Supreme Court of India
VINOD INFRA DEVELOPERS LTD.versusMAHAVEER LUNIA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 772
- Decided
- 22 May 2025
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
A plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 CPC when any independent cause of action within it is maintainable; each relief must be examined separately and title disputes lie within civil court jurisdiction.
Summary
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd., the owner of agricultural land, sued Mahaveer Lunia and others for declaration, possession and injunction after the respondents executed sale deeds despite the appellant's revocation of a power of attorney and board resolution. The respondents filed an Order VII Rule 11 application seeking dismissal of the plaint, which the trial court rejected, but the Rajasthan High Court allowed, rejecting the plaint in its entirety. The Supreme Court examined whether a plaint can be wholly rejected when it contains multiple independent causes of action, and whether civil courts have jurisdiction over title disputes despite claims of khatedari rights under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The Court held that a plaint cannot be dismissed in total merely because one relief is untenable; each independent cause of action must be considered, and title matters fall within civil court jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside and the trial court's order restored, allowing the suit to proceed.
Issues considered
- Whether a plaint may be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 CPC when it contains multiple independent causes of action, some of which are maintainable.
- Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate title disputes involving immovable property despite the appellant's claim of khatedari rights under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.
- Whether unregistered agreements to sell and powers of attorney can confer title or be the basis for a claim of ownership.
- Whether the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to rectify a deficiency in court fee before the plaint can be dismissed.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11
- Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955s. 207
- Registration Act, 1908s. 17, s. 23, s. 49
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 54
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint filed by the appellant u/Or.VII, r.11, CPC, 1908. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, r.11 – Registration Act, 1908 – ss.17, 49, 23 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – filed suit for declaratory reliefs alleging that despite the revocation of the agreement to sell and the power of attorney authorising Respondent No.1 to sell the subject property, Respondent No.1 executed the impugned sale deeds in respect of the subject property – Respondents filed
Subjects
Order VII Rule 11Rejection of plaintTriable issuesMultiple causes of actionUnregistered agreement to sellPower of attorneyRegistration ActTransfer of Property ActCivil court jurisdictionKhatedari rightsCourt fee deficiencyMortgage vs sale
Judgment
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 190 : 2025 INSC 772
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd.
v.
Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7109 of 2025)
23 May 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint filed by the
appellant u/Or.VII, r.11, CPC, 1908.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, r.11 – Registration Act,
1908 – ss.17, 49, 23 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.54 –
Appellant-company (owner of the subject property) filed suit
for declaratory reliefs alleging that despite the revocation of
the agreement to sell and the power of attorney authorising
Respondent No.1 to sell the subject property, Respondent
No.1 executed the impugned sale deeds in respect of the
subject property – Respondents filed application u/Or.VII,r.11,
dismissed by Trial Court – High Court allowed the application
and rejected the plaint in its entirety – Interference with:
Held: A plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety merely because
one of the prayers or reliefs sought is legally untenable, so long
as other reliefs are maintainable and based on independent
causes of action – Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible
where different causes of action are independently pleaded and
supported by distinct facts – High Court’s wholesale rejection of
the plaint without appreciating that the reliefs claimed flowed from
multiple and distinct causes of action was an improper application
of Or.VII, r.11 – On facts, serious triable issues arise which must
be adjudicated by a competent civil court – Impugned order set
aside, order of the trial court restored. [Paras 9.5, 9.6, 14]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, r.11 – Rejection of
plaint – Law with respect to, stated. [Para 8]
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 – s.207 – When not applicable –
Plea of the respondents that u/s.207, suits relating to khatedari
rights and recovery of possession based on tenancy or
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 191
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
mortgage issues fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
revenue courts and as the appellant themselves claimed to
be khatedari tenants seeking restoration of such rights upon
cancellation of the sale deeds hence, the suit lied outside the
jurisdiction of the civil court:
Held: Issues relating to title of immovable property fall exclusively
within the jurisdiction of civil courts and not revenue authorities –
Revenue entries are administrative in nature and intended only for
fiscal purposes – Issues raised in the plaint pertain to ownership,
validity of sale deeds, and declaration of title, which are civil in nature
and, therefore, triable exclusively by a civil court – In view of this,
the applicability of s.207 which bars the jurisdiction of civil courts
in matters relating to khatedari rights and recovery of possession
based on tenancy does not arise in the present case – However,
by rejecting the plaint and reversing the trial Court’s well-reasoned
order, the High Court assumed jurisdiction not vested in it at this
preliminary stage committing a jurisdictional error. [Para 10]
Case Law Cited
Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain, 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR
263; Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner [2007] 5 SCR 155 :
(2007) 6 SCC 186; Jitendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 802; S. Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram
[2010] 4 SCR 515 : (2010) 5 SCC 401; Muruganandam v. Muniyandi
(Died) through LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1067; Suraj Lamp
& Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2011] 11 SCR 848 :
(2012) 1 SCC 656; Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd v. Central
Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352; Tajender Singh
Ghambhir and Another v. Gurpreet Singh and Others [2014] 10
SCR 527 : (2014) 10 SCC 702 – relied on.
Pyare Lal v. Shubhendra Pilania and Others [2019] 1 SCR 717 :
(2019) 3 SCC 692 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882;
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.
List of Keywords
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC; Rejection of plaint; Triable issues;
Multiple and distinct causes of action; Independent causes
192 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of action; Unregistered documents; Inadmissible in evidence;
Power of attorney; Agreement to sell; Revocation of power of
attorney; Impugned sale deeds executed; Competent civil court;
Unregistered agreement to sell, Power of attorney; Security for
the loan; Redeem the mortgaged property; Mutation; Revenue
records; Transfer of ownership; Mortgage; Sections 17, 23 and
49 of the Registration Act, 1908; Suit for specific performance
not filed; Jurisdiction of civil courts; Insufficient court fee; High
Court assumed jurisdiction not vested in it; Preliminary stage,
Jurisdictional error; Khatedari rights; Recovery of possession
based on tenancy or mortgage.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7109 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2025 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SBCRP No. 99 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
C. Aryaman Sundaram, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Advs., Apurv
Singhvi, Zafar Inayat, Ms. Shalini Haldar, D.K. Devesh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Sumit Chander, Yash Johri, Saransh
Vij, Gurdeep Chauhan, Ms. Barnali Basak, Ms. Mahak Dua, Amit
Agarwal, Nitin Mishra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved by the order dated 31.01.2025 passed by the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur1 in S. B. Civil Revision Petition
No. 99/2023, the appellant / plaintiff has preferred the present Civil
Appeal. By the said order, the High Court allowed the Civil Revision
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 193
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
Petition filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, set aside the order dated
14.07.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jodhpur,
and rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).
3. The facts of the case as projected by the appellant are as follows:
3.1. The appellant company claims to be the owner of the agricultural
land purchased in the year 2013, comprising Khasra No.175,
175/2, 175/4, 175/5, 175/6, 175/7 admeasuring 18 bighas
15 biswas situated in Village Pal, District Jodhpur (“subject
property”), and they obtained a loan of Rs.7,50,00,000/- from
Respondent No.1. On 23.05.2014, the Board of Directors
of the appellant company passed a resolution authorising
their Managing Director Mr. Vinod Singhvi, and authorised
representative Mr. Mahaveer Lunia (Respondent No.1), to sell
the subject property. Pursuant to the said Board resolution, on
24.05.2014, Mr. Vinod Singhvi executed unregistered power of
attorney and agreement to sell in favour of Respondent No.1,
concerning the subject property.
