VINAYAKA DEV IDAGUNJI AND ORS.versusSHIVARAM AND ORS.

                                                                                         A.
                        VINA YAKA DEV IDAGUNJI AND ORS.
                                            v.
                                SHIVARAM AND ORS.

                                     JULY 28, 2005
                                                                                         B
                         [B.P. SINGH AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.]


             Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950--Sections 50 and 51--Archaks of
      temple-Termination of their services by Trustees of temple-Suit for
      declaration that right to Archakship was hereditary, that archaks were C
      entitled to share in offerings of devotees, and that termination of their
      services was illegal-Maintainability of-Held: Suit was for enforcement of
      personal/private right and no public interest was involved-It was not
      covered by Section 50 and was maintainable without consent of the Charity
      Commissioner-Sections 9 and 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. D
..~

            Respondents claimed themselves to be hereditary archaks of the temple
      in suit form times immemorial. A trust was created later with respect to the
      temple. Trustees-appellants issued a notice terminating services of
      respondents as archaks. The respondents filed a suit for declaration that they
      were hereditary archaks of the temple, that th~y were entitled to emoluments       E
      in the form of share in the offerings made by devotees, and that the termination
      of their services was illegal, void and contrary to the principles of natural
      justice.

            The defendent-appellants filed a written statement denying the rights
      of the plaintiffs to be hereditary archaks. They pleaded that the temple was F
      under a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950•.
      The reliefs prayed in the plaint directly related to administration and
      management of the public trust, and without making the temple trust a party,
      the suit was not maintainable in view of Sections 50, 51, 79 and 80 of the
      above Act read with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They further
      pleaded that permission of the Charity Commissioner as required under G
      Sections 50 and 51 was not taken.

           Trial Court rejected the application of defendants that issues relating
      to maintainability of the suit be tried as preliminary issues. High Court
                                            ~s                                           H
      856                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

. A declined to interfere with order of trial court and further directed that in view
      of long pendency of the suit, it should be disposed of on merits within a period
      of six months. Hence the present appeal by defendants.

            Respondents contended that the reliefs claimed in the suit did not fall
      in any of the clauses of Section 50 of the Act. There was no allegation of
  B   breach of trust; neither any declaration was sought that some property
      belonged to a public trust nor any direction sought for administration of the
      public trust. The right of archakship was an individual and personal right
      enforceable under ordinary law.

            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
  c
            HELD 1. Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act does not cover a
      suit of the present type. Analogy has been drawn of Section 92 of the Code of
      Civil Procedure. Both provisions are in the nature of representative suits
      which pertain to public trusts and protection of public interest in the trusts. /
                                                                             (864-BJ
·n
            Raje Anand Rao v. Sham Rao and Ors., [1961) 3 SCR 930, relied on.

             1.2. No public interest is involved. Public is not concerned whether A
      acts as an archak or B acts. Such a suit therefore, cannot be covered by Section
  E   50 of the Act. Law is settled on this aspect. (864-F]

            Sahebgouda (Deceased) v. Ogeppa and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 151, relied
      on.

            2. The only interest is that of the plaintiffs ~nd their families. The right
  F   of archakship is claimed on the basis of inheritance. It is a hereditary personal
      right which they want to establish. This is purely of a private nature. [864-C)

            Raje Anand Rao v. Sham Rao and Ors., [1961) 3 SCR 930, relied on.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5641 of2004.

  G         From the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.2004 of the Kamataka High
      Court C.R.P. No. 4708 of2001.

           S.S. Javali, R.S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash, Ms. Savitri Pandey and P.P. _
      Singh with him for the Appellants.

  H         Devadatt Kamat, Arijit Prasad and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the Respondents.
       VINA YAKA DEV IDAGUNJI v. SHIVARAM [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                 857
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                  A
       ARUN KUMAR, J. The question for consideration in this appeal is:
Whether a suit to establish a right to be hereditary 'archaks' (Pujaris) in a
temple and a share in the offerings made to the deity, is a suit in relation to
personal/ private right of the archaks or it is a suit in the nature of exercising
a public right in a public trust? The question has arisen in the context of bar B
created by Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Regarding suits
falling within the categories enumerated in Section 50 of the Act, either the
Charity Commissioner has to file them or they have to be filed after obtaining
consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner.

       Briefly, the facts are : the plaintiffs (respondents herein) claiming to be C
hereditary archaks of the temple in suit from times immemorial and having a
right to perform their duties (poojapal) as archaks in the temple, filed a civil
suit for declaration to establish these rights. According to the plaintiffs, their
family has been performing poojapali and exercising the rights incidental
thereto since ancient times. The plaintiffs also claimed that they are entitled D
to emoluments in the form of share in the offerings made by the devotees.
The ancestors of the plaintiffs have been exercising such rights since time
immemorial when there was no trust for the temple and there were no trustees.
The trust was created much later and the trustees are only managers of the
properties of the trust. The trustees sought to remove the plaintiffs from
archakship. According to plaintiffs the trustees had no right to remove E
hereditary archaks like the plaintiffs. The plai~dffs further pleaded that often
the offerings to the deity are symbol of sacrificial dedication of the produce
of the land grown by the efforts of the devotees. "Padiakki" is the rice and
coconut given by the devotees as dan (donation) to the officiating priest to
take home. On this count, the priest has to accept the many negative karmas F
of the donor and to mitigate this, the priest has to perform penance. The
plaintiffs had been exercising their rights to the knowledge of the defendants
who are the trustees of the temple trust. According to the plaintiffs the
archakship is not a job or vocation but a hereditary religious office, functions
whereof they have to discharge ungrudgingly. A state of harmony and
cooperation between the trustees and archaks continued till 1974-75. Thereafter, G
the trustees allegedly prepared a "Niyamavali" (Rule Book) meant for regulating
the activities like Pooja and Viniyogas etc. The Niyamavali had no legal or
statutory backing. Under the Niyamavali the trustees also tried tci interfere
with the right of the plaintiffs regarding remuneration and donations received
by them from the devotees. According to the plaintiffs the emoluments H
    858                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A received by the archaks are not the income of the temple.
          In order to get rid of the plaintiffs, the defendants issued a notice dated
    21st September, 1994 terminating their services as archaks. The plaintiffs filed
    the instant suit for declaration that the plaintiffs are hereditary archaks of Shri
    Mahaganapathy (Vinayaka Dev) Temple of Idagunji in Honnavar Taluk and
B   for consequential reliefs like declaring that the order of termination issued by
    defendants dated 21st September, 1994 is illegal, void and contrary to the
    principles of natural justice etc.

          The defendants-appellants filed a written statement denying the rights
C   of the plaintiffs to be hereditary archaks. It was further pleaded that the
    temple was under a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts
    Act, 1950. Further a plea was taken in the written statement that the suit filed
    against the trustees of the public trust and the reliefs prayed in the plaint
    directly relate to administration and management of the public trust and as
    such without making the temple trust a party, the suit was not maintainable
D   in view of Sections 50, 51, 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act read
    with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the defendants,
    the plaintiffs had not obtained the permission of the Charity Commissioner
    as required under Sections 50 and 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act to file
    the present suit.

E          On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed as
    many as 32 issues. At the stage of evidence the defendants filed an application
    under Order 14 Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
    that certain issues relating to maintainability of the suit be trie~ as preliminary
    issues. The application was rejected by the learned Civil Judge. The defendants
F   filed a Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
    before the High Court. The High Court declined to interfere with the order of
    the trial court and accordingly dismissed the Civil Revision Petition. Further,
    in view of the fact that the suit had been pending for more than 10 years, a
    direction was issued to the trial court to dispose of the suit on merits within
    six months. The defendants, according to the said order, have come up before
G   this court by way of a petition for special leave to appeal. Leave was granted
    and the order under appeal was stayed by this court on 30th August, 2004.
    Interim stay of the impugned order was passed on the first day of hearing,
    i.e. on 7th May, 2004. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
    The main question for consideration is whether the suit filed by the
     respondents-plaintiffs is one which penains to administration of a public trust
H
        VINA YAKA DEV IDAGUNJI v. SHIVARAM [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                   859

or is it a suit to establish a private right to archakship or worship in the temple A
filed by persons claiming to be having such a right? Relevant portion of
Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act as applicable to the facts of the
present case is reproduced as under :

      "Section 50 :
                                                                                    B
      In any case-

       (i)    where it is alleged that there is a breach of a public trust,

       (ii)   where a declaration is necessary that a particular property is a
              property belonging to a public trust or where a direction is          C
              required to recover the possession of such property or the
              proceeds thereof or for an account of such property or proceeds
              from any person including a person holding adversely to the
              public trust, or

       (iii) where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the
             administration of any public trust,                                    D
       the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons having an interest
       in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Charity
       Commissioner as provided in Section 51 may institute a suit whether
       contentious or not in the Court within the local limits of whose
       jurisdiction the whole or part of the subject matter of the trust is         E
       situate, to obtain a decree for any of the following reliefs :

       (a)    an order for the recovery of .the possession of such property or
              proceeds thereof,

       (b)    the removal of any trustee or manager,                                F
       (c)    the appointment of a new trustee or manager,

       (cc) vesting any property in a trustee,

       (d)    a direction for taking accounts and making certain inquiries,

       (e)    a declaration as to what proportion of the trust property or of the G
              interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the
              trust,

       (t)    a direction authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property
              to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged,
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    860                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R. ,.

A          (g)   the settlement of a scheme or variations or alterations in a scheme
                 already settled, or
           (h)   granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may
                 require:

            Provided that no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in this
B           section shall be instituted in respect of any public trust f'xcept in
            conformity with the provisions thereof."

           To find out the nature of the suit, we have to go to the plaint in the
    suit as instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents in the Civil Court. It is the case
C   of the plaintiffs that they have a hereditary right of archakship with emoluments
    attached. This right of archakship .started with the consecration of the deity.
    The families of the plaintiffs have been performing archakship right from the
    time of consecration of the deity. In fact the ancestors of the plaintiffs who
    were performing the functions as archaks also acted as managers and
    custodians of the temple and its properties. After the introduction of the
D   Madras Endowment Act, the trustees were appointed. One of the members of /
    the families of the plaintiffs used to be appointed as a trustee of the Board
    which consisted of five trustees at the initial stages. This continued till the
    year 1930 whereafter they stopped having a member of the plaintiffs' families
    on the Board of trustees. The plaint contains various details to show and
E   establish the right of the plaintiffs to archakship of the temple and the right
    to a share in the offerings of the deity with which we are not concerned at
    this stage. The fact relevant for our purpose is that vide a notice dated 21st
    September, 1994, the plaintiffs' services as archaks were terminated with
    which their right to perform puja in the temple and to have a share in the
    offerings also came to be terminated. The plaintiffs challenged the said notice
F   as illegal and untenable. The plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that they are
    hereditary archaks of the temple in question. The said right to act as archaks
    was in the nature of the property. A declaration was also sought to have
    share in the offerings to the deity at the temple. Further a declaration was
    sought that the order of termination dated 21st September, 1994 was illegal,
    void and contrary to the principles of natural justice. Injunction was sought
G   to restrain the plaintiffs from interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs in
    performing their duties as archaks.

         We are in the present appeal concerned with the pleas raised by the
    defendants-appellants in their written submissions to the effect that the suit
H   was barred under Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The trial
        VINA YAK.A DEV IDAGUNJI v. SHIVARAM [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                    861
court as well as the High Court have rejected this plea raised by the defendants-       A
appellants.

      A perusal of Section 50 of the Act shows that in matters referred to or
enumerated in the said Section, a suit is to be instituted after obtaining the
consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner as per provisions of Section
51 of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the claim          B
of the plaintiffs in the plaint falls within the ambit of administration of a public
trust as admittedly there is a public trust with respect to the temple in
question. If the matter pertains to administration of public trust then the
Charity Commissioner comes into the picture and a Civil suit is not maintainable
without compliance of Sections 50 and 51 of the Act. The real question is               C
whether the present suit is a suit pertaining to administration of a public trust.
In response to this question, the learned counsel for the respondents drew
our attention to the preamble to the Act which provides "an Act to regulate
and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and
charitable trusts in the State of Bombay''.
                                                                                        D
      From this Preamble it is apparent that the main object of the Act is to
regulate the administration of public trusts. The question is: Will this extend
to regulating the right to perform worship in the temple? The right asserted
by the plaintiffs in the plaint is claimed as their families' personal/private right.
Whether they are entitled to continue as archaks on hereditary basis is a
private claim of the plaintiffs. This right has nothing to do with any public           E
functions of the trust or administration of the trust. Thus according to the
learned counsel for the plaintiffs, Section 50 of the Act is not attracted at all.
In support of the submission that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is their
personal right which is an enforceable civil right, the learned counsel relied
on Rajkali Kuer v. Ram Rattan Pandey, [1975] 2 SCR 186 wherein it was                   p
observed "that religious offices can be hereditary and that the right to such
an office is in the nature of property under the Hindu Law is now well
established." In the said judgment, this Court has relied on a Full Bench
judgment of the Calcutta High Court while observing as under :

            "That religious offices can be hereditary and that the right to such G
        an office is in the nature of property under the Hindu Law is now well
        established. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Manohar v.
        Bhupendra, AIR ( 1932) Calcutta 791 has laid down in respect of
        Shebaitship of a temple and this view has been accepted by the Privy
        Council in two subsequent cases in Ganesh v. Lal Behary, (1936) LR H
    862                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A          63 IA 448 and Bhabatarini v. Ashalata, (1943) LR 70 IA 57. In a recegt
           judgment of this Court reported as The Commissioner, Hindu Religious
           Emdowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, [1954]
           SCR l 005] this view has been reiterated and extended to the office of
           a Mahant. On the view that Shebaiti is property, this Court has also
           recognized the right of a female to succeed to the religious office of
B           Shebaitship in the case reported as Angurbala v. Debabrata, [1951]
           SCR 1125, where the question as to the applicability of Hindu Women's
           Right to Property Act to the office of Shebaitship came up for
           consideration. On the same analogy as that of a Shebaiti right, the
           right of a hereditary priest or Pujari in a temple must also amount to
c          property where emoluments are attached to such an office."

          Reliance was also placed on Ram Rattan, through Lrs. v. Bajrang Lal
    and Ors., [1978] 3 SCC 236 wherein while dealing with the question whether
    hereditary office of She bait is immovable property, it was noted that :

D          "The question then is whether the hereditary office of Shebait is
           immovable property. Much before the enactment of the Transfer of
           Property Act a question arose in the context of the Limitation Act
           then in force whether a suit for a share in the worship and the
           emoluments incidental to the same would be a suit for recovery of
           immovable property or an interest in immovable property. In
E          Krishnabhat bia Hiragange v. Kanabhat bia Mahalbhat etc. [ 6 Born
           HCR 137] after referring to various texts of Hindu Law and the
           commentaries of English commentators thereon, a Division Bench of
           the Bombay High Court held as under :

               Although, therefore, the office of a priest in a temple, when it is
F          not annexed to the ownership of any land, or held by virtue of such
           ownership, may not, in the ordinary sense of the tenn, be immovable
           property, but is an incorporeal hereditament of a personal nature, yet
           being by the custom of Hindus classed with immovable property, and
           so regarded in their law .... "
G         It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the reliefs claimed in
    the present suit do not fall in any of the clauses of Section 50 of the Act.
    There is no allegation of breach of trust; no declaration is sought that any
    property is a property belonging to a public trust. The right to archakship is
    an individual and personal right enforceable under ordinary law; nor any •
H   direction of the court is sought for administration of the public trust. The
        VINAYAKA DEV IDAGUNJI v. SHIVARAM [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                    863
plaintiffs have never sought any orders of the court regarding administration A
of the trust. To illustrate the point our attention was drawn to Sri Kallagar
Devasthanan v. Thiruvengad.athan, AIR 30 (1943) Madras 222. In this case
the question was about the competence of Civil Court to entertain a suit.
Father of the plaintiffs in this case was a hereditary archak of a temple. The
plaintiff was adopted by the mother after the death of his father. The trust
did not recognize the plaintiff as an archak. The plaintiff filed a civil suit B
challenging the action and he being not allowed to be archak of the temple.
Objection was taken about the maintainability of the suit. Reliance was placed
on Section 73 of the Hindu Religious and Endowments Act by the defendants
in support of objection regarding maintainability of the suit. The said Section
had provision similar to the one under consideration in the present case. The C
following observations are relevant for the present purpose :

            "If the words "administration or management" used in sub-clause
        (3) of s.73 have been employed with reference to the "religious
        endowment" as defined in the Act and this is what is stated in that
        sub-clause, it appears to be clear that they could not possibly be D
        taken to cover or include the case of a dismissal of an archaka of a
        temple. The administration or management must be with reference to
        the "religious endowment," i.e. with reference to the property
        mentioned in the definition and not with respect to the dismissal of.
        an archaka. The suit to set aside his dismissal relates to a personal E
        right and as long as there is no question relating to the administration
        or management of the endowed property, the suit cannot be held to
        have been barred under that section."

      This was also a case in which right to archakship was claimed and it
was held to be a private personal right which had nothing to do with                  F
administration or management of the trust and the suit was held to be
maintainable in a civil court. In the case in hand respondents/plaintiffs are
trying to estabJish their hereditary right to act as archaks in the temple in suit.
This has nothing to do with administration of the trust.

      What is to be seen is the relief the plaintiffs are seeking from the court. G
First of all, they are seeking a declaration about their hereditary right as
archaks of the temple. This right is claimed in their personal capacity as a
family of archaks who have been performing the functions of archaks since
the day the temple was established and the deity was consecrated. It is
different matter whether ultimately the plaintiffs' contention is accepted by
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    864                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the court or not. Surely, the plaintiffs are entitled to have their claim examined _
    by the court. If they fail to establish their claim, they will be out of the court.
    However, if they succeed in establishing the claim they will be entitled to the
    declaration sought. They cannot be non suited at the threshold unless the
    suit is expressly barred by any statute. We have seen the provision of Section
    50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act relied upon by the appellants-defendants.
B   The said section does not cover a suit of the present type. Analogy has been
    drawn of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure while considering Section
    50 of Bombay Public Trusts Act. Both provisions are in the nature of
    representative suits which pertain to public trusts and protection of public
    interest in the trusts. In the present case, there is no public interest involved.
C   The only interest is that of the plaintiffs and their families. The right of              I="
    archakship is claimed on the basis of inheritance. It is a hereditary personal            I

    right which they want to establish. The right is purely of a private nature. We
    are of the view that Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is not
    attracted at all in the facts of the present case.

D         We have seen the object of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Appropriately
    the Act seeks to regulate and make better provision for administration of
    public religious and charitable trusts. Such trusts cater to things of public
    interest, i.e .things which concern large sections of public. Unless such trusts
    are properly administered public interest will suffer. Therefore, matters affecting
                                                                                          •
E   administration of such trusts are covered under Section 50 of the Bombay
    Public Trusts Act. This situation is somewhat similar to suits under Section
    92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These suits are suits in representative
    capacity and pertain to matters of public interest. In contrast the suit which
    has given rise to the present appeal is a suit to establish an individual right.
    The plaintiffs claim that they are hereditary archaks of the temple since time
                                                                                              ,'.
                                                                                              '
F   immemorial and are entitled to exercise this right which cannot be taken away
    from them. No public interest is involved. Public is not concerned whether A
    acts as an archak or B acts. Such a suit, therefore, cannot be covered by                 I-


    Section 50 of the Act. Law is settled on this aspect as per various judgments             ~

    of this Court.

G         In Raje Anand Rao v. Sham Rao and Ors., [1961] 3 SCR 930, the dispute
    had arisen in view of dissatisfaction with the management of a temple which
    was an endowment for the public. A suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure was filed. A scheme was framed for the management of the temple.
    The right of pujaris as a hereditary right was not affected under the scheme.
H   Therefore, some of the pujaris who were not parties to the suit and were not,


                                                                                              J
           VINA YAKA DEV IDAGUNJI v. SHIVARAM [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                865
•   therefore, heard, made a grievance of this fact. The matter came upto this A
    court. An amendment of the scheme by the District Judge without hearing.the
    pujaris was also put in issue. However, it was held that the fact that the
    pujaris were not parties to the suit will not take away the jurisdiction of the
    District Judge to modify the scheme, if the modification is with respect to
    administration of the trust and if it has not affected the private rights of the
    pujaris. A suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure being a B
    representative suit binds not only the parties thereto but all those who are
    interested in the trust. The scheme was framed for the management and
    administration of the trust and it did not affect the hereditary right of the
    pujaris to conduct the puja. Thus this judgment makes it clear that the right
    of the pujaris to conduct puja is their private right and does not fall in the C
    category of suits under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

            Our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to
    some other judgments holding the right to perfonn puja in the temple as a
    private right of the pujaris or archaks and the same cannot be defeated by
    invoking section 50 the Bombay Public Trusts Act or Section 92 of the Code D
    of Civil Procedure. We need not referto all the judgments in view of the fact
    that the law on this point is well settled. We only refer to the latest judgment
    of this court in Sahebgouda (Deceased) v. Ogeppa and Ors., [2003] 6 SCC
     I 5 l. This case pertains to a suit for declaration of Pujaris' Pujariki right of
    performing puja. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendants E
    from interfering with the aforesaid right. Objection was taken about the
    maintainability of the civil suit in view of the provision of Bombay Public
    Trusts Act, I 950. However, the objection was tnrned down holding that the
    reliefs claimed in the suit do not come within the ambit of Sections 19 or 79
    of the Act which gave jurisdiction to the Assistant Charity Commissioner to
    decide certain issues like existence of public trust or whether a property is F
    a trust property. In this suit brought by the plaintiffs to establish his right
    of archakship the only relief claimed was a declaration regarding the right of
    the plaintiffs-appellants to function as hereditary pujaris or for pujariki rights
    in performing puja in the temple and consequential decree for injunction for
    restraining the respondents from interfering with the aforesaid rights of the G
    plaintiffs. The facts of this case are somewhat similar to those of the case in
    hand. It was held that the case was clearly out of the purview of the barring
    provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. We are in respectful agreement
    with the view taken in this judgment. It is held that the present suit is not
    barred by provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Accordingly, nn
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    866                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A interference is called for with the judgment under appeal. The appeal is             ,...,,,
    without merit and is hereby dismissed. Since the trial of the suit on merits has
    been already sufficiently delayed, the trial court may dispose of the suit on
    priority basis as directed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

    v.s.s.                                                      Appeal dismissed.
B