Holding

The tank is a public tank vested in the Gram Panchayat only for possession, control and supervision under s. 85 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, and the ryotwari patta granted under the Inams Act does not confer ownership, rendering the civil suit for possession barred.

Summary

The dispute involved a 100‑acre tank and its appurtenant land in Vatticherukuru village, originally granted by a zamindar for digging and maintaining a tank. The descendants of the original grantee held a ryotwari patta under the Andhra Pradesh Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, while the Village Panchayat had taken possession of the tank in 1965 and claimed that the tank and land vested in it under sections 64 and 85 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, 1964. The High Court held the tank to be a public tank vested in the Panchayat and dismissed the descendants’ suit for possession; the trial court had earlier treated it as a public trust. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of “vest”, the nature of the grant recorded in the Inam Fair Register, and the bar on civil suits under section 14 of the Inams Act. It held that the tank is a public tank, not a public trust, and that vesting under s. 85 confers only possession, control and supervision to the Panchayat, not an absolute title, and that the ryotwari patta was granted for tank maintenance and does not give ownership. Consequently, the descendants were divested of any right to the tank and the civil suits were barred, leading to dismissal of both appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the tank and its appurtenant land vest in the Gram Panchayat under sections 64 and 85 of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, 1964.
The nature of the tank: public tank versus public trust.
The effect of the ryotwari patta granted under the Andhra Pradesh Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act on ownership of the tank.
Whether the civil suit for possession is barred by section 14 of the Inams Act.
The proper interpretation of the term “vest” in the context of the Gram Panchayat Act.
Whether section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 is applicable for removal of the descendants as trustees.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948
Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, 1964s. 64, s. 65, s. 85
Andhra Pradesh Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966s. 77
Andhra Pradesh Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956s. 14, s. 3, s. 7, s. 8
Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 9
Constitution of Indias. 9, s. Chapter IV, s. Preamble
Estate Abolition Act, 1984
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6

Subjects

Gram Panchayat Actpublic tankvestingryotwari pattaInams Actcivil suit jurisdictionpublic trustprescriptive rightstribunal jurisdictionsocial legislationsection 14 barsection 85section 64

Judgment

VATTICHERUKURU VILLAGE PANCHAYAT AND ORS.
A
v.
NORI VENKATARAMA DEEKSHITHULU AND ORS.

APRIL 26, 1991

[N.M. KASLIWAL AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.] B

A.P. Gram Panchayat Act, 1964--Sectiims 64 and 65-Property
of income belongs to or administered for benefit of villagers in
common-Vests in Gram Panchayat.

r
A.P. Gram Panchayat Act, 1964--Section 85-Vesting of Water
courses and tanks, lands used by public with Gram Panchayat- c
Assumption of management by Government, subject to villagers' pre-
scriptive right.

~
'
A.P. lnams (Abolition and Conversion 'into Ryotwari) Act,
1956-Section 8-Tank-Grant of ryotwari patta to users of inam D
land-Conclusive nature of their right, title and interest.

Constitution of India, 1950-Preamble, Chapter IV read with
section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Social legislation-Con-
ferring power and jurisdiction on Tribunals-Orders passed by them-
Pinality-Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts-Purpose of- E
Decisions of Revenue Courts under section 3 read with section 7, Jnams
Act-Whether retriable in Civil Court.

Words and Phrases-'Vest', 'Vested', 'Vesting'-Meaning of.

Civil Appeal Nos. 931 of 1977 and 200 of 1978 relate to the same F
dispute though arose from two suits and separae judgments.

Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977 arose out of the suit for possession by
the Gram Panchayat against the descendants of the grantee of inam.
The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and was confirmed by the
High Court and the High Court granted leave under Art. 133. G

Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1978 arose out of the suit for possession
and mesne profits which was laid by the descendants of the grantee of
inam. The pleadings are the same in both cases.

A Zamindar granted 100 acres of land .in inam to dig, preserve H

531
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 2 S.C.R.

A and maintain a tank in favour of the predecessors of the respondents of
C.A. No. 931/77.

In 1700 A.D.i.e., 1190 Fasli, the tank was dug by the villagers and
ever since, the villagers were using the tank for their drinking purpose
.-
and perfected their right by prescription.
B
In course of time the tank was silted up and fre•lt water existed
only in and around 30 acres. The grantee's descendants-respondents
did not make any repairs. Grass and trees had been grown in the rest of
the area and was being enjoyed.

c Under section 3 of the A.P. loams (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, (Act XXXVII of 1956) Ryotwari Patta was granted to
the respondents in individual capacity and on appeal the Revenue Divi-
~
sional Officer confirmed the same and it became final, as it was not
challenged any further.
D
On 7. 7.1965, the Gram Panchayat - the appellant in C.A. No.
931/77 took unilateral possession of the tank and ever since, it was
exercising possession, supervision and control over it. 7'

After the expiry of three years from the date of dispossession, the
respondents flied a suit for possession based on title. Earlier thereto the
E
appellant-Gram Panchayat had flied a suit for possession.

The Trial Court found that the tank was a 'public trust', the
appellants would he hereditary trustees and could be removed only by
_,,_
taking action under s. 77 of the A.P. Hindu Charitable and Religious
Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 and that the respondents had
F
acquired title by adverse possession. Accordingly the snit for possession
was decreed relegating the flling of a separate application for mesne
profits.

On appeal, the High Conrt reversed the decree and held that the
tank was a pnblic tank, and the tank and the lands stood vested in the
G ~
Gram Panchayat under A.P. Gram Panchayat Act, 1964. Since, the \-
Gram Panchayat was in possession from Joly 7, 1966, thongh disposses-
sed the respondents forcibly and as the snit was not under s. 6 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, but one based on title, it called for no inter-
ference and dismissed the snit. This Court granted leave to appeal
H under Article 136.
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHJTHULU 533

The respondents in C.A. No. 931/77 (the appellants in C.A. No. A
200/78) contended that in view of the entries of the Inam Fair Register,
the tank was a public trust and not a public tank; they could not be
dispossessed until recourse made under section 77 of the A.P. Charit-
able and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act; that under the
Gram Panchayat Act, the lands did not vest in the Gram Panchayat;
B
and that since the grant of ryotwari patta under the loams Act had
become rmal, S. 14 thereof barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to
entertain the suit.

The appellant-Gram Panchayat in C.A. No. 931/77 (the respon-
dents in C.A. No. 200/78) contended that the tank and the appurtenant
land was correctly held as public tank by the High Court that by opera- c
tion of sections 85 and 64 of the Gram Panchayat Act, the land and the
tank stood vested in the Panchayat, that the entries in the Inam Fair
Register established that the grant of land was for preservation, main-
tenance and repairs of the tank and therefore, the grant should be in
favonr of the institution, i.e., the tank and the respondents thereby did
D
not acquire any title, that ryotwari patta was only for the purpose of
land revenue; that the Gram Panchayat acquired absolute right, title
and interest in the land; and the suit was not a bar in the facts of the
case.

Dismissing both appeals, this Court
E
HELD: 1.01. Any property or income, which belongs to or has
been administered for the benefit of the villagers in common or the
holders in any of the village land generally or of land of a particular
description or of lands under particular source of irrigation shall vest in
the Gram Panchayat and be administered by it for the benefit Of the
villagers or holders. The lands or income used for communal purpose F
shall either belong to the Gram Panchayat or has been administered by
the Gram Panchayat. It is not the case of the Gram Panchayat nor any
finding recorded by the courts below to that effect. So. s. 64 is not
attracted though the villagers acquired prescriptive right to use the
water from the tank for their use and of their cattle. [5540-F]
G
1.02. AU public water-courses, springs, reservoirs, tanks, cis-
terns, etc. and other water works either existing on the date of the Act
or made thereafter by the Gram Panchayat, or otherwise including
those used by the public ripened into prescriptive right for the use and
benefit of the public and also adjacent or any appurtenant land not H
being private property shall vest in the Gram Panchayat under s. 85( 1)
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A
and be subject to its control. [554F-G]

2.01. The word 'vesting' in s. 85 would signify that the water-
courses aud tanks, lauds etc. used by the public to such an extent as to
give a prescriptive right to their use, are vested in the Gram Panchayat,
.... -
and placed them under the control and supervision of the Gram
B Panchayat. It confers no absolute or full title. It was open to the
Government, even after vesting, to place restrictions upon the Gram
Pancbayat in the matter of enjoyment and use of such tanks, and
appurtenant lands etc. The assumption of management by the Govern-
ment would be subject to the prescriptive right of the villagers, if any.
The vesting of the tanks etc. in the Gran: Panchayat was with absolute
rights and the village community rights would over-ride against rights
c of the Government. [546C-F]

2.02. The tank is a public tank aud not a public trust and t_bat
under s. 85(1) ands. 64, the vesting of the tanks, the appurtenant land
and the common land is only for the purpose of possession, supervision,
D control and use thereof for the villagers for common use subject to the
over-riding title hy the Government and its assumption of management
should he in terms of sub-s. (3) of s. 85 of the Act and subject to the
prescriptive right in the water, water spread tank for common use. [547A-B]

Gram Panchayat, Mandapaka & Ors. v. Distt. Collector, Eluru
E & Ors. AIR 1982 AP 15, approved.

Anna Narasimha Rao & Ors. v. Kurra Venkata Narasayya &
Ors., (1981] AWR325, over-ruled.

3.01. Under A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905; Talengana Area
F Land Revenue Act, relevant Abolition Acts like A.P. Estates (Abolition
and Conversion into R:yotwari) Act, 1948, loams Abolition Act etc. give
absolute rights of vesting in the State over the forest land, tanks, rivers,
mines, poramboke, land, etc. free from all encumbrances and the pre-
existing rights in the other bmd stood abolished and will he subject to
the grant of Ryotwari Patta etc. [546F-Hj
G
3.02. Grant of Ryotwari patta is not a title hut a right coupled
with possession to remain in occupation aud enjoyment, subject to pay-
ment of the land revenue to the State. [546H]

3.03. The entries in the loam Fair Register are great acts of the
H State and coupled with the entries in the survey and settlement record
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU 535

furnishes unimpeachable evidence. On construction of these docu- A
ments, it would clearly emerge that the original grant was made for the
preservation and maintenance of the tank and tax-free lnarn land was
'""' ,1. granted for that purpose, thongb it was in the name of the individual
grantee. The grant was for the preservation and maintenance of the
tank. [548C-D]
B
3.04. The grant was for the institution. Under s. 3 of the Inams
Act, the enquiry should be, whether ( 1) a particular land is Inam land;
(2) Inarn land in a Ryotwari, Zamindar or lnam Village; and (3) is held
by any institution. In view of the f"mding that the grant was for the
preservation and maintenance of tank, the Inam land in an inam village
was held by the institution, namely, the tank. Ryotwari patta shall,
therefore, be in favour of the institution. Undoubtedly the ryotwari
c
patta was granted in favour of the descendants. [5480-F]

3.05. The pattas were obtained in the individuals name, the
trustees of an institution cannot derive personal advantage from the

. "'·
administration of the trust property. The grant of patta was for the
maintenance of the trust. [548G]

3.06. The descendants, though enjoyed the income from the
properties, did not effect the repairs and neglected the maintenance and
D

upkeep of the tank. They rendered the tank disused and abandoned. By
operation of s. 85 of the Act the lands and tank stood vested in the Gram E
Panchayat for control, management and supervision. [550E-F]
• 3.07. A hereditary trustee is entitled to be the Chairman of a
Board of Trustees, if any, constituted under the Endowment Act or else
be in exclusive possession and management of the public trust
registered thereunder until he is removed as per the procedure pro- F
vided therein. Since the tank always remained a public tank and not
being a public trust, the Endowment Act does not apply. Therefore, the
qµestion of initiating action under s. 77 of the Endowment Act for
removal of the descendants as trustees does not arise. [550F-G I

Arunachalam Chetty v. Venkatachalpathi Ga_ru Swamigal, AIR G
1919 P.C. 62 at P. 65; Syed Md. Mazaffaral Musavi v. Bibi Jabeda &
Ors., AIR 1930 PC 1031; Bhojrajv. Sita Ram & Ors, AIR 1936 P.C. 60;
M. Srinivasacharyulu & Ors. v. Dinawahi Pratyanga Rao & Ors., AIR
1921 Madras 467; Ravipati Kotayya & Anr. v. Ramaswamy Subba-
raydu & Ors., [1956] 2 A.W.R. 739, referred to.
H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

K. V. Krishna Rao v. Sub-Colletor, Ongole, [1969] l S.C.R. 624,
A
followed.

Nori Venkatarama Dikshitulu & Ors. v. Ravi Venkatappayya & J, -
Ors., [1959] 2 A.W.R. 357, approved.

B Krishan Nair Boppudu Punniah & Ors. v. Sri Lakshmi Nara-
simhaswamy Varu, [1963] 1 A.W.R. 214; Bhupathiraju Venkatapathiraju
& Ors. v. The President Taluq Board, Narsapur & Ors.; [1913) 19 J.C.
727 (Mad.) (D.B.), distinguished.

Tagore Law Lecture, "Hindu Religious Endowments and Institu-
tions at P. 6, distinguished.
c
4.01. In the laws made to restructure the social order creating
rights in favour of the citizens and conferring power and jurisdiction on
the· hierarchy of Tribunals or the authorities constituted thereunder
and giving fmality to their orders or decisions and divested the jurisdic-
D tion of the established civil courts expressly or by necessary implication.
Departure in the allocation of the judicial functions would not be viewed
with disfavour for creating the new forums and entrusting the duties
under the statutes to implement socio-economic and fiscal laws. Courts
have to consider, when questioned, why the legislature made this
departure. The reason is obvious. The tradition bound civil courts grip-
E ped with rules of pleading and strict rules of evidence and tardy trial,
four tier apppeals, endless revisions and reviews under C.P.C. are not
suited to the needed expeditious dispensation. The adjudicatory system
provided in the new forums is cheap and rapid. The procedure before
the Tribunal is simple and not hide bound by the intricate procedure of
pleadings, trial, admissibility of the evidence and proof of facts accord-
F ing to law. Therefore, there is abundant flexibility in the discharge. of
the functions with greater expedition and inexpensiveness. [5520-H)

4.02. In order to find out the purpose in creating the Tribunals
under the statutes and the meaning of particular provisions in social
legislation, the Court would adopt the purposive approach to ascertain
G the social ends envisaged in the Act, to consider scheme of the Act as an
integrated whole and practical means by which it was sought to be
effectuated to achieve them. Meticulous lexographic analysis of words
and phrases and sentences should be subordinate to this purposive
approach. The dynamics of the interpretative functioning of the Court
is to reflect the contemporary needs and the prevailing values consistent
H with the constitutional and legislative declaration of the policy envisa'
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU 537

ged in the statute under consideration. [552H-553B]
A
4.03. The law should, therefore, respond to the clarion call of
social imperatives evolve in that process functional approach as means
., to subser~.e-''social promises'' set out in the Preamble, Directive Princi-
ples and the Fundamental Right• of the Constitution. [5530]
B
4.04. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides that
whenever a question arises before the Civil Court whether its jurisdic-
tion is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the court natur-
ally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alterna-
tive provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate. In
cases where exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction is expressly pro-
vided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question c
and the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be
relevant, but cannot be decisive. Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter
of necessary implication such consideration would be very important
and inconceivable circumstances might become even decisive. [553G-554B]
D
4.05. The jurisdiction of a Tribunal created under statute may
depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon exist-
ence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual
matter which the Tribunal has to try and the determination whether it
existed or not is logically temporary prior to the determination of the
actual question which the Tribunal has to consider. At the inception of E
an enquiry by a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is
made to its jurisdiction, the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral
fact whether it would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some
decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be Tribunal ·
which by virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine
finally, even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its F
jurisdiction depends; but subject to that, the Tribunal cannot by a
wrong decision with regard to collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction
which it would not otherwise have except such tribunals of limited
jurisdi~tion when the statute not only empowers to enquire into juris-
dictional facts but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to
·f enter on the enquiry and reach a decision rightly or. wrongly. If it has G
jurisdiction to do right, it has jurisdiction to do wrong. It may be
irregular or illegal which could be corrected in appeal or revision sub-
ject to that the order would become final. [5548-F[
4.06. The loams Act did not intend to leave the decisions of the
revenue courts under s. 3 read with s. 7 to retry the issue once over.in the
H
civil court. [5610-E]
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A 4.07. The glimpse of the object of the Inams Act, scheme, scope
and operation thereof clearly manifest that loams Act is a self contained
code, expressly provided rights and liabilities; prescribed procedure;
remedies; of appeal and revision, excluded the jurisdiction of the civil
court, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, given primacy of
loams Act though inconsistent with any law or instrument having force
B of law. The jurisdictional rmdings are an integral scheme to grant or
refuse ryotwari patta under s. 3, read with s. 7 and not collateral
findings. It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under Art.
226. The decision of the Revenue Tribunal, are final and conclusive
between the parties or persons claiming right, title or interest through
them. The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not
decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the tribunal
c under the loams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of
fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable.
The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit is not maintainable
when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted under s. 3
of the loams Act. [56IE-562A]
D
Deena v. Union of India, [1984] 1 SCR, referred to.

Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1966] 1SCR64; Secretary
of State v. Mask & Co., [1940] L.R. 671.A. 222; Raleigh Investment Co.
Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council, L.R. 74 I.A. 50; Firm and Il/uri
E Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1964] 1 SCR 752;
Desika Charyulu v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 807; Dhulabhai & Ors
v. State of M.P. & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 662; Hatti v. Sunder Singh,
[1971] 2 SCR 163; Muddada Chayana v. Karam Narayana and Anr.
etc., [1979] 3 SCR 201; T. Munuswami Naidu v. R. Venkata Reddy,
AIR 1978 A.P. 200; 0. Chenchulakshmamma & Anr. v. D. Subra-
F manya Reddy, [1980] 1 SCR 1006; A. Bodayya & Anr. v. L.
Ramaswamy (dead) by Lrs., [1984] Suppl. SCC 391; Doe v. Bridges,
[ 1831] 1 B & Ad. 347 at p. 359; Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar
Shantara,,; Wadke and Ors., [1976) 1 SCR 427; State of Tamil Nadu v.
Ramalinga Samigal Madam, [1985) 4 SCC 10; Syama/a Rao v. Sri
Radhakanthaswami Varu, [1984] 1 A.P .L.J. 113; Jyotish Thakur & Ors. •
+·
G v. Tarakant Jha & Ors., [1963] Suppl. 1SCR13; Sri Athmanathaswami
Devasthanam v. K. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, [1964) 3 SCR 763; Sri
Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami
Reddy, [1967] 1 SCR 280; Shree Raja Kandragula Srinivasa Jagan-
nadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1970)
2 SCR 714; Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra & Ors.,
H [1980] 3 SCR 207; Anne Basant National Girls High School v. Dy.
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU 539

Director of Public Instruction & Ors., [1983) 1 SCC 200; Raja Ram
A
Kumar Bhargava (dead) by Lrs. v. Union of India, [1988) 2 SCR 352;
Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd., etc. v. The Dy. Commissioner, Lakhimpur,
etc.., [1968) 1 SCR 260 and K. Chintamani Dora & Ors. v. G. An-
namnaidu & Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 655, distinguished.

D. V. Raju v. B.G. Rao & Anr., [1961) 2 A.W.R. 368, approved. B

P.Pedagovindayy v. Subba Rao, [1969) 2 A;L.T. 336, over-ruled •

..;.,.f 5.01. The word 'vest' clothes varied colours from the context and
situation in which the word came to be used in a statute of rule. I545B-C]

5.02. The word 'vest', means, to give an immediate, fixed right of c
present or future enjoyment, to accrue to, to he fixed, to take effect, to
clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an estate,
to give seisin to enfeoff. [545C-D]

5.03. The word, 'vest', in the absence of a context, is usually taken D
to mean, 'vest' in interest rather than vest in possession'. [545E-F]

5.04. 'Vest'. "generally means to give the property in". [545E-F)

5.05. The word, 'vested' was defined, 'as to the interest acquired
by public bodies, created for a particufar purpose, in works, such as E
embankments, which are 'vested' in them by statute.' [5450-E)

5.06. "Vesting" in the legal sense means, to settle, secure, or put
in fixed right of possession; to endow, to descend, devolve or to take
effect, as a right'. [545C]
F
Chamber's Mid-Century Dictionary at P. 1230; Blacks Law Dictio-
nary, 5th Edition at P. 1401; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition
Vol, 5 at P. 2938, Item 12, at P. 2940, Item 4 at P. 2939; Port of London
Authority v. Canvey Island Commissioners, [1932) l Ch. 446; Fruit and
Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, [1957) S.C.R.
I, referred to. G

6. Under the Gram Panchayat Act the statutory Interposition of
vesting the tank and the appurtenant land in the Gram Panchayat made
it to retain possession, control and supervision over it, tbouglt the Gram
Panchayat unlawfully took possession. The need to grant decree for
possession m favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant. The suit H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A of the descendants normally to be decreed on the finding that ryotwari
patta under s. 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that
they were unlawfully dispossessed. Since the grant of ryotwari patta,
4
though in the name of individuals, was to maintain the public tank .A
which stood vested under s. 85 of the Act in the Gram Panchayat, the
descendants are divested of the right and interest acquired therein.
B Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable to be dismissed. [562A-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 931/
77 & 200/78.

Appeals by Certificate from the Judgment and Decree dated
J.4.76 and from the Judgment and Decree dated 19.6.1975 of the
c Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.S. No. 71/73 and Appeal No. 259 of
1972.

B. Kanta Rao for the Appellants.

D C. Sitaramiah, and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:
.,.
K. RAMASWAMY, J. Civil Appeal Nos. 931 of 1977 and 200 of
1978 relate to the same dispute though arose from two suits and sepa-
E rate judgments. The Bench that heard Civil appeal No. 931 of 1977
directed on January 24, 1991 to list Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1978 for
common disposal. Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1978 arose out of O.S. No
118 of 1968 on the file of the Court of Addi. Subordinate Judge,
Guntur and Appeal No. 259 at 1972 dated June 19, 1975 of the A.P.
High Court. The suit for possession and mesne profits was laid by the
F descendants of Nori Lakshmipathi Somayajulu of Vatticherukuru,
Guntur Taluq and District, for short 'N.L.S.'. The dispute relates to
the tank known as 'Nori Lakshmipathi Somayajulu's Western Tank'
"Vooracheruva" (Village Tank). It consists of 100 acres of which
roughly 30 acres is covered by water spread area marked 'A' Schedule.
'B' Schedule consists of 70 acres (silted up area). The tank was dug in
G Fasli 1190 (1700 A.O.) Zamindar, Raja Manikya Rao made a grant of
the land for digging the tank and its preservation, maintenance and
repairs. It is the descendants' case that it is a private tank enjoyed by
the 'grantee', N.L.S. as owner and thereafter the descedants and
perfected the title by prescription. It was found as a fact by the High
Court and the descendants are unable to persuade us from the evi-
H dence to differ from the findings that the tank is a "public tank" dug b)
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU [RAMASWAMY, J.J 541

the villagers and ever since and as of right they have been drawing the
water from the tank for their use and for the cattle of the village. The
descendants' plea ancj evidence adduced in support thereof that it is
their private tank, was negated by both the courts. The Trial Court
found that the tank is a 'public trust', the appellants would be heredit-
ary trustees and could be removed only by taking action under s. 77 of
B
the A.P. Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endow-
ments Act, 1966 for short 'the Endowments Act'. it also held that the
descendants acquired title by adverse possession. Accordingly the suit
for possession was decreed relegating to file a separate application for
mesne profits. On appeal the High Court reversed the decree and held
that the tank is a public tank and the tank and the lands stood vested in
the Gram Panchayat under A.P. Gram Panchayat Act 2 of 1964 for c
short 'the Act'. Since the Gram Panchayat was in possession from July
7, 1965, though dispossessed the descendants forcibly and as the suit is
not under s. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but one based on title, it
called for no interference. It dismissed the suit. This Court granted
leave to appeal under Article 136.
D
Civil Appeal No. 931 of 1977 arose out of the suit for possession
in O.S. No. 57 of 1966 on the file of the court of Subordinate Judge at
Guntur filed by the Gram Panchayat against the descendants. The suit
was dismissed by the Trial Court and was confirmed by the High Court
in A.S. No. 71 of 1973 and the High Court granted leave under Art.
E
133 on Dec. 10. 1976. The pleadings are the same as in the other suit,
In addition the descendants further pleaded in the written statement
that the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession of the tank on
• July 7, 1965. They also acquired title by grant of ryotwari patta under
..... s. 3 of the A.P. Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act
(Act XXXVII of 1956), for short 'the lnams Act'. The Gram
Panchayat had no manner of right to interfere with their possession F
and enjoyment. They also pleaded and adduced evidence tilat they
were leasing out the fishery rights and grass and trees grown on the
land. The income was being utilized for the repairs of tank. The Trial
Court and the High Court found that the lands were endowed to
N.L.S. for the maintenance of the tank and the descendants obtained
.. -+ ryotwari patta under Inams Act and are entitled to remain in posses- G
sion and enjoyment as owners subject to maintain the tank. Accord-
ingly the suit was dismissed. On appeal in A.S. No. 71 of 1973 by
judgment dated April 1, 1976 the High Court confirmed the decree on
further finding that by operation of s. 14 of the lnams Act, Civil Suit
was barred. Thus both the appeals are before this Court.
H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A In Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1978, Shri Seetharamaiah, learned
Senior Counsel for the descendants conceded that the descendants or
N .L.S have no exclusive personal right, title or interest in the tank and
the appurtenant total land of 100 acres. In view of the entries of the
Inams Fair Register for short 'I.F.R.', it is a public trust and not a
public tank. Unless recourse is had to remove them from trusteeship
B under s. 77 of the Endowments Act, Hie appellants cannot be dispos-
sessed. Since admittedly N.L.S. and the descendants were enjoying
the property till date of dispossession, presumption of the continuance
of the enjoyment anterior thereto as owners could be drawn. The High
Court thereby committed error of law in holding that the lands stood
vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Act and that it is a public
C tank. In Civil Appeal No. 931of1977, it was further contend.ed that
since the grant of R yotwari patta under the In ams Act had Iiecame
final s. 14 thereof bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain
the suit. Shri B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the Gram Panchayat
contended that the finding of the High Court that the tank and the
appurtenant land, namely, the plaint schedule property, as 'public
D tank', is based on evidence that the tank was dug by the villagers and
that they have been using for their drinking purposes and the cattle is a
finding of fact. By operation of ss. 85 and 64 of the Act, the land and
the tank stood vested in the Gram Panchayat. Entries in the I.F.R.
establishes that the grant of the land was for preservation, main-
tenance and repairs of the tank. Therefore, the grant should be in
E favour of the institution, namely, the tank. The pattas obtained by the
descendants should be for the benefit of the tank, though granted in
individual names. By operation of s. 85 of the Act, the descendants
acquired no personal title to the property. Ryotwari patta is only for
the purpose of land revenue. The Gram Panchayat acquired absolute
right title and interest in the land. The Civil Suit is not a bar on the
F facts in this case.

Before appreciating the diverse contentions, the facts emerged
from the findings iri both the appeals could be gathered thus. Admit-
tedly the Zamindar. Raja Manikya Rao granted 100 acres of land in
lnam village to dig the tank and the grant was for its preservation and
G maintenance. the grant was in favour of N.L.S. In 1700 A.P., i.e. 1190
Fasli, the tank was dug by the villagers and ever since the villagers
have been using the fresh water tank for their drinking purposes and of
the cattle and perfected their right by prescription. In course of time
the tank was silted up and in and around 30 acres the water spread
area, fresh water is existing. No repairs were effected by the des-
H cendants. The rest of the land was silted up. Grass and trees have been
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU [RAMASWAMY, J.] 543

grown thereon and was being enjoyed. On July 7, 1965, the Gram
A
Panchayat took unilateral possession of the tank and ever since was
exercising possession, supervision and control over it. After expiry of
three years from the date of dispossession, the descendants filed O.S.
No. 57 of 1966 for possession based on title. Earlier thereto the Gram
Panchayat filed the suit for possession. Under the Inams Act,
Ryotwari patta under s. 3 was granted to the descendants in individual B
capacity and on appeal the Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur con-
firmed the same. It became final as it was not challenged by filing any
writ petition. Both the suits now stood dismissed. The counsel on
other side have taken us through the evidence and we have carefully
scanned the evidence.

From these facts the first question emerges is whether the tank c
and the appurtenant land stood vested in Gram Panchayat.

Section 64 of the Act reads thus:

"Vesting of common property or income in Gram D
Panchayat-Any property or income which by custom
belongs to or has been administered for the benefit of the
villagers is common, or the holders in common of village
land generally or of land of a particular description or of
lands under a particular source of irrigation, shall vest in
the Gram Panchayat and be administered by it for the E
benefit of the villagers or holders aforesaid".

Section 85 reads thus:

"Vesting of water works in Gram Panchayat-( 1) All public
water-courses, springs, reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, foun- F
tains, wells, ponds and other water works (including those
used by the public to such an extent as to give a prescriptive
right to their use) whether existing at the commencement of

-
this Act or afterwards made, laid or erected and whether
made, laid or erected at the cost of the Gram Panchayat or
-t otherwise for the use or benefit of the public, and also any G
adjacent land, not being private property, appertaining
thereto shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be subject to its
control".

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any
work which is, or is connected with, a work of irrigation or H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

•
to any adjacent land appertaining to any such work.
A

(2) Subject to such restrictions and control as may be pre-
scribed, the Gram Panchayat shall have the fishery rights in
any water work vested in it under sub-section (1), the right
to supply water from any such work for raising seed beds on
B payment of the prescribed fee, and the right to use the
adjacent land appertaining thereto for planting of trees and
enjoying the usufruct thereof or for like purpose.

(3) The Government may, by notification in the Andhra
Pradesh Gazette, define or limit such control or may
assume the administration of any public source of water-
c supply and public land adjecent and appertainig thereto
after consulting the Gram Panchayat and giving due regard
to its objections, if any".
(emphasis supplied)

D A bird's eye view of the provisions brings out vividly that any
property or income which belongs to or has been administered for the
benefit of the villagers in common or the holders in any of the village ,-
land generally or of land of a particular description or of lands under
particular source of irrigation shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be
administered by it for the benefit of the villagers or holders aforesaid.
E The lands or income used for communal purpose shall either belong to
the Gram Panchayat or has been administered by the Gram Pan-
chayat. It is not the case of the Gram Panchayat nor any finding
recorded by the courts below to that effect. So s. 64 is not attracted,
though the villagers acquired prescriptive right to use the water from
the tank for their use and of their cattle.
F
All public water-courses, springs, reservoirs, tanks cisterns, etc.
and other water works either existing on the date of the Act or made
thereafter by the Gram Pancl)ayat, or otherwise including those used

G
by the public ripened into prescriptive right for the use and benefit of
the public and also adjacent or any appurtenant land not being private
property shall vest in the Gram Panchayat under s. 85(1) and be sub-
ject to its control. The proviso is not relevant for the purpose of this
-
case. Under sub-s. (2), the Gram Panchayat shall have fishery rights
therein subject to any restriction or control prescribed by the Govt. by
rules. The Gram Panchayat also shall have the right to use the adjacent
land appertaining thereto for planting trees and enjoying the usufruct
H thereof or for like purposes. Sub-section (3) gives over-riding power to
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU [RAMASWAMY, J.l 545

the Govt., by a notification published in the A.P. Gazette to define or
A
limit the control or supervision by the Gram Panchayat or the Govt.
may assume administration of any public source of water supply and
public land adjacent an_d appertaining thereto. The only condition pre-
cedent thereto is prior consultation of the Gram Panchayat and to have
due regard to any objections. if raised, by the Gram Panchayat and
issue notification published in the Gazette resuming the water sources B
or the land etc.

The word 'vest' clothes varied colours from the context and situ-
ation in which the word came to be used in a statute or rule. In
Chamber's Mid-Century Dictionary at p. 1230 defined "vesting" in the
legal sense 'to settle, secure, or put in fixed right of possession; to C
endow, to descend, devolve or to take effect, as a right'. In Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Edition at p. 1401, the word, 'vest', to give an
immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to accrue to, to
be fixed, to take effect, to clothe with possession, to deliver full pos-
session of land or of an estate, to give seisin to enfeoff. In Stroud's
Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, Vol. 5 at p. 2938, the word 'vested' D
was defined in several senses. At p. 2940 in item 12 it is stated thus 'as
to the interest acquired by public bodies, created for a particular
purpose, in works such as embankments which are 'vested' in them by -
statute, see Port of London Authority v. Canvey Island Commissio-
ners, [1932] 1 Ch. 446 in which it was held that the statutory vesting
was to construct the sea w_all against inundation or damages etc. and E

- did not acquire fee simple. Item 4 at p. 2939, the word 'vest', in the
absence of a context, is usually taken to mean vest in interest rather
than vest in possession'. In item 8 to 'vest',. "generally means to give
the property in". Thus the word 'vest' bears variable colour taking its
content from the context in which it came to be used. Take for instance,
the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. By operation of F
ss. 16 & 17 thereof, the property so acquired shall vest absolutely in
the Government free from all encumbrances. Thereby, absolute right,
title and interest is vested in the Government without any limitation
divesting the pre-existing rights of its owner. Similarly, under s .. 56 of
tlie Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, the estate of the insolvent vests
-+ in the receiver only for the purpose of its administration and to pay off G
the debts to the creditors. The receiver acquired no personal interest
of his own in the property. The receiver appointed by the court takes
possession of the properties in the suit on behalf of the court and
administer the property on behalf of the ultimate successful party as an
officer of the court and he has no personal interest' in the property
vested thereunder. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. ~elhi; H;
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 2 S.C.R.

