Holding

Section 69(2A) of the Indian Partnership Act, introduced by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, is unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A and is therefore ultra vires.

Summary

The appellant, V. Subramaniam, filed a suit for dissolution of an unregistered partnership firm against Rajesh Raghunandra Rao. The defendant argued that the suit was barred by Section 69(2A) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1984, which restricts unregistered firms from suing for dissolution, accounts, or property recovery unless the firm’s duration is six months or capital is up to Rs.2,000. The Supreme Court examined whether this restriction violated Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution. It held that the provision was arbitrary, excessive, and not a reasonable restriction in the public interest, thereby infringing the constitutional guarantees of equality, freedom to trade, and protection of property. Consequently, the provision was declared ultra‑vires and unconstitutional, allowing the appeal and permitting the suit to proceed without regard to Section 69(2A).

Issues considered

Whether Section 69(2A) of the Indian Partnership Act, as inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution of India.
Whether the restriction imposed by Section 69(2A) is a reasonable limitation on the right to practice a trade or business.
Whether the provision deprives partners of an unregistered firm of the right to sue for dissolution, accounts, or recovery of property.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 19(1)(g), s. Article 300A
Indian Partnership Act, 1932s. 69

Subjects

Partnership lawConstitutional validityArticle 14Article 19(1)(g)Article 300AUnregistered partnershipMaharashtra AmendmentSection 69Right to dissolve partnershipArbitrarinessReasonableness

Judgment

[2Ju.J; l S C.R. 942

A V SU3R.AMANIAl'v1
v
RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO
Civil Appeal No.7438 of 2000

MARCH 20, 2009
B
(MARKANDEY KAT JU AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.)
Indian Partnership Act, 1932 -s 69(2A) as introduced by ~
•
Maharashtra Amendment of 1984 (Maharashtra Act No.29 of
1984)- Constitutional validity of - Held: It is not valid - The
c provision violates Arts. 14. 19(1 )(g) and 300A of the
Constitution - It deprives a partner in an unregistered firm from
recovery of his share in property of the firm or from seeking
dissolution of the firm - Restrictions placed by s.69(2A) are
arbitrary and of excessive nature and go beyond what is in the +
D public interest - Constitution of India, 1950 -Arts. 14, 19(1 )(g)
and 300A.
In a suit filed before the Bombay City Civil Court for
dissolution of an unregistered partnership firm, the
defendant took the stand that the suit was not
E maintainable in view of sub-section (2A) of Section 69 of
the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The said sub-section (2A)
.:i. -
was introduced to s.69 of the Act, by the Maharashtra
Amendment of 1984 (Maharashtra Act No. 29 of 1984).
Till the Maharashtra Amendment of 1984 came into
F force on 1-1-1985, a partner in a firm could file a suit for
dissolution of an unregistered partnership firm or for
accounts of the dissolved firm or to recover the properties
of the dissolved firm. However, in view of sub-section (2A)
of Section 69, w.e.f. 1-1-1985 a partner in an unregistered .!
G partnership firm in the State of Maharashtra cannot file a
suit for dissolution or for accounts of a dissolved firm or
realize properties of a dissolved firm, unless the duration
of the firm was only six months or it's capital is upto
Rs.2000/-.
H 942
V SUBRAMANIAM V RAJESH RAGHUV/\NDRA RAO 943

i
-~ The question raised in the instant appeal was: A
whether sub-section (2A) of Section 69 inserted by the
Maharashtra Amendment is constitutionally valid.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1. There is no legal requirement, unm<e in B
England, which makes registration of a firm compulsory,
rather in India it is voluntary. Both registered and
unregistered are legal though of course registration and
non registration have different legal consequences. The
primary object of registration of a firm is protection of third c
parties who were subjected to hardship and difficulties
in the matter of proving as to who were the partners. Under
the earlier law, a third party obtaining a decree was often
put to expenses and delay in proving that a particular
person was a partner of that firm. The registration of a D
firm provides protection to the third parties against false
denials of partnership and the evasion of liability. Once a
firm is registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932
the statements recorded in the Register regarding the
constitution of the firm are conclusive proof of the fact E
contained therein as against the partner. A partner whose
-) name appears on the Register cannot deny that he is a
partner except under the circumstances provided. Even
then registration of a partnership firm is not made
compulsory under the Act. A partnership firm can come
into existence and function without being registered. F
[Paras 26 & 28] [952-G-H; 954-D-E; 953-A-C]
1.2. The Maharashtra Amendment to s.69 of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932, whereby sub-section (2A) was
introduced, effects such stringent disabilities on an G
unregistered firm which are crippling in nature. It lays
down that an unregistered firm cannot enforce its claims
against third parties. Similarly, a partner who is not
registered is unable to enforce his claims against third
parties or against his fellow partners. An exception to this H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

