Holding

An appellate court has full power to review, re‑appreciate and reconsider the evidence on which an order of acquittal is based, subject only to the double presumption of innocence and the requirement that two reasonable conclusions are not possible.

Summary

The State of Kerala appealed a trial court acquittal of Valson and others for offences including murder (IPC s.302) and assault (s.324) read with s.34. The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting two accused and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined the scope of appellate power under CrPC s.378, holding that an appellate court may fully re‑appreciate the evidence and reach its own conclusions, as the statute imposes no limitation. However, the Court emphasized the double presumption of innocence and that an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable conclusions are possible. Finding that the High Court correctly identified flaws in the trial court's reasoning and that the evidence supported conviction, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

The extent of the appellate court's power to review evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal under CrPC s.378.
Whether the High Court erred in overturning the trial court's acquittal of the accused.
The role of the presumption of innocence and the standard of 'reasonable doubt' in appellate review.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 372, s. 373, s. 374, s. 375, s. 376, s. 377, s. 378, s. 379, s. 380
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 143, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 323, s. 324, s. 34, s. 341

Subjects

appeal against acquittalpresumption of innocencereasonable doubtCrPC s.378review of evidencedouble presumptionappellate jurisdictionIPC s.302IPC s.324

Judgment

[2008] 11 S.C.R. 642

A VALSON AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF KERALA
(Criminal Appeal No. 572 of 2001)
AUGUST 1, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 378 - Appeal
c against acquittal - Power of appellate court-Ambit and scope
of - Stated - On facts, in appeal against acquittal; High Court
convicted two accused uls. 302 and s. 324 rlw s. 34 /PC and
awarded imprisonment for life - Interference with - Held: Or-
der of High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant
interference - High Court rightly found the reasons indicated
D
by trial court to direct acquittal to be vulnerable - Trial coun'.
discarded the otherwise cogent and credible evidence ~ Pe-
nal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 324 rlw s. 34.
According to the prosecution case, a minor dispute
E between accused persons and the prosecution witnesses
along with S, resulted in death of S and injuries to the
prosecution witnesses. The accused persons were tried
for the commission of offences punishable u/s 143, 147,
148, 341, 323, 324 ands. 302 r/w s. 149 IPC. However, the
F trial court acquitted them. In appeal, the High Court con-
victed accused no. 1 and 2 u/s 302 and s. 324 r/w s. 34 IPC "'-
and sentenced them to imprisonment for life: Hence the
present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1 The principles regarding powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an
Qrder of acquittal are: (1) An appellate court has full power 1'

to revj~w, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
H 642
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 643

which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of A
Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclu-
sion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various ex-
pressions, such as, "substantial and compelling rea- B
sons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong cir-
cumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mis-
takes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of Ian- C
guage" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court
to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come to its own con-
clusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
0
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of inno-
cence is available to him under the fundamental principle
of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be pre-
sumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a com-
petent court of law. Secondly, the accused having se-
cured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is E
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court. (5) If two reasonabie conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court. [Para 32] [664-E,F,G,H, 665 A,B,C,D] F
Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007 (4) SCC
415 - relied on.
Shea Swarup v. R. Emperor 1934 (61) IA 398; Nur Mohd.
v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC G
36; Surajpal Singh v. State 1952 SCR 193; Ajmer Singh v.
State of Punjab 1953 SCR 418; Atleyv. State of UP AIR 1955
SC 807; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra 1955 (2) $CR
1285; Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1961 (3) SCR 120,
M. G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra 1963 (2) ·SCR 405; H
' .
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2C08] 11 S.C.R.
'f

A Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973 (2)
sec 793; K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P 1979 (1) sec 355;
Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996 (9) SCC 225;
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat 2002 (3) SCC 57;
Bhagwan Singh v. State of MP 2002 (4) SCC 85; Harijana
B Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor; High Court of A.P 2002 (6) SCC
470; Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha 2003 (12) SCC
606; Kallu v. State of MP 2006 (10) SCC 313 - referred to.
1.2 Doubts would be called reasonable if they are
free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot af-
c ford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reason-
able doubt, it must be free from an overemotional re-
sponse~ Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts
as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the
evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague
D apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based >
upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the
evidence in the case. [Para 34] [666-8,C,D]
1.3 The concepts of probability, and the degrees of
E it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an ..
\
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Foren-
F sic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust ~
(
common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions
of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal
process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at
the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities
G would make a mockery of administration of criminal jus-
tice. (Para 35) [666-E-F]
..,
State of UP v. Krishna Gopal 1988 (4) SCC 302; Krishnan
and Anr v. State represented by Inspector of Police 2003 (7) ~i
sec 56 - relied on.
H
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 645

"Tha Mathematics of Proof 11": Glanville Williams A
Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, pp.340-
342 - referred to.
2.1 The trial court's judgment appears to be bundle
of confusions. The trial court did not attach any impor-
tance to Ext.P-12 to Ext.P-14 and did not rely on the same f3
but attached undue importance to the portion therein
states "unknown persons". It is of significance that the
trial court found that "the version does not appear to have
been given and recorded very carefully and cautiously".
The trial court noted that the injuries definitely show that C
they could not have been as a result of beating. PW-1 had
incised injuries though only skin deep. It further observed
that the Court should not be "pedomtic" (did the trial Court
mean "pedantic'?) in matters like this. It was always pos-
sible according to the trial court that PWs 1, 2 and 4 may D
\{ "" have loosely referred to and PW-16 may have recorded
an attack by "unknown persons" as "beaten by unknown
persons". Thereafter, the trial court held that the crucial
emphasis was on 'unknown persons'. PWs 1, 2 and 4
stated that there was a wrong recording by PW-16 of what E
they said while recording version in English. PW 1's state-
ment was give"'! to the police at 5.00 a.m. i.e. immediately
after the incident and the names of Ap1 and A-2 had been
specifically mentioned along with overt act attributed to
them. At 8.00 a.m. PW-14 registered crime 34/1994 as per F
Ext.P-9, FIR wherein the names of A-1 and A-2 were men·
' tloned. Ext. P-1 and Ext.P-9 reached the Magistrate imme-
diately. [Paras 38 and 39] [667 B, 667 C,D]
P. Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1994 (1) SCC 388 -
referred to. G
2.2 The trial court referred to the evidence of PWs 1,
2 and 4 to 7. The trial court came to the conclusion that
PWs 1, 2 and 4 to 7 were present at the scene of occur-
rence and PWs 1, 2, 4 and 6 have suffered injuries. It ob-
H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
·~

A served that the victims must have suffered injuries as a
result of pre-meditated attack on PW-1. It further observed
that the evidence clearly show that the prime attack was
on J'.>VV-1 and. others including the deceased sustained
injuries· only because the_y· interfered to save PW-1 and it
6 was beyo_nd doubt that attack on PW:-1 was pre-.m~ditated.
After that the trial court recorded the following findings
th~t .the.re was an incident ·1n the morring in which 'PW-1
and others had taken· objection to the conduct of A-1 and
A-2 and others in' the kavadi procession at Gandhigram
and that ·A-1 and A-2 were enraged and had left adminis-
c a
tering warning that they will avenge the conduct against
them. PWs 1~ 2, 4 and 6 and the deceased had suffered·
injuries involun.tarily at the time and 'place as alleged by
the p·rosecution. Such injuries must have been inflicted
on them by a group of persons with weapons like M.Os 1
D to 5. Such infliction myst have·been done by members of
an unlawful assembly who erite·rtained the common ob- >
ject to attack and do away with deceased and remove ·
obstruction if any caused by· anyone. {Paras 41 and 42]
[668 C,D 668 G,H, 669 A,B,C,D,E]
-
'

!= . 2.3 After having so concluded the. trial court imag-
ined. certain irrelevant aspects to discard the othe.rwlse
cogent anct credible evidence qf eye.-witnesses. One of r--
;

the most untenable conclusions recorded by the trial court
is as to why only witnesses from a particular locality were
a
F chosen, as in procession ''there .must have been per- ~

sons other than the inhabitants of . Gandhigram". Same, ~·
(
cannot eertainly be a ground to discard the otherwise
cogent and credible evidence. The reasons indicated by
the trial Court to direct acquittal have been rightly found
G to be vulnerable by the High Court. The judgment of the
High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant
interference. [Para 43] [669 E,F,G]
Case Law Reference
H 1934 (61) IA 398 Referred to. Para 9
-
"
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
647

AIR 1945 PC 151 Referred to. Para 13 A
AIR 1954 SC 36 Referred to. Para 14
.
1952 SCR 193 Referred to. Para 16
1953 SCR 418 Referred to. · Para 17
AIR 1955 SC 807 Referred to. Para 19 B
1955 (2) SCR 1285 Referred to. Para 20
1961. (J) SCR 120 Referred to. Para 21
1963 (2) SCR 405 Referred to. Para 22
c
1973 (2) sec 793 Referred to, . Para 23
'
1979 (1) sec 355 Referred to. Para 25
1996 (9) sec 225 Referred to. Para 26
2002 (3) sec 57 ·Referred to. Para _27
D
2002 (4) sec 85 Referred to. Para 28
2002 (6) sec 470 Referred to. Para 29
2003 (12) sec 606 Referred to. Para 30
2ooa (1 o) sec 313 Referred to. Para 31 E
2001 (4) sec 415 Relied on. Para 32
1sss (4) sec 302 Relied on. Para 36
2003 (7) sec 66 Relled on. Para 36

... 1994 c1) sec 388 Referred to. Para 40 F
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 572 of 2001 From the final Judgment dated 15/2/2001 of
the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in C.R.A. No. 306of1999
E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant. G
P.V. Dinesh and Sindhu T.P. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Thirteen persons faced trial
H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
..
.:
~

A for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections
143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324 and 302 read with Section 149 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). All accused
persons except A-8 faced trial before the Sessions Judge,
Thrissur. By judgment dated 16.2.1998 all of them were found
B to be not guilty of the charges and were acquitted. The State of
Kerala filed an appeal questioning the acquittal. By the im- )

pugned judgment, the High Court found that accused 1 and 2
were guilty and directed their conviction for offences punish-
able under Section 302 and Section 324 read with Section 34
IPC and were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and
c pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each with default stipulation.
2. The appellants had questioned the correctness of the
High Court's judgment. According to them, the High Court had
not kept in view the parameters of appeal against acquittal. It is
D submitted that even if two views are possible, the view support~
ing the accused had to be accepted and since the trial Court
had precisely done it, there was no reason to interfere with the '"
judgment of the trial Court.
3. In view of rival submissions of the parties, we think it
E proper to consider and clarify the legal position first. Chapter
XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the present Code") deals with
appeals. Section 372 expressly declares that no appeal shall
lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as pro-
F vided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force.
,..
Section 373 provides for filing of appeals in certain cases. Sec-
tion 374 allows appeals from convictions. Section 375 bars
appeals in cases where the accused pleads guilty. Likewise,
no appeal is maintainable in petty cases (Section 376). Sec-
G t1on 377 permits appeals by the State for enhancement of sen-
tence. Section 378 confers power on the State to present an
appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal. The said y
section is material and may be quoted in extenso: .
"378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-(1) Save as otherwise
H
. VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
649
;
provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions A
of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in
any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal
to the High Court from an original or appellate order of
acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court, or
an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in B
revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
Special Police Establishment constituted under the
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of c
1946), or by any other agency empowered to make
investigation into an offence under any Central Act
other than this Code, the Central Government may
also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), D
to the High Court from the order of acquittal.
'
..
(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
shall be entertained except with the leave of the High
Court.
E
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
application made to it by the complainant in this
behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order
of acquittal, the complainant may present such an F
... appeal to the High Court .
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal
shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry
of six months, where the complainant is a public G
servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed
from the date of that order of acquittal.
"' (6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4)
for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order
H
(

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - [2008] 11 S.C.R.

.A of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of "'
. acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-
section (2).
4. Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of ap-
peals,· other sections lay down procedure t.o be followed by ap-
.B pellate· courts.
)
5. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions
were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinaf-
ter ref~rred to as "the ()Id Code") which. came up for consider-
·c ation before Vi:!rious High Courts, Judicial Committee of the
~rivy Council as also before this Court. Since in the present
app~al, we have bee1' called upon to decide_ the ambit and
scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal against
an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one aspect
only i.e._ an app'eal against an order of acquittal.
D
6. Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code (ap-
peal in case of acquittal) quoted above,. makes it clear that no ;..
restrictions have l;>een imposed by the legislature on the pow-
ers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against ac-
·E quittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full
power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at
large, the .material on which the order of acquittal is founded
and to reach its own conclusio.ns on such evidence. Both ques-
tions of fact and of law are open to determination by the High
-F Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.
;
7. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, ,.._
there is a double presumption in favour·of the accused. Firstly, ·
the presumption of innocence is available to· him under the fun-
damental principle of crirninal jurisprudence that every person
G should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused hav-
ing secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strength- 'f
ened by the trial court.
H

,___
i
I
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 651
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] .
1 8. Though.the above principles are well established, a dif- A
ferent note was struck in several decisions by various High
Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we
consider some of the leading decisions on the point.
9. The first important decision was rendered by the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v. R. Em- B
.. peror (1934) 61 IA 398). In Shea Swarup the accused were
acquitted by the trial court and the local Government directed
the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the. High Court
from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code
(similar to Section 378 of the present Code). At the time of hear- c
ing of appeal before the High Court, it was contended on behalf
of the accused that in an appeal from an order of acquittal, it
was not open to the appellate court to interfere with the findings
of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could
not have been reached by him had there not been some per- D
versity or incompetence on his part. The High Court, however,
declined to accept the said view. It held that no condition was
imposed on the High Court. in such appeal. It accordingly re-
viewed all the evidence in the .case and having formed an op in-
ion of its weight and reliability different from that of the trial Judge, E
recorded an order of conviction. A petition was presented to
His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that
conflicting views had been expressed by the High Courts in dif-
ferent parts of India upon the question whether in an appeal
from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had the power to F
interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge.
Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal position and ac-
cordingly upon the "humble advice of their Lordships", leave was
granted by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued. The
Committee considered the scheme and interpreting Section 417
G
of the Code (old Code) observed that there was no indication
in the Code of any limitation or restriction on the High Court in
exercise of powers as an Appellate Tribunal. The Code also
..,..
made no distinction as regards powers of the High Court in
dealing with an appeal against acquittal and an appeal against
H
l
. i}
\.,.
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
.)._
,,.
A conviction. Though several authorities were cited revealing dif-
ferent views by the High Courts dealing with an appeal from an
order of acquittal, the Committee did not think it proper to dis-
cuss all the cases.
10. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:
B
"There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view, j,
'1
apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in
India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in
)
c cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered', }---
or has 'through ;ncompetence, stupidity or. perversity' ,I

reached such 'dis~orted conclusions as to produce a
positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way
so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a
glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the
D
; defence so as to produce a similar result."
11. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404) !
"Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High
Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which ~
E
the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the
conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code."

F 12. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts
and stated: (IA p.404)
.>.
"But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and
before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court
sho.uld and will always give proper weight and
G consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he -r
has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused
H to the benefit of any doubt; and ( 4) the slowness of an
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 653
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
' appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by A
~ a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court
in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in
accordance with rules and principles well known and
recognised in the administration of justice." B
f
(emphasis supplied)
13. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the
Committee reiterated the above view in Shea Swarup (Supra)
and held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has c
full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.
14. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first
decision on the point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36)
(though the case was decided on 14-3-1950, it was reported
only in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by the D
... trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal which
was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences pun-
ishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for
convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain eyewit-
nesses. E
15. Upholding the decision of the High Court and follow-
ing the proposition of law in Shea Swarup (supra), a six-Judge
Bench held as follows:
"6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot F
support the view which has been expressed in several
cases that the High Court has no power under Section
417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of
acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the
subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected
G
itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a two-
Judge Bench observed that it was well established that in an
H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2008] 11 S.C.R.
.,.
A appeal under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court
had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of t
acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the
presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced
by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial
B court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
hearing their evidence could be reversed only for very substan- )

tial and compelling reasons.
17. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418) the
accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted by
c the High Court in an appepl against acquittal filed by the State.
The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was con-
tended by him that there were "no compelling reasons" for set-
ting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight had
not been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial court
D as regards the credibility of witnesses seen and examined. It
was also commented that the High Court committed an error of
~
law in observing that "when a strong 'prima facie' case is made
out against an accused person it is his duty to explain the cir-
cumstances appearing in evidence against him and he cannot
E take shelter behind the presumption of innocence and cannot
state that the law entitles him to keep his lips sealed".
18. Upholding the contention, this Court said:
"We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of
F acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is
further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial )\

court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that
the accused had failed to explain the circumstances
appearing against him but only for very substantial and ,I
'
compelling reasons."
G
(emphasis supplied)
19. In Atleyv. State of UP (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court said:

"In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the
H appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal

l
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 655
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment A
of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set
aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own B
. conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established
rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is
not weakened but strengthened by the.judgment of acquittal
passed by the trial court which had the advantage of
observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence c
have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an
D
order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption
of innocence with which the accused person starts in the
trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that
the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion
of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.
E
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion,
the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."
(emphasis supplied)
F
20. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2
SCR 1285) the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302
and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted
by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court
against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority
G
(2:1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1) "It is, in our opinion, well settled
that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of
~ the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling
reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong."

(emphasis supplied) H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A 21. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR
120, a three-Judge Bench considered almost all leading deci-
sions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty in
applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that
B appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding
the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons"
used in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:
"This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition
to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words
c were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court
not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the
PrivY Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming
to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong."
The Court concluded as follows:
D
"9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results:
( 1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the
principles laid down in Shea Swarup case afford a correct
E guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in
disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different
phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as,
(1) 'substantial. and compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are
F not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire
evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing
so it should not only consider every matter on record having
a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given
by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its
G
arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also
express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to
hold that the acquittal was not justified."
22. Again, in M. G Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963)
H 2 SCR 405, the point was raised before a Constitution Bench
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 657
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed A
as follows:
"17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however,
in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious
approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it
was observed that the presumption of innocence is 8
reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, 'the findings of
the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the
witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only
for very substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpal
Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh C
v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that
the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the
order of acquittal would be justified only if there are 'very
substantial and compelling reasons to do so'. In some other
decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can D
be reversed only for 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons'
or for 'strong reasons'. In appreciating the effect of these
observations, it must be remembered that these
observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or
inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High E
Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended,
and should not be read to have intended to introduce an
. additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the
Code. All that the said observations are intended to
emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing F
with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious
because as Lord Russell observed in Shea Swarup the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused 'is not
certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted
at his trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression G
'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be
construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in
every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this
Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1· SCR
H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R. ~

..,
A 104) and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a
judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily
characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse."
(emphasis supplied)

B 23. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court .,
held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the pow-
ers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the plenary
power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on
c which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty
to scrutinise the probative material de nova, informed, however,
by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed
to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the horn-
age our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the
higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing rea-
D
sons and comprehensive consideration."
24. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of >
individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court
observed as follows:
E "6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which .
-.
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers 1

of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at
the expense of social defence and to the soothing
F sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless
of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial >
emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime
and escape. The judicial instrument has a public
accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread
G of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the ,,_
web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace
every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive
solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty
....
men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a
H false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 659
[DR. AR1JIT PASAYAT, J.]
'r
accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will A
then breakdown and lose credibility with the community.
The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a
learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has
saliently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that
just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited B
acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical
disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public
demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted
'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are
found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may c
lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial
protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true
to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice
may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from
the conviction of the innocent. ... ' In short, ourjurisprudential
D
enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated
by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent
and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing
chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent
free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability
to punish marginal innocents." E

(emphasis supplied)

25. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the
Court was considering the power of the High Court against an order
of acquittal under Section 378 of the present Code. After consider- F
ing the relevant decisions on the point it was stated as follows:
"9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was
thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for
'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used
G
to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and
compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of 'substantial
'Y and compelling reasons' 'good and sufficiently cogent
I

reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the search for them
were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this
H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3
..
SCR 120. In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back
to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Shea
Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those principles.
After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court has
B consistently recognised the right of the appellate court to
review the entire evidence and to come to ·its own .,
conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned
bythe Privy Council in Shea Swarup case. Occasionally
phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly unjust', have beP.n
c used to describe the orders of acquittal which warr2n
interference. But, such expressions have been used more
as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance,
the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal
than to curtail the power of the appellate court to revievv
the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In
D
some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A.P, (AIR
1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said that to
the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be
added the further principle that 'if two reasonable
E conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence
on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It
stems out of the fundamental principle of. our criminal
jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of
F any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly
balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must
necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt.
But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of
account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a
G doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the
possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly
reasonably probable as that against him. If th~
preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility ...,,
of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the
H benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 661
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

of the evidence in favour of the accused must be A
reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an
accused person may claim, must be reasonable."
(emphasis supplied)
26. In Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 8
SCC 225, this Court said:
"While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate
court is first required to seek an answer to the question
whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong,
manifestly-erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the c
appellate court answers the above question in the negative
the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if
the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that
the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of
any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only- D
reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions."
~
27. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3
SCC 57, referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated:
"7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to E
avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which
may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from
the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial
court has taken a view based upon conjectures and
hypothesis and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast F
upon the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in
acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to
whether the accused has committed any offence or not.
Probable view taken by the trial court which may not be
disturbed in the appeal is such a view which is based
G
upon legal and admissible evidence. Only because the
accused has been acquitted by the trial court, cannot be
"' ')"
made a basis to urge that the High Court under all
circumstances should not disturb such a finding."
28. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85, H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

't
A the trial court acquitted the accused but the High Court con-
victed them. Negativing the contention of the appellants that the
High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of the
trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court observed:
"7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned
B counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the .
Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not ~

disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found
that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On the
basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled
c position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court
has full powers to review the evidence upon which an
order of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere
with the order of acquittal because by passing an order of
D acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal ,•
case is that if two views are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused
E and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable
to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction
limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines
for circu.mspection. The paramount consideration of the
court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A
F
miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal
of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
,)..
innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view
ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal
. for the purposes of ascertainin.g as to whether all or any
G of the accused has committed any offence or not".
29. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court
of A.P (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said: f
-
11111111

"12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an
H
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 663
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal A
has full power to review the evidence to reach its own
independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with
an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other
view is possible, because with the passing of an order of
acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the s
accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court
would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal
merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would
have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on
the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to C
examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court
to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If
the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment
will suffer from serious infirmity."
30. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12 D
SCC 606, this Court observed:
"21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with E
because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal
cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused
and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable F
to the accused should be adopted. The paramount
consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of
justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may
arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the
conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible G
evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate
court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the
accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
any offence or not". H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A 31. Again in Kallu v. State of M.P (2006) 10 SCC 313,
th.is Court stated:
"8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power
of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised
while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of
B appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence.
However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal
will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where thb·
judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view
taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse thee
c decision of the trial court merely because a different view is
possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there
is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and
the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further
if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing
D with the decision of the trial court."
(emphasis supplied)
32. From the above decisions; in Chandrappa and Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general
E principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
F
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of
fact and of law.
G
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions",
"glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail
H extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 665
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in A
the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise
the reluctance of an appellate court to i.nterfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that B
in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved C
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the'
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
D
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court.
33. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be con- E
victed of an offence which is not established by the evidential
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this stan-
dard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute stan-
dard. What degree of probability amounts to "proof' is an exer-
cise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence F
~. of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by
another, a learned author says [see "The Mathematics of Proof
II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet
and Maxwell, p.340 (342)):
"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the G
separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events
are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the
evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent.
In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to
establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with H

.
666. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A
junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged
confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact
that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally
guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions,
B and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the
two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece
of evidence may confirm the other."

34. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract'speculation. Law cannot afford any
C favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must
be free from an overem~tional response. Doubts must be ac-
tual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused per-
sons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as op-
posed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is
D not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair
doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out
of the evidence in the case.

35. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, can-
E not' obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathemati-
cally enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective
element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the '
I

quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis,
rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
F intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal
process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same
time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mock-
ery of administration of criminal justice. This position was illumi-
natingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was)
G in State of UP v. Krishna Gopal (1988 (4) SCC 302).
36. The above position was highlighted in Krishnan and Anr.
v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC 56).
37. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
H hand supported the judgment of the High Court. In the instant
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 667
.. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

case, the primary ground which appears to have weighed with A
the High Court is the endorsement on the injury certificate to the
effect that injury was caused by unknown persons.
38. Reference was made by the trial Court in this context
to Ext.P-12 to Ext.P-14. The trial Court's judgment appears to
be bundle of confusions. B
~

39. It is to be noted that the trial Court did not attach any
importance to Ext.P-12 to Ext.P-14 and did not rely on the same
but attached undue importance to the portion therein states "un-
known persons". It is of significance that the trial Court found
that "the version does not appear to have been given and re- c
corded very carefully and cautiously". The trial Court noted that
the injuries definitely show that they could not have been as a
result of beating. PW-1 had incised injuries though only skin
deep. It further observed that the Court should not be "pedomtic"
(did the trial Court mean "pedantic'?) in matters like this. It was D
~
always possible according to the trial Court that PWs 1, 2 and 4
may have loosely referred to and PW-16 may have recorded
an attack by "unknown persons" as "beaten by unknown per-
sons". Thereafter, the trial Court held that the crucial emphasis
was on 'unknown persons'. It is of significance to note that PWs E
1, 2 and 4 stated that there was a wrong recording by PW-16 of
\
what they said while recording version in English. PW 1's state-
ment was given to the police at 5.00 a.m. i.e. immediately after
the incident and the names of A-1 and A-2 had been specifi-
cally mentioned along with overt act attributed to them. At 8.00
F
a.m. PW-14 registered crime 34/1994 as per Ext.P-9, FIR
"" wherein the names of A-1 and A-2 were mentioned. Ext. P-1
and Ext.P-9 reached the Magistrate immediately.
40. As regards statements in injury certificate in P Babu
v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1994 (1) SCC 388), it was ob- G
served as follows:
.,. "Ex.PG is the injury certificate. It appears that it was noted
in Ex.PG against an entry that the injured was said to have
been stabbed by somebody. Placing much reliance on
this entry PW-10 was asked in the cross examination as H
)
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

·to how it was made. PW-10 stated that the deceased
•
A
stated so in the first instance. The learned counsel relying.
on this admission sought to contend that the· deceased
was not aware as to who stabbed him. We see no force
in this submission. It is a mater of common knowledge
s· that such entry in the injury certificate does notnecessarily
)
amount to a statement. At that stage the doctor was
r
a
· required to fill up that column in normal manner' and it
· · was not the duty of the doctor to enquire from the injured
(
patient about the actual assailants and that the inquiry ~
c would be confined -as to how he received the injuries·
namely the weapons '.Jsed etc."
4·1. The trial Court has referred to the evidence of PWs 1, '-

2 and 4 to 7. After referring to the evidence it formulated the
following points for consideration:
D
"1: Ca~se of death of Sudheerkumar
~
2. Whether PW-1; PW-2, PW-4 and PW-6 had suffered
injuries as alleged by the prosecution.
3. Whether the.deceased as well as PWs f, 2, 4 and
,.
E . 6 had suffered the injuries at the hands of the accused
in the manner alleged by the prosec.ution. r
4. Whether such injuries were inflicted by the assailants
in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful
F assembly of which the ac·cused or any one of them
were members.
5. What, if any, are the offences proved against th.e
accused (or any of them).

G 6. The sentence."
42. The trial Court came to the conclusion that PWs 1, 2
and 4 to 7 were present at the scene Qf occurrence and PWs 1, ..,
2, 4 and·6 have suffered injuries. It also observed that the vie-
tims must have suffered injuries as a result of pre-meditated
H attack on PW-1. It has been further observed that the evidence
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 669
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

clearly show that the prime attack was on PW-1 and others in- A
eluding the deceased sustained injuries only because they in-
terfered to save PW-1 and it was beyond doubt that attack on
PW-1 was pre-meditated. After that the trial Court recorded the
following findings:
"1. That there was an incident in the morning in which B
PW-1 and others had taken objection to the conduct
of A-1 and A-2 and others in the kavadi procession
at Gandhigram and that A-1 and A-2 were enraged
and had left administering a warning that they will
avenge the conduct against them. c
2. The PWs 1, 2, 4 and 6 and the deceased had suffered
injuries involuntarily at the time and place as alleged
by the prosecution.
3. Such injuries must have been inflicted on them by a
0
group of persons with weapons like M.Os 1 to 5.
4. Such infliction must have been done by members of
an unlawful assembly who entertained the common
object to attack and do away with deceased and
remove obstruction if any caused by anyone. E
43. After having so concluded the trial Court went to a dream
world imaginations and imagined certain irrelevant aspects to
discard the otherwise cogent and credible evidence of eye-wit-
nesses. One of the most untenable conclusions recorded by
the trial Court is as to why only witnesses from a particular lo- F
cality were chosen, as in a procession "there must have been
persons other than the inhabitants of Gandhigram". Same can-
not certainly be a ground to discard the otherwise cogent and
credible evidence. The reasons indicated by the trial Court to
direct acquittal have been rightly found to be vulnerable by the G
High Court. The judgment of the High Court does not suffer from
any infirmity to warrant interference.
44. The appeal is dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
H