Supreme Court of India
VIKRAM BAKSHI AND OTHERSversusR.P. KHOSLA AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1020
- Decided
- 20 August 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
Under Section 362 of the CrPC, a criminal court cannot review or recall its own judgment or order in a proceeding under Section 340 CrPC except for clerical errors or where expressly authorized, and a review petition under the CPC is not maintainable in such criminal matters.
Summary
The dispute arose between the Khosla and Bakshi groups over a resort development project, leading to allegations of perjury and a criminal proceeding under Section 340 of the CrPC. The High Court initially dismissed the criminal application but later recalled its own order after a review petition was filed under Order XLVII of the CPC, claiming a material fact had been omitted. The appellants challenged this recall, arguing that Section 362 of the CrPC bars a criminal court from reviewing or altering its own judgment except for clerical errors or where expressly authorized. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding under Section 340 is a criminal matter governed solely by the CrPC, and the bar of Section 362 applies, rendering the High Court's recall a substantive review not permissible. Consequently, the review petition under the CPC was deemed non‑maintainable and the impugned order was set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under Section 340 CrPC is permissible.
- Whether a review petition filed under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is maintainable in a criminal proceeding under Section 340 CrPC.
- Whether the bar under Section 362 CrPC applies to the High Court's recall of its own order.
- Whether the High Court's recall constitutes a procedural review or a substantive review.
Legislation cited
- Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 403
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XLVII
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 2(g), s. 340, s. 362, s. 4, s. 482
- Companies Act, 1956s. 397, s. 398
Headnote
1444 : 2025 INSC 1020 Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3646 of 2025) 20 August 2025 [B.R. Gavai, CJI and Augustine George Masih,* J.] Issue for Consideration Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 petition filed u/s.340 against the appellants for prosecution of offences of perjury and directed that the said application be listed for hearing: Held: As envisaged under the CrPC, criminal courts are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions explicitly provided
Subjects
Section 340 of CrPCSection 362 of CrPCReview or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceedingBar under Section 362 of CrPCCriminal courts barred from altering or reviewing their own judgmentsPerjuryProceedings initiated under section 340 of CrPC are criminalFunctus officioProcedural reviewNot a substantive reviewReview Petition under Order XLVII, Code of Civil ProcedureCompany Law BoardCompany Petition
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1444 : 2025 INSC 1020
Vikram Bakshi and Others
v.
R.P. Khosla and Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 3646 of 2025)
20 August 2025
[B.R. Gavai, CJI and Augustine George Masih,* J.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal
proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible or not.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.362 – Bar under –
Scope and applicability – High Court recalled its earlier order
disposing of the petition filed u/s.340 against the appellants
for prosecution of offences of perjury and directed that the
said application be listed for hearing:
Held: As envisaged under the CrPC, criminal courts are barred from
altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions
explicitly provided by the statute, viz., correction of a clerical
or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the
said power is provided under any other law for the time being
in force – As the courts become functus officio the very moment
a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of s.362 becomes
applicable, this, despite the powers provided u/s.482 which, this
veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an
explicit bar – Bar u/s.362 is to be applied stricto sensu – It is
only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or
judgment seeking a “procedural review” that the bar would not
apply and not a “substantive review” where the bar as contained
in s.362 is attracted – Neither the impugned order falls within
the ambit of “procedural review” to not attract the bar of s.362
CrPC, nor is it the case of the ‘KG’ that they were either denied
a hearing before the High Court or were not given an opportunity
to inform the court of the said development – Furthermore, an
act to undermine the finality of the judicial proceedings cannot
be permitted especially in situations of deliberate omissions or
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1445
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
misrepresentation on the part of the parties before the court
and thereafter attempting to defend themselves and obtaining
the verboten order (Impugned Order) substantially reviewing
and recalling the Judgment dated 13.08.2020, under the garb of
“procedural review” which is impermissible – Impugned Order set
aside. [Paras 34, 43-45]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.362 – Bar under –
Exceptional circumstances wherein a criminal court is
empowered to alter or review its own judgment or a final order
u/s.362, enumerated – Exercise of, when:
Held: All these exceptions are only exercisable for seeking a recall
or review of an order or judgment, if a ground that is raised was
not available or existent at the time of original proceedings before
the Court – Mere fact that the said ground, although available,
was not raised or pressed during the concerned proceedings,
does not provide for an exemption to the parties to assert it as a
ground – Moreover, the said power cannot be invoked as a means
to circumvent the finality of the judicial process or mistakes and/or
errors in the decision which are attributable to a conscious omission
by the parties. [Para 34]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.4, 2(g), 340 – Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Review Petition u/Or.XLVII –
Maintainability:
Held: A proceeding under section 340 of CrPC is in the nature
of criminal proceeding and governed by the provisions of the
CrPC, as a consequence, thereof, all the procedural safeguards,
consequences, and effects thereto associated with a criminal
proceeding under CrPC are also attracted to it – The proceedings
initiated u/s.340 of CrPC are of criminal nature and governed
by the provisions of CrPC which is a self-contained Code, and
includes entire procedure within itself to deal with the proceedings
initiated under its provisions, there is no scope for application of
provisions of any other procedural law until specifically provided
under such law – In the present case, the review application was
filed by ‘KG’ u/Order XLVII of CPC 1908 before High Court – The
CPC 1908 does not expressly provide for a provision wherein a
review can be filed in the proceedings of criminal nature initiated
1446 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
under CrPC – Thus, the said petition filed by ‘KG’ under provisions
of CPC 1908 could not have been entertained by the High Court
being not maintainable. [Paras 38-40]
Case Law Cited
Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor and Others [2020] 1 SCR
663 : (2020) 13 SCC 172; Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 2050; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government
Industrial Tribunal and Others [1981] 2 SCR 341 : (1980) Supp.
SCC 420; State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair [2001] 3 SCR
203 : (2001) 4 SCC 752; Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh
Bajwa and Others [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 313 : (2001) 1 SCC 169;
Budhia Swain and Others v. Gopinath Deb and Others [1999] 2
SCR 1189 : (1999) 4 SCC 396 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
Section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 362 of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Review or recall of an order
passed in a criminal proceeding; Bar under Section 362 of Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Criminal courts barred from altering
or review their own judgments; Perjury; Proceedings initiated under
section 340 of CrPC are criminal; Functus officio; Procedural review;
Not a substantive review; Review Petition under Order XLVII, Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908; Company Law Board; Company Petition.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3646 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.05.2021 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in COA No. 579 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Jay Savla, Sr. Adv., Anand Mohan Mishra, Jasdeep Singh Dhillon,
Prabhat Chaurasia, Anirudh Jamwal, Yugantar Singh Chauhan,
Deepak Khosla, Arpit Shukla, Shibu Devasia Olickal, Rahul Gupta.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1447
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
Advs. for the Respondents:
Jay Savla, Sr. Adv., Anand Mohan Mishra, Jasdeep Singh Dhillon,
Prabhat Chaurasia, Anirudh Jamwal, Arpit Shukla, Deepak Khosla,
M/s. Equity Lex Associates.
Petitioner-in-person.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Augustine George Masih, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The instant Criminal Appeal assails the Judgment and Order dated
05.05.2021 (hereinafter “Impugned Order”) passed by the High
Court of Delhi (hereinafter, “High Court”), whereby it recalled its
earlier Judgment dated 13.08.2020 which had disposed of Criminal
Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 4 of 2019 filed under Section 340 Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”) against the Appellants for
prosecution of offences of perjury and directed that the said application
be listed for hearing. In the Judgment dated 13.08.2020, the High
Court declined to interfere in the matter in view of the directions of
this Court in Judgment dated 08.05.2014 passed in SLP (Criminal)
No. 6873 of 2010 whereby dispute between the parties in relation
to their Company Petition No.114 of 2007 (hereinafter “CP 114 of
2007”) and other related matters arising out of it was to be decided
by Company Law Board (hereinafter, “CLB”).
3. The Appellants before us are Mr. Vikram Bakshi, Mr. Vinod Surha and
Mr. Wadia Prakash while Mr. R.P. Khosla is the Contesting Respondent
No.1 and Mr. Anand Mohan Mishra is Proforma Respondent No.2.
4. Briefly, the facts relevant for adjudication of the case in hand is that
two groups, namely, the Khosla Group (comprising of Mr. R.P. Khosla,
Mr. Deepak Khosla - son of R.P. Khosla and Ms. Sonia Khosla -
wife of Mr. Deepak Khosla) and the Bakshi Group (comprising of
Mr. Vikram Bakshi, Mr. Vinod Surha and Mr. Wadia Prakash) came
together in relation to development of a resort at Kasauli in the State
of Himachal Pradesh on the land owned by the Khosla Group where
the Bakshi Group was to finance and manage the entire project.
1448 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
5. The undisputed facts as presented and extracted from material on
record are that a Memorandum of Understanding dated 21.12.2005
(hereinafter “MoU”) was entered between Mr. Deepak Khosla
(representing Khosla Group), Mr. R.P. Khosla, Mr. Vikram Bakshi
and Montreaux Resorts Private Limited (hereinafter “MRPL”) for
development of the project.
6. The MRPL was a Special Purpose Vehicle incorporated under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 for execution of the said
project. As the terms of MoU required transferring of shareholding
in MRPL by Khosla Group to Mr. Vikram Bakshi subject to fulfilment
of certain conditions, an Agreement dated 31.03.2006 was executed
between Ms. Sonia Khosla, Mr. R.P. Khosla, Mr. Vikram Bakshi and
MRPL, transferring 51% shareholding in MRPL to Mr. Vikram Bakshi.
Pursuant to that, Mr. Vinod Surha and Mr. Wadia Prakash (of Bakshi
Group) were appointed as Additional Directors in the MRPL.
7. Owing to subsequent disagreements, Ms. Sonia Khosla in her capacity
as minority shareholder of MRPL, filed CP 114 of 2007 under section
397/398 of Companies Act, 1956 on 13.08.2007 before CLB alleging
oppression and mismanagement by the Bakshi Group, inter alia,
contending that her shareholding in MRPL had been illegally reduced
from 49% to 36% and sought removal of the Directors representing
the Bakshi Group from the Board of Directors.
8. An application, C.A. No. 572/2007, in CP 114 of 2007 was filed by
the Khosla Group praying to restrain the Bakshi Group from holding
a meeting between themselves regarding the affairs of MRPL
scheduled on 26.12.2007 claiming that the appointment of Directors
belonging to the Bakshi Group was not confirmed as per the Minutes
of Annual General Meeting (hereinafter “AGM”) dated 30.09.2006 of
MRPL, implying that they had ceased to be Directors and therefore
cannot hold meeting of MRPL. CLB accepted the request and vide
Order dated 24.12.2007 directed deferment of the aforesaid meeting
scheduled for 26.12.2007.
9. Thereafter, while dealing with the CP 114 of 2007, the CLB vide Order
dated 31.01.2008 directed maintenance of status quo with respect
to the shareholding and composition of the Board of Directors in
MRPL as existed on the date of the filing of said Company Petition
by Ms. Sonia Khosla.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1449
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
10. Aggrieved by the Order dated 31.01.2008, Mr. R.P. Khosla moved the
High Court by filing Company Appeal (SB) No. 7 of 2008, which came
to be disposed of as not pressed by the Appellant therein vide Order
dated 11.04.2008 as the High Court was informed that the parties
have agreed that CP 114 of 2007 shall be withdrawn by Ms. Sonia
Khosla and the dispute has already been referred to arbitration as per
the terms of Agreement dated 31.03.2006. Furthermore, the parties
had agreed to maintain status quo with respect to their shareholding
in MRPL as it stood at the time of filing of CP 114 of 2007.
11. It needs mention here that Ms. Sonia Khosla had also assailed the
same Order dated 31.01.2008 passed by the CLB in Company Appeal
(SB) No. 6 of 2008 in which the High Court relying extensively upon
the Order dated 11.04.2008 passed in Company Appeal (SB) No. 7 of
2008 dismissed the said appeal vide Order dated 22.04.2008 noting
that agreement in terms of maintaining of status quo in shareholding
and Board of Directors of MRPL has been achieved between parties.
12. In an attempt to prolong the litigation and not to be confined to 36%
shareholding in MRPL, Mr. R.P. Khosla and Ms. Sonia Khosla had
filed review petitions against Order dated 11.04.2008 in Company
Appeal (SB) No. 7 of 2008 and Order dated 22.04.2008 in Company
Appeal (SB) No. 6 of 2008 respectively before the High Court, these
came to be dismissed on 06.05.2008.
13. In the interregnum, Bakshi Group filed an application being C.A.
No. 1 of 2008 in CP 114 of 2007 before CLB seeking vacation of its
Order dated 24.12.2007 leading to deferment of the meeting of MRPL
scheduled on 26.12.2007. It was asserted in the said application that
Mr. Vinod Surha and Mr. Wadia Prakash were confirmed as Directors
of the MRPL as per the minutes of AGM held on 30.09.2006. It is
at this stage, the litigation between the parties took a different turn
altogether.
14. Alleging the Minutes of AGM of the MRPL dated 30.09.2006 as
filed by Bakshi Group in C.A. No. 1 of 2008 are forged, Ms. Sonia
Khosla filed an application under Section 340 of CrPC before the
CLB seeking their prosecution for perjury.
15. However, citing inaction on the part of CLB, Ms. Sonia Khosla moved
the High Court by filing Criminal Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 3 of 2008
seeking same relief of initiation of prosecution against Bakshi group
1450 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
under section 195(1)(b) and 195(4) read with section 340 (1) of
CrPC for forgery and perjury with reference to claim made in C.A.
1 of 2008 and concerned affidavits filed by the Bakshi Group in CP
114 of 2007 before CLB.
16. Herein, the High Court, vide an interim Order dated 15.02.2010
directed the Registrar (Vigilance) of the High Court to hold a
preliminary inquiry into the genuineness of the minutes of AGM
dated 30.09.2006. This order dated 15.02.2010 was challenged by
the Bakshi Group in SLP (Criminal) No. 6873 of 2010 contending
that the Criminal Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 3 of 2008 filed by Ms.
Sonia Khosla under section 340 of CrPC before the High Court was
not maintainable.
17. This Court, vide Judgment dated 08.05.2014 in SLP (Criminal) No.
6873 of 2010, passed a consent order recording the submission of
the parties that once the Company Petition i.e., CP 114 of 2007 itself
is decided, the issue relating to the genuineness of the minutes of
AGM dated 30.09.2006, as raised in the application under Section
340 of CrPC before the CLB, would also be addressed by the CLB.
This Court accordingly directed the CLB to decide CP 114 of 2007
filed by Ms. Sonia Khosla within a period of six months from the date
of receipt of a copy of the order. It was further directed that the High
Court ought not proceed further with the application moved by Ms.
Sonia Khosla under Section 340 of CrPC.
18. The relevant part of the Judgment dated 08.05.2014 passed by this
Court is produced herein:
“21. In fact, though the learned Senior Counsel for the
parties had argued the matters before us at length on
the previous occasions, at the stage of conclusions of
the arguments, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Cama
appearing for Khosla Group suggested for an early
decision of the Company Petition before the CLB as a
better alternative so that at least main dispute between
the parties is adjudicated upon at an early date. He was
candid in his submission that the issues which are subject
matter of these two Special Leave Petitions and arise out of
the proceedings in the High Court, have their origin in the
orders dated 31.1.2008, which is an interim order passed
by the CLB. He thus, pointed out that once the Company
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1451
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
Petition itself is decided, the issues involved therein namely
whether Board meeting dated 14.12.2007 was illegal or
whether Board meeting dated 30.9.2006 was barred in law
would also get decided. In the process the CLB would also
be in a position to decide as to whether minutes of AGM
of the Company allegedly held on 30.9.2006 are forged
or not and on that basis application under Section 340
Cr. PC which is filed before the Company Law Boared
[sic] Board would also be taken care of by the CLB itself.
Learned Senior Counsels appearing for the Bakshi Group
immediately agreed with the aforesaid course of action
suggested by Mr. Cama. We are happy that at least there is
an agreement between both the parties on the procedural
course of action, to give quietus to the matters before us
as well. In view of the aforesaid consensus, about the
course of action to be adopted in deciding the disputes
between the parties, we direct the Company Law Board
to decide Company Petition No. 114 of 2007 filed before
it by Ms. Sonia Khosla within a period of six months from
the date of receiving a copy of this order. Since, it is the
CLB which will be deciding the application under Section
340 Cr PC filed by Ms. Sonia Khosla in the CLB, High
Court need not proceed further with the Criminal Misc.
(Co.). No. 3 of 2008. Likewise the question whether Mr.
R.K. Garg was validly inducted as a Director or not would
be gone into by the CLB, the proceedings in Co. Appeal
No. (SB) 23 of 2009 filed by Mr. R.K. Garg in the High
Court, also become otiose.
22. The only aspect on which some directions need to be
given are, as to what should be the interim arrangement.
The Bakshi Group wants orders dated 31.1.2008 passed
by CLB to continue the interregnum. The Khosla Group
on the other hand refers to orders dated 11.4.2008 as it is
their submission that this was a consent order passed by
the High Court after the orders of the CLB and, therefore,
this order should govern the field in the meantime.
23. After considering the matter, we are of the opinion that
it is not necessary to either enforce orders dated 31.1.2008
passed by the CLB or orders dated 11.4.2008 passed by the
1452 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
High Court. Fact remains that there has been a complete
deadlock, as far as affairs of the Company are concerned.
The project has not taken off. It is almost dead at present.
Unless the parties re-concile, there is no chance for a joint
venture i.e. to develop the resort, as per the MOU dated
21.12.2005. It is only after the decision of CLB, whereby
the respective rights of the parties are crystallised, it would
be possible to know about the future of this project. Even
the Company in question is also defunct at present as it
has no other business activity or venture. In a situation like
this, we are of the opinion that more appropriate orders
would be to direct the parties to maintain status quo in the
meantime, during the pendency of the aforesaid company
petition before the CLB. However, we make it clear that
if any exigency arises necessitating some interim orders,
it would be open to the parties to approach the CLB for
appropriate directions.
24. Both these petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid
terms. All other pending I.As including criminal contempt
petitions and petitions filed under Section 340 Cr. PC are
also disposed of as in the facts of this case, we are not
inclined to entertain such application. No costs.”
19. The Criminal Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 3 of 2008 came to be dismissed
vide Order dated 03.12.2018 of the High Court in consonance with
Judgment dated 08.05.2014 passed in SLP (Criminal) No. 6873 of
2010 by this Court.
20. Reverting to the High Court’s Orders dated 11.04.2008 and 22.04.2008
in Company Appeal (SB) No. 7 of 2008 and Company Appeal (SB)
No. 6 of 2008 respectively, a Contempt Petition being C.C.P. (Co.)
No. 1 of 2009, was filed by the Khosla Group before the High Court
alleging wilful disobedience of abovesaid Orders dated 11.04.2008
and 22.04.2008, this petition came to be withdrawn with liberty to
file afresh with a proper array of parties.
21. Thereafter, the Khosla Group filed another application being Criminal
Miscellaneous (Co) No. 4 of 2019 under Section 340 CrPC before the
High Court alleging that the Bakshi Group had filed a counter-affidavit
dated 24.02.2010 in C.C.P. (Co.) No. 1 of 2009 which contained
false and contradictory statements. This application was disposed of
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1453
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
by the High Court vide Judgment dated 13.08.2020, observing that
the CLB (which has now been replaced by National Company Law
Tribunal, hereinafter “NCLT”) was seized of the matter as submitted
by the Khosla Group that the CP 114 of 2007 was pending before
NCLT, further taking note of the Judgment dated 08.05.2014 passed
in SLP (Criminal) No. 6873 of 2010 by this Court that the CP 114 of
2007 and application under section 340 of CrPC was to be decided
by the CLB/NCLT, the High Court decided not to interfere in the
issue. Relevant portion of the Judgment dated 13.08.2020 passed
by the High Court reads as follows:-
“20. Broadly understood, the claim of the Petitioner
is that if the claim of the Respondents in C.A.
No.1/2008 is that they were elected in the AGM
held on 30.09.2006, then no EGM took place on
28.06.2006 and they were not elected in the said
EGM. As a corollary if they had been elected in the
EGM then a claim of having been elected in the AGM
held on 30.09.2006 is false and the Minutes are
forged, making the Respondents liable to punishment
for perjury.
21. In my view the allegations in the present petition,
directly or indirectly touch upon the Minutes of the
AGM of 30.09.2006, which is the subject matter of
adjudication before NCLT. While Mr. Khosla urges
that this petition can be independently decided as
it relates to the alleged EGM and certain other
issues raised therein, but on a holistic reading of the
petition, this Court is of the opinion that any decision
in the present petition will have a bearing on the
genuineness of AGM dated 30.09.2006 and other
aspects sub-judice before NCLT, as the controversies
are intrinsically linked.
22. It is apparent from the order passed by the
Supreme Court, which was a consent order, that the
parties chartered a course of action for further litigation
and the path chosen was to have the entire dispute
decided before the then CLB (now NCLT). In fact, it
was the Petitioner Group which had put forth before
1454 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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the Supreme Court that once the Company Petition
is decided, the connected issues of the alleged
illegalities in the various Board Meetings would be
taken care of, including allegations qua AGM held
on 30.09.2006. In this light Supreme Court directed
the CLB to decide the Co. Pet. No. 114/2007 as also
the Application under Section 340 Cr.PC. Apposite
would it be to emphasize that the Supreme Court
categorically directed the High Court not to proceed
with Crl. Misc. (Co.) No. 3/2008 and the said petition
has been dismissed by this Court, in the light of the
observation of the Supreme Court.
23. It is not disputed by Mr. Khosla that the NCLT is
even currently seized of the Petitions/ Applications,
as referred to in the order of the Supreme Court,
between the two Groups. Thus in the light of the
order of the Supreme Court, it is not proper for this
Court to entertain the present Petition at this stage.
Petitioner may approach the NCLT, in accordance
with law, if so advised.
24. In all probability once the proceedings pending
before the NCLT end, the creases shall be ironed
out with respect to the EGM also. Nonetheless, in
case the issues raised herein still survive after the
proceedings end before NCLT, it shall be open to
the Petitioner to approach this Court, in accordance
with law.
25. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed
any view on the merits of this case or with respect to
any inter-se litigation between the parties.”
21A. Khosla Group, thereafter, moved an application under Order
XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking review and
recall of the Judgment dated 13.08.2020 alleging that CP 114
of 2007 was withdrawn by Ms. Sonia Khosla on 07.02.2020
with liberty to file a fresh petition and this fact was not brought
to the notice of the court prior to the passing of the Judgment
dated 13.08.2020. Moreover, it was contended that in Criminal
Miscellaneous (Co) No. 4 of 2019 allegations of false affidavits
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1455
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
being filed by Respondent No.2 on behalf of Bakshi Group
had been made and, therefore, the same should be heard on
its merits without relegating the dispute to the NCLT.
22. Objecting to the said contention on behalf of Khosla Group, the
Bakshi Group reiterated the observations made in Judgment dated
13.08.2020 with reference to the earlier order of this Court and
further asserted that the High Court did not have power to review
or alter its order passed while exercising criminal jurisdiction as per
Section 362 of CrPC.
23. The High Court while passing the Impugned Order dated 05.05.2021,
did take note of the objections of the Bakshi Group and observed
that there can be no debate that a review petition does not lie under
the CrPC, except for correction of clerical and arithmetical errors
but, still, it proceeded to recall the Judgment dated 13.08.2020
on the ground that the fact of withdrawal of the Company Petition
before the CLB (now NCLT) was not brought to the notice of the
court earlier but only now through the review application and as a
consequence, directed Criminal Miscellaneous (Co) No. 4 of 2019
to be listed for consideration. It is this order dated 05.05.2021 which
is under challenge before this Court.
24. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants contends that there
is no power of review under Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. The
only power available under Section 362 of CrPC is to correct a
clerical or arithmetical error. To substantiate this contention, reliance
is placed upon the decision of this Court in Sanjeev Kapoor vs.
Chandana Kapoor and Others1 which held that that there are only
two relaxations given from the rigour of Section 362 of CrPC where
such power to alter or review is provided either (i) by the CrPC itself
or (ii) by any other law for time being in force and no such relaxations
are met out in the Impugned Order. He further highlighted that the
High Court in Impugned Order agreed with the proposition that
review was not maintainable, yet decided to review and recalled its
Judgment dated 13.08.2020. He contends that this Court while dealing
with the litigation between two groups involving similar applications
under section 340 of CrPC, vide Judgment dated 08.05.2014 had
directed CLB/NCLT to decide the matter and restrained the High
1 (2020) 13 SCC 172
1456 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Court to proceed with the application under section 340 of CrPC.
The learned Counsel contends that the High Court acted in violation
of this Court’s above judgment while passing the Impugned Order.
He prays for setting aside of Impugned Order dated 05.05.2021
passed by the High Court.
25. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, contends that
the Impugned Order dated 05.05.2021 is a classic manifestation of
the court undoing its own wrong. He submits that the Order was
not passed under any statutory provision but by the court acting
ex debito justitiae in order to undo the injurious effect flowing from
its factually erroneous observation included in Judgment dated
13.08.2020. He relied on the order passed by this Court in Ganesh
Patel vs. Umakant Rajoria2 which relying on Grindlays Bank Ltd.
vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others3 has
carved out a distinction between “procedural review” and “substantive
review” and has clarified that when it comes to procedural review,
the rigour of Section 362 of CrPC will not be attracted. He submits
that the recall in such circumstances is a recall simpliciter and not
a review ensuing recall which is on merits. He further asserted that
the High Court in the Impugned Order has clearly recorded that it
is not entering into the merits of case and merely correcting the
mistake it made in Judgment dated 13.08.2020 due to absence of the
correct material factual development and thus sustainable. Further,
it is contended that while passing its Judgment dated 13.08.2020,
the High Court was not dealing with a criminal proceeding per se,
as the outcome of application filed under Section 340 of CrPC does
not directly result into any sentence or fine or any other implication
which is a necessary outcome for a proceeding to be of criminal
in nature. The proceedings under section 340 of CrPC are just to
ascertain whether an offence of perjury has been prima facie made
out. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal.
26. Having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, and on perusal of
the material on record, the primary issue which arises for consideration
of this Court is “whether a review or recall of an order passed in a
2 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050
3 (1980) Supp. SCC 420
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1457
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible
or not?” In our opinion, the resolution of the said issue would lead
to conclusion of present petition.
27. The law relating to power of a criminal court to review or alter its own
judgment or order is governed by the provisions of Section 362 of
CrPC (equivalent to Section 403 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023). The Provision explicitly provides that except for clerical and
arithmetical error, no court shall alter or review its judgment. It is
appropriate to refer to the bare provision of Section 362 of CrPC
which reads as follows:
“362. Court not to alter judgment.–– Save as
otherwise provided by this Code or by any other
law for the time being in force, no Court, when it
has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a
case, shall alter or review the same except to correct
a clerical or arithmetical error.”
27A. The comparison of the power of review of a civil court vis-a-vis
power of criminal court to review or recall its own judgment or
order arising out of criminal proceedings has been put to rest
by numerous decisions of this Court. It would be appropriate
at this juncture to discuss the relevant decisions of this court
pertaining to review or recall power of criminal courts to
ascertain the correct position of law before proceeding to refer
and deal with the factual matrix of the present case.
28. The scope of Section 362 of CrPC has been discussed and elaborated
by a three-judge bench decision of this Court in State of Kerala vs.
M.M. Manikantan Nair,4 wherein it held that CrPC does not authorize
High Court to review its judgment or order passed either in exercise
of its appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction. Section 362 explicitly
prohibits the court after it has signed its judgment or final order
disposing of case from altering or reviewing the said judgment or
order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition
is complete and no criminal court can review its own judgment or
order after it is signed.
4 (2001) 4 SCC 752
1458 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
29. Similarly, in Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and
Others5, this Court observed that section 362 of CrPC is based
on the acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally
disposed of by a court, the said court, in absence of specific statutory
provisions, becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain
fresh prayer for same relief.
30. In Sanjeev Kapoor (supra) it has been reiterated that Section 362
of CrPC imposes an embargo on a criminal court to alter and review
its own judgment. Elaborating on the two relaxations envisioned by
the legislature, this Court explained that an alteration or review is only
feasible if it is so provided by the said legislation itself or by any other
law in force. It was also clarified that such an attempt to alter or review
is also not feasible or permissible through a reference to Section 482
of CrPC for being expressly barred under Section 362 of CrPC.
31. This Court, however, in exceptional cases, has carved out limited
scope for exercise of review power by criminal courts. In Grindlays
Bank Ltd. (supra), it was observed that review can be distinguished
between “procedural review” and “substantive review”. A “procedural
review” is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably
erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a
“substantive review” is when error sought to be corrected is one of
law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense,
this Court, held that no review lies on merits unless specifically
provided under a statute.
32. This distinction has been further clarified in Budhia Swain and
Others vs. Gopinath Deb and Others6, wherein this Court has laid
down certain grounds on which a criminal court can review or recall
its judgment or order i.e. when the proceedings before it itself suffers
from an inherent lack of jurisdiction or, a fraud is played upon court to
obtain the order or, a mistake of court causing prejudice to party or
the order was in ignorance of non-serving of necessary party or party
had died and estate was not represented. It was further clarified that
these exceptions were subjected to the limitation that such grounds
cannot be raised to recall or review if they were available during the
original action and was not availed.
5 (2001) 1 SCC 169
6 (1999) 4 SCC 396
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1459
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
33. In Ganesh Patel (supra) this Court held that application for recall
seeking “procedural review” and not “substantive review” to which
Section 362 of CrPC be attracted is permissible. This Court upheld
the order of the High Court wherein it recalled the earlier order
passed in the absence of the Respondent and based on false
information.
34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid
decisions of this Court clarify the now-well-settled position of
jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize
would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC,
are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for
the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely,
correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been
committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the
time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very
moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362
CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers provided under
Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step
beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it
is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or
judgment seeking a “procedural review” that the bar would not apply
and not a substantive review” where the bar as contained in Section
“362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also
elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto
sensu.
34A. Having said that, the following exceptional circumstances may
be identified, wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter
or review its own judgment or a final order under Section 362
CrPC:
a. Such power is expressly conferred upon court by CrPC
or any other law for the time being in force or;
b. The court passing such a judgement or order lacked
inherent jurisdiction to do so or;
c. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain
such judgment or order or;
d. A mistake on the part of court caused prejudice to a
party or;
1460 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
e. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death
leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to
notice of court while passing such judgment or order.
It needs to be reiterated that all these exceptions are only
exercisable for seeking a recall or review of an order or judgment,
if a ground that is raised was not available or existent at the time
of original proceedings before the Court. Mere fact that the said
ground, although available, was not raised or pressed during
the concerned proceedings, does not provide for an exemption
to the parties to assert it as a ground. Moreover, the said power
cannot be invoked as a means to circumvent the finality of the
judicial process or mistakes and/or errors in the decision which
are attributable to a conscious omission by the parties.
35. Before we delve into the facts of the instant case in an attempt to
sieve out the correct jurisprudence from the gamut of the arguments
raised by the parties before us, we find it appropriate to first consider
the maintainability of the Review Petition No. 579 of 2020 under
Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 preferred by the
Khosla Group before the High Court. The Khosla Group filed the said
review under the provisions of CPC 1908 seeking recall of Order
dated 13.08.2020 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 4 of
2019 which was filed under section 340 of the CrPC.
36. The scheme of CrPC as enshrined in its long title defines it is an Act
“to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure”.
Further, Section 4 of CrPC provides for scope of the CrPC which is
reproduced herein:
“4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and
other laws.
(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise
dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to
the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for
the time being in force regulating the manner of place of
investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing
with such offences.”
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1461
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of CrPC expressly
mandates an investigation, inquiry or trial of offences under Indian
Penal Code of 1860 to be conducted strictly as per the procedure
provided in the provisions of the CrPC. The definition of “inquiry” as
stipulated in Section 2 (g) of CrPC means every inquiry, other than
a trial, conducted under the CrPC by a Magistrate or Court.
37. The intent of proceedings as can been seen from provision of Section
340 of the CrPC, is to determine as to whether a complaint ought to
be made in writing by concerned court to the competent Magistrate
for prosecution of accused in respect of an offence alleged to have
been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a court. Section
340 of CrPC empowers the court that such determination may be
done by way of holding preliminary inquiry to ascertain sufficient
material to justify the initiation of prosecution against the accused. The
nature of such an inquiry is not administrative or mere procedural. It
is an initial step to a course which may lead to criminal prosecution,
and this step is taken by a court with avowed purpose of examining
whether a person should be prosecuted for an offence which, more
often than not, relates to fabricating or giving false evidence, or
committing other offences affecting the administration of justice,
all of which are offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code.
38. If the nature of proceeding is such, the outcome of which, may
result in a trial before a criminal court and, upon conviction, entail
punishment for an offence under the penal law, then such a proceeding
must, in substance, be treated as criminal in nature. Section 4(1) of
the Code mandates that all offences under the Indian Penal Code.
must be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the CrPC. The nature
of the proceeding is determined by its substance and consequences
it may result into. Thus, a proceeding initiated under section 340 of
CrPC is in the nature of criminal proceeding and governed by the
provisions of the CrPC, as a consequence, thereof, all the procedural
safeguards, consequences, and effects thereto associated with a
criminal proceeding under CrPC are also attracted to it.
39. Considering that the proceedings initiated under section 340 of CrPC
are of criminal nature and governed by the provisions of CrPC which
is a self-contained Code, and includes entire procedure within itself
to deal with the proceedings initiated under its provisions, there is
1462 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
no scope for application of provisions of any other procedural law
until specifically provided under such law.
40. In the present case, the review application was filed by Khosla Group
under Order XLVII of CPC 1908 before High Court. The CPC 1908
does not expressly provide for a provision wherein a review can be
filed in the proceedings of criminal nature initiated under CrPC. As
a result, the said petition filed by Khosla Group under provisions of
CPC 1908 could not have been entertained by the High Court for
being patently not maintainable in light of above discussion. This
finding itself leads to the disposal of case at hand, however, in our
view, it is pertinent to delve into the merits of the review application
so moved by the Khosla Group and leading to the Impugned Order
vis-à-vis the jurisdiction and expanse of Section 362 of CrPC.
41. To deal with the case at hand, it is essential to peruse the material-
on-record, especially the Impugned Order dated 05.05.2021 and
the Judgment dated 13.08.2020 in juxtaposition to the scope and
applicability of Section 362 CrPC. While it appears that the withdrawal of
the CP 114 of 2007 pending before the CLB/NCLT (now) impressed the
High Court to recall its Judgment dated 13.08.2020 vide the Impugned
Order dated 05.05.2021 but a perusal of the former would show that it
was not premised exclusively on the pendency of the CP 114 of 2007.
The High Court had gone on to observe the intertwined nature of the
allegation with the on-going proceedings between the parties before
the NCLT. Moreover, it was originally pursuant to the binding directions
of this Court in Judgment dated 08.05.2014 passed in SLP (Criminal)
No. 6873 of 2010 to the effect that aforesaid Company Petition and
the application filed by Ms. Sonia Khosla under Section 340 CrPC
alleging perjury on part of the Bakshi Group before the then CLB were
to be decided by the CLB/NCLT and the High Court was directed not
to proceed with Criminal Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 3 of 2008.
42. Hypothetically, even the withdrawal of the CP 114 of 2007 by Ms. Sonia
Khosla, does not disturb or hamper the directions and observations
of this Court in Judgment dated 08.05.2014 with respect to vesting
of jurisdiction with the CLB/NCLT. The High Court would have been
required to therefore re-assess the binding nature of this Court’s
Order. Such an application for recall could not have been held to
be maintainable by the High Court owing to it being a prima facie
attempt to circumvent the position of law and the letter and spirit of
the provision/statute.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1463
Vikram Bakshi and Others v. R.P. Khosla and Another
43. Further, neither the Impugned Order falls within the ambit of “procedural
review” to not attract the bar of Section 362 CrPC, nor is it the case
of the Khosla Group that they were either denied a hearing before the
High Court or were not given an opportunity to inform the court of the
said development. It is pellucid that Ms. Sonia Khosla of the Khosla
Group had herself withdrawn the CP 114 of 2007 on 07.02.2020 that
too, more than six months before the passing/pronouncement of the
Judgment dated 13.08.2020. It rather appears as an intentional attempt
to mislead the court. An explicit statement is recorded on the part of
the Khosla Group in paragraph 23 of the Judgment dated 13.08.2020
(reproduced above) that NCLT was still seized of the proceedings vis-
à-vis CP 114 of 2007. The ground on which recall was later sought
was one that was fully available to the Khosla Group at the time of the
original hearing and thus, could have been duly raised but was not so
taken. Later, in their attempt to abuse the process, they had moved
the Company Application No 579 of 2020 for review that too under
Order XLVII of CPC, 1908 which, any way, would not be permissible
leading to passing of the Impugned Order by the High Court.
44. Such an act to undermine the finality of the judicial proceedings cannot
be permitted especially in such situations of deliberate omissions
or misrepresentation on the part of the parties before the court and
thereafter attempting to defend themselves and obtaining the verboten
order dated 05.05.2021, substantially reviewing and recalling the
Judgment dated 13.08.2020, under the garb of “procedural review”
which is impermissible.
45. In light of the aforesaid, we cannot allow the Impugned Order dated
05.05.2021 to hold the field, being antithetical to the law as laid down
by this Court relating to Section 362 of CrPC and, thus, ought to be
set aside. Ordered accordingly.
46. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
47. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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