I
A disability with regard to an unregistered firm was made in
sub-section (3)(a) to Section 69, and this clause enabled
•
the partners in an unregistered firm to sue for the
dissolution of the firm or for accounts or for realizing the
property of the dissolved firm. Thus a partnership firm
B could come into existence, function as long as there is
no problem, and disappear from existence without being
registered. This changed by the 1984 Amendment
extending the bar of the proceedings to a suit for •
I. ...
dissolution or recovery of property as well. The effect of
c the Amendment is that a partnership firm is allowed to
come into existence and function without registration but
it cannot go out of existence (with certain exceptions).
This can result into a situation where in case of disputes
amongst the partners the relationship of partnership
D cannot be put an end to by approaching a court of law. A
dishonest partner, if in control of the business, or if simply
stronger, can successfully deprive the other partner of
his dues from the partnership. It could result in extreme
hardship and injustice. An aggrieved partner is left without
any remedy whatsoever. He can neither file a suit to
E
compel the mischievous partner to cooperate for
registration, as such a suit is not maintainable, nor can
.i. -
he resort to arbitration if any, because the arbitration
proceedings would be hit by Section 69(1) of the Act. [Para
26] [953-C-H; 954-A]
F
1.3. The restrictions placed by sub-section (2A) of
Section 69 introduced by the Maharshtra (Amendment)
Act are arbitrary and of excessive nature and go beyond
what is in the public interest. Hence the restrictions
G cannot be regarded as reasonable. The said provision is ~·
clearly unreasonable and arbitrary since by prohibiting
suits for dissolution of an unregistered firm, for accounts
and for realization of the properties of the firm, it creates
a situation where businessmen will be very reluctant to
enter into an unregistered partnership out of fear that they
H
V. SUBRAMANIAM V. RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO 945

t will not be able to recover the money they have invested A
in the firm or to get out of the firm if they wish to do so.
[Paras 27, 28] [954-A-D]
1.4. Sub-section (2A) of Section 69 of the Act virtually
deprives a partner in an unregistered firm from recovery
8
of his share in the property of the firm or compensation in
lieu thereof, and prohibits him from seeking dissolution
of the firm although he may want it dissolved. Sub-section
(2A) of Section 69 as introduced by the Maharashtra
Legislature clearly violates Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A C
of the Constitution, it is ultra vires and hence declared
unconstitutional. The suit can now proceed ignoring sub-
section 2A which we have declared invalid. [Paras 16, 17,
20, 30) [950-E-F; 955-8-C]
--+ Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another AIR 1978 o
SC 597; Chintamanrao and another vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1951SC118; MC. VS. Arunachala Nadarv. State
of Madras and others AIR 1959 SC 300; Jagdish Chandra
Gupta vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. AIR 1964 SC 1882 and
Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others vs. P. Laxmi Devi E
AIR 2008 SC 1640 - relied on.
-.> Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs. Union of India AIR 1951 SC
41; Ananda Behera vs. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 17;
Virendra Singh vs. State of UP. AIR 1954 SC 447; Wazir
Chand vs. State of H.P. AIR 1954 SC 415; Nathubhai Dhulaji F
vs. Municipal Corporation AIR 1959 Born. 332 and Vajrapuri
Naidu, N. vs. New Theatres, Carnatic Talkies Ltd. 1959(2) MLJ
469 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
G
AIR 1978 SC 597 relied on Para 19
AIR 1951 SC 41 referred to Para 21
AIR 1956 SC 17 referred to Para 21
AIR 1954 SC 447 referred to Para 21 H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ["Oo~·
" ::I .i :::>.
-
J ·. C. R•

A AIR 1954 SC 415 reforred to Para 21
't-
AIR 1959 Born. 332 referred to Para 21
1959(2) MLJ 469 referred to Para 21
AIR 1951 SC 118 relied on Para 24
B
AIR 1959 SC 300 relied on Para 25
AIR 1964 SC 1882 relied on Para 26 •
.l

AIR 2008 SC 1640 relied on Para 30
c CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7438
of 2000
From the Judgement and Order dated 27.09.2000 of the
Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil References
No. 19/1999 in S.C. Suit No. 6212 of 1998. +·
D
Prasenjit Keshwani, Prashant Kumar, Shankar Divate,
Chinmony Khaladkar, Asha Gopalan Nair, appearing for the
parties.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
E
MARKANDEY KATJU, J.
~-
1. This appeal by special leave has been filed against the
impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 27 .9.2000
in Civil Reference No. 19 of 1999.
F
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
3. This appeal arises out of a suit filed before the Bombay
City Civil Court instituted by the appellant praying inter alia for -~
G dissolution of an unregistered partnership firm between the
appellant and the respondent. In that suit a defence taken was
that the suit was not maintainable in view of sub-section (2A) of
Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act'). The Bombay City Civil Court was of the
H view that the said sub-section 2A, which was introduced by the
'
4
V. SUBRAMANIAM V. RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO 947
[MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]

