Holding

Article 233(2) bars only the appointment of a person already in Union or State service as District Judge and does not prohibit his participation in the selection process.

Summary

Vijay Kumar Mishra and another, who had qualified for the Subordinate Judicial Service of Bihar, applied for the District Judge Entry Level (Direct from Bar) interview but were barred by the Patna High Court on the ground of Article 233(2) of the Constitution, which it interpreted to prohibit their participation in the selection process. The Supreme Court examined whether the constitutional bar applies only to the appointment of a District Judge or also to the earlier stage of selection. It held that Article 233(2) creates a disqualification only for appointment, not for being considered in the selection process, and that such persons retain the right under Articles 14 and 16 to participate without resigning. Consequently, the Court directed that the appellants be allowed to appear for the interview without being compelled to resign from their current posts. The appeal was allowed, overturning the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

The scope of Article 233(2) of the Constitution: does it bar only appointment as District Judge or also participation in the selection process?
Whether a person already in the Union or State judicial service can be considered for selection to the post of District Judge without resigning.
Whether compelling resignation violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 233(2), s. Article 236

Subjects

Article 233District Judge appointmentSelection vs appointmentJudicial serviceConstitutional lawEquality clauseRight to practiceResignation requirement

Judgment

[2016J 3 S.C.R. 806

A VIJAY KUMAR MISHRA AND ANR.
v.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7358of2016)
B AUGUST 09, 2016
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
Conslilulirm of India - Ari. 233(2) · · Meaning and p11rpor1 of
- Appoinlmenl <!( Dislricl .Judges Bar 011 appoint111en1 of certain
elms o/ perso11.1 IY!il'!ha oper11ll'.1· 011/y .f;;r appoint111e/l/ or even
c
fi1r parlicipution i11 the si.:lecrio11 process ·-Appellants alreal~J' in
the Stale Subordinate .Judicial Service qualified in !he \l'riuen
examination for !he post <!(District .Judge - Howeve1; were denied
permission fo appear in the inter\'iell', 011 ground of bar u,~4rl. 233(2),
as !hey ll'ere already in the service of the Slate - As a conditio11 fo
D appear i11 the inten•ie11· were asked fo firs/ resign ji-0111 !he curre11t
employment in subordi11are judidar)' - Held: There is a distinction
between selection and appointmenl - Ari. 233(2) only prohibits the
appoi111111e11t of a person already in the service of the Union or
S!a/e but not the selection/consideration 11( the candidature <!(such
a person in the selection process - Such a person has a right u/Art.
E
I./ & 16 lo parlicipate and he considered in the seleclion process
undertaken by the Stare fin· appointment ro any post in public service
- Compel! ing a persim to resign his joh even j(Jr the purpuse <!f
assessing his s11irahili~vfiJr appointment nor permitted by the reit uf
Arr. 233(2) Direction ro Respo11denfs permit appellanls to
F participale in the selec1ion process without insisting upon their
resignation fiwn current employmelll - Service law.
Constitution of India: Articles I./ and 16 - Right to parlicipate
and be considered in the selection process - Discussed.
Service Law - Seleclion and appointment -- Distinction between
G - Discussed·- 1!.l'err ;;erson ffho is succi.:ssfit! in the sdection 1;rocess
111ulerrulw11 hr Stute }Ji· the 11111·;;ose o/)il/ing 1111 o/ ccrlai11 posls
does not uc1111ire any right to he appoinfl.!d a111m1wtically.
Allowing the appeal, the Court

H
806
VIJAY KUMAR MISHRA v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 807
PATNA

HELD: Per J. Chelameswar, J.: A
1.1. Article 233(2) of the Constitution declares that only a
person not already in the service of either the Union or the State
shall be eligible to be appointed as District Judges. The Article
is couched in negative language creating a bar for appointment
of certain class of persons described therein. It does not prescribe B
any qualification. It only prescribes a disqualification. [Para 6)
[812-A-B]
1.2. It is well settled in service law that there is a distinction
between selection and appointment. Every person who is
successful in the selection process undertaken by State for the c
purpose of filling up of certain posts under the State does not
acquire any right to be appointed automatically. Article 233(2)
only prohibits the appointment of a person already in the service
of the Union or the State, but not the selection of such a person.
The right of such a person to participate in the selection process
undertaken by the State for appointment to any post in public D
service and be considered is guaranteed under Arts. 14 & 16.
(Para 7) (812-C-D)
1.3. Article 233(2) does not prohibit the consideration of the
candidature of a person already in the service of Union or State.
The person would still have the option, if selected, to join the E
service as a District Judge or continue with his existing
employment. Compelling a person to resign his job even for the
purpose of assessing his suitability for appointment as a District
.Judge not penniltcd by the text of Art. 233 (2). (Para 81 (812-E;
813-A-Bf F
2. Respondents to permit the appellants to participate in
the selection prnccss without insisting upon their resigning from
their current employment. (Para 13) (814-l•'-G)
Per Abhay M:rnohar Sapre, .J.: (Concurring)
G
HELD: 1. Reading of clause (2) of Article 233 shows that
the "eligibility" of a person applying for the post of District Judge
has to be seen in the context of his appointment. A fortiori, the
eligibility of a person as to whether he is in the service of Union
or State is required to be seen at the time of his appointment for
such post and not prior to it. (Para 8) (818-DJ H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016) 3 S.C.R.

A 2. There lies a subtle distinction between the words
"selection" and "appointment" in service jurisprudence. [Para
11) [816-G-H)
Prafulla Kumar Swain v. Prakash Chandra Misra &
Ors. (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 181: 1993 (1) SCR 241 -
B referred to.
3. It is not possible to read the word "selection" or
"recruitment" in place of "appointed" when the framers of the
Constitution have used this word for determining the eligibility
of a person with reference to his service. ID other words, the
word "appointed" cannot be read to include the word "selection",
c "recruitment" or "recruitment process". [Para 11) (817-A)
4. There is no bar for a person to apply for the post of District
Judge, if he othenvise, satisfies the qualifications prescribed for
the post while remaining in service of Union/State. It is only at
the time of his appointment the question of his eligibility arises.
D Denying such person to apply for participating in selection
process when he otherwise fulfills all conditions prescribed in
the advertisement by taking recourse to clause (2) of Article 233
would amount to violating his right guaranteed under At1icles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of lndia.[Para 12) [817-B-C)
E Case Law Reference
In the judgment of J. Chelameswar, J.:
1985 (2) SCR 112 distinguished Para 10
2013 (1) SCR 402 distinguished Para 11
F In the judgment of Abbay Manohar Sapre, J.:
19~3. (1) SCR 241 referred to Para 11
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7358
of2016.
G From the Judgment and Order dated 12.05.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 3504 of2016.
Ranjan Kumar. Sanjay Kumar, Shailya Balasariya, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Ranjeet Kumar, S. G., Pravin H. Parekh, Sr. Adv., Kshatrshalraj,
H Ms. Ritika Sethi, Abhishek Vinod Deshmukh (For M/s. Parekh & Co.),
VIJAY KUMAR MISHRA v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 809
PATNA [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

Advs. for the Respondents. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J .. CHELAMESWAR, J. I. Leave granted.
2. To explore the true purport of Art. 233(2) of the Constitution of
India is the task of this Court in this appeal. The facts of the case are B
very elegantly narrated in the first six paragraphs of the judgment under
appeal. They are:
"The challenge in the present writ application is to the
communication, dated 16'" of February, 2016, whereby
representation of the petitioners to appear in interview for the c
post ofDistrict Judge Entry Level (Direct from Bar) Examination,
2015, was rejected and a condition was imposed that petitioners
will have to tendertheir rejection, first, from the Subordinate Judicial
Service of the State ofBihar and only, thereafter, they could appear
in the interview.
D
2. An Advertisement No. 0I/2015 was issued inviting applications
from eligible Advocates for direct recruitment in respect of 99
vacancies as on 31" of March, 2015. The cut off date for the
~ligibility was 5'" of February, 2015. The petitioners appeared in
the Preliminary as well as in the Mains Examination pursuant to
such advertisement. E
3. In the meantime, petitioners qualified for the Subordinate Judicial
Service of the State of Bihar in 28'" Batch. The petitioners
accordingly joined the Subordinate Judicial Service of the State of
Bihar in August, 2015.
F
4. The result of the Mains Examination of the District Judge Entry
Level (Direct from Bar) was published on 22"d of January, 2016.
Both the petitioners qualified in the Mains Examination.
5. The High Court published the detail of interview schedule and
issued Call Letters for the interview to both the petitioners; but
one of the conditions in the Interview Letter was 'No-Objection G
Certificate of the Employer'. Therefore. the petitioners filed their
representation before the Registrar General, Patna High Court,
Patna, to appear in the interview. The requests were declined on
I 61h of February, 2016. The communication to one of the petitioners
reads as under:- H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 3 S.C.R.

A "To,
The District & Sessions Judge
Siwan
Dated, Patna the I 61h February, 20 I 6
Sir,
B With reference to your letter no. 80 dated 05.02.20 I6, I am
directed to say that the Court have been pleased to reject the
representation dated 05.02.20 I 6 of Sri Yijay Kumar Mishra,
Probationary Civil Judge (Junior Division), Siwan with regard to
permission to appear in the interview in respect of District Judge
c Entry Level (Direct from Bar) Examination, 20 I5, in view ofArticle
233(2) of the Constitution of India, as he is already in the State
Subordinate Judicial Service. However, he may choose to resign
before participating in the interview, which resignation, once
tendered, would not be permitted to be withdrawn.

D The officer concerned may be informed accordingly.
Yours faithfully
Sd/-
Registrar General
6. It is the said letter, which is subject matter of challenge
E in the present writ application, wherein the petitioners clai111
that since they were eligible on the date of inviting
applications, the action of the High Court in not permitting
them to appear in the interview is illegal."
The High Court repelled the challenge holding that to per111it the
F appellant to participate in the interview would be breaching the mandate
of Art. 233(2).
"11 ..... Since before the date of interview, the petitioners joined
the Judicial Service, the petitioners, cannot, in terms of Clause (2)
of Article 233 of the Constitution, be permitted to continue with
G the selection process for District Judge Entry Level (Direct from
Bar) as they are, now, members of the Judicial Service.
Therefore, the petitioners have rightly not called for interview."
Hence the appeal.
3. Unfortunately, it was neither argued nor did the High Court
H examine the true meaning and purport of Article 233(2). The appellants'
VJJAY KUMAR MISHRA v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 811
PATNA [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

argument before the High Court appears to be that notwithstanding the A
fact that they are the members of the judicial service, the eligibility for
competing for the post of District Judges should be considered on the
basis of the facts as they existed on the "cut off date", and the subsequent
events are not be taken into consideration for determining the question
whether the appellants are barred from appearing in the interview.
B
" ... intervening fact of the petitioners joining the Judicial Service
will not act as bar for their appearance in the interview."'
We are afraid that the entire enquiry before the High Court was
misdirected. The real question which arises in the case on hand is whether
the bar under Article 233(2) is only for the appointment or even for the c
participation in the selection process.
4. The High Court believed in its administrative facet that Article
233(2) would not permit the participation of the appellant in the selection
process because of his existing employment. The High Court came out
with a 'brilliant' solution to the problem of the appellant i.e., the appellant D
may resign his membership of the subordinate judicial service ifhe aspires
to become a district judge. But the trouble is the tantalizing caveat. If the
appellant tenders resignation, he would not be permitted to withdraw the
same at a later stage.
5. For any youngster the choice must appear very cruel,· to give up E
the existing employment forthe uncerlain possibility of securing a better
employment. If the appellant accepted the advice of the High Court but
eventually failed to get selected and appointed as a District Judge, he
might have to regret his choice for the rest of his life. Unless providence
comes to the help of the appellant to secure better employment elsewhere
or become a successful lawyer, if he chooses to practice thereafter the F
choice is bound to ruin the appellant. The High Court we are sure did not
intend any such unwholesome consequences. The advice emanated from
the High Court's understanding of the purport of A11. 233(2). Our assay
is whether the High Court's understanding is right.
6. A11icle 233( I)' stipulates that appointment of District Judges be G

1
See Para 9 of the Judgment under appeal
2
233 (I) Appointments of persons to be. and the posting and promotion ot: district
judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the
High Court exercisingjurisdiction in relation to such State
H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 3 S.C.R.

A made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court
exercisingjurisdiction in relation to such State. However, Article 233(2)'
declares that only a person not already in the service of either the Union
or of the State shall be eligible to be appointed as District Judges. The
said article is couched in negative language creating a bar for the
appointment of certain class of persons described therein. It does not
B
prescribe any qualification. It only prescribes a disqualification.
7. It is well settled in service law that there i's a distinction between
selection and appointment.• Every person who is successful in the
selection process undertaken by the State for the purpose of filling up of
certain posts under the State does not acquire any right to be appointed
c automatically. 5 Textually, Article 233(2) only prohibits the appointment
of a person who is already in the service of the Union or the State, but
not the selection of such a person. The right of such a person io participate
. in the selection process undertaken by the State for appointment to any
post in public s,ervice (subject to other rational prescriptions regarding
D the eligibility ·for participating in the selection process such as age,
educational qualification etc.) and be considered is guaranteed under
Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
8. The text of Article 233(2) only prohibits the appointment of a
person as a District Judge, if such person is already in the service of
E either the Union or the State. It does not prohib_it the consideration of
the candidature of a person who is in the service of the Union or the
State. A person who is in the service of either of the Union or the State
3
233 (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be
eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an
advocate or .a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment.
F
' ( 1993) Supp (3) SCC 181 at pg 190 "29. At this stage, we will proceed to decide as to
the meaning and effect of the words "recruitmenr· and ··app.ointment". The term
"recruitment"' connotes and clearly signifies enlistments, acceptance, selection or
approval for appointment. Certainly, this is 11ot actual appointment or posting in
service. In contradistinction !he word "appointment" means an actual act of posting a
person to a particular office. 30. Recruitment is just an initial process. That may lead
G to eventual appointment ih the service. But, that cannot tantamount to an appointment."
'(1994) I SCC 126 at pg 129 "8. "It is now well settled that a person who is selected
does not, on account of being empanelled alone, acquire any indefeasible right of
appointment. Empanelment is· at the best a condition of eligibility for purposes of
appointment. and by itself cjoes not amount to selection or create a vested right to be
appointed unless relevant service rule says' to the contrary. (See Shankarsan Dash r.
. H L'nion of India and Sabira Prasad and Ors. v. Si ale in Bilwr and Ors.··
VIJAY KUMAR MISHRA v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 813
PATNA (J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

would still have the option, if selected to join the service as a District A
Judge or continue with his existing employment. Compelling a person to
resign his job even for the purpose of assessing his suitability for
appointment as a District Judge, in our opinion, is not permitted either by
the text of Art. 233(2) nor contemplated under the scheme of the
constitution as it would not serve any constitutionally desirable purpose.
B'
9. The respondents relied upon two judgments of this Court in a
bid t<isustain the judgment under appeal, Satya Narain Singh Vs. High
Co11rt of J11dicatw:e at Allahabad and Others ( 1985) 1 SCC 225 and
Deepak Aggarwal Vs. Keshav Kaushik and Others (2013) 5 SCC
277.
c
I 0. In first of the above-mentioned judgments, the petitioners/
appellants before this Court were members of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial
Service. In response to an advertisement by the High Court, they applied
to be appointed by direct recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial
Service (District Judges).
D
It appears from the judgment '·as there was a question about the
eligibility of the members of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service to
appointment by direct recruitment to the higher judicial service ....... ",
some of them approached the High Court by way of writ petitions which
were dismissed and therefore, they approached this Court. It is not
very clear from the judgment, as to how the question about their eligibility E
arose and at what stage it arose. But the fact remains, by virtue of an
intedm orderofthis Court, they were allowed to appear in the examination.
The argument before this Court was that all the petitioners had practiced
for a period of seven years before their joining the subordinate judicial
service, and therefore, they are entitled to be considered for appointment F
as District Judges notwithstanding the fact that they were already in the
judicial service.
It appears from the reading of the judgment that the case of the
petitioners was that their claims for appointment to the post of District
Judges be considered under the category of members of the Bar who G
had completed seven years of practice ignoring the fact that they were
already in the judicial service. The said fact operates as a bar undoubtedly
under A1ticle 233(2) fortheir appointment to the higl1erjudicial service.
It is in this context this Court rejected their claim. The question whether
at what stage the bar comes into operation was not in issue before the
Court nor did this Court go into that question. H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 3 S.C.R.

A 11.ln the case of Deep(lk Agg(ITW(lf (supra), the question before
this Court was;
"52. T!Je question that has been raised before us is whether.
a Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor/District
Attorney/Assistant District Attorney/Deputy Advocate
B General, who is in full-time employment of the Government,
ceases to be an advocate or pleader within the meaning of
Article 233(2) of the Constitution."
On an elaborate examination of the various aspects of the legal
profession, the provisions of the Bar Council Act etc., this Court concluded
c that public prosecutors etc. did not cease to be advocates, and therefore,
they could not be considered to be in the service of the Union or the
State within the meaning of Article 232.
"IOI. ... .In our view, none of the Attorney/Public
Prosecutor/Deputy Advocate General, ceased to be
D · "advocate" and since each one of them continued to be
"advocate", they cannot he considered to be in the service
of the Union or the State within the meaning of Article
233(2). The view of the Division Bench is clearly erroneous
and cannot be sustained." and finally held that they are not
debarred under Article 233. A judgment which has no
E relevance to the issue before us
12. We are of the opinion that neither of the cases really dealt with
the issue on hand. Therefore, in our opinion, neither of the above two
judgments is an authority governing the issue before us.
13. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Appeal is allowed.
F
Consequently, the Writ Petition (CWJC No. 3504 of2016) filed by the
appellants also stands allowed directing the respondents to permit the
appellants to participate in the selection process without insisting upon
their resigning from their current employment. If the appellants are
found suitable, it is open to the appellants to resign their current
G employment and opt for the post of District Judge, if they so choose.
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J .
.
I. I have had the advantage of going through the elaborate, well
considered and scholarly draft judgment proposed by my esteemed
Brother Jasti Chelameswar J. I entirely agree with the reasoning and
H
VJJAY KUMAR MISHRA v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 815
PATNA [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

the conclusion, which my erudite Brother has drawn, which are based A
·on remarkably articulate process of reasoning. However, having regard
to the issues involved, which were ably argued by le(lmed counsel
appearing in the case, I wish to add few lines of concurrence.
2. I need not set out the facts, which are not in dispute and set out
in the order proposed by my learned Brother. B
3. The short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal,_
is what is the true object, purport and scope of Article 233 (2) of the
Constitution of India and, in particular, the words "eligible to be
appointed as district judge" occurring in the Article?
4. Chapter VI of the Constitution of India deals with the c
subordinate courts in the State. Articles 233 and 236, which are part
of Chapter VI, read as under:
"233. Appointment of district judges. - (1)
Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and
promotion of, district jndges in any State shall be made D
by the Governor of the State in consultation with the
High Court exercising jurisdiction in .relation to such
· State.
(2) A person not already in the.service of the Union
or of the State shall only be eligible tO be appointed ~
E
district Judge if he has been for not less than seve~
years an advocate or a pleader and.is recommended
'by the High Coµrt for appointment.
. ..
236. lnterpret"tion. - In this Chapter-
(a) The expression "district judge" includes judge of F
a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district
judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small .
cause court, chief presidency magistrate, additional
chief presidency magistrate, s~ssions judge, additional
sessions judge and assistant sessions judge;
G
(b) the expression "judicial service" means a service
consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the
post of district judge and other civil judicial posts
inferior to the .post of district judge."
5. Article 233 deals with appointment, posting and promotion ofthe H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 3 S.C.R.

A district judges in the State. Clause (I) provides that appointment, posting
and promotion of the district judges in any State shall be made by the
Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to such State.
6. Clause (2) of Article 233 with which we are concerned here
B provides that a person not already in service of the Union or of the State
shall only be eligible to be appointed as adistrictjudge ifhe has been for
not less than 7 years as an advocate or a pleader and is recommended
by the High Court for appointment.
7. Article 236 (a) defines the word "district judge" occurring in
c Chapter VI.
8. Reading of clause (2) of Article 233 shows that the "eligibility"
of a person applying for the post of district judge has to be seen in the
context of his appointment. A.fortiori, the eligibility of a person as to
whether he is in the service of Union or State is required to be seen at
D the time of his appointment for such post and not prior to it.
9. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General of India appearing for the·
respondent (High Court), however, contended that the word "appointed"
occurring in Article 233(2) of the Constitution should necessarily include
the entire selection process starting from the date of submitting an
E application by the person concerned till the date of his appointment. It
was his submission that if any such person is found to be in service of
Union or State, as the case may be, on the date when he has applied
then such person would suffer disqualification prescribed in clause (2)
of Article 233 and would neither be eligible to apply nor be eligible for
appointment to the post of district judge.
F
I 0. This submission though look attractive is not acceptable. Neither
the text of Article and nor the words occurring in Article 233(2) suggest
such interpretation. Indeed, if his argument is accepted, it would be against
the spirit ofArticle 233(2). My learned Brother for rejecting this argument
has narrated t!1e consequences, which are likely to arise in the eyent of
G accepting such argument and I agree with what he has narrated.
11. In my view, there lies a subtle distinction between the words
"selection" and "appointment" in service jurisprudence. (See: Prafulla
Kumar Swain vs. Prakash Chandra Misra & Ors., (1993) Supp.
(3) SCC 181 ). When the framers of the Constitution have used the
H word "appointed" in clause (2) .of Article 233 for determining the
VIJAY KUMAR MISHRA v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 817
PATNA [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

eligibility of a person with reference to his service then it is not possible A
to read the word "selection" or "recruitment" in its place. In other
words, the word "appointed" cannot be read to include the word
"selection". "recruitment" or "'recruitment process".
12. In my opinion, there is no bar for a person to apply for the post
of district judge, if he otherwise, satisfies the qualifications prescribed ·B
for the post while remaining in service of Union/State. It is only at the
. time of his appointment (ifoccasion so arises)the question of his eligibility
arises. Denying such person to apply for participating in selection process
when he otlierwise fol fills all conditions prescribed in the advertisement
by taking recourse to clause (2) of Article 233 would, in my opinion,
amount to violating his right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the
c
Constitution oflndia.
13. It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation that one must
have regard to subject and the object for which the Act is enacted. To
interpret a Statue in a reasonable manner, the Court must place itself in
a chair of reasonable legislator/authpr. So done, .the rules of purposive D
construction have to be resorted to so that the object of the Act is fulfilled.
Similarly, it is also a recognized rule of interpretation of Statutes that
expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in the sense in
which they best harmonize with the object of the Statute and which
effectuate the object of the legislature. (See-Interpretation of Statues E
12 1• Edition, pages 119. and 127 by G.P.Singh). The aforesaid
principle, in my opinion, equally applies while interpreting the provisions
of Article 233(2) of the Constitution.
l4. With these few words of mine, I agree with the reasoning.and
the conclusion arrived at by my learned Brother. F
Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.