Holding

A murderer is deemed to have predeceased the decedent and is totally disqualified from inheriting, and the disqualification extends to his wife, who cannot claim through him.

Summary

The appellant, Vellikannu, a daughter‑in‑law, claimed inheritance of the joint family property of her deceased father‑in‑law, Ramasami Konar, asserting her right as his widow. The sole son of the deceased, Respondent No.1, had murdered his father and was convicted under Section 302 IPC, later released. The issue was whether the murderer is disqualified from inheriting under Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and whether the wife can claim through him. The Supreme Court held that Section 25 disqualifies a murderer from any succession and Section 27 deems such a person to have predeceased the decedent, thereby extinguishing his right to inherit. Consequently, the son could not inherit the coparcenary property, and the appellant could not claim as his widow. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' order that the appellant has no right to the estate.

Issues considered

Whether a person who murders his father is disqualified from inheriting under Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Whether the wife of such a disqualified son can claim inheritance as a widow under the same Act.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 25, s. 27, s. 6, s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActSection 25Section 27disqualificationmurderercoparcenary propertyMitakshara lawsurvivorshipwidow's rightjoint family

Judgment

A VELLIKANNU
v.
R. SINGAPERUMAL AND ANR.

MAY 6, 2005

B [ASHOK BHAN AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.]

Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Sections 25 and 27 rlw Sections 6 and
8-Coparcenery property-Succession-Disqualification-Respondent No.1
C murdered his father, who died intestate-Deceased was already divorced-He
was survived by Respondent No. I- his only son and the sole male survivor and
Appellant- the daughter-in-law-Properties of the deceased were joint family
properties and the parties were governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu
Law-Question of succession-Held: Respondent no. I having murdered his
father, will be deemed to have pre-deceased him and would be disqualified
D from inheriting the properties left by him as coparcener--Since the right of
Appellant flows as wife of Respondent No.I, she too cannot inherit the said
properties claiming as widow of Respondent No.I.

Respondent No.I murdered his father and was convicted under
Section 302 IPC to life imprisonment. High Court confirmed the conviction
E but recommended the Government to reduce the .sentence to the period
already undergone. Respondent No.I was subsequently released from
prison.

The deceased was already divorced. He died intestate survived by
Respondent No.I, his only son and Appellant, the daughter-in-law. The
F properties of the deceased were joint family properties and the parties were
governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.

The questions which arose for consideration in the present appeal
are whether Respondent no.I having murdered his father, will be deemed
G to have pre-deceased him and would be disqualified from inheriting the
properties left by him as coparcener and that since the right of Appellant
flows as wife of Respondent No.I, she too cannot inherit the said properties
claiming as widow of Respondent No.I.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
H I~
VELLIKANNU v. R. SINGAPERUMAL 161
HELD: 1. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 if a A
male Hindu dies after commencement of the Act, an interest in a
Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by survivorship upon the
surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the Act.
In the present case, the concurrent finding of the fact is that the deceased
was governed by Mitakshara Law and the property was the coparcenary B
property. But he died intestate. Therefore, as per Section 6, the property
shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the
coparcenary and not by Section 6 of the Act and at the same time there
is proviso to Section which qualifies the main Section that if deceased left
a surviving female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male
relative specified in that class -who claims through such female, the C
interest of deceased in Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve
by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be and not by
survivorship. (167-D-E-F)

2. So far as the rights of coparceners under the Mitakshara Law are
concerned, the son acquires by birth or adoption a vested interest in all D
coparcenery property whether ancestral or not and whether acquired
before or after his birth or adoption, as the case may be, as a member of
a joint family. A member of l!Oparcenery acquires a right in the property
by birth. His share may fluctuate from time to time but his right by
way of survivorship in copracenary property in Mitakshara Law is a E
settled proposition. The concept of coparcener as given in the Mitakshara
School of Hindu Law is that of a joint family property wherein all the
members of the coparcenery share equally. (167-H)

State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram, AIR (1969) SC 1333 and State
of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh and Ors., [1985) 2. SCC F
321, referred to.

Principles of Mui/a, I 5Jh Edition (1982) pp. 284 and p. 285; S. V.Gupta,
Hindu Law, Vol.I, Third Edition (1981) p. 162 and N.R. Raghavachariar's
Hindu Law and Principles and Precedents, 8th Edition (1987) at p. 230,
~~~ G
3.1. Respondent No.I and his wife, the Appellant were members of
joint Hindu family. If Respondent No.I had not incurred the
disqualification, then they would have inherited the property as per
Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. When the sole male survivor had
incurred the disqualification he cannot claim the property by virtue of H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. If he cannot get the property by way
of survivorship, his wife who succeeds through the husband cannot succeed
to the property. [171-E, F]

3.2. In fact, prior to the amendment of the Hindu Succession Act,
Sections like 25 & 27 were not there but the murderer of his own father
B was disqualified on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience
and as a measure of public policy. [171-F-G)

Kenchava Korn Sanyellappa Hosmani and Anr. v. Girimallappa
Channappa Somasagar, AIR (1924) PC 209; Gangu v. Chandrabhagabai,
(1908) 32 Born. 275; K.Stanumurthiayya and Ors. v. K.Ramappa and Ors.,
C AIR 29 1942 Madras 277; Nakchhed Singh & Ors. v. Bijai Bahadur Singh
and Anr., AIR (1953) All 759; Mata Badal Singh and Ors. v. Bijay Bahadur
Singh and Ors., AIR (1956] All 707 and Minotiv, Sushi/ Mohansingh Malik
and Anr., AIR (1982) Born. 68, referred to.

D~ 3.3. The above position of law was incorporated by way of Section
25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which clearly enunciates that a
person who commits murder or abates the commission of murder shall
be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or
any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she
committed or abetted the commission of the murder., [173-D-E]
E
3.4. Thus a person who has murdered his father or a person from
whom he wants to inherit, stands totally disqualified. Section 27 of the
Hindu Succes!':ion Act makes it further clear that if any person is
disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall be deemed
as if such person had died before the intestate. That shows that a person
F who has murdered a person through whom he wants to inherit the
property stands disqualified on that account. That means he will be
deemed to have predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read with
Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally
disqualified to succeed to the estate of deceased. (173-G-H]
G
4. In the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is that the
respondent No.1 cannot inherit any property of" his father as he has
murdered him, on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and
the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist. Once the son is totally
disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or son.
H Respondent No.1 son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of Sections
VELLIKANNU v. R. SINGAPERUMAL [A.K. MATHUR, J.) 163

25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no A
better claim in the property of the deceased. [174-C, DJ

- CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4838of1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.3.97 of the Madras High Court
in S.A.No. 773 of 1983. B
V. Balachandran for the Appellant.

V. Prabhakar, R.S. Krishna Kumar, Rakesh Garg, Mrs. Revathy
Raghavan and Ashok K. Sadhu Khan for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
A.K. MA THUR, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the
learned Single Judge of Judicature at Madras whereby the learned Single
Judge by his order dated 6th March, 1997 has allowed the Second Appeal
No. 773 of 1983 filed by the respondent- I st Defendant herein. D
Brief·facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are;

That an Original Suit No. 87/1978 was filed in the Court of the District
Munsif, Melur by the plaintiff-appellant (herein).
E
The schedule prop~rties are the self-acquired properties of late Ramasami
Konar and the first defendant was the only son of Ramasami Konar and the
plaintiff is the wife of the first defendant. Wife of Ramasami Konar was
already divorced and married with some other person and was residing
separately. It is alleged that the first defendant in the suit married the plaintiff-
appellant and both were residing as husband and wife. On 10th October, F
1972 the first defendant murdered his father, Ramasami Konar and was
convicted under Section 302 IPC for life imprisonment. The conviction of
the first defendant was confirmed by the High Court but the High Court
recommended the Government to reduce the sentence to the period already
undergone. The first defendant was released in July, 1975. Since the first G
defendant murdered his father, he was not entitled to succeed to the estate of
his deceased father and as such the claim of the plaintiff was that she alone
was entitled to all the properties left by the deceased Ramasami Konar.
According to the plaintiff, the first defendant must be deemed to have
predeceased as provided under Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu
Succession Act. She claimed to be the widow of the first defendant and H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A claimed to be the owner of all the properties left by Ramasami Konar as
coparcener. After the release of the first defendant from the prison, first
defendant lived with the plaintiff for some time but after some time she was
driven out of the house. Second defendant is already imp leaded in the suit as
tenant claiming under first defendant. Plaintiff, ther~fore, prayed that she •
B may be granted the relief of declaration as she is entitled to inherit the entire
estate of the deceased Ramasami Konar. As against this it was contended by
the first defendant that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff is not the
legal heir ofRamasami Konar. It was alleged that all the properties acquired
by the Ramasami, were joint family properties and the first defendant has
acquired the same by survivorship. The Trial Court by Order dated 31st
.C March, 1980 held that all the properties are joint family properties of the
deceased Ramasami Konar and first defendant. The second defendant is a
cultivating tenant. The first defendant having murdered his father is not entitled
to claim any right under Section 6 read with Sections 25 & 27 of the Act but
as per proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act plaintiff is entitled
to a decree for half share and accordingly it was grantecrt<:i the plaintiff. This
D matter was taken up in appeal by defendant No. 1. The Lower Appellate
. Court also confirmed the finding of the Trial Court but modified the decree
that it may be treated as preliminary decree. The Lower Court also held that
first defendant must be treated as non-existent. The plaintiff became a Class
I heir under Schedule 1 of the Hindu Succession Act and she was entitled to
E a share in the property. The appeal was dismissed.
Aggrieved against this, the first defendant preferred a second appeal
before the High Court.

The High Court at the time of admission of the Second Appeal, framed
F following substantial questions of law.

"1. Whether Ex.A.2 judgment in the Criminal case is conclusive on
the question of exclusion from inheritance in the present proceedings?
and

2. Whether the exclusion from inheritance would cover enlargement,
G of interest by survivorsl}ip, in the light of Section 6 of Hindu
Succession Act ?"

So far as the question No. I is concerned, the High Court held that the
judgment of the Criminal Court can be taken into consideration. But the main
H question which was addressed .by the High Court was whether the plaintiff

I
VELLJKANNUv. R. SINGAPERUMAL [AK. MATHUR, J.) 165

can inherit the properties from the estate of her deceased father-in-law, A
Ramasami Konar and what is the effect of Section 25, Section 27 read with
Section 6 and Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act.

It was not disputed that the properties of the Ramasami Konar were
joint family properties in which the defendant No. l was also one of the
member and the parties are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu B
Law.

The learned Single Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties
and considering the relevant law on the subject in detail, came to the conclusion
that the view taken by both the Courts below cannot be sustained. It was held
by the learned Single Judge that plaintiff cannot claim as a widow of the son C
of Ramasamy Konar. It was observed that plaintiff cannot claim one half
share· in the property being coparcenary property under Proviso to Section 6
of the Hindu Succession Act . It was also observed that she is entitled to half
share so kmg as the deceased father and son had not partitioned the property.
The first defendant/ respondent No I herein cannot be said to have inherited D
any share from the victim (Ramasamy Konar) and the ·Plaintiff can claim as
a widow only if there is a succession to the estate of the victim. If there is
no succession, the deeming provision that the first defendant shall be deemed
to have died before the victim (his father) also will not apply and she cannot
claim as a widow of his pre-deceased son. It was also held that Section 6 of
the Hindu Succession Act will also not apply. The principle of justice, equity E
and public policy will apply and the plaintiff cannot be treated as a fresh
stock of descent and defendant No. I shall be treated as a non-existent as if
he never existed. Therefore, the plaintiff also cannot claim as his widow. It
was also observed that since plaintiff claims as a widow of the defendant No.
l and he is disqualified, same disqualification equally applies to her for she F
cannot claim through murderer husband.

Learned single Judge allowed the appeal of the defendant No. 1/
respondent No. I (herein) and judgment and decree of the Courts below wer-e
set aside. The suit was dismissed. Hence the present appeal.
G
Learned counsel for the appellant tried to persuade us that appellant
being the sole female survivor of the Joint Hindu Property as her husband
stands disqualified, she under proviso to Section 6 of the Act, is entitled to
the whole of the estate as a sole survive member of the coparcenary property
read with Section 8 of the Act as a Class I heir. As against this, learned
counsel for the respondent-defendant has submitted that this disqualification H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A which was attached to the son equally applies in the case of the wife as she
is claiming the estate because of her marriage with the respondent and if he
is disqualified, then she is also equally disqualified to claim any property
being a coparcener from the estate of her deceased father in law.

In order to appreciate the rival contention, it would be relevant to
B reproduce provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Sections 6, 8, 25 and 27
of the Act which read as under:

"Section 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property- When a
male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the
time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property,
c his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the
surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with
this Act:

Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female
relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified
D in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of
the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by
testamentary or intestate succession, as the 'case may be, under this
Act and not by survivorship.

Explanation I.- For the purposes of this section, the interest of a
E Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the
property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the
property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective
of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not..

Explanation 2.- Nothing contained in ;the proviso to this section
F shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself
from the coparcenary before the· death of the deceased of any of his
heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein."

Section 8.- General rules of succession in the case of males.- The
property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to
G
the provisions of this Chapter :-

(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of
the Schedule;

(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being
H the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule;
VELLIKANNU '" R. SINGAPERUMAL [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 167

(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon
I
A
the agnates of the deceased; and
(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the
deceased.·

Section 25.- Murderer disqualified-A person who commits murder B
or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting
the property of the person murdered, or any other property in
furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted
the commission of the murder.

Section 27.- Succession when heir disqualified-If any person is C
disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall
devolve as if such person had died before the intestate."

As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, if a male Hindu dies
after commencement of this Act, an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary
property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the D
coparcenary and not in accordance with the Act. So far as the present case
is concerned, the concurrent finding of the fact is that the deceased Ramasamy
Konar was governed by Mitakshara Law and the property was the coparcenary
property. But he died intestate. Therefore, as per Section 6, the property shall
devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and
not by Section 6 of the Act and at the same time there is proviso to Section E
which qualifies the main Section that if deceased left a surviving female
relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that
class who claims through such female, the interest of deceased in Mitakshara
coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession,
as the case may be and not by survivorship. F
So far as the property in question is concerned, there is a finding of the
Courts below that the property is a coparcenary property and ifthat being so,
if the defendant No. I had not murdered his father then perhaps a thing
would have taken a different shape. But what is the effect on the succession
of the property of the deceased father when son has murdered him. If he had G
not murdered his father he would have along with his wife would have
succeed in the matter. So far as the rights of coparceners in the Mitakshara
Law are concerned, son acquires by birth or adoption a vested interest in all
coparcenery property whether ancestral or not and whether acquired before
or after his birth or adoption, as the case may be, as a member of a joint
family. This is the view which has been accepted by all the Authors of the H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A Hindu Law. The famous principles of Mulla , 15th Edition (1982) at pages
284 and 285, the learned Author has stated thus:

"The essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara Law is unity of
ownership. The ownership of the coparcenary property is in the who1e
body of coparceners. According to the true notion of an undivided
B family governed by the Mitakshara Law, no individual members of
that family, whilst it remains un-divided, can predicate, of the joint
and undivided property, that he that particular member, has a definite
share, one third or one-fourth. His interest is a fluctuating interest,
capable 0f being enlarged by deaths in the family, and liable to be
diminished by births-in the family. It is only on a partition that he
c b~comes entitled to a definite share. The most appropriate term to
describe the intere~ of coparcener in coparcenary property is
"undivided coparcenary interest". The nature and extent of that interest
is defined in Section 235. The rights of each coparcener until a partition
takes place consist in a common possession and common enjoyment
D of the coparcenary property. As observed by the privy council of
Katama Natchiar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga, " there is community
of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the
family, and upon the death of any one of them the others may well
take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased's
lifetime a common interest and a common possession."
E
Likewise, S.V. Gupta, author of Hindu Law, Vol. 1, Third Edition
(1981) at page 162, the learned author deals with the rights of a coparcener.
He says thus:-

"Until partition, coparcener is entitled to:-
F
(1) join possession and enjoyment of joint family property
(2) the right to take the joint family property by survivorship, and
(3) the right to demand partition of the joint family property"

G At page 164, the learned author deals with the right of survivorship. He says;
"while the family remains joint, its property continues to devolve
upon the coparcerter for the· time being by survivorship and not by
succession·. Consequently, on the death of a coparcener the surviving
coparceners take his undivided interest in the joint family property by
H survivorship. There is community of interest and unity of possession
VELLIKANNU v. R. SINGAPERUMAL [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 169

between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any of A
them, the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had
during the deceased's life time a common interest and a common
possession."

The learned Author further says :-
B
A coparcener who is disqualified by reason of a disability (such
as insanity) from taking a share on partition may nevertheless take
the whole property by survivorship."

At page 165, the learned Author has further said thus:

By survivorship a coparcener does not obtain the share of a
c
deceased coparcener as his representative; strictly speaking it does
not pass to him the effect if merely to enlarge his share in what he
already owns in the aggregate. Surviving coparceners are not therefore,
the legal representatives of a deceased coparcener".
D
In N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law Principles and precedents " 8th
Edition (1987) at page 230 under the heading 'Rights of Coparceners' it is
said thus:-

"The following are the rights of a coparcener :- (I) Right by birth (2)
Right by survivorship, (3) Right to partition, (4) Right to joint E
possession and enjoyment, (5) Right to restrain unauthorized acts (6)
Right of alienation, (7) Right to accounts and (8) Right to make self-
acquisition".

While dealing with "Right by birth' learned Author says thus:-
F
"Every coparcener gets an interest by birth in the coparcenary property.
This right by birth relates back to the date of conception. This,
however, must not be held to negative the position that coparcenary.
property may itself come into existence after the birth of the coparcener
concerned."
G
While dealing with Right of survivo~hip, itQs said thus:-

"The system of a joint family with its. incident of succession by
survivorship is a peculiarity of the Hindu Law. In such a family no
member has any definite share and his death 0f somehow ceasing to
be a member of the family causes no change in the joint status of the H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A family. Where a coparcener dies without male issue his interest in the
joint family property passes to the other copar_ceners by survivorship
and not be succession to his own heir. Even where a coparcener
becomes afflicted with Lunacy subsequent to his birth, he does not
lose his status as a coparcener which he has acquired by his birth, and
although his lunacy may under the Hindu Law disqualify him from
B demanding a share in a partition in his family. Yet where all the other
coparceners die and he becomes the sole surviving member of the
coparcenary, he takes the whole joint family property by survivorship,
and becomes a fresh stock of descent to the exclusion of the daughter
of the last pre-deceased coparcener, a case of leprosy of the last
C surviving coparcener. The beneficial interest of each coparcener is
liable to fluctuation, increasing by the death of another coparcener
and decreasing by the Dirth of a new coparcener."

Therefore, it is now settled that a member of coparceners acquires a
right in the property by birth. His share may fluctuate from time to time but
D his right by way of survivorship in copracenary property in Mitakshara Law
is a settled proposition.

In this connection, a reference may be made in the case of State Bank
of India v. Ghamandi Ram, reported in AIR (1969) SC 1333, it was held
thus:-
E
"According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all .the property
of a Hindu Joint Family is held in collective ownership by all the
coparceners in the quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of
the Mitakshara Lays down in express terms that the joint family
property is held in trust from the joint family members then living
F and thereafter to be both ( See Mitakshara, Chapter I, l-27) The
incidents of coparcernership under the Mitakshara Law are: first the
lineal male descendants of a person upto the third generation, acquire
on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; Secondly
that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking
G for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership
extending. ov:er J;h~ ,~ntire property co- jointly with the rest; forthly,
that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment
of the propert.jes is common fifthly that no alienation of the property
is possible unless it before necessity, without the concurrence of the
coparceners, and sixthly; that the interest of a deceased member lapses
H
VELLIKANNU v. R. SINGAPERUMAL [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 171

on his death to the surviv.ors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara A
School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except
in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a co-parcener
with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the
letter."

The concept of coparcener as given in the Mitakshara School of Hindu B
Law as already mentioned above, is that of a joint family property wherein
all the members of the coparceners share equally. In this connection a reference
may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra
v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh and Ors., reported in [1985] 2 SCC
321 in which Their Lordships have held as follows: C
"A Hindu coparcenary is however, a narrower body than the joint
·' family. Only males who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or
coparcenary property can be members of the coparcenary or
coparceners. A male member of a joint family and his sons, grandsons
and great grandsons constitute a coparcenary. A coparcener acquires D
right in the coparcenary property by birth but his right can be definitely
ascertained only when a partition takes place. When the family is
joint, the extent of the share of a coparcener cannot be definitely
predicated since it is always capable of fluctuating."

Therefore, in view of various decisions of this Court it appears that Defendant E
No. I and the plaintiff who was married to Defendant No.I were members of
joint Hindu family. If the defendant- appellant had not incurred the
disqualification, then they would have inherited the property as per Mitakshara
School of Hindu Law. But the question is that when the sole male survivor
had incurred the disqualification can he still claim the property by virtue of
Mitakshara School of Hindu Law ? If he cannot get the property by way of F
survivorship, then the question is whether his wife who succeeds through the
husband can succeed to the property? Our answer to this question is in
negative. In fact, prior to the amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, Sections
like 25 & 27 were not there but the murderer of his own father was disqualified
on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and as a measure of G
public policy. This position of law was enunciated by the Privy Council way
back in 1924 in the case of Kenchava Kom Sanyel/appa Hosmani and Anr.
v. Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar reported in AIR (1924) PC 209

-
wherein Their Lordships have held as follows:"

"In their Lordships' view it was rightly held by the two Courts H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A below that the murderer was disqualified; and with regard to the
question whether he is. disqualified wholly or only as to the beneficial
interest which the Subordinate Judge discussed, founding upon the
distinction between the beneficial and legal estate which was made
by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court of Madras in the
case of Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedamma/, their Lordships reject,
B as did the High Court here, any such distinction. The theory of legal
and equitable estates is no part of Hindu law, and should not be
introduced into discussion.

The second question to be decided is whether the title can be
claimed through the murderer. If this were so, the defendants as the
c murderer's sisters, would take precedence of the plaintiff, his cousin.
In this matter also, their Lordships are of opinion that the Courts
below were right. The murderer should .be treated as non-existent and
not as one who forms the stock for a fresh line of descent. It may be
pointed out that this view was also taken in the Madras case just
D cited."

Their Lordships also explained the decision in the case of Gangu v.
Chandrabhagabai, reported in (1908) 32 Born. 275 and held as follows :

"It was contended that a different ruling was to be extracted from
E the decision of the Bombay High Court in Gangu v. Chandrabnagabai.
This is not so. In that case, the wife of a murderer was held entitled
to succeed to the estate of the murdered man but that was not because
the wife deduced title through her husband, but because of the principle
of Hindu family law that a wife becomes a member of her husband's
gotra, an actual relation of her husband's relations in her own right,
F as it is called in Hindu law a gotraja-sapinda. The decision therefore
has no bearing on the present case. "

Therefore, the principle which has been enunciated by their Lordships is in
no uncertain terms totally disinherit the son who has murdered his father.
G Their Lordships have observed as follows:

"A murderer must for the purpose of the inheritance, be treated
as if he. were dead when the inheritance opened and as not being a
fresh stock of descent; the exclusion extends to the legal as well as
beneficial estate, so that neither he can himself succeed nor can the
succession be claimed through him."
H
VELLIKANNU v. R. SINGAPERUMAL [AK. MATHUR, J.] 173
This Privy Council decision made reference to the decisions of the A
High Courts of Madras and Bombay and their Lordships have approved the
ratio contained in those decisions that a murderer should be totally disinherited
because of the felony committed by him. This decision of the Privy Council
was subsequently followed in the following cases :

i. AIR 29 (1942) Madras 277 (K.Stanumurthiayya and Ors. v. B
K. Ramappa and Ors.,)
ii. AIR (1953) All. 759 ( Nakchhed Singh and Ors. v. Bijai Bahadur
-.::.
Singh and Anr.)

iii. AIR (1956) All. 707 (Mata Badal Singh and Ors. v. Bijay C
Bahadur Singh and Ors.,)

iv. AIR (1982) Bomb. 68 ( Minoti v. Sushi/ Mohansingh Malik and
,,
Anr.,).

This position of law was incorporated by way of Section 25 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as quoted above, which clearly enunciates that D
a person who commits murder or abates the commission of murder ·shall be
disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other
property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or
abetted the commission of the murder. In fact, the objects and reasons also
makes a reference to the Privy Council judgment (supra). The objects and E
reasons for enacting Section 25 read as under :

"A murderer, even if not disqualified under Hindu Law from
succeeding to the estate of the person whom he has murdered, is so
disqualified upon principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
The murdered is riot to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of F
descent but should be regarded as non-existent when the succession
opens."

Therefore, once it is held that a person who has murdered his father or
a person from whom he wants to inherit, stands totally disqualified. Section
27 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it further clear that if any person is G
disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall be deemed
as if such person had died before the intestate. That shows that a person who
has murdered a person through who~ he wants to inherit the property stands
disqualified on that account. That means he will be deemed to have
predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to succeed to H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the estate of deceased. The framers of the Act in the objects and reasons have
made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council t~at the murderer is not
to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded
as non-existent. That means "that a person who is guilty of committing the
murder cannot be treated to have any relationship whatsoever with deceased's
B estate.

Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections
25 and 27 is that the respondent No. I cannot inherit any property of his
father as he has murdered him on the principle of justice, equity and good
conscience and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that
C case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands
disinherited i.e. wife or son. The defendant-respondent No. I son himself is
totally disqualified by virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession
Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the
deceased, Ramasamy Konar.

D Therefore, as a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion that
, the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras is
correct that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased,
Rmnasamy Konar and the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the
orders of the two courts below. Since we cannot decide this appeal without
deciding the right of the respondent No. I as the right of the appellant flows
E therefrom as his wife i.e. the plaintiff. Therefore, it was necessary for us to
first decide whether the respondent No.I could succeed or inherit the estate
of his deceased father. When son cannot succeed then the wife who succeeds
to the property through the husband cannot also lay a claim to the property
of her father-in -law. The appeal is thus dismissed. No order as to costs.
F
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.

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