3.2. Subsequently, on 12.08.2015, the original sale deeds through
which the appellant company had purchased the subject property
were impounded by the Collector of Stamps for insufficient
stamp duty. The appellant company challenged this action by
filing a revision petition before the Rajasthan Tax Board, which
allowed the revision and remanded the matter to the Collector
of Stamps for re-adjudication. In the meanwhile, the appellant
company handed over the original documents pertaining to the
suit property to the private respondents as security for the loan
obtained by them.
3.3. In April, 2022, when the appellant company approached the
private respondents to settle the loan and retrieve the original
documents, the respondents failed to respond. Consequently,
on 24.05.2022, the Board of Directors of the appellant company
passed a resolution revoking the authority granted to Respondent
No.1, thereby invalidating all the actions related thereto and
declaring them as non-est. Accordingly, the power of attorney
was also revoked on 27.05.2022.
3.4. Despite the same, Respondent No.1 executed sale deeds
dated 13.07.2022 and 14.07.2022 which were registered on
194 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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19.07.2022 in his favour and Respondent Nos.2 to 4 in respect
of the subject property. Based on these sale deeds, their names
were also mutated in the revenue records.
3.5. Aggrieved, the appellant company instituted Original Civil Suit
bearing No.122 of 2022 before the District Court, Jodhpur,
against Respondent Nos.1 to 4, as well as concerned
government authorities, and developer, seeking the reliefs of
declaration, possession, and permanent injunction in respect
of the subject property.
3.6. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, Respondent Nos.1
to 4 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking
rejection of the plaint, which was dismissed by the Additional
District Judge No.7, Jodhpur Metropolitan, by order dated
14.07.2023. Challenging this order, Respondent Nos.1 to 4
filed S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.99 of 2023 before the
High Court, which was allowed by the impugned order dated
31.01.2025, thereby rejecting the plaint. Aggrieved by the same,
the appellant has preferred this appeal before us.
4. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant are
summarized as under:
4.1. The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule
11 CPC. It is settled law that a plaint can only be rejected if it
is manifestly vexatious or does not disclose any right to sue.
In the present case, the cause of action concerning the sale
deeds dated 13.07.2022 and 14.07.2022 which were registered
on 19.07.2022 subsequent to the cancellation of power of
attorney, clearly raises triable issues of title and fraud, which
cannot be dismissed as ‘academic’.
4.2. The suit was based on two separate and distinct causes of
action: (i) the unregistered agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014
being in the nature of a mortgage; and (ii)the execution of the
sale deed(s) dated 13.07.2022 and 14.07.2022, which were
registered on 19.07.2022, subsequent to the revocation of the
power of attorney on 27.05.2022. The High Court erroneously
treated the entire plaint as unsustainable based on the alleged
invalidity of the first cause of action, without adjudicating upon
the second.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 195
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
4.3. The Board Resolution and the General Power of Attorney
executed in favour of Respondent No.1 were revoked on
24.05.2022 and 27.05.2022, respectively. Hence, the execution
of sale deeds thereafter is non-est in law and raises serious
questions of validity, which must be tried by a civil court.
4.4. Under sections 17, 23 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, an
unregistered agreement to sell is inadmissible in evidence for
the purpose of transferring title. No steps were taken to register
the agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014, nor was any suit for
specific performance filed by the private respondents. Thus,
the document has no legal sanctity in establishing ownership
or rights in immovable property.
4.5. It is well settled that title to immovable property can only be
adjudicated by a competent civil court and not by revenue
authorities. Reliance was placed on Suraj Bhan v. Financial
Commissioner2 and Jitendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh
and Others3, wherein it was held that revenue entries are for
fiscal purposes and do not confer title.
4.6. The appellant has specifically pleaded that the transaction
represented by the agreement to sell was in fact a mortgage
arrangement. This brings the case within the exceptions to
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1892 thereby permitting
oral and extrinsic evidence to establish the true nature of the
transaction.
4.7. The appellant was and remains willing to repay Rs. 19 crores
in order to redeem the mortgaged property. The refusal of
Respondent No. 1 to co-operate and his unilateral execution
of sale deeds amounts to an infringement of the appellant’s
substantive rights.
4.8. The appellant relies on the decision of this Court in Central
Bank of India v. Prabha Jain4, which holds that if even one
cause of action in a plaint survives, the entire plaint must be
tried. The doctrine of severance does not apply to reject an
entire plaint based on a partial defect.
2 (2007) 6 SCC 186
3 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802
4 2025 INSC 95
196 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
With these submissions, the learned counsel seeks to allow this
appeal by setting aside the impugned order passed by the High
Court and restoring the plaint to its original position on the file.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 4 made
the following submissions:
5.1. All documents executed between the parties, including the
agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014, clearly reflect a sale
transaction. There is no reference to a mortgage or loan in
any document between 2014 and 2022. The claim that the
transaction was a mortgage is an afterthought, introduced only
at the time of filing the civil suit in November, 2022. Thus, the
plaint discloses no cause of action, as the entire narrative is
based on an unregistered agreement to sell.
5.2. The High Court rightly held that the plaint was drafted in a
manner intended to abuse the judicial process by disguising a
completed sale transaction as a mortgage and claiming reliefs
without proper pleadings or court fee.
5.3. As per Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, suits
relating to khatedari rights and recovery of possession based on
tenancy or mortgage issues fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the revenue courts. The appellant themselves claimed to
be khatedari tenants seeking restoration of such rights upon
cancellation of the sale deeds. Hence, the suit lies outside the
jurisdiction of the civil court.
5.4. The appellant has merged the claim for redemption of
mortgage into declaratory reliefs without separately praying for
redemption or paying the necessary court fee. This improper
pleading supports the High Court’s conclusion that the suit is
not maintainable.
5.5. Regarding mutation entries in the respondents’ favour, it is
submitted that once the sale deeds are validly executed and
registered, the corresponding mutation is a natural administrative
consequence.
5.6. The High Court’s view is consistent with binding precedents
including Pyare Lal v. Shubhendra Pilania and Others5,
5 (2019) 3 SCC 692
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 197
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
wherein, it was held that suits for declaration of khatedari rights
must be adjudicated by revenue courts.
5.7. The High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC in rejecting the plaint at the threshold, given
the absence of a valid cause of action, jurisdictional infirmities,
and procedural impropriety in the reliefs sought by the appellant.
Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order passed
by the High Court does not warrant any interference by this Court.
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and
perused the materials available on record.
7. Seemingly, the appellant, claiming ownership of the subject property
(agricultural land), instituted a suit for declaratory reliefs, primarily
asserting that despite the revocation of the power of attorney,
Respondent No.1 proceeded to execute sale deeds in respect of
the subject property. Elaborating further, the appellant stated that
they had borrowed Rs. 7,50,00,000/- from Respondent No. 1 in May,
2014. In connection with this loan, the appellant executed a board
resolution, a power of attorney, and an agreement to sell in favour
of Respondent No. 1, which were all unregistered documents. The
appellant contended that these documents were not intended to
effect transfer of ownership, but were executed as security for the
loan, thereby constituting a mortgage in substance, and that, the
board resolution and power of attorney were revoked on 24.05.2022
and 27.05.2022 respectively. It was further stated that the appellant
is ready and willing to repay Rs. 19 crores to redeem the property.
The appellant also sought a declaration that the sale deeds dated
13.07.2022 and 14.07.2022 (registered on 19.07.2022) executed by
Respondent No. 1 in his favour and in favour of Respondent Nos. 2
to 4, are void and ineffective, having been executed on the basis of
the revoked instruments. Further, a decree for possession was prayed
for, along with a permanent injunction restraining Respondent Nos. 1
to 4 and Respondent No. 7 (developer) from alienating, altering, or
undertaking any construction or agricultural activity on the property.
