V. K. MISHRA&ANR.versusSTATE OF UTIARAKHAND &ANR.

                     [2015] 8 S.C.R. 1


                   V. K. MISHRA&ANR.                          A
                             v.
            STATE OF UTIARAKHAND &ANR.
             Criminal Appeal No. 1247 OF 2012
                                                              B
                      JULY28, 2015
          [T. S. THAKUR, R. K. AGRAWAL AND
                   R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
      Penal Code, 1860: ss.3048, 498A - Dowry death -         c
Death by poisoning - Prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that soon before death the deceased was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and in-
laws in connection with demand of dowry-Accused were not
successful in rebutting presumption raised uls. 1138 of the   o
Evidence Act- Conviction upheld, however, sentence of life
imprisonment reduced in case of husband to 10 years and
in case of in-Jaws to 7 years each - Evidence Act, 1872 -
 1138.
       Evidence Act, 1872: 1138 - Presumption - Held: In a E
  case where demand of dowry is alleged such demands are
  confined within the four walls of the house and known only to
  the members of both sides of the family - In such cases,
  independent and direct evidence with regard to the F
  occurrences is ordinarily not available - That is why the
  Legislature introquced ss.113A and 1138 in the Evidence
  Act by permitting presumption to be raised in certain
. circumstances - Penal Code, 1860- ss.3048, 498A.
      FIR: Evidentiaryvalue of-Held: FIR is not meant to be G
an encyclopedia nor is it expected to contain all the details
of the prosecution case - It may be sufficient if the broad
facts of the prosecution case are stated in the FJR- lfyoung
daughter dies in unnatural circumstances within 6 weeks of
                                                              H
                             1
2         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2015] B S.C.R.


A marriage then father is expected to be disturbed and under
    mental shock and, therefore, non mention of details of
    payment of money and dowry harassment meted out to her
    daughter in FIR would not make the prosecution version
    incredulous.
B
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
        ss. 161, 162 - Police examination of witnesses -
  Purpose and manner in which police statement recorded us.
   161 can be used- Held: Police statement recorded uls. 161
C can be used for limited purpose of contradiction of such
  witnesses - Court cannot suo moto make use of statements
  to police not proved and a$k question with reference to them
  which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the
  court- In the instant case, PW-1 was not confronted with his
D statement recorded by the police u/s. 161 to prove the
  contradiction nor his stateaient marked for the purpose of
  contradiction was read out to the investigating officer - When
  neither PW-1 nor the investigating officer were confronted
E with the statement and questioned about it, PW-1 's statement
  recorded u/s. 161 cannot be looked into for any purpose much
  less to discredit the testimony of PW-1 and the prosecution
  version.
        s. 162 - Words 'if duly proved' used in s. 162 -
F Connotation of - Held: These words clearly show that the
  record of the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in
  evidence straightway nor can be looked into but they must
  be duly proved for the purpose of contradiction by eliciting
  admission from the witness during cross-examination and
G also during the cross-examination of the investigation officer.
         Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1. A conjoint reading of Section 1138 of the
  Evidence Act and Section 3048 IPC shows that there
H must be material to show that soon before her death the
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                3
                       ANR.

victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. In his        A
complaint, PW-1 had cat~gc;irically stated that the
appellants had been torturing his daughter with their
cruel behaviour and she had complained the same to
him and that he advised her to compromise with the
situation and create a healthy atmosphere. In. the FIR,      B
though, there is no specific mention about the demand
of dowry, however, cruelty and torture alleged in the FIR
could have been only in connection with demand of
money or jewels. It was not the case of ti. 0 defence that
the alleged cruelty could only be ti. .. matrimonial         C
skirmishes due to normal wear and tear of the
matrimonial house. The money was given by PW-1 both
prior to marriage and after the·marriage on 11.07.1997
also. Viewed in that context, the alleged cruelty and
                                                             0
torture could have been only in the context of demand
of money or jewellery. FIR' is not meant to be an
encyclopedia nor is it expected to contain all the details
of the prosecution case. Complaint was lodged within
few hours after the tragic event. Death of a daughter        E
within few days of the marriage, the effect on tire mind
of the father-PW1 cannot be measured by any yardstick.
While lodging the report, PW-1 must have been,in great
shock and mentally disturbed. Because of death of his
young daughter being grief stricken, it may not have         F
occurred to PW-1 to narra!~. all the details of payment
of money and the dowry harassment meted out to his
daughter. Unless there are i!ldications of fabrication,
prosecution version cannot be doubted, merely. on the
ground that FIR does not contain the details. [Paras 7,      G
11, 12] [12-C-D; 14-E-H; 15-A-D]
     2. Section 161 Cr.P.C. titled "Examination of
witnesses by police" provides for oral examination of a
person by any investigating officer when such person H
4         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A    is supposed to be acquainted with the facts and
     circumstances of the case. The purpose for and the
     manner in which the police statement recorded under
    Section 161 Cr.P.C can be used at any trial are indicated
     in Section 162 Cr.P.C. Section 162 Cr.P.C. bars use of
B   statement of witnesses recorded by the police except
    for the limited purpose of contradiction of such
    witnesses. Court cannot suo moto make use of
    statements to police not proved and ask question with
    reference to them which are inconsistent with the
c   testimony of the witness in the court. The words in
    Section 162 Cr.P.C. "if duly proved" clearly show that
    the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be
    admitted in evidence straightway nor can be locked into
    but they must be duly proved for the purpose of
0
    contradiction by eliciting admission from the witness
    during cross-examination and also during the cross-
    examination of the investigating officer. Statement
    before the investigating officer can be used for
E   contradiction but only after strict compliance with
    Section 145 of Evidence Act that is by drawing attention
    to the parts intended for contradiction. Under Section
    145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended to contradict
    the witness by his previous statement reduced into
F   writing, the attention of such witness must be called to
    those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose
    of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. If
    the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it
    stands proved and there is no need to further proof of
G   contradiction and it will be read while appreciating the
    evidence. If he denies having made that part of the
    statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement
    and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this
    process the contradiction is merely brought on record,
H
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                 5
                       ANR.

but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter when investigating     A
officer is examined in the court, his attention should be
drawn to the passage marked for the purpose of
contradiction, it will th·en be proved in the deposition of
the investigating officer who again by referring to the
police statement will depose about the witness having         B
made that statement. The process again involves
referring to the.police statement and culling out that part
with which the maker of the statement was intended to
be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with
that part of the statement with which the defence wanted      C
to contradict him, then the court cannot suo moto make
use of statements to police not proved in compliance
with Section 145 of Evidence Act that is, by drawing
attention to the parts intended for contradiction. [Paras
                                                              0
14to 16, 18] [16-A-B; 17-C, F-H; 18-C-H; 19-A-B]
     3. In the case at hand, PW-1 was not confronted
with his statementrecorded by the police under Section
161 Cr.P.C. to prove the contradiction nor his statement
marked for the purpose of contradiction was read out to       E
the investigating officer. When neither PW-1 nor the
investigating officer were confronted with the statement
and questioned about it, PW-1 's statement rece>rded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C~cannot be looked into for any
purpose much less to discredit the testimony of PW-1          F
and the· prosecution version. Evidence of PW-1
regarding making payments to the appellants is cogent
and consistent and is amply strengthened by the bank
stat~ments. Non-mention of details of money paid to the
appellants and the demand of dowry and cruelty and            G
harassment meted out to the deceased in the statement
of PW-1 does not affect the credibility of PW-1. By
perusal of evidence of brother of the deceased (PW-2), it
is seen that he remained consistent throughout his            H
6         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2015) 8 S.C.R.


A   cross-examination and nothing substantial was elicited
    to discredit his version. [Paras 19, 20, 23] (19-8-D, G-H;
    20-A; 22-E]
         4. PW-6, tenant-neighbour of the accused, has
B stated that he has never heard any shouting, screaming
  from the house of the appellants and the couple was
  living happily. In a case where demand of dowry is
  alleged such demands are confined within the four walls
  of the house and known only to the members of both
c sides of the family. In such cases, independent and direct
  evidence with regard to the occurrences is ordinarily not
  available. Evidence of PW-6, therefore, does not in
  anyway advance the case of the appellants. (Para 27] .
  (24-D-G]
D       5. So far as the suicide note is concerned, the
    deceased is said to have stated that she is taking the
    step "suicide" because her mental condition is not good
    and that nobody should be held responsible for her act.
E   The suicide note was not discovered during
    investigation but it was later produced by the appellants.
    When PW-1 (father) was confronted with the suicide note,
    he denied it to be in the hand writing of the deceased.
    The appellants did not take steps to prove the suicide
F   note to be in the hand writing.of the deceased. Another
    document relied upon by the appellants was an inland
    letter purportedly written by a person with whom the
    deceased was said to have had love affair. Inland letter
    was not discovered during investigation but the same
G   was produced by the accused in a bail application filed
    on 29.08.1997. The possibility of such an inland letter
    being fabricated to create evidence to make a possible
    defence cannot be ruled out and rightly the courts below
    recorded concurrent findings rejecting the said letter.
H   [Paras 30, 31, 33] (25-D-F, G; 27-G-H; 28-E]
  V. K. MISHRA &ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &               7
                          ANR.

      6. Prosecution has established beyond reasonable       A
doubts that 'soon before her death' the deceased was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband
and her in-laws in connection with demand of dowry.
The accused were not successful in rebutting the
presumption raised under Section 1138 of the Evidence        B
Act. Concurrent findings of the courts below convicting
the appellants under Section 3048 IPC was based upon
proper appreciation of evidence and convincing
reasons. For the offence under Section 3048 IPC, the
punishment is imprisonment for a term which shall not        C
be less than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life. Section 3048 IPC thus prescribes
statutory minimum of seven years. As per prison records,
the accused-RM is in custody for more than five years        D
which includes remission. Bearing in mind the facts and
circumstances of the case and the occurrence was of
the year 1997 and that the accused RM is in custody for
more than five years, interest of justice would be met if
life imprisonment awarded to him is reduced to               E
imprisonment for a period of ten years. Appellants VKM
and NM, each of them have undergone imprisonment of
more than one year. They are aged about seventy and
sixty four years and are said to be suffering from various
ailments. Considering their age and ailments and facts       F
and circumstances of the case, life imprisonment
imposed on them is also reduced to imprisonment of
seven years each. [Paras 39, 40, 41] [30-D-F, G; 31-B-E]
Sunil Kumar & Anr. vs. State of- Rajasthan (2005) 9 SCC
283: 2005 (1 ) SCR 612; Sher Singh@ Partapa vs. State of G
Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29; Ramakant Mishra@ Lalu etc.
vs. State of U.P 2015 (3) SCALE 186; Ku/want Singh & Ors.
vs. State of Punjab (2013) 4 SCC 177: 2013 (5) SCR 604 -
relied on.
                                                             H
8         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A   Tomaso Bruno & Anr. vs. State of U.P. (2015) 1 SCALE 498;
    Mussauddin Ahmed vs. State ofAssam (2009) 14 SCC 541 ;
    State ofKamataka vs. K. Yarappa Reddy(1999) 8 SCC 715:
    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 359 - referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
B
    2005 (1 ) SCR 612                    relied on.      Para 25
    (2015) 1 SCALE 498                   referred to.    Para 31
    (2009) 14 sec 541                    referred to.    Para 31
c 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 359                referred to.    Para 32
    (2015) 1 SCR 29                      relied on.      Para 37
    2015 (3) SCALE 186                   relied on.      Para 37
    2013 (5) SCR 604                     relied on.      Para40
D
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
    Appeal No. 1247 of 2012

         From the Judgment and Order dated 26.09.2011 of the
E   High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Crl. Appeal No. 42 of
    2002.

                                  WITH

    Criminal Appeal No. 1248 of2012.
F
         K. T. S. Tulsi, Siddharth Luthra, M. A. Chinnasamy, V.
    Senthil Kumar, Satyawan Rathi for the Appellants.

       R. K. Das, Mukesh Giri, AAG, Dinesh Kumar Garg,
G Deepak Mishra, Bhim Pratap Singh, Dr. AbhishekAtrey, Sumi!
  Rajora, Raj Kamal for the Respondents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. These appeals arise out of the ·
H judgment dated 26.09.2011 passed by the High Court of
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                      9
              ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.42 of 2002, A
whereby High Court confirmed the conviction of the appellants
under Section 304B, 498A IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act and the sentence of imprisonment
for life was imposed on each of them.
                                                                    B
       2. Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as
under:- Deceased-Archanawas given in marriage to accused
Rahul Mishra on 28.06.1997. Before marriage and after the
engagement; Dr. Hirday Narayan Tripathi, father of the
deceased, had given a sum of Rs.50,000/- each on three c
occasions and Rs.63,200/- on 11.07.1997 and also gifted
jewellery worth Rs.2,00,000/-toArchana. Archana, after return
from honeymoon, visited her parents house and complained
several times to her father, mother and brother about the
continuous harassment and torture meted out fo Archana by D
her in-laws and husband and that they used to abuse her in
connection with demand of dowry. Between 09.08.1997 to
10.08.1997, Archana visited her parents house. On
09.08: 1997, Archana informed her brother-Santosh (PW-2)
about the demand of Rs. 5,00,000/- by the appellants and PW- E
2 told Archana that he will talk to the appellants. On 10. 08.1997,
 appellant Rahul came to Archana's house and had taken back
Archana to his house. On 10.08.1997, PW2-Santosh Kumar
visited the house of the accused and tried to pacify the
accused regarding their demand of Rs. 5,00,000/-; but the F
accused persisted in their demand. On 13.08.1997, PW1-Dr.
 Hirday Narayan Tripathi visited various institutions to find job
for Archana. On the same day, Archana was admitted in the
hospital as a suspected case of poisoning and she died due G
to poisoning. Law was set in motion by PW1-Dr. Hirday
Narayan Tripathi and on the basis of the complaint, FIR was
registered against the accused in FIR Case No.571/1997
 under Sections 306 and 498A IPC at P.S. Kotwali, Dehradun.
After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and charges were H
10         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2015] 8 S.C.R.


A    framed against the appellants-accused by the trial court under
     Sections 3048, 498A IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the
     Dowry Prohibition Act.
         3. To substantiate charges against the accused,
  prosecution has examined 14 witnesses. When the accused
8
  were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. about the
  incriminating evidence and circumstances, the accused denied
  demand of any dowry and pleaded that they are innocent. Upon
  consideration of evidence, trial court-Additional Sessions
c Judge, Dehradun vide judgment dated 04.02.2002 convicted
  the appellants under Section 3048 IPC and sentenced them
  to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The appellants were
  also convicted under Section 498A IPC and each of them was
  sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years
D with a fine of Rs.2,000/-each with default clause. They were
  also convicted under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
  Act and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
  for one year with a fine of Rs.1, 000/- each with default clause.
  All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Aggrieved
E by the verdict of conviction, the appellants preferred an appeal
  before the High Court which came to be dismissed confirming
  the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused by the
  trial court.
F        4. The learned counsel for t~e appellants contended that
  in the FIR lodged by the father of the deceased or in his earlier
  statement recorded by the police neither there was mention of
  any dowry demand made by the appellants nor of any
  harassment meted out to his daughter. It was contended that
G PW2-brother of the deceased made a false statement for the
  firsttime on 18.08.1997 i.e. five days after the death of Archana
  stating that the parents-in-laws of the deceased were raising
  dowry demand of Rs.5,00,000/- and also made allegations
  regarding cruelty and harassment in connection therewith. It
H was submitted that PW-2 kept silent for about eight days from
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                     11
                  ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

the date of the alleged dowry demand and the cruelty and while A
so, the trial court and the High Court erred in placing reliance
upon the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 to record the verdict of
conviction. It was contended that entire investigation was flawed
as regards the suicide note and the letter written by the
deceased to her brother-in-law and no detailed investigation B
was carried out viz. the inland letter dated 10. 08.1997 received
by the deceased which according to the appellants contained
threats from a dejected lover and sample ofvomitus taken was
either changed or tampered. It was vehemently contended that
the courts below were not right in recording the conviction C
based on the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 which were
purely hearsay and full of contradictions and thus lacked
credibility apart from being clearly an afterthought.
      5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that D
the prosecution adduced cogent and consistent evidence to
prove the dowry demand and that deceased-Archana was
highly educated girl and very sensitive who ended her life only
due to the appellants' greed for dowry and the appellants
subjecting her to cruelty and harassment in connection with E
the demand of dowry. It was submitted that upon proper
appraisal of evidence, the trial court as well as the High Court
rightly convicted the appellants and the verdict of conviction
and sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellants
warrant no interference.                                         F
      6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
contentions urged by the counsel for the parties and perused
the impugned judgment and the materials on record.
    7. In order to attract application of Section 3048 IPC, the   G
essential ingredients are as follows:-
   1. The death of a woman should be caused by burns or
      bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal
      circumstance.                                               H
12        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A     2. Such a death should have occurred within seven years of
         her marriage.
      3. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment
         by her husband or any relative of her husband.
8     4. Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection
         with demand of dowry.
      5. Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted
         out to the woman soon before her death.
C On proof of the essential ingredients mentioned above, it
  becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that
  the accused caused the dowry death. A conjoint reading of
  Section 1138 of the Evidence Act and Section 3048 IPC
  shows that there must be material to show that soon before
D her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment.
  'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon
  circumstance of each case and no strait-jacket formula can
  be laid down as to what would constitute a period 'soon before
  the occurrence'. There must be inexistence a proximate live
E link between the facts of cruelty in connection with the demand
  of dowry and the death. If the alleged incident of cruelty is
  remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb
  mental equilibrium of the woman concerned it would be of no
  consequence. The evidence and material on record to be
F examined whether there is evidence to prove that 'soon before
  the occurrence', deceased-Archana was subjected to torture
  and harassment in connection with demand of dowry and
  whether the courts below are right in convicting the appellants
G under Section 3048 IPC.
          8. In his evidence, PW1-Dr. Hirday Narayan Tripathi,
  father of the deceased, stated Archana was highly educated
  girl i.e. M.Sc. 8.Ed and that the marriage was solemnized with
  Rahul Mishra on 28.06.1997. He deposed that after the
H engagement of his daughter-Archana on 07 .02.1997,
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                        13
              ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

demands of dowry started from the side of groom for a motor-         A
cycle, a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- etc. In his evidence PW-1 stated
that amount was given to the accused persons both before
marriage and also after marriage-(a) Rs.50,000/- on
24.02.1997; (b) Rs. 50,000/- on 14.03.1997; (c) Rs.50,000/-
on 05.05.1997 and (d) Rs.63,200/-on 11.07.1997 and thathe            B
raised. money by sale of his land and by drawing money from
his GPF. PW-1 further stated that the demands were raised
for TV, washing machine, dining table, chairs and almirah etc.
He has stated that his daughter came after three days of
'pagphera' and she told that the appellants are treating her         C
cruelly demanding balance amount. PW-1 told his daughter
that as he has no money, he will be paying them Rs.10,000/-
from his salary. Archana asked her father to shut the mouth of
the appellants by throwing money on their face by withdrawing        D
the amount from her own account and accordingly they paid
Rs.63,200/- to the appellants and the appellants still unsatisfied
made demand for money for starting the new business.
Deceased-Archana also told her parents over phone that her
in-laws were pressurizing her for money in order to start a new      E
business. PW-1 stated that in the last week of July 1997, the
appellant V.K. Mishra telephonically demanded money for
starting new business and due to PW-1 's inability to fulfill the
demand, the accused persons' attitude towards Archana
worsened and they threatened her to throw out of the                 F
matrimonial house.
      9. PW-1 further stated thatArchana feeling depressed
and being a determined girl decided to take up a job and two
or three days prior to 06.08.1997 in the night she came to her
parental house to collect her certificates of educational G
qualification and other materials. PW-1 stated that on
13.08.1997 in search of job for his daughter he went to Central
School and also Indian lnsmute of Petroleum and in the evening
he wanted to inform his daughter about his efforts and that H
14         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015) 8 S.C.R.


A    there being no vacancy. But before that PW-1 made a phone
     call to his wife who asked him to reach Doon Hospital
     immediately asArchana was seriously ill and when he reached
     the hospital, he was informed by the appellant V.K. Mishra that
     Archana consumed poison and died. PW-1 stated that his elder
B    son-Santosh Kumar (PW-2) returned from Bombay on
     15.08.1997, who also informed him about the demand of
     Rs.5,00,000/- by the accused persons fromArchana.
         10. Evidence of PW-1-complainant is assailed by the
c appellants contending that in the complaint lodged by him it is
  not mentioned that any kind of dowry demand was ever made
  and that allegation of demand of dowry is flawed as the same
  was neither mentioned in the FIR nor in his statement recorded
  by the investigating officer. It was also submitted that the details
D of payment of dowry was also not made clear by PW-1 either
  in the FIR or in his statement and evidence in the Court is only
  an exaggeration and no weight could be attached to the same.
         11. Of course, in the FIR, PW-1 had not given the details
E of the money paid to the accused. But in his complaint PW-1
  had categorically stated that th~ appellants had been torturing
  Archana with their cruel behaviour and Archana complained
  the same to him and that he advised her to compromise with
  the situation and create a t)ealthy atmosphere. In the FIR,
F though, there is no specific mention about the demand of dowry,
  cruelty and torture alleged in the FIR could have been only in
  connection with demand of money or jewels. Marriage of
  Archana with accused-Rahul Mishra was solemnized only on
  28.6.1997 and Archana was yetto settle down in the house of
G her in-laws. Both the families were almost of same social and
  economic status. It is not the case of the defence that the
  alleged cruelty could only be the matrimonial skirmishes due
  to normal wear and tear of the matrimonial house. As noticed
  earlier, money was given by PW-1 both prior to marriage and
H after the marriage on 11.07 .1997 also. Viewed in that context,
  V. K. MISHRA &ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                   15
               ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.)

the alleged cruelty and torture could have been only in the       A
context of demand of money or jewellery.
       12. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopedia nor is it
expected to contain all the details
                               ~. r1r
                                      of the prosecution case. It
may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case
                                                                  8
are stated in the FIR. Complaint was lodged within few hours
after the tragic event. PW-1 has lost his young daughter just
married before six weeks in unnatural circumstances. Death
of a daughter within few days of the marriage, the effect on the
mind of the father-PW1 cannot be measured by any yardstick.       c
While lodging the report; PW-1 must have been in grE;!at shock
and mentally disturbed. Because of death of his young daughter
being grief stricken, it may not have occurred to PW-1 to
narrate all the details of payment of money and the dowry
harassment meted out to his daughter. Unless there are D
indications of fabrication, prosecution version cannot be
doubted, merely on the ground that FIR does not contain the
details.
      13. Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel for the
                                                                   E
appellants submitted that FIR contains only allegations of torture
and cruel behavior on the part of.the appellants towards the
deceased and in his statement recorded by the police under
Section 161 Cr.P.C., PW-1 had-hot stated anything aboutthe
alleged dowry demand whereas in his statement recorded by F
the police, PW-1 had only stated about many restrictions
imposed on his daughter due to which Archana felt suffocated.
Contending that there were no allegations of crueity in
connection with dowry demarl'd'or any such conduct of the
appellants which could have driven Archana to commit suicide G
either in the FIR or in the statement of PW-1 recorded on the
next day by the investigating officer, the learned Senior Counsel
urged and tried to persuade us to look into the statement of
PW-1 recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
                                                                   H
16         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A          14. Section 161 Cr.P.C. titled "Examination of witnesses
     by police" provides for oral examination of a person by any
     investigating officer when such person is supposed to be
     acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The
     purpose for and the manner in which the police statement
B    recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C can be used at any trial
     are indicated in Section 162 Cr.P.C. Section 162 Cr.P.C. reads
     as under:
       162. Statements to police not to be signed-Use of
c      statements in evidence.-(1) No statement made by
       any person to a police officer in the course of an
       investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to
       writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any
       such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police
D      diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or
       record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter
       provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence
       under investigation at the time when such statement was
       made:
E
       Provided that when any witness is called for the
       prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has
       been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his
       statement, if duly proved; may be used by the accused,
       and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution,
F
       to contradict such witness in the manner provided by
       section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1of1872);
       and when any part of such statement is so used, any part
       thereof may also be used fn the re-examination of such
G      witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter
       referred to in his cross-examination.
       (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to
       any statement falling within the provisions of clause (1)
       of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1of1872),
H      or to affect the provisions of section 27 ofthatAct.
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE
                         . , OF UTTARAKHAND &                      17
              ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

  Explanation.-An omission to state a fact or circumstance         A
  in the statement referred to in s.ub-section ( 1) may amount
  to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and
  otherw!se relevant having regard to the context in which
  such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts
  to a contradiction in the particular context shall be a          B
  question of fact.
       15. Section 162 Cr.P.C. bars use of statement of
witnesses recorded by the police exceptforthe limited purpose
of contradiction of such witnesses as indicated there. The         c
statement made by a witness before the police under Section
161(1) Cr.PC. can be used only for the purpose of contradicting
such witness on what he has stated at the trial as laid down in
the proviso to Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. The statements under
Section 161 Cr.PC. recorded during the investigation are not D
substantive pieces of evidence but can be used primarily for
the liinited purpose:- (ifof contradicting such witness by an
accused under Section 145 of Evidence Act; (ii) the
contradiction. of such witness also by the prosecution but with ·
the leave of the Court and (iii) the re-examination of the witness E
                                  • V'
if necessary.
                                •'111
        16. Court cannot suo moto make use of statements to
police not proved and ask qu"estion with reference to them
which are inconsistent with the.te~timony of the witness in the    F
court. The words in Section 162 Cr.P.C. "if duly proved" clearly
show that the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be
admitted in evidence straightway nor can be looked into but
they must be duly proved for. the purpose of contradiction by
eliciting admission from the witness during cross-examination      G
and also during the cross-examination of the investigating
officer. Statement before the investigating officer can be used
for contradiction but only after strict compliance with Section
145 of Evidence Act that is by drawing attention to the parts
intended for contradiction.                                        H
18         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A         17. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
       145. Cross-examination as to previous statements
       in writing.- A witness may be cross-examined as to
       previous statements made by him in writing or reduced
       into writing, and relevantto matters in question, without
B
       such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if
       it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention
       must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those
       parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of
c      contradicting him.
         18. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is
  intended to contradict the witness by his previous statement
  reduced into writing, the attention of such witness must be
  called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose
D of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While
  recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of
  the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement
  with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to
  the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The attention
E of witness is drawn to that part'and this must reflect in his cross-
  examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part
  intended to contradict him, it stands proved and there is no
  need to further proof of contradiction and it will be read while
F appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part
  of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement
  and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process the
  contradiction is merely brought on record, but it"is yet to be
  proved. Thereafter when investigating officer is examined in
G the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked
  for the purpose of contradiction, it will then be proved in the
  deposition of the investigating officer who again by referring
  to the police statement will depose about the witness having
  made that statement. The process again involves referring to
H the police statement and culling out that part with which the
  V. K MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND &                     19
                 ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If A
the witness was not confronted with
                                 ,,_ that part of the statement
with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court
cannot suo moto make use of statements to police not proved
in compliance with Section 1.lf5"6f Evidence Act that is, by
drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.      B
      19. In the case at hand, PW-1 was not confronted with
his statement recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
to prove the contradiction nor his statement marked for the
purpose of contradiction was read out to the investigating       c
officer. When neither PW-1 nor the investigating officer were
confronted with the statement and questioned about it, PW-
1's statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be
looked into for any purpose much less to discredit the
testimony of PW-1 and the prosec.ution version.                  D
      20. PW-1 in his evidence clearly stated that one year
 before the marriage he had sold his land for Rs.2,50,000/-
and he has stated that he withdrew the money from the banks
three-four months prior to marriage. PW-1 further st~!ed that    E
 he withdrew Rs.1,00,000/- from his G.P.F account one year
before the marriage and deposi.ted the money in his Central
 Bank Account, D.B.S. College Branch and whenever he
 needed, he used to withdraw meney from his account. In his
evidence, PW-1 has clearly narrated about the details of money   F
paid to the appellants i.e. payment of amount of Rs.11,000/-
and Rs.15,000,/- was given .on the occasion._of 'Tika'
ceremony', Rs. 50,000/- each paid on three different dates;
fixed deposit amount of Rs.63,000/- left in the account of
Archana which was matured was also withdrawn and paid to         G
the appellants on 11.07.1997... Evidence of PW-1 regarding
making payments to the appellants is cogent and consistent
and is amply strengthened by the bank statements. Non-
mention of details of money paid to the appellants and the
demand of dowry and cruelty and harassment meted out to          H
20          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 8 S.C.R.


A    Archana in the statement of PW-1 does not affect the credibility
     of PW-1. As rightly observed by the High Court, it cannot be
     expected from a father to narrate everything when he himself
     was in agony due to death of his own daughter.
B             21. PW2-Santosh Kumar, brother of deceased-Archana
     is a Geologist working as a Surveyor in Tehri Dam. In Tehri,
     PW-2 has a quarter and his family resides with him at Tehri
     and sometimes at Dehradun. In August, as PW-2 has to go to
     Bombay for treatment of his wife, PW-2 took leave for four
c    days from 11.08.1997 and he went to Dehradun on
     07.08.1997. In his evidence, PW-2 stated that on 09.08.1997
     his sister Archana came to the parental house and told him
     that she is continuously tortured by the appellants and that they
     are demanding dowry of Rs.5,00,000/- and asked him not to
D    tell it to the parents as they will not be in a position to arrange
     such a big amount of Rs.5,00,000/- and will be worried. PW-2
     further stated that in order to settle the matter amicably, on the
     evening of 10.08.1997 he went to the matrimonial house of
     his sister where he saw mother-in-law, father-in-law and
E    husband of Archana scolding.her for not bringing the amount
     of Rs. 5,00,000/-. The appellant-Neelima Mishra (mother-in-
     law), told PW-2 " ... Santosh open your ears and listen if you
     do not return back immediately after arranging Rs. 5, 00, 0001
     -, you keep your sister at your home .... ". PW-2 deposed that
F    the appellant V.K. Mishra asked him about the saving details
     of PW-2 and all other brothers and their father. PW-2 tried to
     convince them politely and touched their feet but in vain. PW-
     2 stated that as he had to go to Delhi and then to Bombay and
     it was raining heavily and he rushed to the hotel, and stayed in
G    the hotel for the whole night and next day in the night he took
     bus from Dehradun to Delhi and then reached Bombay by train
     on 13.08.1997. On 14.08.1997, PW-2 gotthe information that
     Archana died and on 15.08.1997, PW-2 came to Delhi by air
H    and from Delhi to Dehradun by taxi. PW-2 stated that due to
   V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                      21
                   ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

VIP visit he was not immediately examined by the police and A
that his statement was recorded only on 18.08.1997.
       22. Evidence of PW-2 is assailed contending that PW-2
 did not allege any dowry demand prior to 09.08.1997 and the
 alleged demand of dowry is clearly an afterthought. It was
                                                                    B
 contended that the stay of PW-2 in hotel at Dehradun on the
 night of 10.08.1997 and till his departure to Delhi on
 11.08.1997, despite his parents' house being situated at
 Dehradun is unnatural and PW~2 is not a reliable witness. PW-
 2's evidence is further assailed contending that PW-2 could        c
 not have met his sister on 09.08.1997 nor he visited Archana 's
 matrimonial house on 10.08.1997 as he was granted leave
·only from 11.08.1997 to 14.08.1997 and his presence in                      •
 Dehradun on 09.08.1997 and 10.08.1997 is highly doubtful.
                                                                         •
 Evidence of PW-2 is further assailed contending that his           D
 parental house situated at Dehradun, it is quite unnatural that
 PW-2 claims to have stayed in a hotel at Dehradun and
 strangely afterthe alleged demand of Rs.5,00,000/-, strangely
 PW-2 did not choose to contact his parents and informed them
 about the alleged demand even though PW-2 stayed in hotel           E
 at Dehradun till 11.08.1997. It was submitted that PW-2 had
 not taken written permission from his department to leave the
 project station atTehri prior to 11.08.1997 and stay of PW-2 in
 hotel which is only 4-5 kms. away from his parental house raises
 serious doubt about his testimony. It was further submitted that   F
 statement of PW-2 that there was a dowry demand of
 Rs.5,00,000/-was recorded only on 18.08.1997 whereas PW-
 2 returned to Dehradun even on 15.08.1997.
        23. Contentions urged assailing credibility of PW-2 do G
 not merit acceptance. PW-2 in his evidence had clearly stated
 that he had come to Dehradun fromTehri on 7.08.1997 and
 was in his parents house till 3.00 pm on 10.08.1997when he
 left for the hotel. PW-2 clearly explained the reason for his
 stay at hotel stating that distance of his father's house from H
  22         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 8 S.C.R.


  A    Dehradun bus stand is 4-5 kms. and as he wanted to settle
      the matter with the in-laws of his sister-Archana about their
      additional demand of dowry for Rs.5,00,000/-, he left his home
      to the hotel with his luggage at 3.00 o'clock perhaps to settle
      the matter with in-laws ofArchana and in order to save time to
  B take the bus on the night of 10.0?.1997, PW-2 might have
      stayed in the hotel at Dehradun. In his evidence, PW-2 clearly
      stated that he had taken permission to be away from Tehri
      from 07.08.1997 to 10.08.1997 and that he took leave from
    · 11. 08.1997 for three-four days to go to Bombay in connection
  C with his wife's treatment in Bombay. PW-2's evidence that he
      metArchana at their parental home on 09.08.1997 and that
      Archana informed him about the demand of Rs.5,00,000/- and
      cruelty meted out to her and that he proceeded to the house of
•
      the appellants to settle the dispute amicably is quite natural
  0
      and inspires confidence. PW-2 acted like a loving brother
      and probably he did not want to give tension to his old parents
      and on seeing the urgency of the matter, went to the appellants'
      house to convince them. By perusal of evidence of PW-2, it is
  E seen that he remained consistent throughout his cross-
      examination and nothing substantial was elicited to discredit
      his version. Merely because PW-2 has not produced
      documents showing the permission granted to him to be away
      from the headquarters Tehri from 07.08.1997 to 10.08.1997,
  F version of PW-2 cannot be doubted. The reasons stated by
      PW-2 for his stay in hotel is quite convincing and the contention
      assaiiing the credibility of PW-2 was rightly rejected by the
     trial court and the High Court.
          24. It has been further contended on behalf of the
  G appellants that there was delay in recording the statement of
    PW-2 by the investigating officer and therefore his evidence
    should be viewed with suspicion, especially when he did not
    disclose about the alleged dowry demand before he left for
  H Dehradun or till his statement      was recorded by the
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                    23
              ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

police. In this context as pointed out earlier, PW-2 went to A
Mumbai for treatment of his wife and on 14.08.1997 he was
informed about death of Archana and on the next day he
returned to Delhi by air and from Delhi he reached Dehradun
by taxi. In his evidence PW-2 stated that the police being busy
in the programme of Ms. Mayawati, the then Chief Minister of B
Uttar Pradesh on 17 .08.1997, the police did not examine and
record his statement and it was only on 18.08.1997 his
statement was recorded by the investigating officer.
Considering the evidence of PW-2, it cannot be said that the
prosecution was deliberately taking time with a view to concoct C
a false case and decide about the shape to be given to the
case. It is pertinent to point out that on the delayed examination
of PW-2, no question was put to the investigating officer (PW-
 14) by the defence. Had such question been put to PW-14, he D
would have certainly explained the reason for not examining
PW-2 from 15.08.1997 to 17.08.1997. Having not done so,
the appellants are not right in contending that there was delay
in recording the statement of PW-2.
       25. It cannot be held as a rule of universal application E
 that the testimony of a witness becomes unreliable merely
because there is delay in examination of a particular witness.
 In Sunil Kumar &Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 9 SCC
 2£3; it was held that the question of delay in examining a
 witness during investigation is material only if it is indicative F
and suggestive of some unfair practice by the investigating
 agency for the purpose of introducing a core of witness to
falsely support the prosecution case. As such there was no
delay in recording the statement of PW-2 and even assuming
that there was delay in-questioning PW-2, that by itself cannot G
amount to any infirmity in the prosecution case.
     · 26. PW3-Sharad KumarTripathi, another brother of the
deceased narrated the incident that took place on 13. 08.1997
in the evening at about 3.10 p.m. a phone call was received by    H
24          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A    him from the appellant-Rahul Mishra who asked him to reach
     his home immediately with my father and disconnected the
     phone. PW-3 stated that he heard voices of scolding and
     crying someone from background and so he called him and
     appellant-Rahul Mishra received the phone and asked him to
B    come immediately with his father and disconnected the phone.
     When PW-3 called again, appellant V.K. Mishra came on line,
     who shouted at PW3 at a very high tone asking him to take his
     sister and that they will not keep her. When PW-3 reached
     there, one of the tenants in the appellants' house told him that
C    white froth was coming out of Archana's mouth and that she
     was taken to Doon Hospital and PW-3 rushed to the hospital
     where he came to know that Archana consumed 'Baygon'
     poison and died of poisoning.
D           27. Vijay Kumar Sharma (PW..Q), tenant-neighbour of the
     accused, has stated that he has never heard any shouting,
     screaming from the house of the appellants and the couple
     was living happily. Placing reliance upon the evidence of this
     witness, appellants contended that had there been any dowry
E    demand, there would have been disharmony among the couple
     which would ' have definitely been known to neighbours like PW-
     6. It is to be noted that in a case where demand of dowry is
     alleged such demands are confined within the four walls of the
     house and known only to the members of both sides of the
F    family. In such cases, independent and direct evidence with
     regard to the occurrences is ordinarily not available. That is
     why the Legislature has introduced Sections 113Aand 1138
     in the Evidence Act by permitting presumption to be raised in
     certain circumstances. Evidence of PW-6, in our view, does
G    not in anyway advance the case of the appellants.
             28. Defence placed much reliance upon three documents:
     (i) the suicide note written by the deceased;      (ii) inland letter
     allegedly found in the trunk and lapses in the investigation and
H    (iii) the letter said to have been written by the deceased victim
   V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND &                   25
               ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

to her brother-in-law. The appellants vehemently contended that A
PW-14-investigating officer failed to carry out fair investigation
regarding the above three documents and submitted that those
three documents become more vital on account of belated
and self-contradictory evidence with regard to demand of
dowry.                                                             B
      29. Mr. Mukesh Giri, learned Addi. Advocate General
appearing for the State, and Mr.. Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the informant submitted that the
appellants have fabricated three letters probabl)4 on legal       c
advice and produced the same at a belated stage while making
application for bail and the appellants have not taken any steps
to prove the genuineness of the documents and rightly those
documents were rejected by the trial court as well as by the
High Court.                                                      D
         30. So far as the suicide note is concerned, Archana is
  said to have stated that she is taking the step "suicide"
  because her mental condition is not good and that nobody
  should be held responsible for her act. It is pertinent to note E
  that suicide note was not discovered during investigation but
  it was later produced by the appellants. When PW-1 (father of
  Archana) was confronted with the suicide note, PW-1 denied
  it to be in the hand writing of Archana. Appellants have not
  taken steps to prove the suicide note to be in the hand writing F
  of Archana. Even assuming the suicide note to be true, the
· fact remains that the death of Archana was unnatural. The
  contents of the suicide note does not affect consistent version
  of PW-1 and PW-2.
      31. Another document relied upon by the appellants is G
 an inland letter dated 10.08.1997 purportedly written by a
 person with whom Archana is said to have had love affair.
 According to the appellantsArchana had love affair before her
 marriage with a boy who after Archana's marriage started
 blackmailing her to reveal the love affair and the alleged H
26        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015) 8 S.C.R.


A abortion and due to this reason Archana became upset and
  committed suicide by consuming poison. Paper No.7 Kha/1
  was submitted to the court of sessions during the hearing of
  bail application of the accused. Learned Senior Counsel for
  the accused Mr. Luthra and Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi contended that
B investigating officer had not taken any efforts to investigate
  about this significant lead which would have knocked the
  foundation of the complainant's case raising bonafide doubts.
  Assailing the credibility of the investigation, interalia, the
  following contentions were raised:
c            .
      (a) There was no investigation about the classmates or
      friends from whom the identity of the writer of the letter
      could have been established;
      (b) Investigating officer had neithertried to ascertain the
D     date, time and place of movement of the deceased-
      Archana during her stay at the house of her parents nor
      did he ascertain the people who visited her when she
      was at home nor whom the deceased visited while she
      was there;
E
      (c) Though in the letter it was stated that Archana's
      brother-Santosh knows about the affair there was no
      investigation by PW-14 in this regard;
      (d) The !nvestigating officer did not make any efforts to
F     establish the identity of purported friend one Singh Sahib
      referred to in the letter nor any effort made to recover the
      letters mentioned in the said inland letter Kha7/1.
  Contending that investigating officer made no efforts to conduct
G an impartial investigation, the learned Senior Counsel
  submitted that the investigating officer made no efforts to
  conduct impartial investigation which coupled with the
  embellishments in the prosecution case regarding the demand
  of dowry raise serious doubts arise about the prosecution
H case. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there is
  V. K. MISHRA &ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                        27
               ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

a serious lapse on the part of the investigating officer in A
ascertaining the truth which entitles the accused to urge the
Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution
and investigation under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act
and placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Tomaso
Bruno & Anr. vs. State of U.P., (2015) 1 SCALE 498 and B
Mussauddin Ahmed VS. State Of Assam, (2009) 14            sec 541.
      32. Refuting the contention of the appellants on the lapses
in the investigation and contending that any lapse in the
investigation does not affect the core of the prosecution case,       c
the respondents have placed reliance upon the judgment of
this Court in State ofKamatakavs. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999)
8 SCC 715, wherein this Court held as under:
  "..... It can be a guiding principle that as investigation is
  not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial,    D
  the conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed
  to depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is well-
  nigh settled that even if the investigation is illegal or even
  suspicious the rest of the evidence must be scrutinized
                                                                      E
  independently of the impact of it. Otherwise the criminal
  trial will plummet to the level of the investigating officers
  ruling the roost. The court must have predominance and
  pre-eminence in criminal trials over the action taken by
  investigating officers. Criminal justice should not be made
                                                                      F
  a casualty for the wrongs committed by the investigating
  officers in the case. In other words, if the court is convinced
  that the testimony of a witness to the occurrence is true
  the court is free to act on it albeit the investigating officer's
  suspicious role in the case .... "                                  G
      33. Inland letter Kha7/1 was not discovered during
investigation but the same was produced by the accused in a
bail application filed on 29.08.1997. Thereafter on the request
made by the accused, investigating officer was directed to
investigate upon tile same. As noticed earlier, the inland letter H
28         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A was not discovered during the investigation; but brother-in-law
  of Archana is said to have discovered the inland letter and
  also the letter allegedly written by Archana to her brother-in-
  law from the suitcase of deceased-Archana. Brother-in-law
  who is said to have discovered those letters was not examined
B in the court. No explanation is forthcoming from the accused
  as to why the same was not handed over to the investigating
  officer. We have also perused the original of the inland Jetter
  and the postal seal in the said letter was not clear. In his
  evidence PW14-investigating officer had specifically stated
C that he tried to ascertain from which post office the inland letter
  was dispatched but he could not identify the same. When the
  seal on the inland letter was not clear, investigating officer
  cannot be faulted in conducting further investigation in
  connection with the said inland letter. The fact that it was
0
  produced on 29 .08 .1997 along with the bail application raises
  doubts about the genuineness of the said inland letter. When
  bail application was filed, by that time possibly there would
  have been legal advice and deliberations. The possibility of
E such an inland letter being fabricated to create evidence to
  make a possible defence cannot be ruled out and rightly the
  courts below recorded concurrent findings rejecting the said
  letter.
         34. Deceased-Archana was an educated girl. If really she
F was in love with a boy, she could have married him even against
  the wishes of her parents. As to the genuineness of the inland
  letter, as pointed out by the trial court, it is difficult to believe
  that deceased Archana had preserved the same so that it may
  reach the hands of her husband and her in-laws. Considering
G the defence plea regarding the inland letter, the trial court rightly
  observed that it is natural that a sensible lady after marriage
  would not have kept it so safely.
       35. Insofar as 'the letter allegedly written by the deceased
H to Rahul's brother-in-law, like two other documents, this letter
   V. K. MISHRA &ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                     29
                ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.)

  was also not recovered during investigation but produced by       A
  the accused along with the bail application. Having written
  such a letter to her brother-in-law, it is strange that without
  posting the same, the deceased would have kept the letter in
  the suitcase. When confronted with the letter, PW-1 denied it
  to be in the hand writing of Archana. The accused had also        B
  not taken any steps to send the documents to hand writing
  expert for obtaining the opinion of the hand writing expert by
  summoning the admitted writings of deceased-Archana. If the
  investigating officer had omitted to do the investigation
  regarding the documents produced by the accused in the court,     C·
  the accused could have taken steps to prove the documents
. to substantiate their defence. Having not done so, the accused
  cannot turn round and contend that there were lapses on the
  part of the investigation which vitally affect the prosecution
                                                                    0
  case.
       36. The investigating officer is not obliged to anticipate
 all possible defences and investigate in that angle. lh any event,
 any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go
 against the prosecution. Interest of justice demands that such E
 acts or omission of the investigating officer should not be taken
 in favour of the accused or otherwise it would amount to placing
 a premium upon such omissions.
        37. In Sher Singh @ Partapa vs. State of Haryana, F
 (2015) 1 SCR 29, it had been held therein that the use of
 word 'shown' instead of 'proved' in Section 3048 IPC indicates
 that the onus cast on the prosecution would stand satisfied on
 the anvil of a mere preponderance of probabilify. In other words,
 'shown' will have to be read up to mean 'proved' but only to the G
 extent of preponderance of probability. Thereafter, the word
 'deemed' used in that Section is to be read down to require
 an accused to prove his innocence, but beyond reasonable
 doubt. The 'deemed' culpability ?f the accused leaving no
 room for the accused to prove innocence was, accordingly, H
30         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 8 S.C.R.


A    read down to a strong 'presumption' of his culpability. The
     accused is required to rebut this presumption by proving his
     innocence. Th·e same view was reiterated in Ramakant Mishra
     @Latu etc. vs. State of U.P., 2015 (3) SCALE 186.
            38. Where the prosecution has shown that 'soon before
8
     her death' the deceased was subjected to cruelty or
     harassment by the husband or in-laws in connection with
     demand for dowry, the presumption under Section 1138 of
     Evidence Act arises and the Court shall presume that such
c    pers<?_n who had subjected the woman to cruelty or harassment
     in connection with any demand for dowry shall be presumed
     to have caused the dowry death. The presumption that arises
     in such cases may be rebutted by the accused.
            39. Prosecution has .established beyond reasonable
D    doubts that 'soon before he'r.death' Archana was subjected to
     cruelty and harassment by her husband and her in-laws in
     connection with demand of dowry. The accused were not
     successful in rebutting the presumption raised under Section
E    1138 of the Evidence Act. Concurrent findings of the courts
     below_ convicting the appellants under Section 3048 IPC is
     based upon proper appreciation of evidence and convincing
     reasons. The courts below rightly convicted the appellants under
     Sections 3048 and 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 Dowry
F    Prohibition Act and in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136
     of the Constitution of India, we find no ground warranting
     interference with the conviction of the appellants.
             "
            40. For the offence under Section 3048 IPC, the
     punishment is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
G    than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for
     life. Section 3048 IPC thus prescribes statutory minimum of
     seven years. In Ku/want Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab,
     (2013) 4 SCC 177, while dealing with dowry death Sections
     3048 and 498A IPC in which death was caused by poisoning
H    within seven years of marriage conviction was affirmed. In the
  V. K. MISHRA&ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND &                          31
              ANR. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

said case, the father-in-law was about eighty years a(l9 his           A
legs had been amputated because of severe diabetes and
mother-in-law was seventy eight years of age and the Supreme
Court held impermissibility of reduction of sentence      the 'on
ground of sympathy below the statutory minimum.
                                                                 B
      41. As per prison records, the accused-Rahul Mishra is
in custody for more than five years which includes remission.
Bearing in mind the facts and circ~mstances of the case and
the occurrence was of the year 1997' and that the ac.cused
                                        •J                   1,1\;J,

Rahul Mishra is in custody for more than five years, interest of c
justice would be met if life imprisonment awarded to him is
reduced to imprisonment for a period
                                '·h,..
                                         often years. Appellants
V.K. Mishra and Neelima Mishra, each of them have undergone
imprisonment of more than one year. Appellants No. 1 and 2
are aged about seventy and six'fy four years and are said to D
be suffering from various ailments. Considering their age and
ailments and facts and circumstances of the case, life
imprisonment imposed on appellants V.K. Mishra and Neelima
 Mishra is also reduced to imprisonment of seven years each.
                                  ,.., •                         E
      42. In the result while we uphold the conviction of the
 appellants under Section 3048 IPC and other offences,
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Rahul Mishra is
reduced to ten years. So also the sentence of life impris9,nment
imposed on V.K. Mishra and Neelima Mishra is reduced to F
seven years each. The conviction of the appellants for other
 offences and sentence of imprisonment imposed on eac;h one
of them are confirmed. Judgment of the High Court shall stand
modified to the above extent and the appeals partly allowed
and disposed off.                                      'Mr~      G
Devika Gujral                                Appeals partly allowed.

                               ..   ~   ,

                                                         ,•;.

                                                         '    "