Improvement Trust, [1957] SCR p. I the question was whether the
A
Delhi Improvement Trust was vested of the Nazul land belonging to
the Government with absolute right, when the property was entrusted
under the scheme for construction of the markets etc. It was held by
this court that placing the property at the disposal of the trust did not
signify that the Government had divested itself of its title to the pro-
B perty and transferred the same to the trust. The clauses in the agree-
ment show that the Government had created the Trust as its agent not
off permanent basis but as a convenient mode of having the scheme of
improvement implemented by the Trust subject to the control of the
Government. )---

The word 'vesting' in s. 85 would signify that the water-courses
c and tanks, lands etc. used by the public to such an extent as to give a
prescriptive right to their use, are vested in the Gram Panchayat, and
placed them under the control and supervision of the Gram Panchayat.
It confers no absolute or full title. It was open to the Government,
even after vesting, to place restrictions upon the Gram Panchayat in
D the matter or enjoyment and use of such tanks, and appurtenant lands
etc. Sub-section (3) of s. 85 expressly makes the matter clear. It
empowers the Government to assume the administration of any such
tank or lands or to define or limit the control which is vested in the
Gram Panchayat. Gram Panchayat being a statutory body is bound by
the restrictions imposed by sub-s. (3) The assumption-0f management
E by the Govt. would be subject to the prescriptive right of the vilagers if
any. The Division Bench in Gram Panchayat, Mandapaka & Ors. v.
Distt. Collector Eluru & Ors., AIR 1981 AP 15 considered the mean-
ing of the word 'vesting' and correctly laid the law in its interpreting
s. 85 of the Act. Anna Narasimha Rao & Ors. v. Kurra Venkata
Narasayya & Ors., [1981] 1 AWR p. 325 relied on by Shri Kanta Rao,
-
F though supports his contention that the vesting of the tanks etc. in the
Gram Panchayat was with absolute rights and the village community
rights would over-ride against rights of the Government, in our view
the law was not correctly laid down. Under A.P. Land Encroachment
Act, 1905; Talengana Area Land Revenue Act, relevant Abolition
Acts like A.P. Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
G 1948, Inams Abolition Act etc. give absolute rights of vesting in the +
State over the forest land, tanks. rivers, mines, poramboke, land, etc.
free from all encumbrances and the pre-existing rights in the other
land stood abolished and will be subject to the grant of Ryotwari patta
etc. It is also settled law that grant of Ryotwari patta is not a title but a
right coupled with possession to remain in occupation and enjoyment
J:'f subject to payment of the land revenue to the State. Therefore, we
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU (RAMASWAMY, J.I 547

agree with the High Court that the tank is a public tank and not a A
public trust and that under s. 85(1) ands. 64, the vesting of the tanks,
the appurtenant land and the common land is only for the purpose of
- ~ ""-· possession, supervision, control and use thereof for the villagers for
common use subject to the over-riding titk'by the Government and its
assumption of management should be in terms of sub-s. (3) of s. 85 of B
the Act and subject to the prescriptive right in the water, water spread
tank for common use.

Admittedly, N .S.L. or the descendants used the plaint schedule
-_.. property till July 7, 1965. The question then is what rights the
descendants acquired therein. Admittedly within six months from the
date of dispossession no suit under s. 6 of the Specific Relief Act was c
laid. Therefore, though the Gram Panchayat was not justified to t~ke
law into its own hands to take unilateral possession without due course
of law, since the suit filed by the descendants was based on title the
descendants in Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1978 have to establish their

... better title. Their claim was based on the Ryotwari patta granted
under s. 3 of the Inams Act. Therefore, entries in I.F.R. bear great
evidenciary value to ascertain their rights. In Arunachalam Chetty v.
D

~·

"" Venkatachalpathi Garu Swamigal, AIR 1919 PC. p. 62 at 65 the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council considered the effect of the
columns in the I.F.R. and held thus:
E
"It is true that the making of this Register was for the
ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands
... were tax-free. But it must not be forgotten that the pre-
,_ paration of this Register was a great act of State, and its
preparation and contents were the subject of much con-
sideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes. F
It is to be remembered that the. Inam Commissioners
through their officials made enquiry on the spot, heard
evidence and examined documents, and with regard to
each individual property, the government was put in pos-
session not only of the conclusion come to as to whether the

- -t
land was tax-free, but of a statement of the history and
tenure of the property itself. While their Lordships do not
doubt that such a report would not displace actual and
authentic evidence in individual cases, yet the board, when
G

such is not available, cannot fail to attach the utmost
importance, as part of the history of the property, to the
information set forth in the Inam Register". H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

Construction of the relevant entries in the l.F.R. is a question of
A
law. Col. 2, the general class to which the land belongs, described as
· Dharmattayam' endowment for a charitable "institution", Col. 7,
description of tenure for the "preservation and repairs" of Nori
Lakshmipathi Somayajulu Western Tanks at Vatticherkuru, Col. 9
tax-free, Col. IO, nature of the tenure, permanent, Col. 11, guarantor
B of the land Raja Manikya Rao in 1190 Fasli (1700 A.O.), Col. 13,
name of the original grantee 'Nori Lakshmipathi Somayajulu', Col. 21
to be confirmed under usual conditions of service and Col. 22, con-
firmed. In the survey and settlement record of the year 1906 the same
columns have been repeated. The lands in the tank were classified as
Village 'Poramboke' and the tank as 'village tank'. In the village map
also the same remarks were reiterated. Therefore, the entries in the
c I.F.R. are great acts of the State and coupled with the entries in the
survey and settlement record furnishes unimpeachable evidence. On
construction of these documents, it would clearly emerge that the
original grant was made for the preservation and maintenance of the
tank and tax-free lnam land was granted for that purpose though it was
D in the name of the individual granted. We are of the view that the grant
was for the preservation and maintenance of the tank. In K. V. Krishna
Rao v. Sub Collector, Ongole, [ 1969] 1 SCR 624 this court held under
the Inam ·Act that the tank is a charitable insititution. Thereby we
conclude that the grant was for the institution. Under s. 3 of the Inams
Act, the enquiry should be whether ( 1) a particular land is Inam land;
E (2) lnam land in a Ryotwari, Zamindar or lnam Village; and (3) is held
by any institution. In view of the finding that the grant was for the
preservation and maintenance of tank, the lnam land in an inam
village was held by the institution, namely, the tank. Ryotwari patta
shall, therefore, be in favour of the institution. Undoubtedly the
ryotwari patta was granted in favour of the descendants. In Nori
F Venkatarama Dikshitulu & Ors. v. Ravi Venkatappayya & Ors., [1959]
2 A. W.R. 357 in respect of the tape dedicated to the public benefits in
the same village, namely Vatticherukuru, one of the question that
arose was whether the patta granted in the individuals' names, would
be their individual property or for the endowment. The Division
Bench held that though the pattas were obtained in the individuals'
G name, the trustees of an institution cannot derive personal advantage
from the administration of the trust property. It was held that the grant
of patta was for the maintenance of the trust. We approve that the law
was correctly laid down.

In Krishan Nair Boppudi Punniah & Ors. v. Sri Lakshmi
H Narasimhaswamy Varu, by its trustees & Ors., [1963] 1 A.W.R. 214
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU (RAMASWAMY, J.I 549

relied on by Shri Sitaramaiah, on the basis of the entries in I.F.R., the
A
finding was that the grant was in favour of the individual burdened with
service and not to an institution. Therefore, the ratio therein does not
c>-- assist us to the facts in this case. Moreover, in view of the stand taken
by Shri Sitaramaiah that the lands are not the private property of
N .L.S. or his descendants but held by them as trustees, the grant of
Ryotwari patta to the individuals by necessary implication, as a corol- B
lary, is of no consequence. The question then is whether the enjoy-
ment of the usufruct by the descendants would clothe them with any
right as owners of the land. In view of the concurrent finding that
descendants did not acquire title by prescription, the passage in
Tagore Law Lecture, 'Hindu Religious Endowments and Institutions'
at p. 6 relied on by Shri Sitaramaiah to the effect 'dedication of tanks
and trees' as private property also renders no assistance to the
c
descendants. Undoubtedly, a presumption of an origin in lawful title
could be drawn, as held in Syed Md. Mazaffaralmusavi v. Bibi Jabeda
& Ors., AIR (1930) P.C. 1031 that the court has so often readily made
presumption in order to support possessory rights, long and quietly
en joyed, where no actual proof of title is forth coming. It is not a mere D
branch of the law of evidence. It was resorted to because of the failure
of actual evidence. The matter is one of pr~su1nption based upon the
policy of law. It was also further held that it is not a presumption to be
capriciously made nor is it one which a certain class of possessor is
entited to, de jure. In a case such as the one in question where it was
necessary to indicate what particular kind of lawful title was being E

- presumed, the Court must be satisfied that such a title was in its
nature practicable and reasonably capable of being presumed without
doing violence to the probabilities of the case. It is the completion of a
right to which circumstances clearly point where time had obliterated
any record of the original commencement. The longer the period
within which and the remoter the time when first a grant might be F
reasonably supposed to have occurred the less force there is an objec-
tion that the grant could not have been lawful. In Bhojraj v. Sita Ram
& Ors., AIR ( 1936) P .C. 60 it was further held that the presumption,

- not to supplement but to contradict the evidence would be out of
place. A presumption should be allowed to fill ill gaps disclosed in the
evidence. But the documentary evidence in the I.F.R. and the survey
and settlement records furnish the unerring evidence. Though the
original grant was not produced, the grant was for the institution and
G

not to the individuals. Therefore, the colour of title though enabled
them to enjoy the usufruct for personal use, once the tank and the
appurtenant land was found to be public tank, the descendants
acquired no personal right over it. The decision in· Bhupathiraju H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A Venkatapathiraju & Ors. v. The President, Taluq Board, Narsapur &
Ors., (1913] 19 LC. 727 (Mad.) (D.B.) relied by Shri Sitaramaiah the
finding was that the grant was to the plaintiffs' family subject to condi-
tions of service. Their right to take the usufruct of the trees therein was +
held to be for the benefit of the grantee. In that view its ratio cannot be
applied to the facts in this case. In M. Srinivasacharyulu & Ors. v.
B Dinawahi Pratyanga Rao & Ors., AIR ( 1921) Madras 467 one of the
contentions raised was that since the produce was being enjoyed by the
trustees for over many years for personal use, it must be construed that
the trust was for personal benefit of archakas. It was repelled holding
that it would be a dangerous proposition to lay down that if the
trustees of the religious trusts have for many years being applying the
c income to their own personal use, the trust-deed must be construed in
the light of such conduct. The decree of the trial court that the enjoy-
ment was for the institution was upheld. The finding in Civil Appeal
No. 931of1977, that since the endowment was the dashabandam the
descendants are entitled to the Ryotwari patta cannot be upheld.
Dashabandam grant of land burdened with the service of a public
D nature was made at a time when maintenance of water sources and
water courses to the benefits of the villagers was left to the villagers. In
Ravipati Kotayya & Anr. v. Ramasami Subbaraydu & Ors., [1956] (2)
A.W.R. 739 it was held that in the case of dashabandam inams situated
in R yotwari villages, the Government has the right of resumption on
default of service. The lands burdened with dashabandam service
E which is service of public nature, are inclinable as being against public
policy. We, therefore, hold that the descendants, though enjoyed the
income from the properties, did not effect the repairs and neglected
the maintenance and upkeep of the tank. They rendered the tank
disused and abandoned. By operation of s. 85 of the Act the lands and
tank stood vested in the Gram Panchayat for control, management and
-
F supervision.

Undoubtedly, a hereditary trustee is entitled to be the Chairman
of a Board of Trustees, if any, constituted under the Endowment Act
or else be in exclusive possession and management of the public trust
registered thereunder until he is removed as per the procedure pro-
G vided therein. Since the tank always remained a public tank and not
being a public trust, the Endowment Act does not apply. therefore, '
the question of initiating action under s. 77 of the Endowment Act for
removal of the descendants as trustees does not arise.

In the suit of the descendants the High Court did not consider the
H effect of grant of ryotwari patta under Jnams Act and in the suit of the
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU [RAMASWAMY, J.l 551

Gram (Village) Panchayat the effect of vesting under s. 85 of the Act A
on the grant of ryotwari patta was not considered. Only s. 14 i.e. the
bar of civil suit was focussed. Consequently both the suits were dismis-
-._,._ sed by different division benches. The question is whether the suit is
maintainable.

All communal lands, porambokes, tanks, etc., in inam villages B
shall vest in the Government under s. 2A of Inams Act free from all
encumbrances. Section 3 determines the inam lands whether held by
the individual or the institution, provides procedure for determination
ands. 3(4) gives right of appeal. Section 4 converts those lands into
ryotwari lands and accords entitlement to grant of ryotwari patta.
Section 5 gives power to restitute the lands to the tenants in occupation
though were ejected between specified dates. Section 7 gives power to
c
grant ryotwari patta to the tenants to the extent of two thirds share in
the land and one third to the land-holder. If it was held by the institu-
tion, two third share would be to the institution and one third to the
tenants. Section 3 grants right of permanent occupancy to the tenants
in inam lands held by institutions. Section 9 prescribes procedure for D
eviction of the tenants having right of permanent occupancy. Section
10-A provides right to ryotwari patta to tenants in Ryotwari or
Zamindari village with the right of permanent occupancy, even in the
lands, held under customary right etc. Section 12 fastens liability on
the ryotwari pattadars to pay land assessment. Section 13 gives exclu-
sive power of jurisdiction to Tehsildar, the Revenue Court and the E
Collector to try the suit as per the procedure as of a Civil Court under
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 14 of the Jnams Act reads thus:

14. "Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts: No suit or other
proceedings shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set aside
or modify any decision of the Tahsildar, the Revenue F
Court, or the Collector under this Act, except where such
decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collu-
sion of parties.".

- Section 14-A and Section 15 provides that:

"14-A Revision (I) Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, the Board of Revenue may, at any time either
suo moto or on application made to it, call for and examine
G

the records relating to any proceedings taken by the
Tahsildar, the Revenue Court or the Collector under this
act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the regularity of H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 2 S.C.R.

such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of
A
any decision made or order passed therein; and if, in any
case, it appears to the Board of revenue that any such
decision or order should be modified, annulled, reserved or _,.._ -
remitted for consideration, it may pass order accordingly.

B (2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed
under sub-section (1) unless such person has been given an
opportunity of making his representation.

15. Act to override other laws: "Unless otherwise ex-
pressly provided in this Act the provisions of this act and of
any orders and Rules made thereunder shall have effect
c notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any other law for the time being in force or any instru-
ment having effect by virtue of any such law".

The Constitution intends to herald an egalitarian social order by
D implementing the goals of socio-economic justice set down in the
Preamble of the Constitution. In that regard the Constitution created
positive duties on the State in Part IV towards individuals. The Parlia-
ment and the State legislatures made diverse laws to restructure the
social order; created rights in favour of the citizens; conferred power
and jurisdiction on the hierarchy of Tribunals or the authorities con-
E stituted thereunder and given finality to their orders or decisions and
divested the jurisdiction of the established civil courts expressly or by
necessary implication. The Inam Act is a step in that direction as part
of Estate Abolition Act. Therefore, departure in the allocation of the
judicial functions would not be viewed with disfavour for creating the
new forums and entrusting the duties under the statutes to implement
F socio-economic and fiscal laws. We have to consider, when ques-
tioned, why the legislature made this departure. The reason is obvi-
ous. The tradition bound Civil Courts gripped with rules of pleading
and strict rules of evidence and tardy trial, four tier appeals, endless
revisions and reviews under C.P.C are not suited to the needed

-
expeditious dispensation. The adjudicatory system provided in the
G new forums is cheap and rapid. The procedure before the Tribunal is
simple and not hide bound by the intricate procedure of pleadings, (
trial, admissibility of the evidence and proof of facts according to law.
\"'
Therefore, there is abundant flexibilty in the discharge of the func-
tions with greater expedition and inexpensiveness.

H In order to find out the purpose in creating the Tribunals under
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSH!THULU [RAMASWAMY, J.] 553

the statutes and the meaning of particular provisions in social legisla- A
tion, the Court would adopt the purposive approach to ascertain the
social ends envisaged in the Act, to consider scheme of the Act as an
integrated whole and practical means by which it was sought to be
effectuated to achieve them. Meticulous Jexographic analysis of
words and phrases and sentences should be subordinate to this purpo-
sive approach. The dynamics of the interpretative functioning of the B
Court is to reflect the contemporary needs and the prevailing values
consistent with the constitutional and legislative declaration of the
policy envisaged in the statute under consideration.

In Deena v. Union of India, [1984] 1 SCR 1 this Court held that
the "Law is a dynamic science, the social utility of which consists in its
ability to keep abreast of emerging trends in social and scientific adv-
c
ance and its willingness to readjust its postulates in order to accommo-
date those trends. Law is not static. The purpose of Law is to serve the
needs of life". The law should, therefore, respond to the clarion call of
social imperatives evolve in that process functional approach as means
to subserve "social promises" set out in the Preamble, directive princi- D
ples and the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution.

It is seen that the Inam's Act is an integral part of the scheme of
the Andhra Pradesh Estates (Aboilition and Conservation into
R yotwari) Act, 26 of 1984 for short 'Estate Abolition Act' to cover the
left ewer minor Inams. It determined the pre-existing rights of the E
Inamdars and the religious institutions; envisages grant of ryotwari
patta afresh to the concerned and seeks to confer permanent occu-
pancy rights on the tenants. It also regulates the relationship between
institutions and its· tenants. It created appellate and revision al and
forums and declared finality to the orders passed by the Tribunals and
expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, notwithstanding F
anything contained in any other law or inconsistent therewith the
Inams Act shall prevail. The exception engrafted was that a suit would
lie to challenge the decision obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and
collusion by parties.

Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides that G
whenever a question arises before the Civil Court whether its jurisdic-
tion is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the Court natur-
ally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alterna-
tive provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate. In
cases where exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly pro-
vided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A and the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may
be relevant, but cannot be decisive. Where exclusion is pleaded as a
matter of necessary implication such consideration would be· very
important and in conceivable circumstances might become even
decisive.

B The jurisdiction of a Tribunal created under statute may depend
UJlOn the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon existence of
some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which
the Tribunal has to try and the determination whether it existed or not
is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question
which the Tribunal has to consider. At the inception of an enquiry by a
C Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is made to its juris-
diction, the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact whether it
would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some decision as to
whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be Tribunal which by
virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine finally,
even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdic-
D tion depends; but subject to that, the Tribunal cannot by a wrong
decision with regard to collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it
would not otherwise had. Except such tribunals of limited jurisdiction
when the statute not only empowers to enquire into jurisdictional facts
but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to enter on the
enquiry and reach a decision rightly or wrongly. If it has jurisdiction to
E do right, it has jurisdiction to do wrong. It may be irregular or illegal
which could be corrected in appeal or revision subject to that the order
would become final. The questions to be asked, therefore, are whether
the Tribunal has jurisdiction under Inam Act to decide for itself
finally; whether the institution or the Inamdar or the tenant is entitled
to ryotwari patta under ss. 3, 4 and 7 and whether the Tribunal is of a
F limited jurisdiction and its decision on the issue of patta is a collateral
fact.

The consideration as to exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil
Court is no longer res integra. This Court in bead-roll of decisions
considered this question in diverse situations. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v.
G State of Bombay, (1966) 1SCR64 the questions arose were whether an
assessment made in violation of the Bombay Sales Tax Act could claim
the status of an assessment made under that Act, and whether the
nature of the transactions was a decision of collateral fact. A Bench of
seven Judges of this Court held that if it appears that a statute creates a
special right or liability and provides for the determination of the right
H or liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU !RAMASWAMY, J.) 555

behalf would be considered whether all questions of said right and
A
liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted and it
becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated
'·+ with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. It
was held that the Court was satisfied that the Act provided all the
remedies associated with actions in Civil Courts and the remedy for
refund of the tax illegally collected was provided and it was not col- B
lateral. Section 20 prohibits such a claim being made before an ordi-
nary Civil Court and held that the civil suit was not maintainable. The
leading dicisions of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask &
Co., [1940] L.R. 67 I.A. 222; Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v.
Governor-General in Council, L.R. 74 I.A. 50 and the ratio in Firm
and Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1964] 1
SCR 752 were approved. In Desika Charyulu v. State of A.P., AIR
c
1964 SC 807 a Constitution Bench was to consider whether the juris-
diction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal created under the
Estates Abolition Act to determine whether Shotrium Village was an
inam estate was exclusive and the Civil Court's jurisdiction to try the
dispute was barred. Despite the fact that no express exclusion of the D
Civil Court's jurisdiction was made under the Act it was held that very
provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determi-
nation of the questions on which the applicability of the Act depends
was sufficient in most cases to infer that the jurisdiction of the Civil
Courts to try the same was barred. Accordingly it was held that the
jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal by necessary E
implication was exclusive and that the Civil Courts are barred from
trying or retrying the question once over. The decisions of the Settle-
ment Officer and of the Tribunal were held final and conclusive.

In Dhulabhai & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 662
F
another Constitution Bench reviewed the entire case law on the ques-
tion of maintainability of civil suit and laid do"vn seven propositions.
Propositions 1 and 2 are relevant, which read thus:

-
'
"(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the
special tribunals the Civil Courts' jurisdiction must be held
to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the
Civil Courts normally do in a suit. Such provision, how-
G

ever, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of
the particular Act have not been complied with or the
statutory tribunal has not acted in confom1ity with the
fundamental principles of judicial procedure. H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991) 2 S.C.R.

A
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the
Court. an examination of the scheme of the particular Act
to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies
provided may be relevant-but is not decisive to sustain the
jurisdiction of the civil court.

B Where there is no express exclusion the examination
of the remedies and the scheme of the particular act to find
out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the
inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to
see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and
provides for the determination of the right or liability and
further lays down that all questions about the said right and
c liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted,
and whether remedies normally associated with actions in
Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not."

It was held therein that the civil suit was not maintainable to call in •
D question of assessment made under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act.
In Hatti v. Sunder Singh, [1971) 2 SCR 163 the tenant had a declarat-
ory relief before the authorities under Delhi Land Reforms Act that he
was Bhoomidar. When it was challenged in the civil suit as not being
-
binding, this Court held that the civil suit was not maintainable.

E In Muddada Chayana v. Karam Narayana and Anr. etc., (1979] 3
SCR 201 under s. 56(1)(c) of the Estates Abolition Act, the dispute
whether who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, shall be
decided by the Settlement Officer. Whether it is liable to be ques-
tioned in the Civil Court. Chinnappa Reddy, J., who had intimate
knowledge as an Advocate and the Judge on the subject reviewed the
F law and held that the Act is a self-contained code in which provision
was also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising,
after an estate was notified, by specially constituted tribunals. On the
general principles it was held that the special tribunals constituted by

G
the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to
decide dispute entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication.
Dealing with the object of the Act it was held at p. 207 C-D that the
Act intended to protect ryots and not to leave them in wilderness.
.
f

When the Act provides machinery ins. 56(J)(c) to discover who the
lawful ryot of a holding was, it was not for the Court to denude the Act \
of all meaning and by confining the provision to the bounds of ss. 55
and 56(1)(a) and (b) on the ground of contextual interpretation.
H Interpretation of a statute, contextual or otherwise must further and
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHJTHULU [RAMASWAMY, J.J 557

not frustrate the object of the statute. It was held that the civil suit was
A
not maintainable and approved the Full Bench judgment of 5 Judges of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Munuswami Naidu v. R.
-~ Venkata Reddy., AIR 1978 A.P. 200. The same view was reiterated in
0. Chenchulakshmamma & Anr. v. D. Subramanya Reddy, [1980] I
SCR 1006 and held that the order of the Addi. Settlement Officer was
final in so far as the dispute between the rival claimants to the ryotwari B
patta was concerned and not liable to be questioned in any court of
law. In A. Bodayya & Anr. v. L. Ramaswamy (dead) by Lrs., [1984]
(Suppl). SCC 391 while reiterating the ratio in both the judgments,

• Desai, J. speaking for a Bench of 3 Judges held that under Estate
Abolition Act, who the lawful ryot was decided. Self-same question
directly and substantially raised in the suit cannot be decided by the
Civil Court as it had no jurisdiction to decide and deal with the same but
Settlement Officer had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide and deal
c
with it. In Doe v. Bridges, [1831] 1 B & Ad. 347 at p. 859 the oft
quoted dictum of Lord Tenerden, C.J. reads that:

"where an act creates an obligation and enforces the D
performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a
general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any
other manner."

In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and
Ors., [1976) 1 SCR 427 a Bench of three Judges after reviewing the E
case law held that if a dispute was not industrial dispute, nor does it
relate to enforcement of any right under the Industrial Dispute Act,
the remedy lies only in the civil court. If the dispute arises out of the
...- right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act,
the jurisdiction of the civil court is always alternative, leaving it to the
election of the suitor to choose his remedy for the relief which is F
competent to be granted in a particular remedy. If the dispute relates
to the enforcement of a right or obligation of the Act, the only remedy
available to the suitor is to get an application adjudicated under me
Act. In that view, it was held that the civil suit was not maintainable.

-i In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, [1985) 4 G
SCC 10 strongly relied on by Shri kanta Rao, the question therein was
whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted to redetermine
the nature of the land rendered by the settlement officer under s. 11 of
the Estate Abolition Act, Tulzapurkar, J. speaking for the Division
Bench proceeded on three fundamental postulates namely that the
decision of the Settlement authorities under s. 11 of the Act was for (I) H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

'revenue purposes', "that is to say for fastening the liability on him to
A
pay the assessment and other dues and to facilitate the recovery of
such revenue from him by the Government; and therefore, any deci-
sion impliedly rendered on the aspect of nature and character of the
land on that occasion will have to be regarded as inddental to and
merely for the purpose of passing the order of granting or refusing to
B grant the patta and for no other purpose". (II) only revision against
the order and not an appeal; and (III) that by Madras Amendment,
s. 64-c was deleted. It was unfortunate that it was not brought to the
notice of the court that the purpose of Estate Abolition Act was not
solely for the purpose of collecting the revenue to the State. The Act
had its birth from a long drawn struggle carried on by the ryots in
Madras Presidency for permanent ryotwari settlement of tenures and
c grant of permanent occupancy rights and the Indian National Congress
espoused their rights and passed resolution at Arvadi Session to make
a legislation in that regard. The recovery of revenue was only secon-
dary. In Syamala Rao v. Sri Radhakanthaswami Varu [ 1984] 1
A.P.L.J. 113 a division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to
D which one of us (K. R.S.,J) was a member considered the historical
background, the purpose of the Act and the scheme envisaged therein
.lo.
in extenso and held that the preamble of the Estate Abolition Act was
to repeal the permanent settlements, the acquisition of the rights of
the land-holders in the Estates and introduction of the ryotwari settle-
ment therein; under s. 1(4) by issuance of the notification the pre-
E existing rights shall cease and determined; shall vest in the State free
from all encumbrances and declared that all rights and interests created
in particular over the State 'shall cease and determine as against the
Government' protected only dispossession of a person in possession of
the ryoti land who was considered prima facie entitled to a ryotwari
patta. Section 11 envisaged to enquire into "the nature of the land"
F and whether "ryotwari land immediately before the notified dates" to
be properly included or ought to have been properly included in the
holding of the ryot". The enquiry under the Act was entrusted to the
Revenue Authorities who have intimate knowledge of the nature of
the lands and the entries in the revenue records of the holders, etc. Act
created hierarchy of the tribunals, namely Asstt. Settlement Officer;
G Settlement Officer; Director of Settlements and Board of Revenue;
provided revisional powers to those authorities and ultimately the
order is subject to the decision of the High Court under Art. 226. In
that view it was held that by necessary implication the jurisdiction of
the civil court was ousted, the decision of settlement authorities under
s. 11 was made final and no civil suit was maintainable. The legislature
H having made the Act to render economic justice to the ryots and
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DFEKSHITIIULU (RAMASWAMY, J.l 559

excluded the dispute between land-holders and the ryots covered
A
under ss. 12 to 15 and the ryots inter se under s. 56(1)(c), from the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it would not be the legislative intention to
expose the ryots to costly unequal civil litigation with the state of the
dispute under s. 11. It is not necessary in this case to broach further but
suffice to state that unfortunately this historical perspective and the
real purpose and proper scope and operation of Estate Abolition Act
was not focussed to the notice of this court. In Jyotish Thakur & Ors.
v. TarakantJha & Ors., [1963] Suppl. 1SCR13 s. 27 ofregulation III
of 1872 provides that in respect of transfer of ryoti interest in contra-
vention of the regulation revenue courts shall not take cognizance of
such a transfer. It was contended that by necessary implication the civil
suit was not maintainable. In that context this Court held that provi-
sions therein were not intented to be exhaustive to bar the relief in Civil c
Court. In Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam v. K. Gopalaswami
Aiyangar, [1964] 3 SCR 763 the question was whether the civil suit to
recover damages and for ejectment of the ryoti lands belonging to the
temple was barred. The findings were that the lands were ryoti lands
and that the tenant acquired the occupancy rights, but the lease was D
granted in excess of 5 years. It was contended that it was a transfer
without permission of the Endowment department. While upholding
that the lands were ryoti lands and the tenant acquired occupancy
rights, this Court disagreeing with the High Court, held that there was
no transfer and that the tenant is liable to pay the arrears of rent and
the suit was maintainable. In Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami E
Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy, [1967] 1 SCR 280 the conten-
tion raised was that s. 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charit-
able Endowments Act, 1951 was a bar to maintain suit for rendition of
accounts and recovery thereof against the ex-trustees. This Court
repelled the contention and held that the suit for rendition of accounts
was not expressly or by necessary implication barred the jurisdiction of F
the civil court under s. 93. In Shree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagan-
nadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garn v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1970]
2 SCR 714 it was conceded that the question whether Kalipatnam
village is an Inam estate was to be adjudicated before the tribunals
appointed under the Rent Reduction Act. It was contended that the
tribunals have no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the notification G
reducing the rent by operation of s. 8(1) thereof. It was held that there
was no statutory prohibition to determine the nature of the land con-
templated by the Rent Reduction Act. Accordingly the suit was held
to be mintainable. In Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra
& Ors., [1980] 3 SCR 207 it was found that under s. 7 of the Administ-
ration of Evacuee Property Act,· 1950, no proceedings were taken to H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

declare the suit house as on evacuee property. No notification under
A
sub-s. (3) of 7 was published in the gazette. Under those circumstances
it was held thats. 46 did not bar the civil suit. In Anne Besant National
Girls High School v. Dy. Director of Public Instruction & Ors. [1983] 1
SCC 200 this Court held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine
whether action or decision of an administrative authority was ultra
B vires the relevant rules of Grant-in-Aid Code and Rule 9 (vii) was held
to be ultra vires. Accordingly the suit was held to be maintainable. In
Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (dead) by Lrs. v. Union of India, [1988] 2
SCR 352 two questions were raised, firstly the validity of the assess-
ment and secondly recovery of the tax paid under Excess Profit Tax
Act, 1940. On the first question it was held that the suit was not
maintainable. On the second question, without going into the tech-
c nicalities of the maintainability of the suit, this Court granted the relief.
In Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd., etc. v. The Dy. Commissioner Lakhimpur,
etc., [1968] 1SCR260 the questions were whether the workmen were ordi-
nary unskilled labour or skilled labour; whether the jurisdiction of the
authorities under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is exclusive
D and whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. This court
held that the authorities did not hold any inquiry nor received any
evidence for determining that issue. No proper hearing was given to
the parties to tender evidence. Section 20 is not a complete Code as
there was no provision for appeal or revision against the orders passed
under s. 20(3). There was no further scrutiny by any higher authority
E against the imposition of penalty. The Act in terms does not bar the
employers from instituting a suit. In those circumstances, it was held
that the legislature did not intend to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil
court. The ratio in K. Chintamani Dora & Ors. v. G. Annamnaidu &
Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 655 also does not assist Gram Panchayat for the
reason that the decree therein originally granted became final. Subse-
F quently it was sought to be reopened in a later suit. Under those
· circumstances the civil suit was held to be maintainable notwithstand-
ing the provisions contained under the Estate Abolition Act.

Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio in all these
cases are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance to the
G Gram Panchayat. The scope, ambit and operation of the Inams Act ... '
was considered by P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as he then was) in D. V.
Raju v. B.G. Rao & Ani., [1961] 2 A.W.R. 368 and held that the
paramount object of the legislature was to protect the tenant in occu-
pation and is sought to be achieved by making effective orders of
eviction made by the Civil Court either in execution or otherwise. It
H further prohibits the institution of any suit or proceeding in a Civil
VILLAGE PANCHAYAT v. DEEKSHITHULU [RAMASWAMY, J.] 561

Court under s. 14 to set aside or modify any decision of the Tehsildar,
A
Collector or Revenue Court except where such decision has been

- obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion. Section 15 enjoins
that the provisions of the Act and orders made thereunder shall have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having
effect by virtue of absolute jurisdiction on the Tehsildar, Revenue B
Court or the Collector, as the case may be, notwithstanding any provi-
sion of law or any suit or decree of a Civil Court or for that matter even
where evictions have taken place in pursuance of such decrees, the
evicted tenants can be restored to occupation provided the require-
.--< ments for the protection of the possession of the tenants are satisfied.
In that case the occupant in possession laid proceeding before the
Tehsildar for injunction restraining the writ petitioner from ejecting c
him from the lands. The Tehsildar in exercise of the power ~nder Rule
16 of the Rules granted injunction pending consideration of his right to
Ryotwari patta. The order of injunction was challenged firstly on the
ground of ultra vires of Rule 16 and secondly on the ground of jurisdic-
tion. While upholding the order on both the grounds the learned Judge D
held that Tehsildar, Revenue Court and the Collector have exclusive
A jurisdiction and the civil suit is barred. We respectfully approve it as
correct law. The loams Act did not intend to leave the decisions of the
revenue courts under s. 3 read with s. 7 to retry the issue once over in
the Civil Court. Undoubtedly the decision of the division Bench in P.
Pedagovindayy v. Subba Rao, [1969] 2 A.L.T. 336 is in favour of the E
contention that the civil suit is maintainable. It is not good law.

Thus the glimpse of the object of the Inams Act, scheme, scope
~
and operation thereof clearly manifest that loams Act is a self con-
tained code, expressly provided rights and liabilities, prescribed proce-
dure; remedies of appeal and revision,.excluded the jurisdiction of the F
civil court, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, given pri-
macy of lnams Act though inconsistent with any law or instrument
having force of law. The jurisdictional findings are an integral scheme
to grant or refuse ryotwari patta under s. 3, read with s. 7 and not
collateral findings. It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari
' -4 under Art. 226. The decision of the Revenue Tribunal, are final and G
conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right, title or
interest through them. The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of
the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order
of the tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except
on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of" the parties is
not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit H

..
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A is not maintainable when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari
patta granted under s. 3 of the Inams Act. Under the Gram Panchayat
Act the statutory interposition of vesting the tank and the appurtenant
land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession. control and
supervision over it. though the Gram Panchayat unlawful!)" took pos-
session. The need to grant decree for·possession in favour of the Gram
B Panchayat is thus redundant. The suit of the descendants normally to
be decreed on the finding that ryotwari patta under s. 3 of the In ams Act
was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully disposses-
sed. Since the grant of ryotwari patta, though in the name of individu-
als, was to maintain the public tank which stood vested under s. 85 of
the Act iff the Gram Panchayat, the descendants are divested of the
c right and interest acquired therein. Thus the suit of the descendants
also is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the decrees of dismissal of
both the suits are upheld and the appeals dismissed. But in the
circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.

V.P.R. Appeals dismissed.