Maharashtra Amendment to Section 69 of the Act, being the A
!
t Maharashtra Act no.29 of 1984 (which received assent of the
· President of India) was unconstitutional being violative of Articles
14 and 19 (1 )(g) of the Constitution of India. Hence the Bombay
City Civil Court by order dated 16.8.1999 made a reference to
the High Court under Section 113 of C.P.C. B
4. The High Court, however, in the impugned judgment has
held that the said sub-section 2A of Section 69 of the Act is not
J unconstitutional. Hence th)s appeal before us.
,\
5.Section 69(1) & (2) of the Partnership Act originally read c
as follows:
"69. Effect of non-registration.
(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract
or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by
D
or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm
against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have
been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and
the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of
Firms as a partner in the firm:
E
(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract
shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm
against any third party unless the firm is registered and
->
the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register
of firms as partners in the firms."
F
6. Sub-section 2A which was introduced by the
Maharashtra Amendment 1984 states as follows :
"(2A) No suit to enforce any right for the dissolution of
a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or any right or.
y
.,., power to realize the property of a dissolved firm shall be G
instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing
as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged
to be or have been a partner in the firm, unless the firm is
registered and the person suing is or has been shown in
the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm: H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A Provided that the requirement of registration of firm under
this sub-section shall not apply to the suits or proceedings
instituted by the heirs or legal representatives of the
deceased partner of a firm for accounts of a dissolved .
firm or to realize the property of a dissolved firm."
B
7. It may be mentioned that the Maharashtra Amendment
of 1984 not only inserted sub-section 2A in Section 69, it also
substituted the original sub-section (3)(a) to Section 69 by an
altogether different sub-section (3)(a).
·c 8. The original sub-section (3)(a) of Section 69 in the
Partnership Act read as follows :
"(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shail apply
also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a ·
right arising from a contract, but shall not affect:- ·.
D . .
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution
of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any,
right or power to realize the property of a dissolved
firm."
E 9. The Maharashtra Amendment of 1984 substituted clause ·
(a) of Section 69(3) of the original Act by the following sub-
section (a) :
"The firms constituted for a duration of six months or with
a capital upto Rs.2000/-"
F
10. The Maharashtra Amendment also added a proviso
to Section 69(1) which reads as follows: ·
"Provided thatthe requirement of registration of firm under _
this sub~section shall not apply to the suits or proceedings
G instituted by the heirs or. legal representatives of the'. ·"f'
' deceased partner of a firm for accounts of the firm or to
realize the property of the firm· . ·
11. The'English law in so far as it makes registration
'H compulsory for a firm and imposes a penalty for non-re!)istration
V. SUBRAMANIAM V. RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO 949
[MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
..

.' was not followed when the Partnership Act was made in India in A·
1932 as it was considered that this step would be too drastic
and would introduce several difficulties. Hence registration was
made optional at the discretion of the partners, but following the
English precedent, any firm which was not registered by virtue
of sub-sections (1 )& (2) of Section 69 disabled a partner or the B
firm (as the case may be) from enforcing certain claims against
the firrn or third parties (as the case may be) in a Civil Court.
j
,. 12. An exception to this disability with regard to ·an
unregistered firm was made in sub-section (3)(a) to Section
69, and this clause enabled the partners in an unregistered firm c
to sue for the dissolution of the firm or for accounts or for realizing
· the property of th.e dissolved firm.
13. This exception in clause (a) of Section 69(3) was made
cin the principle that while. registration of a firm is designed D
+ primarily to protect third parties, the absence of registration does
not mean that the partners of an unregistered firm lose all rights
in the said firm or its property and hence cannot sue for accounts
or for its .dissolution or. for realizing their property in the firm.
14. It may be mentioned that a partnership firm, unlike a E
company registered under the Indian Companies Act, is not a
distinct legal entity, and is oryly a compendium of its partners.
-J.
Even the registration of a firm does not. mean that it becomes
' . .a
distinct legal entity like a company. Hence
-
the partners
_, of a firm
. . .

are co-owners of the property of the firm, unlike shareholders in F
a company who are not co-owners of the property of the
company.
.
. 15. Till the Maharashtra Amendment of 1984 came into
force on 1.1.1985, a partner in a firm could file a suit for
·1· dissolution of an unregistered partnership firm or for accounts G
of the dissolved firm or to recover the properties of the di~solved
firm. However, in view of sub-section 2A of Section 69, since
1. t.1985 a partner in an unregistered partnership firm in the
State of Maharashtra cannot file a suit for dissolution or for
accounts of a dissolved firm or realize properties of a dissolved H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A firm, unless the duration of the firm was only six months or it's
capital is upto Rs.2000/-. The question before us is whether ~-
sub-section 2A of Section 69 inserted by the Maharashtra
Amendment is constitutionally valid.
16. In our opinion sub-section 2A of Section 69 inserted
B
by the Maharashtra Amendment violates Articles 14, 19(1)(g)
and 300A of the Constitution of India.
17. It has already been mentioned above that a partnership
_.._l
firm, whether registered or unregistered, is not a distinct legal
c entity, and hence the property of the firm really belongs to the
partners of the firm. Sub-section 2A virtually deprives a partner
in an unregistered firm from recovery of his share in the property
of the firm or from seeking dissolution of the firm.
18. Article 300A of the Constitution of India states :
D
"No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.•
19. It is by now well settled that a law to be valid has to be
non arbitrary vide the 7-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
E Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another AIR 1978 SC
597.
20. Sub-section 2A virtually deprives a partner of a firm
from his share in the property of the firm without any
compensation. Also, it prohibits him from seeking dissolution
F
of the firm although he may want it dissolved.
21. Deprivation of property may take place in various ways,
such as 'destruction' vide this Court's decision in Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhuri vs. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41 or 'confiscation'
G vide this Court's decision in Ananda Behera vs. State ofOrissa
AIR 1956 SC 17, or revocation of a proprietary right granted by .''f'
a 'private proprietor' vide this Court's decision in Virendra
Singh vs. State ofU.P AIR 1954 SC 447, 'seizure of goods'
vide this Court's decision in Wazir Chand vs. State of H.P AIR
H 1954 SC 415 or 'immovable property' vide this Court's decision
V. SUBRAMANIAM V. RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO 951
[MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]

-
-i in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP (supra) from the possession A
of an 'individual' vide this Court's decision in Wazir Chand vs.
State of H.P (supra) or 'assumption of control of a business'
vide this Court's decision in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP
(supra) in exercise of the 'police power' of a State. Thus, there
is a 'deprivation' where a municipal authority, under statutory B
power, pulls down 'dangerous premises' vide decision in
Nathubhai Dhulaji vs. Municipal Corporation AIR 1959 Born.
~
..I 332 or an insolvent is divested of his 'property' vide decision in
Vajrapuri Naidu, N. vs. New Theatres, Carnatic Talkies Ltd.
1959(2) MLJ 469. c
22. The appellant challenges the Amendment as violative
of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Article 14
guarantees the right to equality and states that "The State shall
not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India." Equal D
protection means the right to equal treatment in similar
circumstances. In other words there can be classification for
legitimate purposes, but it is well settled that the classification
must be reasonable i.e. based on intelligible differentia and
having nexus between the basis for classification and the object E
of the legislation.
-k 23. Under Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution all persons
have the right to practice any profession or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business. Clause (6) of that Article enables
the State to make any law imposing, in the interest of general
F
public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred under sub-clause (g) of Article 19(1 ).
24. In Chintamanrao and another vs. The State of Madhya
')' Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 this Court observed: G
.... "The phrase ·reasonable restriction' connotes that the
limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right
should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond
what is required in the interest of the public. The word
reasonable' implies intelligent care and deliberation, that H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A is the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation
. I

which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot
be said to contain the equality of reasonableness and
unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom
guaranteed in Article 19(1 )(g) and the social control
B permitted by clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be
wanting in that quality."

25. Similarly in M. C. VS. Arunachala Nadar vs. State of I
...
Madras and others AIR 1959 SC 300 where the constitutional
validity of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act was
c challenged, as violative of Article 19(1 )(g), while considering
'
the test of reasonableness to be applied this Court observed
as under:

"It has been held that in order to be reasonable, a
D restriction must have a rational relation to the object which
the legislature seeks to achieve and must not go in excess
of that object ( Chintamanrao and another vs. The State
of Madhya Pradesh (supra). The mode of approach to
ascertain the reasonableness of restriction has been
succinctly stated by Patanjali Ssastri, C.J. in State of
E
Madras vs. VG Row AIR 1952 SC 196:
"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test ~ -
of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be
applied to each individual statute impugned, and no
F abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness
can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of
the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying
purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the
G disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions ••
at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict."
26. The primary object of registration of a firm is protection
of third parties who were subjected to hardship and difficulties
in the matter of proving as to who were the partners. Under the
H earlier law, a third party obtaining a decree was often put to
V SUBRAMANIAM V. RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO 953
[MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
.
-I
expenses and delay in proving that a particular person was a A
partner of that firm. The registration of a firm provides protection
to the third parties against false denials of partnership and the
evasion of liability. Once a firm is registered under the Act the
statements recorded in the Register regarding the constitution
of the firm are conclusive proof of the fact contained therein as B
against the partner. A partner whose name appears on the
Register cannot deny that he is a partner except under the
circumstances provided. Even then registration of a partnership
firm is not made compulsory under the Act. A partnership firm
. can come into existence and function without being registered. c
However, the Maharashtra Amendment effects such stringent
disabilities on a firm as in our opinion are crippling in nature. It
lays down that an unregistered firm cannot enforce its claims
against third parties. Similarly, a partner who is not registered
is unable to enforce his claims against third parties or against 0
his fellow partners. An exception to this disability was a suit for
dissolution of a firm or a suit for accounts of a dissolved firm or
a suit for recovery of property of a dissolved firm. Thus a
partnership firm can come into existence, function as long as
there is no problem, and disappear from existence without being E
registered. This is changed by the 1984 Amendment extending
the bar of the proceedings to a suit for dissolution or recovery
of property as well. The effect of the Amendment is that a
partnership firm is allowed to come into existence and function
without registration but it cannot go out of existence (with certain
exceptions). This can result into a situation where in case of F
disputes amongst the partners the relationship of partnership
cannot be put an end to by approaching a court of law. A
dishonest partner, if in control of the business, or if simply
stronger, can successfully deprive the other partner of his dues
from the partnership. It could result in extreme hardship and G
injustice. Might would be right. An aggrieved partner is left without
any remedy whatsoever. He can neither file a suit to compel the
mischievous partner to cooperate for registration, as such a
suit is not maintainable, nor can he resort to arbitration if any,
because the arbitration proceedings would be hit by Section H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

.._
A 69(1) of the Act (Jagdish Chandra Gupta vs. Kajaria Traders 1
(India) Ltd. AIR 1964 SC 1882).

27. In our opinion the restrictions placed by sub-section
2A of Section 69 introduced by the Maharshtra Amendment Act,
for the reasons given above, are arbitrary and of excessive
8
nature and go beyond what is in the public interest. Hence the
restrictions cannot be regarded as reasonable.
I
28. In the Constitution bench decision of this Court in l..
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another (supra) it has
c been held that arbitrariness and unreasonableness violates
Articles 14 and 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution. The said provision
is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary since by prohibiting suits
for dissolution of an unregistered firm, for accounts and for
realization of the properties of the firm, it creates a situation
D where businessmen will be very reluctant to enter into an
unregistered partnership out of fear that they will not be able to
recover the money they have invested in the firm or to get out of
the firm if they wish to do so. As already stated above there is
no legal requirement, unlike in England, which makes
E registration of a firm compulsory, rather in India it is voluntary.
Both registered and unregistered are legal though of course
registration and non registration have different legal
consequences as stated above.
29. The High Court was of the view that the object of the
F Maharashtra Amendment was to induce partners to register and
it was intended to protect third party members of the public. We
cannot see how sub-section 2A of Section 69 in any way protects
the third party members of the public. It makes it virtually
impossible for partners in an unregistered firm to dissolve the
G firm or recover their share in the property of the firm. Hence it is
totally arbitrary.
30. It is true that it has been held by this Court in
Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others vs. P Laxmi Devi
AIR 2008 SC 1640 that the Court should not lightly declare a
H statute to be unconstitutional as it expresses the will of the people
V. SUBRAMANIAM V. RAJESH RAGHUVANDRA RAO 955
[MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]

through its elected representatives. However, that does not A
mean that a statute can never be declared as unconstitutional.
In fact the aforesaid decision this Court has held that in some
circumstances a statute can be declared as unconstitutional,
namely, where it clearly violates some constitutional provision.
Since in our opinion sub-section 2A of Section 69 as introduced B
by the Maharashtra Legislatures clearly violates Articles 14,
19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution, it is in our opinion ultra
vires and is hence declared unconstitutional. Consequently this
appeal is allowed and impugned judgment of the Bombay High
Court is set aside. The suit can now proceed ignoring sub- c
section 2A which we have declared invalid. No costs.

8.8.8. Appeal allowed.

-}-