Holding

The prosecution failed to prove the offences of abduction and murder beyond reasonable doubt, and the High Court erred in reversing the trial court's acquittals, leading to the setting aside of all convictions.

Summary

The case involved the abduction and subsequent death of Neelam, whose husband and brother‑in‑law alleged that seven accused, including Vijay Singh and Tanik Singh, abducted her from her father's house over a property dispute. The trial court convicted five of the accused under Sections 302/34 and 364/34 IPC and acquitted the remaining two, while the High Court later upheld the convictions of all seven, reversing the acquittals. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the circumstantial evidence establishing murder and abduction met the legal standard of an inescapable chain of proof and whether the High Court correctly reversed the trial court's acquittals. The Court found the prosecution's case riddled with doubts: the eye‑witness testimonies were unreliable, the residence of the deceased was not proved, and no direct link between the accused and the murder was established. It also held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittals without demonstrating illegality or perversity in the trial court's findings. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside all convictions and acquitted all seven accused, ordering their immediate release.

Issues considered

The sustainability of the High Court's findings of guilt for the accused under Sections 302/34 and 364/34 IPC.
Whether the High Court correctly reversed the trial court's acquittal of accused A‑6 and A‑7 in accordance with settled law on reversal of acquittals.
The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to prove murder and abduction beyond reasonable doubt.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 302, s. 313, s. 323, s. 34, s. 342, s. 364, s. 380, s. 449, s. 450, s. 506

Subjects

AbductionMurderAbduction and murder of womanCircumstantial evidenceChain of evidenceReversal of acquittalMotiveBurden to prove case beyond reasonable doubtJudicial deprecationObservation of High Court highly objectionableObservation of High Court not commensurate with sensitivity and neutrality expected from court of law

Judgment

[2024] 10 S.C.R. 108 : 2024 INSC 735

Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma
v.
The State of Bihar
(Criminal Appeal No. 1031 of 2015)
25 September 2024
[Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards sustainablility of the findings of the High
Court holding the appellants guilty of commission of offences u/ss.
302/34 and 364/34 IPC; as also the approach of the High Court, if
in line with the settled law for reversing an acquittal into conviction.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302/34 and 364/34 – Kidnapping or
abducting in order to murder – Abduction and murder of woman
over a property dispute – Factum of her death discovered in
furtherance of written report lodged by informant and brother-
in-law of the victim – Conviction and sentence of accused nos.
1-5 of the commission of offences u/ss. 302/34 and 364/34,
however acquittal of accused nos. 6 and 7 of all the charges –
High Court upheld the conviction of accused nos. 1-5, as also
convicted accused nos. 6 and 7 of the commission of offences
u/ss. 364/34 and 302/34 – Sustainability:
Held: Offence of murder is entirely dependent on circumstantial
evidence and in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain
of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable
conclusion of guilt – Prosecution case is far from meeting that
standard – Mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot
be a conclusive proof of the fact that the victim was residing in
the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly
residing there – No material whatsoever could be found at the
house to directly indicate that the deceased as also the informant
were residing there – Prosecution failed to examine even one
cohabitant to prove the said fact – Evidence of the eye witnesses
declared as wholly unreliable including on the aspect of time of
death – Thus, no reason to doubt the post mortem report and
the findings therein – Prosecution case full of glaring doubts as

* Author
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 109

Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar

regards abduction – Although, the post mortem report indicates
that the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission
of murder cannot be ruled out, however no direct evidence to
prove the commission of murder by the accused persons – Link of
causation between the accused persons and the alleged offence
conspicuously missing – Circumstantial evidence emanating
from the facts surrounding the offence of abduction, such as the
testimonies of eye witnesses, failed to meet the test of proof and
cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law – No inference could
be drawn from it to infer the commission of the offence u/s. 302
by the accused persons – Also motive has a bearing only when
the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients of the
offences under consideration – Without the proof of foundational
facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of
motive alone – Thus, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden
to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – Reasonable doubts
are irreconcilable and strike at the foundation of the prosecution’s
case – Furthermore, approach of the High Court in reversing the
acquittal of A-6 and A-7 not in line with the settled law pertaining
to reversal of acquittals – High Court took a cursory view of the
matter and reversed the acquittal without arriving at any finding
of illegality or perversity or impossibility of the trial court’s view or
non-appreciation of evidence by the trial tourt – Thus, the appellants
to be acquitted of all the charges – Findings of conviction arrived
at by the courts below not sustainable and set aside. [Paras 28-
32, 34-37]
Judicial deprecation – High Court’s observation that the make-
up articles found in the house could not have belonged to the
widow lady as there was no need for her to put on make-up
being a widow:
Held: Said observation not only legally untenable but also
highly objectionable – Sweeping observation of this nature not
commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a
court of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any
evidence on record. [Para 27]

Case Law Cited
State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [2007] 3 SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC
755; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007)
4 SCC 415; Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana [2009] 6 SCR 982 :
(2009) 12 SCC 351; Kashiram v. State of M.P. [2001] 4 Supp. SCR
110 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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263 : (2002) 1 SCC 71; Labh Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 1
SCC 181; Suratlal v. State of M.P (1982) 1 SCC 488; Rai Saheb
& Ors. v. State of Haryana (1994) Supp.1 SCC 74; Sanjeev v.
State of H.P (2022) 6 SCC 294 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Abduction; Murder; Abduction and murder of woman; Circumstantial
evidence; Chain of evidence; Reversal of acquittal; Motive; Burden
to prove case beyond reasonable doubt; Judicial deprecation;
Observation of High Court highly objectionable; Observation of High
Court not commensurate with sensitivity and neutrality expected
from court of law.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1031
of 2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.03.2015 of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna in Govt. Appeal (DB) No. 16 of 1992
With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1578, 765, 1579 of 2017
Appearances for Parties
R. K. Dash, Sr. Adv., Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha,
Ms. Pallavi Barua, Ms. Aparna Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh, Advs. for
the Appellant.
Shivam Singh, Kartikay Aggarwal, Manish Kumar, Shantanu Sagar,
Anil Kumar, Prabhat Ranjan Raj, Gunjesh Ranjan, Shashank Kumar
Saurav, Vaibhav Jain, Manoneet Dwivedi, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
1. On 30.08.1985, Neelam breathed her last in Simaltalla, PS Sikandra,
District Munger, Bihar. The factum of her death was discovered in
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 111

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furtherance of the written report lodged by the informant and brother-
in-law of the deceased, namely, Ramanand Singh (examined as
PW18 before the Trial Court1) wherein he alleged that Neelam was
abducted by seven persons from their house in an incident which
occurred at around 10:00 PM on the said day. On the basis of this
information, an FIR bearing no. 127 of 1985 was lodged at PS
Sikandra and investigation was commenced which led to the filing of
a chargesheet against the seven accused persons, namely – Krishna
Nandan Singh (Accused No.1), Ram Nandan Singh (Accused No.2),
Raj Nandan Singh (Accused No.3), Shyam Nandan Singh (Accused
No.4), Bhagwan Singh (Accused No. 5), Vijay Singh (Accused No.
6) and Tanik Singh (Accused No.7).
2. The Trial Court charged all seven accused persons for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 323, 302, 364, 449, 450,
380/34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.2 Later, accused
nos. 6 and 7 were distinctly charged for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 342, 506 read with Section 34 of IPC.
After trial, the Trial Court, vide order dated 05.06.1992, convicted
the accused persons listed as accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the
commission of offences under Section 302/34 and 364/34 of IPC.
They were acquitted of all other charges, and accused nos. 6 and
7 were acquitted of all the charges.
3. The convicts preferred an appeal before the Patna High Court against
the order of conviction and the State preferred an appeal before the
High Court against the order of acquittal of the two accused persons.
The Patna High Court, vide a common judgment dated 26.03.2015,3
upheld the conviction of the five convicts and set aside the acquittal
of accused nos. 6 and 7 by finding them guilty of the commission
of offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of IPC. Accordingly,
accused nos. 6 and 7 were also convicted and were sentenced
to undergo rigorous life imprisonment on each count. The present
batch of appeals assail the order/judgment dated 26.03.2015 of the
Patna High Court.

1 Prosecution witness or PW
2 Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
3 Passed in Govt. Appeal (DB) No. 16/1992, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 219/1992 and Criminal Appeal (DB)
No. 271/1992
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BRIEF FACTS
4. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts reveal that deceased Neelam
was the wife of one Ashok Kumar who happened to be the son of
PW3/Ganesh Prasad Singh, and the informant PW18/Ramanand
Singh was the brother of Ashok Kumar. The informant’s case was
that at the relevant point of time, the deceased was residing with her
husband and the informant in the house belonging to her late father
Jang Bahadur Singh, who belonged to Simaltalla. The house was
partially occupied by the deceased, her husband and her brother-
in-law and the remaining portion was rented out and tenants were
residing in those portions.
5. As per the prosecution case, on 30.08.1985 at about 10:00 PM,
PW18 was sitting outside the house on a rickshaw along with one
Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas, and Neelam was sleeping
inside the house. Her husband, Ashok Kumar, had gone to his native
place Ghogsha. Suddenly, the seven accused persons, including
the appellants before us, came from north direction along with 15
other unknown assailants. Accused Vijay Singh/A-6 caught hold of
the informant/PW18 and as soon as he raised alarm and started
shouting, two unknown persons pointed out pistols towards him and
directed him to maintain silence. Thereafter, the accused persons
who had caught the informant, assaulted him with fists and slaps, and
confined him near the well situated on the north side of the house.
Meanwhile, A-1 entered the house with 5-7 other accused persons
by getting the house unlatched through a resident namely Kumud
Ranjan Singh and dragged Neelam out of the house. As soon as
they dragged her out, four persons caught hold of Neelam by her
arms and legs, lifted her and started moving towards Lohanda. As
per the informant, the accused persons also picked up two sarees,
two blouses, two petticoats and a pair of slippers from Neelam’s
room while going out.
6. As the informant raised alarm, other people of the mohalla also
gathered around including PW2 Vinay Kumar Singh, PW4 Chandra
Shekhar Prasad Singh and PW5 Ram Naresh Singh. The said three
witnesses witnessed the accused persons taking away Neelam but
could not stop them. The informant explained that no one dared to
follow the accused persons as they had pointed pistols and had
threatened of dire consequences. The informant also explained the
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 113

Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar

motive behind the commission of the crime. It transpires from his
statement that Neelam’s late father Jang Bahadur Singh had no
son and his house was in possession of his daughter Neelam. She
was abducted in order to forcefully obtain the possession of the
house belonging to her father. The second limb of motive stems
from the pending litigation between A-1 to A-5 (appellants) on one
side and deceased Neelam, her maternal grandfather and her
two sisters on the other side. The accused persons had obtained
letters of administration and probate of the Will left by late Jang
Bahadur Singh from the competent court and the said order came
to be challenged before the Patna High Court by the deceased,
her maternal grandfather and younger sisters. In the said appeal,
the Patna High Court had injuncted the accused persons from
alienating any part of the property. The High Court also restrained
the execution of the probate of the Will by restraining the delivery of
possession of the property to the accused persons. Thus, deceased
Neelam was residing in her father’s house along with her husband
and brother-in-law in order to retain the possession of the property.
In this backdrop, the matter went for trial.
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
7. The Trial Court, while acquitting A-6 and A-7, observed that the
motive attributed for the commission of the crime was not attributable
to the said two accused persons as no interest of theirs could be
disclosed in the pending litigation. Further, it also found that A-6
was not named in the FIR registered upon the information supplied
by PW18 and in his oral testimony, no statement of assault by A-6
and A-7 was given by him. It further held that no evidence surfaced
during the trial to indicate the participation of A-6 and A-7 in the acts
of abduction and commission of murder.
8. While convicting A-1 to A-5 on the charges under Sections 302/34
and 364/34 of IPC, the Trial Court primarily relied upon the oral
testimonies of PW18/informant, PW2, PW4 and PW5. The motive
for the commission of the offence was supplied by the pending legal
dispute relating to the property belonging to late Jang Bahadur Singh.
The Court also replied upon circumstantial evidence borne out from
the testimonies of PW7 (maternal uncle of the de-ceased), PW3
(father-in-law of the deceased), PW23 (sister of the deceased) and
PW13 (doctor) to arrive at the finding of guilt.
114 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
9. A reading of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court
suggests that the High Court carried out a fresh appreciation of
evidence. The High Court firstly examined the question whether
Neelam was actually residing in the house from which she was
abducted. Relying upon the testimonies of PW7 (maternal uncle of
deceased), PW18 (brother-in-law of deceased and informant) and
PW21 (Investigating Officer), the Court concluded that Neelam was
indeed residing in the said house. In doing so, the Court discarded
the fact that the other independent occupants of the house such as
Ram Chabila Singh, his son, Kumud Ranjan Singh etc. did not come
in support of the said fact. To overcome this deficiency, the Court
relied upon the statements of PW21 and PW23 (sister of deceased)
that some make-up articles were found in a bag lying in the room,
which was suggestive of the fact that a woman was residing in the
said room.
10. In further consideration, the High Court excluded the evidence
of PW5 for the reason that his presence at the place of incident
was doubtful. For, PW5 deposed that he was heading towards his
home from Deoghar and on the way from Lakhisarai to Simaltalla,
he stopped at Sikandra Chowk along with PW2 and PW4. It was
at this point that they heard the hulla and ended up witnessing the
commission of offence. The High Court took note of the fact that
while going from Deoghar to Simaltalla, Lakhisarai and Ghogsha
would come first and thus, there was no reason for PW5 to come all
the way to Sikandra Chowk if he was going to his home in Ghogsha
as he could have directly proceeded from Lakhisarai to Ghogsha.
Nevertheless, the High Court duly relied upon the evidence of PW2,
PW4 and PW18 as well as on circumstantial evidence comprising
of the testimonies of PW23, PW13 (doctor) and absence of suitable
explanation in the statements of accused persons under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734 as regards the fatal
injuries suffered by the deceased. Thus, the High Court upheld the
finding of guilt of A-1 to A-5.
11. As regards A-6 and A-7, the High Court reversed the finding of
acquittal of the Trial Court into that of conviction. Primarily, the High

4 Hereinafter referred as “CrPC”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 115

Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar

Court observed that the said two accused persons were acquitted on
the basis of the exonerating testimony of PW5 and the same cannot
be sustained as the testimony of PW5 has been excluded by the
High Court in appeal. Further, the Court held that the testimonies of
PW2, PW4 and PW18 were consistent regarding the participation
of A-6 and A-7 and thus, they were convicted for the commission of
the offences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section
34 of IPC. The applicability of Section 34 IPC was based on the
fact that A-6 and A-7 had confined PW18 near the well in order to
eliminate any chances of resistance in the acts committed by the
other five accused persons.
SUBMISSIONS
12. On behalf of A-6 and A-7, it is submitted that there was no motive
for the said accused persons to have indulged in the commission
of the offence in question. The motive, if any, existed only for the
remaining five accused persons who were interested in the outcome
of the pending litigation between the parties. It is further contended
that the High Court ought not to have entered into the exercise of
re-appreciation of the entire evidence without finding any infirmity in
the view taken by the Trial Court. To buttress this submission, it is
submitted that since the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible
view, it could not have been disturbed by the High Court in appeal.
In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this
Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran,5 Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka,6 Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana,7 Kashiram v. State of
M.P.,8 Labh Singh v. State of Punjab9 and Suratlal v. State of M.P.10
13. It is further submitted that no reliance could be placed upon the
testimonies of PW2 and PW4 as their presence at the spot was
doubtful. Further, if they were 400 yards away when hue and cry was
raised, they could not have seen A-6 taking away PW18 towards the
well as the said fact took place prior to the hue and cry. It is further

5 [2007] 3 SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC 755
6 [2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007) 4 SCC 415
7 [2009] 6 SCR 982 : (2009) 12 SCC 351
8 [2001] 4 Supp. SCR 263 : (2002) 1 SCC 71
9 (1976) 1 SCC 181
10 (1982) 1 SCC 488
116 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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submitted that in the FIR, no pistol was assigned to A-6, whereas, the
said fact was brought forward at the time of evidence. The appellants
have also raised a question regarding the time of incident on the
basis of medical evidence. It is stated that the post-mortem report
indicated that half-digested food was found in the stomach of the
deceased, whereas, the informant PW18 deposed that the incident
took place immediately after dinner. If such was the case, the death
ought to have occurred around 1-2 AM in the intervening night of
30.08.1985-31.08.1985, but the post-mortem report, based on the
post-mortem conducted at around 05:30 PM on 31.08.1985, indicated
that death took place about 24 hours ago and thus, the time of death
was around 05:00 PM on 30.08.1985 and not 10:00 PM, as alleged.
14. The appellants have also submitted that the prosecution has not
proved that the deceased was actually residing in the concerned
house at Simaltalla.
15. Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of the State that mere non-
examination of some independent witnesses shall not be fatal to
the case of the prosecution. Reliance has been placed upon the
decision of this Court in Rai Saheb & ors. v. State of Haryana11 to
contend that at times, independent witnesses may not come forward
due to fear. It is further submitted that the High Court has correctly
appreciated the evidence in order to arrive at the finding of guilt of
the accused persons. It is further submitted that the testimonies of
PW2, PW4 and PW18 are consistent and the High Court has correctly
placed reliance upon their testimonies. As regards motive as well, it
is submitted that the evidence is sufficient to reveal motive for the
commission of the crime.
16. We have heard learned counsels for the appellants as well as for
the State. We have also carefully examined the record.
DISCUSSION
17. In light of the rival contentions raised by the parties, the principal
issue that arises before the Court is whether the finding of guilt of
the appellants arrived at by the High Court is sustainable in light of
the evidence on record. As a corollary of this issue, it also needs

11 (1994) Supp.1 SCC 74
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 117

Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar

to be examined whether the approach of the High Court was in line
with the settled law for reversing an acquittal into conviction in a
criminal appeal.
18. After two rounds of litigation before the Trial Court and the High Court,
it is fairly certain the case is to be examined only with respect to the
offences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section 34
IPC. With respect to the offence under Section 364 IPC, the case of
the prosecution is based on direct oral evidence, and with respect
to the offence under Section 302 IPC, the case of the prosecution is
essentially based on circumstantial evidence as no direct evidence
of the commission of murder could be collected. However, it is
quite evident that the offence of murder was committed after the
commission of the offence of abduction. There is a sequential
relationship between the two offences and thus, in order to set up
a case for the commission of the offence of murder, it is necessary
to prove the commission of the offence of abduction by the accused
persons/appellants. For, the chain, in a case based on circumstantial
evidence, must be complete and consistent.
19. In order to prove the offence under Section 364 IPC, the prosecution
has relied upon the oral testimonies of four eye witnesses – PW-
2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-18. Their testimonies have been assailed
on various counts. The appellants have termed the said witnesses
as interested and chance witnesses. The former charge originates
from the fact that the witnesses were related to the deceased, and
the latter charge originates from the fact that the witnesses had no
rea-son to be present at the place of offence and they just appeared
unexpectedly as a matter of chance. Let us examine both the aspects.
We may first examine the testimonies of the witnesses independently,
without going into their relationship with the deceased.
20. The informant PW18 has deposed that he was standing near a
rickshaw outside his house and the deceased was sleeping inside
the house. PW18 was standing along with three independent
persons namely, Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas. The seven
accused persons came along with 15 other persons. A-6 and A-7,
along with unknown persons, first came to PW18 and took him away
towards the well and confined him there. Thereafter, the remaining
accused persons, along with other unknown assailants, entered
the house wherein the deceased was sleeping. Interestingly, as
118 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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per the version of the informant, the house was bolted from inside
and was opened by a tenant namely Kumud Ranjan Singh. The
problem with the informant’s version begins from this point itself.
As per his version, the first eye witnesses of the incident ought to
have been Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas and Kumud Ranjan
Singh. One person, namely Soordas, was stated to be blind and
thus, he may be excluded. Nevertheless, the prosecution ought to
have examined the three natural witnesses of the incident namely,
Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Kumud Ranjan Singh. There is no
explanation for non-examination of the natural eye witnesses. The
version becomes more doubtful when it is examined in light of his
statement that he could not prevent the accused persons as A-6
had threatened him with a pistol. In the FIR, no pistol has been
attributed to A-6, whereas in the statement recorded before the Trial
Court, this fact was introduced for the first time, which is indicative of
improvement. Furthermore, PW18 got it recorded in the FIR that A-6
and others had assaulted him with fists and slaps, but the said fact
was not deposed before the Trial Court in his examination in chief.
The discrepancy assumes greater seriousness in light of the fact that
no pistol has been recovered from any of the accused persons and
if the factum of branding of pistol is un-der the cloud of doubt, the
entire conduct of PW18 becomes doubtful and unnatural, as he did
not try to prevent the accused persons from entering the premises
or from abducting the deceased or from taking away the deceased
on their shoulders in front of his eyes as he was the brother-in-law
of the deceased.
21. The other eye witnesses, PW2, PW4 and PW5, de-posed collectively
in favour of the prosecution as they had arrived at the scene of
crime together. At around 10:00 PM on the fateful night, the said
eye witnesses happened to be present at Sikandra Chowk and
they heard some hue and cry at the house of the deceased. The
witnesses were coming together in a jeep from Lakhisarai and were
going towards their home in Ghogsha village, the village wherein the
deceased was married and also the native village of PW18/informant.
PW2 was the driver of PW4. The testimo-nies of the said PWs have
made it clear that while coming from Lakhisarai to Sikandra Chowk,
Ghogsha came first, followed by Lohanda and Simaltalla. In such
circumstances, their presence at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM must
be explained to the satisfaction of the Court. For, if they were going
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to their village, there was no occasion for them to come to Simaltalla
as it did not fall on their way. But no such ex-planation is forthcoming
from the material on record.
22. Interestingly, this lacuna was duly noted by the High Court with
respect to PW5 as there was no reason for him to be present at
Sikandra Chowk at the time of incident and his testimony was
excluded. However, the same logic was not extended to the testimony
of PW4 as well, as it was equally improbable for him to be present
at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM on the date of incident. His visit to
Sikandra Chowk was not necessitated for going to his village. Even
otherwise, since the three eye witnesses were similarly placed as
per their own version, the rejection of testimony of one witness
ought to have raised a natural doubt on the testimonies of the other
two witnesses unless they had a better explanation. However, no
such doubt was entertained by the High Court and the impugned
judgment offers no explanation for the same. In light of their own
testimonies, none of the three eye witnesses were required to visit
Sikandra Chowk or Simaltalla for going to their village.
23. The testimonies of the eye witnesses are also impeachable in light of
the other evidence on record. PW21 was the investigating officer in
the case and he had examined the aforesaid PWs as eye witnesses
of the incident. The version put forth by the eye witnesses meets a
serious doubt when examined in light of the evidence of DW3 and
DW4, the concerned Deputy Superintendent and Superintendent of
Police respectively who had supervised the investigation of the present
case. Both these officers were examined as defence witnesses on
behalf of the appellants. As per the supervision notes prepared by
DW3 during the course of investigation, PW2 and PW4 got to know
about the incident only when PW18 came running to them after the
incident. PW2, at that time, was sitting in a hotel with Umesh Singh
to have ‘prasad’. Similarly, the evidence of DW4 indicates that on
the date of incident, at around 10:00 PM, PW4 was coming from
Lakhisarai in his jeep and he saw six-seven persons fleeing away in
a jeep and he identified them as the accused persons. Thus, PW4
entered the scene after the commission of offence and he did not
witness the act of abduction. The testimony of PW2 strengthens
the doubt as he deposed that when they reached the police station
after the incident with PW18, neither him nor PW4 in-formed the
IO that they had directly seen the incident. The stark difference
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between the versions put forth by the PW21 and DW3/DW4 raises
serious concerns regarding the fairness of investigation conducted
by PW21 and it is a reasonable possibility that the eye witnesses
were brought in to create a fool proof case. The evidence of DW3
and DW4, both senior officers who had exercised supervision over
the investigation conducted by PW21, indicates that the so-called
eye witnesses of the incident were actually accessories after the
fact and not accessories to the fact.
24. The second limb of the objection against the testimonies of the eye
witnesses is that none of the eye witnesses is an independent witness
of fact. Ordinarily, there is no rule of law to discard the testimonies
of the witnesses merely because they were known to the victim
or belonged to her family. For, an offence may be committed in
circumstances that only the family members are present at the place
of occurrence in natural course. However, the present case does
not fall in such category. In the facts of the present case, the natural
presence of the eye witnesses at the place of occurrence is under
serious doubt, as discussed above, and for unexplained reasons, the
naturally present public persons were not examined as witnesses in
the matter. The non-examination of natural witnesses such as Doman
Tenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas, Kumud Ranjan Singh and many other
neighbours who admittedly came out of their houses to witness the
offence, coupled with the fact that the projected eye witnesses failed
to explain their presence at the place of occurrence, renders the
entire version of the prosecution as improbable and unreliable. The
eye witnesses, being family members, were apparently approached
by PW18 who in-formed them about the incident and later, their
versions were fabricated to make the case credible. Notably, when
the version put forth by the interested witnesses comes under a
shadow of doubt, the rule of prudence demands that the independent
public witnesses must be examined and corroborating material must
be gathered. More so, when public witnesses were readily available
and the offence has not taken place in the bounds of closed walls.
25. Pertinently, the conduct of the eye witnesses also ap-pears to be
unnatural considering that they were all relatives of the deceased.
Firstly, PW18 did not try to prevent the ab-duction. Even if it is believed
that he was held against a pistol, the statement regarding the existence
of pistol comes as an improvement from his first information given
to the police, as already noted above. Nonetheless, it is admitted
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that PW2, PW4 and PW5 came in a jeep and they saw the accused
persons leaving with Neelam after abducting her. It is also admitted
that they had identified the accused persons, who were essentially
the relatives of the eye witnesses. In such circumstances, as per
natural human conduct, the least that they could have done was
to follow the accused persons in their jeep. They admittedly had a
ready vehicle with them. Despite so, there was no such attempt on
their part, so much so that the dead body of Neelam was not even
discovered until the following morning as none of the eye witnesses
had any clue as to where the accused persons had taken away the
deceased after abducting her.
26. One crucial foundational fact in the present case is that the deceased
was residing in her father’s house at Simaltalla. Although, the Trial
Court and High Court have not doubted the said fact, we have our
reservations regarding the same. In addition to the statements of
PW18 (informant), PW23 (sister of deceased) and PW7 (maternal
uncle of deceased), no other witness has deposed to prove the factum
of residence. The admitted evidence on record sufficiently indicates
that various other tenants were residing in the same house, including
Kumud Ranjan Singh, Education Officer Ram Chabila Singh along
with his daughter and son.
27. The investigating officer PW21 had inspected the house and no direct
material, except some make-up articles, could be gathered so as to
indicate that Neelam was actually residing there. Admittedly, another
woman namely, Chando Devi (sister of Ram Chabila Singh) was
also residing in the same portion of the house. The High Court did
take note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since
Chando Devi was a widow, the make-up articles could not have
belonged to her as there was no need for her to put on make-up
being a widow. In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is
not only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping
observation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity
and neutrality expected from a court of law, specifically when the
same is not made out from any evidence on record.
28. Be that as it may, mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot
be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in
the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly
residing there. Furthermore, if Neelam was indeed residing there,
her other belongings such as clothes etc. ought to have been found
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in the house and even if not so, the other residents of the same
house could have come forward to depose in support of the said fact.
29. Notably, certain clothes such as two sarees, two blouses and two
petticoats were recovered along with the dead body of the deceased.
The prosecution version is that the accused persons had taken away
the said clothes from the house of the deceased while abducting her.
There is absolutely no explanation for the said conduct on the part
of the accused persons. It is difficult to understand as to why the
accused persons would take her clothes along while abducting her.
On the contrary, this fact actually serves the case of the prosecution
in proving that the de-ceased was actually residing at the house in
Simaltalla. The clothes appear to have been planted along with the
dead body in order to support the fact of actual residence of the
deceased at her father’s house in Simaltalla. In light of the material
on record, it could be concluded that no material whatsoever could
be found at the house of Jang Bahadur Singh to directly indicate
that the deceased was residing there. The make-up articles were
linked with the deceased on the basis of a completely unacceptable
reasoning and without any corroborative material. The prosecution
has failed to examine even one cohabitant to prove the said fact.
Furthermore, no personal belongings of the deceased, such as
clothes, footwear, utensils etc., could be found in the entire house.
Therefore, we are not inclined to believe that the deceased was
actually residing in the house at Simaltalla. In the same breath, we
may also note that even for PW18, no material was found in the
said house to indicate that he was in fact residing there. Apart from
his own statement, no witness has come forward to depose that the
informant was a resident of the said house. The prosecution has not
spotted any room in the entire house wherein PW18 was residing
and thus, his own presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful.
30. The appellants have also raised certain objections with respect to the
time of death. The discrepancy has been flagged in light of the post
mortem report, based on the post-mortem conducted at around 5:30
PM on 31.08.1985, which indicates that death took place around 24
hours ago. It indicates that the time of death must have been around
5:00 PM on 30.08.1985, which is contrary to the evidence of PW18
that the incident took place around 10:00 PM on 30.08.1985. A post
mortem report is generally not considered as conclusive evidence
of the facts mentioned in the re-port regarding the cause of death,
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time of death etc. It could always be corroborated with other direct
evidence on record such as ocular evidence of the eye witnesses.
However, when there is no other credible evidence on record to
contradict the report, the facts stated in the post mortem report are
generally taken as true. In the present matter, the evidence of the
eye witnesses has been declared as wholly unreliable including on
the aspect of time of death. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the
post mortem report and the findings therein.
31. At this stage, we may also note that the approach of the High Court
in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 was not in line with the
settled law pertaining to reversal of acquittals. The Trial Court had
acquitted the said two accused persons on the basis of a thorough
appreciation of evidence and the High Court merely observed that
their acquittal was based on the improbable statement of PW5 and
since the evidence of PW5 stood excluded from the record, there
was no reason left for the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Pertinently, the
High Court did not arrive at any finding of illegality or perversity in
the opinion of the Trial Court on that count. Furthermore, it did not
arrive at any positive finding of involvement of the said two accused
persons within the sphere of common intention with the remaining
accused persons. Equally, the exclusion of the evidence of PW5,
without explaining as to how the evidence of PW2 and PW4 was
not liable to be excluded in the same manner, was in-correct and
erroneous.
32. We do not intend to say that the High Court could not have
appreciated the evidence on record in its exercise of appellate
powers. No doubt, the High Court was well within its powers to
do so. However, in order to reverse a finding of acquittal, a higher
threshold is required. For, the presumption of innocence operating
in favour of an accused through-out the trial gets concretized with a
finding of acquittal by the Trial Court. Thus, such a finding could not
be reversed merely because the possibility of an alternate view was
alive. Rather, the view taken by the Trial Court must be held to be
completely unsustainable and not a probable view. The High Court,
in the impugned judgment, took a cursory view of the matter and
reversed the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 without arriving at any finding
of illegality or perversity or impossibility of the Trial Court’s view or
non-appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court.
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33. We may usefully refer to the exposition of law in Sanjeev v. State
of H.P.,12 wherein this Court summarized the position in this regard
and observed as follows:
“7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the
reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting
the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court
is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court
deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State
of Karnataka13, Anwar Ali v. State of H.P.14)
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the
normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets
reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P.15)
7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record,
the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering
with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v.
State of Kerala16)”
34. Having observed that the case of the prosecution is full of glaring
doubts as regards the offence of abduction, we may briefly note
and reiterate that the offence of murder is entirely dependent on
circumstantial evidence. Although, the post mortem report indicates
that the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission
of murder cannot be ruled out. But there is no direct evidence on
record to prove the commission of murder by the accused persons.
The link of causation between the accused persons and the alleged
offence is conspicuously missing. The circumstantial evidence
emanating from the facts surrounding the offence of abduction,
such as the testimonies of eye witnesses, has failed to meet the
test of proof and cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law.
Therefore, the foundation of circumstantial evidence having fallen
down, no inference could be drawn from it to infer the commission

12 (2022) 6 SCC 294
13 (2019) 5 SCC 436
14 (2020) 10 SCC 166
15 AIR 1955 SC 807
16 [1998] 3 SCR 280 : (1998) 5 SCC 412
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 125

Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar

of the offence under Section 302 IPC by the accused persons. It is
trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain
of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable
conclusion of guilt. In the pre-sent case, the prosecution case is far
from meeting that standard.
35. As regards motive, we may suffice to say that motive has a bearing
only when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients
of the offences under consideration. Without the proof of foundational
facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of
motive alone. Moreover, the motive in the present matter could operate
both ways. The accused persons and the eyewitnesses belong to
the same family and the presence of a property related dispute is
evident. In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from
implicating the other. In such circumstances, placing reliance upon
motive alone could be a double-edged sword. We say no more.
36. The above analysis indicates that the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
The reasonable doubts, indicated above, are irreconcilable and strike
at the foundation of the prosecution’s case. Thus, the appellants are
liable to be acquitted of all the charges.
37. In light of the foregoing discussion, we hereby conclude that the
findings of conviction arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court
are not sustainable. Moreover, the High Court erred in reversing
the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Accordingly, the impugned judgment
as well as the judgment rendered by the Trial Court (to the extent
of conviction of A-1 to A-5) are set aside, and all seven accused
persons (appellants) are hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled
upon them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if
lying in custody.
38. The captioned appeals stand disposed of in terms of this judgment.
Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. No costs.

Result of the Case: Appeals disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain