.
On a consideration of the materials before it, the Trial Court found
the petitioner guilty of offences under Sections 406, 468, 465, 420
and 471 of the IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment
(hereinafter abbreviated to ‘R.I.’), simple imprisonment (hereinafter
abbreviated to ‘S.I.’) and fine(s), as under:

1 ‘406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine,
or with both.’
2 ‘420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole
or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
3 ‘468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.—Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or
electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
4 ‘34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by
several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act
in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.’
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2269

V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka

IPC Section Conviction and Sentence
406 Fine of Rs.5,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo three
months’ S.I.
468 Two years’ R.I. along with fine of Rs.3,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo further
three months’ S.I.
465 Fine of Rs. 5,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo three
months’ S.I.
420 Two years’ R.I. along with fine of Rs.3,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo further
three months’ S.I.
471 Fine of Rs.5,000/-.
In default of payment of fine, to undergo three
months’ S.I.

5. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded supra, the
petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No.29/2018, which came to be
dismissed by the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the petitioner filed
Criminal Revision Petition No.653/2020 before the High Court which
has also been dismissed vide the Impugned Order and the conviction
and sentence, imposed and affirmed by the Courts below, has been
confirmed.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE PETITIONER:
6. At the outset, learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court
as well as the Appellate Court and the Trial Court committed error
in convicting the petitioner without considering his case. It was
argued that the Courts below failed to appreciate the fact that the
petitioner had repaid the loan amount and received the receipt (Ex.
P9), No-Objection Certificate (Ex. P8) and Form No.35 (Ex. P10)
from the Company, after clearing the loan. It was pointed out that the
Company failed to produce any document/ledger/booklet to show that
the loan was not repaid by the accused. Even the allegedly-forged
Form No.35 was never produced before the Courts.
2270 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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7. It was argued that the prosecution failed to produce any evidence/
material to show how the disputed documents were fabricated and
by using which computer/printer. There is also no material placed
on record to connect the accused with the forged signatures. It was
submitted that in the absence of such evidence, the petitioner cannot
be convicted for the alleged offences in question.
8. It was submitted that Exs. P11 and P12 are said to be the formats
of the receipt and No-Objection Certificate, which the Company
issues to its customers. A customer entitled to receive Exs. P11
and P12 was not examined before the Trial Court. When the loan
pertaining to the said customer is cleared and Exs. P11 and P12
were issued, there was no reason for the Company to retain those
documents with it. Therefore, no importance could be attached to
the said documents, and it was submitted that the said two exhibits
were not produced from proper custody.
9. It was further submitted that all the witnesses were employees of the
Company and hence no reliance could be placed on their depositions.
It was pointed out that PW4 was the only independent witness and
PW13 did not support the case of the prosecution. It was put forth
that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
and therefore, in the interest of justice, the Impugned Order be set
aside by acquitting the petitioner.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted
that Courts below have rightly convicted and sentenced the accused
based on cogent grounds and the same does not call for any
interference by this Court. It was submitted that without repaying
the loan, the accused has sold the vehicle to PW4 and forged Exs.
P8 to P10. The disputed documents were forwarded to a handwriting
expert along with the admitted signature and handwritings of the
accused. The expert report (Ex. P28) fully supports the case of the
prosecution. Further, PW5, the Divisional Manager of the Company,
has specifically deposed that he never signed and issued Exs. P8,
P9 and P10. It was submitted that the evidence on record sufficiently
demonstrates that it is the accused alone who is the author of
the forged and fabricated documents. In these circumstances, it
was canvassed that the prosecution had proved the case beyond
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2271

V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka

reasonable doubt. On these grounds, learned counsel prayed for
dismissal of the instant petition.

ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
evidence on record as well as the orders of the Courts below. The
issue before us is whether the petitioner is guilty of committing
offences under Sections 406, 420, 468, 465 and 471 IPC, and if
so, whether the sentences imposed on him by the Trial Court and
confirmed by the Appellate Court and High Court call for interference.
12. The accused has not denied availment of the loan from the
Company and the subsequent sale of the vehicle made in favour of
Savithramma. However, he has taken the specific defence that he
had cleared the loan and closed the account. PW1, the informant
who was working as Manager in the Company, has specifically stated
in his evidence that the accused had not cleared the loan and got
the hypothecation cancelled on the basis of forged documents. He
has stated that Exs. P8, P9 and P10 are not issued by the Company
and has identified them as forged documents. PW1 has admitted the
payment of 2-3 instalments made by the accused. As per the terms
of the Agreement, if any customer commits default in payment of 5
instalments, the Company is empowered to seize the vehicle. He
has further stated that the Investigating Officer collected the sample
writings and signatures of the Divisional Manager of the Company
as Exs. P13 and P14. Similarly, the writing of the accused was also
collected as Exs. P15 and P16. These documents were sent to the
handwriting expert for examination. This witness further stated that
Exs. P11 and P12 are the standard sample receipt and No-Objection
Certificate which the Company issues to its customers and these
documents are prepared in duplicate and one copy is retained with
the Company. It was further deposed that as per the Company’s
rules, after clearance of the loan, the No-Objection Certificate is to
be issued after one week.
13. PW3-Nagabhushana is a Legal Executive in the Company and
he has supported the statement of PW1. PW5-Nandakumar is the
Divisional Manager of the Company. According to this witness, after
the repayment of the entire loan by the customer the concerned
branch forwards the file seeking No-Objection Certificate from him
2272 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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(PW5). He has specifically stated that the case-file pertaining to the
accused’s loan has never come to his office and he had not issued
Ex. P10 at any point of time. He has denied the signature on Ex.
P10 as being his and deposed that the document is forged.
14. PW8-Venkataramaiah is a Junior Executive in the Company. He
has deposed that during the relevant period when the accused is
stated to have repaid the loan, he was working as a cashier in the
relevant branch. He has specifically stated that being cashier of the
Company’s branch, he has not issued Ex. P9 and has not received
any payments from the accused. This witness has also deposed that
the Investigating Officer had obtained the signatures and writings of
the accused as also PW5.
15. PW4-the husband of Savithramma has stated that he purchased the
vehicle from the accused in the name of his wife. He also stated
that the accused on his request brought the Clearance Certificate
from the office of the RTO, Nelamangala. PW9-Dinesh Kumar is
the Police Sub-Inspector who has deposed about receiving Exs. P9
and 10 from RTO, Nelamangala. He further states that he forwarded
the sample handwritings, signatures and Exs. P8 to P10 along with
sample documents secured from PW1 being Exs. P11, P12 and P19
to the handwriting expert.
16. PW11-Syed Asgar Imam is a retired Assistant Director of the Forensic
Sciences Laboratory, Bangalore. This witness is an expert witness
in the case and had submitted an expert report being Ex. P28. This
witness has specifically deposed that the signatures found on Exs.
P8 and P9 were forged. This witness also specifically stated that it
was the accused who had made the D5, D6 and D7 signatures on
Ex. P10. It was stated that the signatures found on these documents
were not the signatures of PW5, who is the competent person to
issue these documents on behalf of the Company.
17. It is undoubtedly true that some of the prosecution witnesses are
officials working in the Company, but just for that reason they cannot be
termed as interested witnesses. Except a bald allegation, no material
has been placed on record by the accused to show any enmity or
ill-will against him by these witnesses, to bolster the argument of false
incrimination. As stated earlier, the accused took a specific defence
that he had repaid the entire loan amount. However, nothing has
been produced to show how the amount was repaid, when it was
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2273

V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka

repaid, and by which mode it was repaid. Having taken a specific
defence, it was for the accused to lead evidence and probabilize his
defence. In our view, the accused has failed in this regard.
18. In fact, the Court is a little surprised as to how the petitioner, even
before this Court, has taken the stand that the documents are
genuine and not forged and/or fabricated, when the entire evidence,
both oral as well as documentary, clearly reveal to the contrary.
Moreover, there is no record, whatsoever, forthcoming to show that
the accused had repaid the loan. Obviously, the act of repayment
of the loan, had the petitioner actually paid back the loan, could
have been demonstrated by bringing before the Courts documents
to indicate that money was transferred from his account/source to
the financier-Company. This has not been done.
19. At this stage, and subject to what we have stated infra, it would
suffice to say, that for the purposes of establishing the petitioner’s
guilt, there was sufficient and reliable material, which rightly the Courts
below have believed and relied upon. Thus, no infirmity in the same
having been found, the conviction needs no interference. On the
point of sentencing, we find that the Trial Court’s view, affirmed by
the High Court, may need some tinkering, which we shall deal with
in the penultimate paragraph. Needless to state, the sentence(s)
awarded to the petitioner shall run concurrently.
20. In Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh (2024)
10 SCC 690, a recent decision by a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
it has been elucidated as under:
‘Difference between criminal breach of trust and
cheating
35. This Court in its decision in S.W. Palanitkar v. State
of Bihar [S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC
241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] expounded the difference in the
ingredients required for constituting of an offence of criminal
breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) vis-à-vis the offence of
cheating (Section 420). The relevant observations read
as under : (SCC p. 246, paras 9-10)
“9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal
breach of trust are : (i) entrusting a person with
property or with any dominion over property; (ii) that
2274 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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person entrusted : (a) dishonestly misappropriating
or converting that property to his own use; or (b)
dishonestly using or disposing of that property or
wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation
(i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in
which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal
contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.
10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are :
(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement
of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so
deceived should be induced to deliver any property
to any person, or to consent that any person shall
retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived
should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b),
the act of omission should be one which causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced
in body, mind, reputation or property.”
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the
offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC)
and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients:
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section
406 IPC)
(1) There must be entrustment with person for
property or dominion over the property, and
(2) The person entrusted:
(a) Dishonestly misappropriated or converted
property to his own use, or
(b) Dishonestly used or disposed of the property
or wilfully suffers any other person so to do in
violation of:
(i) Any direction of law prescribing the method
in which the trust is discharged; or
(ii) Legal contract touching the discharge of
trust (see: S.W. Palanitkar [S.W. Palanitkar v.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2275

V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka

State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 129] ).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420
IPC, the essential ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either by making a false
or misleading representation or by other action or
by omission;
(2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person
to deliver any property, or
(3) The consent that any person shall retain any
property and finally intentionally inducing that person
to do or omit to do anything which he would not do
or omit (see : Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State
of Punjab [Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of
Punjab (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 620]).
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e.
intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be
present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from
the very beginning or inception.
xxx
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and
dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the
transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a
person who comes into possession of the movable property
and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts
it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then
the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention
is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention
involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability
would depend upon the facts of each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and
the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a
fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused
at the time of inducement should be looked into which
may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this,
the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach
2276 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when
the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it
is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property
must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have
dominion over it. The property in respect of which the
offence of breach of trust has been committed must be
either the property of some person other than the accused
or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be of
some other person. The accused must hold that property
on trust of such other person. Although the offence i.e. the
offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest
intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in
basic concept.
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust
and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary
at the time of making a false or misleading representation
i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof
of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal
breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the
property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same.
Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or
dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver
any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot
co-exist simultaneously.
xxx
55. It is high time that the police officers across the country
are imparted proper training in law so as to understand the
fine distinction between the offence of cheating vis-à-vis
criminal breach of trust. Both offences are independent and
distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in
the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other.
The two provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins
that they cannot survive without each other.’
(emphasis supplied)
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2277

V.D. Raveesha v. The State of Karnataka

21. Though, having regard to the afore-enumerated position of law,
on an overall conspectus of the factual aspects juxtaposed with
the evidence on record, as regards fulfilment of the ingredients of
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, at first sight, it may appear that
the petitioner cannot be convicted both under Sections 406 and
420 of the IPC, but, in the present case, on a proper consideration
of the issue in its entirety, there is a fine distinction inasmuch as,
there are two different persons against whom the petitioner has
committed the respective offences under the Sections supra: first, the
Company and second, Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband of purchaser
Savithramma). Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, evidently the petitioner is guilty of offence committed against
the Company punishable under Section 406 of the IPC and also,
of offence committed against Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband of
purchaser Savithramma) punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
22. Accordingly, for reasons aforesaid, the criminal Special Leave
Petition(s) stands dismissed, upholding the Impugned Order, with
the distinguishment of the offences committed supra and by, in the
interest of justice, reducing the sentence(s) awarded to one year
and six months’ Simple Imprisonment. From the bail application it
transpires that the petitioner has already surrendered and presently
is lodged in Central Prison, Parappana Agrahara, Electronic City
Post, Bangalore. Thus, he is directed to serve the remaining period
of the sentence as per this order. This shall be notwithstanding
that vide Record of Proceedings of even date, we had dismissed
the matter(s) simpliciter.
23. Registry shall communicate the order to the Superintendent, Central
Prison, Parappana Agrahara, Electronic City Post, Bangalore
forthwith.
24. We do not propose to make an order as to costs. Pending I.A.s do
not subsist for consideration and are closed.

Result of the case: SLP dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan