V. S. R. MOHAN RAOversusK. S. R. MURTHY & ORS.

                 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 773 : 2025 INSC 708

                           V. S. R. Mohan Rao
                                     v.
                          K. S. R. Murthy & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6879 of 2025)
                                 15 May 2025
           [Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the appellant is a ‘land grabber’ under the Andhra Pradesh
       Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

                                  Headnotes†
       Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 –
       ss.2(d), (e) – ‘Land grabbing’; ‘Land grabber’ – Case of the
       applicant (predecessors-in-interest of the respondents) before
       the Special Court was that the appellant was in occupation of
       a portion of the land belonging to the applicant forming part of
       survey no.9 whereas the sale deed produced by the appellant
       showed his property to be in survey no.10 – Appellant was
       held to be a ‘land grabber’, eviction directed:
       Held: The term ‘land grabbing’ is employed in the statute
       conferring on it both a narrow and broad connotation – The
       broader meaning being of taking away unauthorisedly, greedily
       or unfairly and the narrow meaning being of snatching forcibly,
       violently or by unscrupulous means – It cannot be said that there
       should necessarily be criminality insofar as the encroachment
       or trespass carried out – The mens rea or intention required is
       only of illegally taking possession of land, through unlawful or
       arbitrary means, by oneself or through others, for creation of third
       party rights, carrying out constructions or use and occupation
       unauthorisedly – Undisputedly, the appellant had purchased land
       in survey no.10 – Applicant proved her possession by virtue of
       the title deed and also took out a Commission which identified the
       property in the possession of the appellant to be clearly in survey
       no.9 and not survey no.10 – Thus, the survey numbers in the sale
       deed produced by the applicant and the appellant, as also the



* Author
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       failed attempts of the appellant to obtain an injunction against the
       applicant and the Municipality; in suits wherein the claim raised was
       against the very same property, together establish the allegation of
       land grabbing – Impugned judgment of High Court not interfered
       with. [Paras 7, 16, 17].
       Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 –
       s.10 – Ownership of the land, burden of proof – Shifting of
       onus – Discussed. [Para 14]

                                Case Law Cited
       Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. [2002] 1 SCR 651 :
       (2002) 3 SCC 258 – relied on.

                                  List of Acts
       Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

                               List of Keywords
       Land grabber; Land grabbing; ‘Grab’; Mens rea; Intention;
       Criminality; Encroachment; Trespass; Encroached into the property;
       Possession proved; Title deed; Adverse possession; Principle of
       adverse possession; Injunction; Prima facie proof; Taking away
       unauthorisedly, greedily or unfairly; Snatching forcibly, violently
       or by unscrupulous means; Illegally taking possession of land;
       Vendors; Ownership of the land; Initial burden; Burden of proof;
       Shifting of onus; Presumption; Special Court.

                              Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6879 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2025 of the High Court
       for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WP No. 73 of 2007

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Ms. Madhvi Diwan, Sr. Adv., Arun Kumar Nagar, Sudhir Naagar,
       Ms. Rajshree Singh.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       P.V. Yogeswaran, Y. Lokesh, Bibek Tripathi, Arun Singh, Guneswaran
       Pv, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                                775

                   V. S. R. Mohan Rao v. K. S. R. Murthy & Ors.


                     Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                           Judgment

      K. Vinod Chandran, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    The appellant is aggrieved with the fact that he has been accused
      and termed to be a ‘land grabber’ without due cause and directed
      to be evicted from the property which he duly acquired under a sale
      deed, wherein he had been residing from the date of purchase; that
      is from 27.03.1997. The applicant before the Special Court under the
      Land Grabbing Act1 was concerned with 252 square yards of land
      in occupation of the appellant, which the applicant asserted, was a
      clear case of land grabbing, of a portion of the land belonging to the
      applicant admeasuring 555 square yards forming part of survey no. 9
      of Saroornagar Village, Ranga Reddy District; which she purchased
      under a registered sale deed dated 01.01.1965.
3.    Smt. Madhvi Diwan, learned Senior Counsel argued that the
      provisions of the Land Grabbing Act could not have been invoked
      against the appellant herein. The appellant, if at all, was a simple
      trespasser, who had bonafide purchased the property by way of a
      registered sale deed dated 27.03.1997 and had been in residence
      in a double storied building constructed on it. The appellant’s case
      was that the land had changed hands, over the years, he having
      purchased the land from his vendors who trace their title to a Housing
      Society, the 11th respondent. If at all, his title is in doubt, it is perfected
      by his predecessors-in-interest by reason of the principle of adverse
      possession since a two storied building occupied by his vendor was
      existing in the land for very many years. Learned Senior Counsel also
      took us to the decision in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of
      A.P.,2 to impress upon us the constricted scope of the Land Grabbing
      Act and argued with specific reference to paragraphs 37 and 38.
      To term an encroachment or trespass as a ‘land grab’, under the
      Act, there should be obvious criminality and clear mens rea which
      is totally absent in the present case. It is argued without admitting,


1    Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982
2    (2002) 3 SCC 258
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       that, if at all the appellant is guilty, it is a simple trespass, for which
       the remedy under the Act cannot be invoked and one has to go
       before the civil court. It is argued that under the Act, a summary
       trial is conducted and only on a prima facie finding of the title of the
       applicant, the appellant is sought to be evicted.
4.     Learned Counsel Sh. P. V. Yogeswaran, entered appearance for the
       respondents who are the legal heirs of the original applicant before
       the Special Court. It is pointed out that the Commissioner appointed
       by the Court, an officer of the Survey Department, clearly found the
       appellant having encroached into the property of the applicant. The
       property owned by the applicant by virtue of a deed of 1965 was in
       survey no. 9, while the sale deed produced by the appellant showed
       his property to be in survey no. 10. It is also argued that two suits
       filed by the appellant, one against the applicant and the other against
       the Municipality, failed miserably. The Land Grabbing Act brings in
       any encroachment of land within its ambit and scope, inter-alia, of
       a private individual and does not specify any limit on extent for it to
       operate. It provides a special remedy for evicting the person who
       has grabbed the land, which is rightly availed by the applicant.
5.     We refer to the contesting parties as the applicant; who initiated the
       proceedings before the Special Court and the one alleged as a land
       grabber: as the appellant. We first looked at the decision in Konda
       Lakshmana Bapuji2 to understand whether criminality and mens
       rea is a requirement under the enactment. The Learned Judges
       having looked at the definition of ‘grab’, especially in the context of
       the statute having not provided a definition for ‘grabbing’, found it
       literally to have a broad meaning and a narrow one. The broader
       meaning being of taking away unauthorisedly, greedily or unfairly
       and the narrow meaning being of snatching forcibly, violently or by
       unscrupulous means. It was held, with regard to the object of the
       Act that it took within its scope and ambit both the narrow as well
       as the broad meaning. It was held so in paragraph 37:-
            “… Thus understood, the ingredients of the expression
            “land grabbing” would comprise (i) the factum of an
            activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently,
            unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful
            entitlement, and (ii) the mens rea/intention – “with the
            intention of with a view to” (a) illegally taking possession of
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              777

               V. S. R. Mohan Rao v. K. S. R. Murthy & Ors.


           such lands or (b) enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease
           and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements
           in respect of such lands, or (c) to construct unauthorised
           structures thereon for sale or hire, or (d) to give such lands
           to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis
           for construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised
           structures.”
6.   We are in respectful agreement with the above proposition especially
     looking at the definition of ‘land grabber’ and ‘land grabbing’ as is
     seen from clauses (d) and (e) of Section 2 of the Act, the ambit of
     which also has been delineated in paragraph 38 of the cited decision:-
           “A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e) would suggest
           that to bring a person within the meaning of the expression
           “land grabber” it must be shown that : (i)(a) he has
           unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently
           or unscrupulously any land belonging to the Government
           or a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or
           endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person;
           (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c) with a view to
           illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter or create
           illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any
           other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to
           construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire,
           or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and
           licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of
           unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has given financial aid
           to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for
           construction of unauthorised structures thereon; or (iii) he
           is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers
           of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by
           criminal intimidation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing of
           any of the abovementioned acts; or (v) that he is the
           successor-in-interest of any such persons.”
7.   The definition under clause (cc) of Section 2 of ‘land belonging to
     a private person’ includes a land belonging to (i) an evacuee, (ii)
     a military personnel, or (iii) any private individual. Clause (e) is an
     inclusive definition which takes in every activity of grabbing of any
     land whether belonging to the Government, a local authority or even
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       a private person. The definition of ‘land grabber’ under clause (d)
       also takes in a person who commits land grabbing and includes any
       organised activity for the purpose of land grabbing. As has been
       held in the cited decision, the term ‘land grabbing’ is employed in
       the statute, conferring on it both a narrow and broad connotation
       and it cannot be said that there should necessarily be criminality
       insofar as the encroachment or trespass carried out. The mens rea
       or intention required is only of illegally taking possession of land,
       through unlawful or arbitrary means, by oneself or through others,
       for creation of third party rights, carrying out constructions or use
       and occupation unauthorisedly.
8.     Konda Lakshmana Bapuji 2 has also held that the allegation of any
       act of land grabbing is the sine qua non for maintaining an application
       under the Act and not the truth or otherwise of such an allegation.
       However, to hold that a person is a land grabber, it is necessary to
       find that the allegations satisfying the requirement of land grabbing
       are proved to make out a case that the appellant is a land grabber.
       The applicant should include both the ingredients, the factum as
       well as the intention, that the person accused of land grabbing falls
       under the definition clause (d) of section 2 of the Act and that the
       intention was to illegally take possession of such land, as required
       under clause (c) of Section 2.
9.     A reading of the complaint filed as LGC No. 121 of 1999 would
       clearly indicate that the applicant had asserted her ownership over
       555 sq. yards of land in survey no. 9, having obtained it by virtue
       of a registered sale deed of 09.01.1965 which was purchased by
       her vendor Valluru Venkateshwarlu who purchased the land through
       a registered deed dated 29.01.1962. The Society which is said to
       have purchased the land from the legal representatives of the very
       same person, purchased land that existed in survey no. 10. The
       applicant had asserted before the Special Court that the vendors
       of the appellant had trespassed into the land and the appellant too
       was occupying the land illegally with a view to grab lands over which
       the applicant had a valid title, especially since the continuance of
       the appellant’s possession was based on a sale deed wherein the
       property scheduled is said to be existing in survey no. 10.
10. The ingredients required under the Land Grabbing Act definitely are
    pleaded in the application, which remain an allegation till it is proved
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                          779

               V. S. R. Mohan Rao v. K. S. R. Murthy & Ors.


     before the Special Court. The applicant proved her possession
     by virtue of the title deed and also took out a Commission which
     identified the property in the possession of the appellant to be clearly
     in survey no. 9 and not survey no. 10. The Special Court also spoke
     of the suits filed by the appellant, one of which, seeking injunction
     against the applicant was rejected and the other, seeking injunction
     against the Municipality, was withdrawn when the applicant sought
     to implead herself in the said suit.
11. Admittedly, the appellant’s land; more fully described in the application,
    is existing in survey no. 9 and it is not disputed that the appellant’s
    purchase was of a land in survey no. 10. The learned Senior Counsel
    had argued that there was lack of clarity in the Commission Report.
    We have looked at the report produced as annexure P-10 in the
    SLP records. In fact, the lack of clarity is insofar as identification
    of properties in survey no. 10. The Commission Report specifically
    records that survey no. 9 has a total extent of 462 acres and 28
    guntas and there are several survey numbers lying scattered and
    aloof, in which is comprised survey no. 10 admeasuring 6 acres
    and 7 guntas. As per the inspection, the schedule property clearly
    falls within survey no. 9 and not in survey no. 10. The Commission
    Report, by the Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records according
    to us, clearly identifies the property of the applicant, in the survey
    number. 9 as revealed from her document of 1965.
12. Further as found by the Special Court and the High Court, two suits
    were filed by the appellant, both for injunction; one against the
    applicant and the other against the Municipality. The first suit against
    the applicant was dismissed and the second suit was withdrawn,
    when the applicant sought impleadment.
13. Much was argued about the summary manner in which an enquiry
    is conducted in a proceeding before the Special Court under the
    Act which however does not come out from a plain reading of the
    Land Grabbing Act or the decision cited for the appellant. This Court
    in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji2 emphasised the object of the Act
    which was to curb the increasing trend in grabbing the lands of the
    government and the other public authorities as also private persons
    by unscrupulous, but resourceful persons. The intention was to
    immediately detect such instances of land grabbing and deal with it
    sternly and swiftly by specially devised adjudicating forums to ensure
780                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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       that the evil subsides and social injustice will not be perpetrated with
       impunity. The Special Court is constituted with both civil and criminal
       jurisdiction; which consists of a serving or retired Judge of a High
       Court as Chairperson, two serving or retired District Judges and
       two serving or retired Civil Servants not below the rank of a District
       Collector, as members; as is seen from the statute produced in the
       SLP. The Special Court constituted is also an appellate forum as
       against the orders passed by a Special Tribunal, constituted under
       the Act which is the Court of the District Judge having jurisdiction
       of the area, including the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
14. Under Section 10 of the Act the initial burden, prima facie, to prove
    the ownership of the land is on the person who asserts it by way of
    an application alleging an act of land grabbing. On prima facie proof
    being offered the onus will shift to the land grabber, since there is
    a presumption arising if the ownership of the subject land is proved
    prima facie. The allegation of land grabbing by itself does not give
    rise to the presumption, which arises only when prima facie the
    ownership is established, at which point the alleged land grabber
    can lead evidence to rebut the presumption. Merely because of the
    shifting of the onus, on the initial prima facie burden being discharged,
    it cannot be said that there is a prejudice caused to the respondent
    before the Special Court.
15. As has been held in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji 2, an allegation is
    a requirement to maintain a petition but however, proof should be
    offered insofar as the claim of title asserted by the applicant in which
    context only the onus of proof shifts to the alleged land grabber.
    Even then, there is ample opportunity for the land grabber to rebut
    the presumption, which the appellant herein has not been able to
    do before the Special Court.
16. The survey numbers evidenced in the sale deed produced by the
    applicant and the appellant, as also the failed attempts of the appellant
    to obtain an injunction against the applicant and the Municipality; in
    suits wherein the claim raised was against the very same property,
    together establish the allegation of land grabbing. We cannot but
    observe that though a claim is raised on adverse possession, by
    reason only of a building constructed on the subject land, no proof was
    offered as to the date on which such construction was commenced
    and concluded. We say this, despite having noticed that the applicant
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           781

                 V. S. R. Mohan Rao v. K. S. R. Murthy & Ors.


     has a case that on being aware of the commencement of construction,
     the applicant had moved the Registrar of Co-operative Societies
     seeking action against the Housing Society, the 13th respondent, which
     purchased the property in survey no. 10 from Valluru Venkateshwarlu,
     the vendor of the applicant as also the Society; the predecessor in
     interest of the appellant too. This puts to peril the plea of adverse
     possession since it puts paid the foundation of a hostile animus.
17. We find absolutely no reason to interfere with the judgment impugned
    specifically noticing that the decision cited, in paragraph 17 held that:-
             “The purpose of the Act is to identify cases involving
             allegation of land grabbing for speedy enquiry and trial.
             The courts under the Act are nonetheless civil courts which
             follow the Code of Civil Procedure and are competent to
             grant the same reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary
             civil courts.”
18. The appeal stands dismissed.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey