Holding

When two plausible narratives exist, the version contended by the accused must be accepted, and the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt warrants setting aside the conviction.

Summary

Vikramjit Singh (Vicky) was convicted by the Sessions Court and sentenced to death for the murder of his wife, Meena Rani, based on a prosecution case that alleged he killed her due to an illicit relationship. The prosecution relied on a knife allegedly recovered after a confession, jewellery found nearby, and a series of circumstantial facts, while many material witnesses turned hostile and the forensic evidence was inconclusive. The High Court upheld the conviction, but the Supreme Court held that where two plausible versions of events exist, the version advanced by the accused must be accepted and the prosecution must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the circumstances cited by the lower courts did not form a proper chain of evidence, the accused was not put to explain key facts under Section 313 CrPC, and Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution of its burden. Consequently, the conviction and death sentence were set aside and the appellant was ordered to be released.

Issues considered

The prosecution failed to prove the murder charge beyond reasonable doubt despite reliance on circumstantial evidence.
Whether the lower courts erred in preferring the prosecution’s version over the accused’s version when both were plausible.
Whether the circumstances relied upon formed a complete chain of evidence under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the failure to put certain material circumstances before the accused under Section 313 CrPC vitiated the conviction.
Whether Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act relieves the prosecution of the burden of proof.

Legislation cited

Subjects

murdercircumstantial evidenceburden of proofSection 313 CrPCdeath penaltyreasonable doubtacquittalcriminal jurisprudence

Judgment

VIKRAMllT SINGH@ VICKY A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB

NOVEMBER 24, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860--Prosecution case that husband murdered wife-
Imposition of death sentence-Upheld by High Court-Correctness of-Held:
Circumstances referred to by High Court did not form links in the chain- C
It did not point out to the guilt of the accused-Also, circumstances which
as per the prosecution led to the proof of guilt against accused were not put
to accused in his examination under section 313 Cr.P. C.-Thus, order of
courts below cannot be accepted-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-
Section 313.
D
Criminal Law:

Two views-Possibility, effect-Held: If.two views appear to be probable,
one contended by accused should be accepted-On facts, 'courts below
weighed the probability of two views and opined that accused not been able
to prove its case, prosecut~on case should be accepted, is not correct and E
thus, set aside-Criminal jurisprudence.

Suspicion, that in all probabilities accused guilty-Effect-Held:
Suspicion, however, grave cannot be a substitute for proof-It would lead to
only conclusion, ihat prosecution unable to prove its case beyond all
reasonable doubt. F
According to the prosecution case, M-wife was married to appellant-
husband. On the fateful day M left her parents' house in appellant's car. It is
alleged that she was wearing all her jewellery. After few hours, a Press
Reporter received a call that the car in which the parties were travelling had
met with an accident and both of them were lying in an injured condition. On G
receiving the information, mother of M along with others reached ·the place
of occurrence and found the car standing at an open place and also saw the
b~\()ngings of appellant and M lying there. Both appellant and M were
hospitalized. M died having suffered multiple stab injuries. Mother of M lodged
3~ H
'I!

376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A FIR alleging that the appellant had murdered M since he had illicit relations
with some other girl. Appellant received few superficial injuries. A knife was
recovered pursuant to confession made by the appellant Some ornaments were
also recovered from the scooter of A. The statement of the appellant was
recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. Prosecution examined witnesses. Mother
B of the deceased turned hostile. Other material witnesses also did not support
the prosecution case at all. However, the Sessions Judge held the appellant
guilty and imposed death penalty. High Court upheld the order. Hence the
present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
c HELD: 1.1. It is beyond any cavil that where two views of a _story appear
to be probable, the one that was contended by the accused should be accepted.
In the instant case, there are two versions. Sessions Judge proceeded to weigh
the probability of both of them and opined that the appellant having not been
able to prove its case, the prosecution case should be accepted. The approach
D of Sessions Judge was not correct. High Court erred in affirming the findings.
Therefore, the view of the courts below cannot be accepted. (384-D-E)

K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979)1 SCC 355; Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984] 4 SCC 116; Tota Singh
and Anr. v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1987) SC 1083; Divakar Neelkantha Hegde
E and Ors. v. The State of Karnataka, JT (1996) 7 SC 63; State of Orissa v.
Babaji Charan Mohanty and Anr., (2003) 10 SCC 57 and Hem Raj and Ors.
v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 614, relied on.

1.2. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution to
prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution case
F has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within the
special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for explaining
the same. There are certain exceptions to the said rule, e.g., where burden of
proof may be imposed up on the accused by reason of a statute. (384-F-H!

G 1.3 ln a situation of this nature where the court legitimately may raise
a strong suspicion that in all probabilities the accused was guilty of
commission of heinous offence but applying the principle of law that suspicion,
however, grave may be, cannot be a substitute for proof, the same would lead
to the only conclusion, that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case
beyond al reasonable doubt. [385-A-B)
H
VIKRAMJIT SINGH@ VICKY v. STATE OF PUNJAB 377

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC A
1622: 11984) 4 sec 11, relied on.

1.4. High Court referred to certain purported independent
circumstances. Some of them are not such which form links in the chain.
They are not such which point out to the guilt of the accused, whk~
categorically demonstrate that it was the accused and accused alone who could B
commit the said offence. CCJnduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime
committed. In must form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either
preceding, during or after commission of the offence as envisaged under
Section 8 of the Evidence Act. No such inference was drawn, nor in the fact
situation obtaining herein such an inference could be drawn. How and in what C
circumstances the car was stopped by the appellant is not known. The accused
was entitled to maintain his silence. Only because he stopped the car at a
distance of about 13 feet from the main road, the same by itself would not lead
to a conclusion that he did so deliberately in order to facilitate attack. Whether
any obstacles were put or were not found to have been placed on road by the
attackers is also a question which would be of not much significance as no D
such evidence was brought on record. If some persons stand on the road, the
same may itself be sufficient for a driver to stop his vehicle. [386-D-G I

1.5. Why an information was given only that an accident had taken place
which was in fact a robbery is again a matter which does not point out to the
guilt of the appellant Information was given by somebody to a Press Reporter. E
He might not have wanted to disclose that the deceased has expired or her
husband was lying injured at that point of time. It is a natural course of
conduct. The conduct of a third person in any event is wholly irrelevant unless
the same has a direct nexus in proving the crime. (386-G-H; 387-A)

1.6. It may or may not be that when brother of the appellant brought the
F
dead body of M and appellant to the hospital he did not inform the doctors
about the circumstances in which the incident had occurred but again the
same relates to the conduct of the brother of the appellant and not that of the
appellant. Brother was not examined. The doctor was examined but the
prosecution did not put any question to him in regard to the conduct of the G
brother or otherwise. However, the police had already been informed and they
came to the hospital. The statement of mother was recorded only in the
hospital. Therefore, it cannot be said that the police was not informed at all.
The purported conduct of the appellant in not requesting the doctor to inform
the police in regard to the circumstances in which he and his wife had received H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A injuries is again not a circumstance which point out to the guilt of the accused.
Further, the brother might not have gone to the police but having regard to
the fact that he had brought them to hospital, it was for the investigating
officer to record his statement. (387-B-D)

1. 7. The reaction of the family is not of much consequence to prove the
B guilt of the appellant It does not lead to a circumstance which forms th~ link
in the chain. The nature of injuries on the person of the appellant even does
not form a circumstantial evidence which would prove the prosecution case.
The doctor opined that injuries Nos. 1,4,5 and 6 could be caused by friendly
hand but he has not stated so about the other injuries. The courts below did
C not consider the effect thereof. (387-E-G)

1.8. The prosecution witnesses have turned hostile. It may be an act of
dishonesty on their part but by reason thereof only it cannot be held that the
appellant is guilty of commission of a heinous offence. In view of their
statements in the cross-examination giving a complete go bye to what had been
D stated in the examination-in-chief, it is not possible to rely even upon a part
of their statement. (387-G-H)

1.9. The circumstances which according to the prosecution lead_ to proof
of the guilt against the accused must be put to him in his examination under
Section 313 Cr. P.C. It was not done. (388-A]
E
Tara Singh v. The State, AIR (1951) SC 441, referred to.

1.10. A knife was recovered purported to be pursuant to a confession
made by the appellant The statement was admissible in evidence but the knife
was recovered from the place of incident without something more which would
F lead to a discovery of fact, therefore, it may not have much evidentiary value.
Furthermore, recovery of a knife alone is not sufficient to arrive at a finding
of guilt. Some jewellery might have been recovered form A but such recovery
was not made at the instance of the appellant. It was said to be a chance
recovery. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant knew A PW-
G 8 who has proved recoveries stated that A ran away after leaving his scooter.
Yet again in her cross-examination she denied that the deceased was having
the said jewellery on her person. (388-E-H)

Kora Ghasi v. State of Orissa, AIR (1983) SC 360: [1983) 2 SCC 251,
relied on.
H
VIKRAMJITSINGH@VICKYv. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA,J.) 379
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1459 of A
. 2005.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 25-8-2005 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Cr!. A: No.296-DB/2005 and Murder
Reference No. 7/2005.
B
S. Jaspal Singh, Vipin Gogia, Jaspreet Gogia, Vinita Goyal and Girinder
Pal Singh for the Appellant.

Kawaljit Kochar, D. Jha and Arun K. Sinha for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
S.B. SINHA, J. Appellant and the deceased Meena Rani were married
on 3.03.2002. She went to her parents' place on 3.07.2002. The appellant came
to her parents' house which was situated at village Ghal Kalan to take her
back on 7.07.2002. They started in the appellant's Maruti Car at about 7.30
p.m. She was allegedly wearing all her gold ornaments at that time. After D
about a couple of hours, a telephonic call was received at a Medical Store
·of a local Press Reporter Rakesh Kumar informing him that car of the appellant
and his wife had met with an accident on the bridge of Bukan Wala and they
were lying in an injured condition. The caller had allegedly informed that he
would be leaving for the said place of accident and the mother of the appellant E
Amarjit Kaur should reach the same place. Upon receipt of the said information,
Amarjit Kaur, her neighbour Kusum Lata wife ofRajinder Kumar and her son
Deepak Kumar reached the place of occurrence and found the Maruti Car to
be standing at an open place on the right near canal minor. The mobile phone
of the appellant and one of the shoes of the deceased. were lying on the rear
side of the car along with some luggage. Broken bangles were found scattered F
and the other shoe of the deceased was also found lying nearby. They went
to the appellant's house and came to learn that both of them have been
hospitalized. On reaching Civil Hospital, Moga, they found Meena Rani to be
dead having suffered multiple stab injuries. She was wearing a gold ear ring,
two gold rings, one silver ring, silver pajebs and bishue. A First Information G
Report was lodged by the said Amarjit Kaur alleging that the appellant
murdered her by inflicting knife injuries. She suspected that the appellant had
illicit relations with some other girl and had murdered her daughter in order
to remove her from his way.
Twenty-three injuries were found on the person of the deceased. A few H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A of them were stab wounds. The injuries on the person of the appellant were
as under:

"I. Superficial incised wound with tail on the left side present
horizontally l .5 x I V.S cm on back side of chest 23 cm. below top of t.I

shoulder. I I cm from midline.
B
2. Linear abrasion 2 cm on lateral aspect of left upper arm mid part.

3. Lacerated and punctured wound I-1/3 x 1-l/3 cm on the lateral
aspect of left upper arm 12 cm above elbow.

4. Superficial incised wound 3.75 x I cm on the front ofright forearm.
c Horizontally placed 9 cm above wrist.

5. Superficial incised wound 6 x l!-'2 cm horizontally placed on front
of right forearm, 8.5 cm above injury no. 4.

6. Superficial incised wound 2 x Yi cm on the front of right forearm
D horizontally placed 3 cm above injury no. 5.

7. Lacerated wound 5 x Y. cm with abrasion Yi x I-l-'2 cm on left side
of skull, 7 cm from pinna 13 cm from posterior hair line.

8. Swelling 2.5 x 2.5 cm on the right side of skull. 10 cm from right
E pinna, I 5 cm from posterior hair line.

9. Swelling I-Yi x I-Yi cm on right side of skull. I I cm from pinna. 9
cm from posterior hair line.

10. Linear abrasion 6 cm on the right scapular region.

F 11. Linear abrasion 3 cm on lateral aspect of left knee."

The doctor opined:

"Patient was conscious. General condition was fair. He was well
oriented in time and space. Injuries nos. 7,8,9 were advised X-ray. Rest
G were declared simple. Injuries No. l ,4,5,6 were inflicted by sharp weapon.
Injury nos. 2, I 0, 11,3 with pointed and blunt. Rest were blunt. Duration
of injuries was fresh. There was no corresponding cut on pent and
banyan injuries. Injuries Nos. 4,5,6 were horizontally placed and were
parallel to each other. On receiving the X-ray report No. HK 171/3050
dated 8.7 .2002, the injuries nos. 7,8 and 9 were declared simple."
H
VIKRAMJITSINGH@VICKYv. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA,.1.) 381

According to him, the possibility of injuries Nos. 1,4,5 and 6 having A
been caused by friendly hand cannot be ruled out.

Allegedly, the appellant made a confession leading to recovery of 'a
knife just like chhuri' near Kingwah canal's bridge, near the southern bank
side of Rajbaha on the eastern side of the Bukkanwala road at a distance of
20 karams from the bridge in the bushes in the area of village Bukkanwala B
thereof.

Some ornaments were said to have been recovered from a dicky of a
scooter belonging to the co-accused Arvind Shanna. He has been declared
to be a proclaimed offender.
c
The version of the appellant as stated in his statement under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as under:

"I am innocent. I have been falsely implicated. My relations with my
wife were nonnal and we were living happily. I had also good relations
with the family members of my wife. r had no relations with any lady. D
I and my wife were going in a car. We were waylaid by some unknown
persons and they caused injuries to both of us. I sent information at
my house, who took us to Moga Hospital where she died. My family
members also sent information to the family members of my wife at
Baghapurana. I was medically examined. I did not make any disclosed E
statement nor got recovered any weapon like knife. It was foisted
against me. Recovery of necklace and topas is a made up affair. The
FIR statement was concoted and fabricated at about 4 or 5-00 p.m. on
8.7.2002"

The prosecution in support of its case examined a large number of F
witnesses. The complainant Amarjit Kaur was examined as PW-4. She
supported the prosecution case in its entirety in her examination-in-chief
which took place on 15.04.2003. Her cross-examination was deferred. It resumed
after a period of five months, i.e., on 16.09.2003. She, however, turned hostile.
Similarly, all the material witnesses who although supported the prosecution
case in their examination-in-chief, in their cross-examination, did not support G
the prosecution case at all.

The learned Sessions Judge, however, despite the same arrived at a
finding of guilt. He imposed death penalty on the appellant. By reason of the
impugned judgment, the High Court affirmed the said findings. H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
,..
A In its judgment, the High Court purported to have placed reliance on
so called independent circumstances collected by the investigating agency,
the medico-legal and post-mortem reports which are as under:

(i) "According to the appellant, the car in which couple was traveling
was waylaid by some unknown persons. If that is correct, it is
B inconceivable that the appellant, who was driving the car would
instead of driving through the hostile elements, who were trying
to stop the car and in the process giving injuries to some of them,
had pulled up the car on a katcha path at a distance of about 30
fts. from the main rciad and thereby facilitated the attack."

c (it) "Apart from this, the fact that no obstacles were found placed
on the road as would normally be done in case some people were
trying to rob unwary travelers on the road also militates against
the story being true."
(iii) "The appellant asserts that he had informed his family at Ghal
D Kalan, who in tum had conveyed the message to Amarjit Kaur
at Bagha Purana but the message, which was received was to the
effect that they had met with an accident and there was no
indication about the couple having been attacked by some
unidentified persons."

E (iv) "The fact that when Maninder Singh had brought the dead body
of Meena Rani and the injured appellant to the Hospital, he did
not inform the Doctors or the police about the circumstances in
which Meena Rani had died and Vikramjit Singh received injuries
would also indicate that the stand of the appellant at the time of
recording the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is an after
F thought."
(v) "One would have expected that the appellant who was examined
by Dr. Naresh Kumar PW-2 at 10.45 P.M. would normally have
requested the Doctor to forward to the Police Station the
circumstances in which he and his wife had received injuries.
G Rather than doing this the appellant had chosen to keep quiet
and the police is only informed through the ruqqa sent by the
Hospital about Maninder Singh having brought the dead body
of Meena Rani."

(vi) "Even Maninder Singh chose not to go across to the Police
H Station to give the version which his brother Vikramjit Singh
VIKRAMJIT SINGH@VICKY v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.] 383
might have given to him to the Investigating Officer." A
(vii) "The reaction of the family of the in-laws of Meena Rani to the
death of their daughter-in-law and injuries suffered by their son
is also unexplainable as none of the members of the family of the
in-laws were available at the Hospital, when the police arrived
and, therefore, in the inquest proceedings, which were conducted B
at 11.20 P.M., the Investigating Officer only mentioned that Amarjit
Kaur, Kusum Lata, Deepak Sharma and Sukha Singh were present
near the dead body and the respectables, who attested and
participated in the proceedings are Tek Chand son of Hardial
Sharma and Tarsem Singh son of Mohan Lal Pandit, residents of
Budh Singh Wala." C
(viii) "Looked at from another angle, if the husband and wife were
waylaid and all the injures were caused by unfriendly assailants,
the description of injuries on the person of deceased and that of
the appellant injured show a marked disparity between the way
in which the husband and wife were being treated by the attackers. D
There are 23 injuries on the deceased with sharp edged weapon,
which include injury no. 4 which consists of 8 incised wounds
on the right side of the upper arm. Out of these 23 injuries,
injuries No. 5 to 19 are around chest, breast and abdomen of the
deceased and it is inconl;eivable that a loving husband, who had E
married the lady only three months ago would not try to intervene
to prevent this assault and in the process receive as serious if
not more than serious injuries on his person. Seen in comparison
with the injuries found on the person of Meena Rani those that
were found on the body of appellant are simple. Only in. case of
injuries No. 7,8 & 9 Doctor found it necessary to get X-ray F
examination conducted and after receipt of report of radiological
examination declared even these injuries to be simple."

Mr. S. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would submit that the High Court committed a serious error in
relying on the said purported circumstances, as some of them are non-existing G
and, particularly, in view of the fact that a few of those circumstances had
not been put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.

Mrs. Kawaljit Kochar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, H
~.
!
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A on the other hand, would support the judgment contending inter alia:

(i) there was no reason as to why the appellant did not lodge a First
lnfonnation Report.

(li) the deposition of the PWs to the extent of their examination-in-
chief should be relied upon as they turned hostile only after a
B period of five months which is unnatural.
(iii) The injuries on the person of the accused were not only found
to be superficial; there being no corresponding cut in his waist
or trouser, the same must have been held to have been self-
inflicting.
c
(iv) All relevant questions having been put to the appellant in his
examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
he was not prejudiced by omission to put some of the
circumstances to him by the learned Trial Judge.

D In the instant case, there are two versions. The learned Sessions Judge
proceeded to weigh the probability of both of them and opined that the
appellant having not been able to prove its case, the prosecution case should
be accepted. In our opinion, the approach of the learned Sessions Judge was
not correct. The High Court also appeared to have fallen into the same error.
E It invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act although opining:

"The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the
section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded
in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
. regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by
F virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer
any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different
inference."

Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution
G to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution
case has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within
the special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for
explaining the same. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule,
e.g., where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of
a statute.
H
VIKRAMJIT SINGH@ VICKY v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.] 385

It may be that in a situation of this ~ture where the court legitimately A
may raise a strong suspicion that in all probabilities the accused was guilty
of commission of heinous offence but applying the well-settled principle of
law that suspicion, however, grave may be, cannot be a substitute for proof,
the same would lead to the only conclusion herein that the prosecution has
not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
B
In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC
1622 = [1984] 4 SCC 116, this Court laid down the law in the following terms

"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be C
said to be fully established:

(I) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances D
concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is
not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved"
and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
E
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused be and not
merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions."

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the F
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency, G
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one
to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused."

It was further observed :·

"179. We can fully understand that though the case superficially
B viewed bears an ugly look so as to prim a facie shock the conscience
of any court yet suspicion, however great it may be, cannot take the
place of legal proof. A moral conviction however strong or genuine
cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law.

180. It must be recalled that the well established rule of criminal
C justice is that "fouler the crime higher the proof'. In the instant case,
the life and liberty of a subject was at stake. As the accused was
given a capital sentence, a very careful, cautious and meticulous
approach was necessary to be made."

The High Court ih support of its judgment has referred to certain
D purported independent circumstances. Some of them are not such which form
links in the chain. They are not such which point out to the guilt the accused.
They are not such which categorically demonstrate that it was the accused
and accused alone .who could commit the said offence. How and in what
circumstances the car was stopped by the appellant is not known. The
E accused was entitled to maintain his silence. Only because he stopped the
car at a distance of about I 3 feet from the main road, the same by itself would
not lead to a conclusion that he did so deliberately in order to facilitate attack.
Conduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime committed. It must
form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either preceding, during or
after commission of the offence as envisaged under Section 8 of the Indian
F Evidence Act. No such inference was drawn, nor in the fact situation obtaining
herein such an inference could be drawn. Whether any obstacles were put
or were not found to have been placed on road by the attackers is also a
question which would be of not much significance as no such evidence was
brought on record. If some persons stand on the road, the same may itself
G be sufficient for a driver to stop his vehicle. In any event, it does not appear
that such a question was even put to the appellant in his examination under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why an information was given only that an accident had taken place
which was in fact a robbery ·is again a matter which does not point out to
H the guilt of the appellant. Information was given by somebody to a Press
VIKRAMJITSINGH@VICKYv. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA,J.) 387

Reporter. He might not have wanted to disclose that the de~eased has expired A
or her husband was lying injured at that point of time. It is a natural course
of conduct. The conduct of a third person in any event is wholly irrelevant
unless the same has a direct nexus in proving the crime.

It may or may not be that when Maninder Singh brother of the appellant
brought the dead body of Meena Rani and the appellant to the hospital, he B
did not inform the doctors about the circumstances in which the incident had
occurred but again the same relates to the conduct Qf the brother of the
appellant and not that of the appellant. Maninder Sing) was not examined.
The doctor was examined but the prosecution did not put any question to
him in regard to the conduct of Maninder Singh or otherwise. We have, C
however, noticed hereinbefore that police had already been informed and they.
came to the hospital. The statement of Amarjit Kaur was recorded only in the
hospital. It was, therefore, not correct to contend that the police was not
informed at all. The purported conduct of the appellant in not requesting Dr.
Naresh Kumar PW-2 to inform the police in regard to the circumstances in D
which he and his wife had received injuries is again not a circumstance which
point out to the guilt of the accused.

Maninder Singh might not have gone to the police but having regard
to the fact that he had brought them to hospital, it was for the investigating
officer to record his statement. E
The reaction of the family is again a matter which is not of much
consequence to prove the guilt of the appellant. It does not lead to a
circumstance which forms the link in the chain. Again, no such question was
put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The nature of injuries on the person of the appellant, in F
our opinion, even does not form a circumstantial evidence which would prove
the prosecution case. The doctor opined that injuries Nos. 1,4,5 and 6 could
be caused by friendly hand but he. has not stated so about the other injuries.
The courts below did not consider the effect thereof.
G
Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, the prosecution witnesses have
turned hostile. It may be an act of dishonesty on their part as contended by
Mrs. Kochar but by reason thereof only we cannot hold the appellant guilt
of commission of a heinous offence. In view of their statements in the cross-
examination giving a complete go bye to what had been stated in the
examination-in-chief, it is not possible to rely even upon a part of their H
statement.
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A It is now a well-settled principle of law that the circumstances which
according to the prosecution lead to proof of the guilt against the accused
must be put to him in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. It was not don~.

B In Tara Singh v. The State, AIR (1951) SC 441, the law is stated in the
following terms:

"The High Court also bases its conciusion on the circumstantial
evidence arising from the production of the kripan and the recovery
of the shirt from the appellant. Those articles are said to be stained
c with human blood. The appellant was not asked to give any explanation
about this. The serologists .report had not been received when the
appellant was questioned by the Committing Magistrate. Therefore,
he could not be asked to explain the presence of human bloodstai.1s
on the kripan. All he was asked was whether the bloodstained Kripan
was recovered at his instance. That is not enough. He should also
D have been asked whether he could explain the presence of blood
stains on it. The two are not the same. Then, in the Sessions Court
there was the additional evidence of the Imperial Serologist showing
that the kripan had stains of human blood on it. That was an additional
and very vital'piece of evidence which the appellant should have been
E afforded an opportunity of explaining."

A knife was recovered purported to be pursuant to a confession made
by the appellant. The statement was admissible in evidence but the knife W<'S
recovered from the place of incident without something more which would
lead to a discovery of fact, it, therefore, may not have much evidentiary value.
F [See Kora Ghasi v. State of Orissa, AIR (1983) SC 360: [1983] 2 SCC 251]

Furthermore, recovery of a knife alone is not sufficient to arrive at a '
finding of guilt. Some jewellery might have been recovered from the accused
No. 2 but such recovery was not made at the instance of the appellant. It was
G said to be a chance recovery. There i·s nothing on record to show that
accused No. 2 was known to the appellant. PW-8 Amarjit Singh who has
proved recoveries stated that Arvind Sharma ran away after leaving his
scooter. Yet again PW-4 in her cross-examination denied that the deceased
was having the said jewellery on her person.

H We have noticed hereinbefore that both the learaed Sessions Judge as
\
;
VlKRAMJITSINGH@VICKYv. STATEOFPUNJAB [S.B. SlNHA,J.] 389

also the High Court proceeded to compare the probabilities of two views. 1t A
is now beyond any cavil that where two views of a story appear to be
probable, the one that was contended by the accused should be accepted.
[See K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1979] I SCC 355, Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, [1984] 4 SCC 116, Tota Singh
and Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 1083, Divakar Neelkantha Hegde
& Ors. v. The Stace of Karnataka, JT (1996) 7 SC 63, State of Orissa v. Bafiaji B
Charan Mohanty and Anr, [2003] IO SCC 57 and Hem Raj and Ors. v. State
of Haryana, [2005] 10 SCC 614]

We have, in the aforementioned situation, no other option but to express
our disagreement with the views of the learned Sessions Judge and the High C
Court. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is directed to be released unless
wanted in any other case.

NJ. Appeal allowed.