Supreme Court of India
VAARIKUPPAL SRINIVASversusSTATE OF A.P.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 83
- Decided
- 28 January 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
A dying declaration, when satisfied to be true and voluntary, may form the sole basis of conviction without corroboration, and thus the conviction was upheld.
Summary
The appellant, Vmrikuppal Srinivas, was convicted under Sections 498A and 3048 of the IPC for causing the death of his wife by acid. The conviction was based primarily on the victim's dying declaration recorded by a magistrate and an earlier statement to a police constable. On appeal, the appellant argued that the medical evidence showed the victim was not in a condition to make a reliable dying declaration, and therefore the statement should not have been relied upon. The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration, if found true, voluntary and made by a person in a fit mental state, may be the sole basis of conviction without any corroboration. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial and High Court judgments and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a dying declaration can be relied upon as the sole basis of conviction without corroboration.
- Whether the medical evidence in this case disqualified the dying declaration.
- Whether the trial court erred in accepting the dying declaration as evidence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 3048, s. 498A
Subjects
dying declarationevidentiary valueSection 498ASection 3048corroborationacid attackcriminal conviction
Judgment
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 680
-
A VMRIKUPPAL SRINIVAS
v.
STATE OF A.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 2009)
JANUARY 28, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 498A and 3048 - Conviction on
c the basis of dying declaration - Held: conviction justified.
Dying Declaration - Evidentiary value of - Discussed.
Appellant-accused was convicted uls. 498A and
3048 IPC, for having caused death of his wife. The
D conviction was on the basis of dying declaration and
another statement by the deceased, made to a police
constable. His conviction was confirmed by High Court.
In appeal to this Court appellant contended that
E dying declaration could not have been relied upon
because the medical evidence does not show that the
victim was in a position to give any statement.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F HELD: 1.1 The trial court and the High Court have
rightly convicted the appellant for offence punishable
under Section 498A and 3048 IP. The basis for conviction
of the accused by the trial court was the dying
declarations. The situation in which a person is on his
G deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave,
is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his
statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of
oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides
should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in
H 680
VAARIKUPPAL SRINIVAS v. STATE OF A.P. 681
_..,,_ miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally A
the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of
the statement would leave the court without a scrap of
evidence. [Paras 9 and 7] [688-B; 685-F-G]
1.2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great B
weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no
power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential
for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be.
This is the reason the court also insists that the dying
declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full
confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has
c
to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was
not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product
of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear
opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once D
4
the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule
of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule E
requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. [Para
8] [685-H; 686-A-D]
Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat AIR 1992 SC 1817,
relied on. F
Munnu Raja and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976)
2 SCR 764; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and
Ors. AIR 1985 SC 416: Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar AIR
1983 SC 164; K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The
Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994; Rasheed Beg v. State G
of Madhya Pradesh 1974(4) SCC 264; Kaka Singh v State
of MP AIR 1982 SC 1021; Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State
of U.P 1981 (2) SCC 654; State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu AIR 1981 SC 617; Surajdeo
Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1505; Nanahau H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1988 SC 912;
State of UP. v. Madan Mohan and Ors. AIR 1989 SC 1519;
Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra AIR
·1982 SC 839 and Mohan Lal and Ors. v. State of Haryana
2007 (9) sec 151, referred to.
B
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1992 SC 1817 Relied on. Para 8
1976 2 SCR 764 Referred to. Para 8
c AIR 1985 SC 416 Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1983 SC 164 Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1976 SC 1994 Referred to. Para 8
D 1974(4) sec 264 Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1982 SC 1021 Referred to. Para 8
1981(2) sec 654 Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1981 SC 617 Referred to. Para 8
E
AIR 1979 SC 1505 Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1988 SC 912 Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1989 SC 1519 Referred to. Para 8
•F AIR 1982 SC 839 Referred to. Para 8
2001 (9) sec 151 Referred to. Para 8
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 168 of 2009.
..,--
From the Judgment and final Order dated 21.03.2007 of
the High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
Criminal Appeal No. 1001 of 2002.
-t P. Radha Rani, P. Vijay Kumar, P.M. Pandey, D. Mahesh
VAARIKUPPAL SRINIVAS v. STATE OF A.P. 683
Babu and C.S.N. Mohan Rao for the Appellant. A
i'-·
I. Venkatanarayana, V. Prabhakar Rao and D. Bharathi
Reddy for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant
for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 3048 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). Learned 4th
c
Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad had
convicted both the accused persons for offences punishable
under Sections 498A and 3048 IPC and sentenced each to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and seven years
... respectively and to pay a fine of Rs.200/- with default stipulation .
D
In appeal, A2 was acquitted by the High Court.
3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
A 1 the present appellant is the son of A2 who married E
Manjula (hereinafter referred to as the ·deceased') the daughter
of PWs.1 and 2 about six years prior to the date of incident.
Sub Inspector of Police (PW9) of Osmania University Police
Station received a message at 6.45 P.M. on 8.2.1999 from
Gandhi Hospital stating that one Manjula was admitted in the
F
hospital allegedly having consumed unknown acid at her
residence on the said date. He entered the same in G.D., went
to the hospital and found that the deceased was unable to
speak due to acid burns in her throat. All his visits on
subsequent dates proved futile. Therefore, he deputed
Constable (P.W.3) on 13-2-1999 to the hospital. Accordingly, G
he went to the hospital at 11 A.M. and recorded her statement-
Ex.P2 and handed over the said statement to P.W.9. On the
basis of the said statement P.W.9 registered a case in Cr.No.34
of 1999 under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC and issued FIR-
H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 1 S.C.R.
A Ex.P12 to all concerned. He visited the Gandhi Hospital and
recorded statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') of the deceased under
Ex.P13. He further examined P.Ws.1, 2 and others, visited the
scene of offence, which is the house of the deceased at
B Manikanteswar Nagar, but did not find any incriminating
material at the scene of offence and examined the neighbours.
He sent a requisition-Ex.P3 to P.W.4-XXll Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad for recording the dying declaration of
the deceased. On receipt of requisition the Magistrate visited
c the hospital at 7.20 P.M. and after obtaining endorsement of
the doctor that patient was conscious and coherent and also
after putting some preliminary questions he recorded the dying
declaration-(Ex.P4). Thereafter, P.W.9 arrested the accused on
23-03-1999 and sent them to court, subsequently on 13-04-
D 1999 on the instructions of Assistant Commissioner of Police
he along with P.Ws.8 and 7 proceeded to Golanukonda village
and exhumed the dead body of the deceased PW 7, the M.R.O.
conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased and
Professor (PW 8), Forensic Medicine, Kakatiya Medical
College, Waranga conducted postmortem examination. After
E completion of investigation police laid the charge sheet for the
offence as aforementioned.
On committal, charges were framed against the accused;
read over and explained to them in Telugu and they pleaded
F not guilty.
The prosecution in order- to prove its case examined
P,Ws.1 to 13 and marked Exs.P1 to P16. No oral or
documentary evidence has been adduced on defense side.
G The learned Sessions Judge after evaluating the evidence
on record found the accused guilty and convicted for the
offence, as aforementioned.
The trial court relied primarily on the statement made
H before the Head Constable (PW3). The statement recorded by
VMRIKUPPAL SRINIVAS v. STATE OF AP. 685
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.... him is Exh.P2. The Magistrate (PW 4) recorded the dying A
declaration. Placing reliance on the evidence more particularly
on the dying declaration, the conviction was recorded.
In appeal, the primary stand was that the evidence was
insufficient to convict A2 and that the dying declaration should
B
not have been acted upon. The High Court found substance in
the plea that the evidence was not sufficient to convict A2, but
.;.- found the evidence to be sufficient so far as A 1 i.e. present
appellant is concerned.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the c
evidence of the magistrate (PW 4) should not have been
accepted so far as the dying declaration is concerned. The
medical evidence does not show that the victim was in a
,.• position to give any statement.
-41, D
5. In response, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the statements made by the deceased that is
Exhs.P2, P4 and P13 are consistent with regard to the A1
pouring acid in the mouth of the deceased which resulted in
her death.
E
6. The deceased breathed her last on 9.4.1999. The dead
body was exhumed on 13.4.1999.
7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the
-·- accused by the trial Court was the dying declarations. The F
situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being
exceedingly solemn, serene and grave;is the reason in law to
accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that
the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed
with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will G
result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being
~
generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion
of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of
evidence.
8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross- +
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as
an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also
insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as
to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness·. The
B Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product
of imagination. :fhe Court must be further satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to
,.
observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied
c basetheits declaration
that was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can
conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot
be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it
is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a •
rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments
D ~
the principles governing dying declaration, which could be
summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of
Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817):
-
t:
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
[See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
(1976) 2 SCR 764)]
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
• '
F
corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar
Yadav and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi
v. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)]
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
G carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased y
had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants
and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K.
Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor
H (AIR 1976 SC 1994)]
VMRIKUPPAL SRINIVAS v. STATE OF A.P. 687
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
+- (iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not A
be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See
Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC
264)]
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never B
make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to
it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v State of M.P. (AIR
1982 SC 1021)]
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. c
v. State ofU.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See
_.. State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu D
(AIR 1981 SC 617)]
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the
statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and
Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505). E
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
4 declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the
eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and F
conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical
opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)].
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version
as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration G
cannot be acted upon. [See State of UP. v. Madan Mohan
and Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)].
(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature
of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations
could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. [See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v.State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839) and Mohan Lal and Ors.
V. State of Haryana (2007 (9) sec 151).
B
9. In the background of the principles set out above, the
inevitable conclusion is that the trial court and the High Court
have rightly convicted the appellant for offence punishable under
Sections 498A and 3048 IPC.
c 10. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal, which
we direct.
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
.,... .
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