7.1. During the pendency of the suit, Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed
an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of
the plaint on the grounds that it disclosed no cause of action, no
mortgage existed, the valuation was incorrect, and the requisite
court fee had not been paid.
198 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
7.2. The trial Court (Additional District Judge, Jodhpur) dismissed the
Order VII Rule 11 application, holding that triable issues were
raised. However, the High Court allowed the application and
rejected the plaint in its entirety, resulting in the present appeal.
8. The position of law is that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule
11 CPC is permissible only when the plaint, on its face and without
considering the defence, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred
by any law, is undervalued, or is insufficiently stamped. At this
preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination
strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the
merits or veracity of the claims. If any triable issues arise from the
pleadings, the suit cannot be summarily rejected. Keeping in mind
this settled principle of law, we proceed to examine whether the High
Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
9. Admittedly, the appellant is the owner of the subject property. As
stated in the plaint, the appellant received Rs. 7.5 crores from
Respondent No. 1 in 2014 through cheques, in consideration of
which, unregistered power of attorney and agreement to sell were
executed, purportedly based on a board resolution. Subsequently,
those documents were revoked by the appellant on 24.05.2022 and
27.05.2022 respectively. Despite the revocation and the fact that
the documents were unregistered, Respondent No. 1 executed sale
deeds on 13.07.2022 and 14.07.2022, which were registered on
19.07.2022, in his favour and in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
As per the settled law, in the absence of registration, such documents
do not confer valid authority to transfer title. Sections 17 and 49 of
the Registration Act, 1908, clearly state that unregistered documents
required to be registered are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose
of conveying title or completing a sale transaction, and can only be
admitted for collateral purposes or in a suit for specific performance.
This legal position has been well established in S. Kaladevi v. V.R.
Somasundaram6, wherein, it was held as follows:
“10. Section 17 of the 1908 Act is a disabling section.
The documents defined in clauses (a) to (e) therein
require registration compulsorily. Accordingly, sale
6 (2010) 5 SCC 401
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 199
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
of immovable property of the value of Rs.100 and
more requires compulsory registration. Part X of the
1908 Act deals with the effects of registration and
non- registration.
11. Section 49 gives teeth to Section 17 by providing
effect of non-registration of documents required to
be registered. Section 49 reads thus:
“S.49. Effect of non-registration of documents required
to be registered.- No document required by Section
17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall-
(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein,
or
(b) confer any power to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction
affecting such property or conferring such power,
unless it has been registered:
Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be
registered may be received as evidence of a contract
in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II
of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), or as
evidence of any collateral transaction not required
to be effected by registered instrument.”
12. The main provision in Section 49 provides that
any document which is required to be registered,
if not registered, shall not affect any immovable
property comprised therein nor such document
shall be received as evidence of any transaction
affecting such property. The proviso, however,
would show that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by the 1908 Act or
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered
may be received as an evidence to the contract in a
suit for specific performance or as evidence of any
200 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
collateral transaction not required to be effected by
registered instrument. By virtue of proviso, therefore,
an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property
of the value of Rs.100 and more could be admitted in
evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific
performance of the contract. Such an unregistered
sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an
evidence of any collateral transaction not required
to be effected by registered document. When an
unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not
as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an
oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in
evidence making an endorsement that it is received
only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under
the proviso to Section 49 of the 1908 Act.
13. Recently in K.B. Shah and Sons (P) Ltd v.
Development Consultant Ltd, this Court noticed the
following statement of Mulla in his Indian Registration
Act, (7th Edn., at p. 189):
“The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad,
Madras, Patna, Lahore, Assam, Nagpur, Pepsu,
Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon and Jammu & Kashmir;
the former Chief Court of Oudh; the Judicial
Commissioner’s Court of Peshawar, Ajmer and
Himachal Pradesh and the Supreme Court have held
that a document which requires registration under
Section 17 and which is not admissible for want of
registration to prove a gift or mortgage or sale or lease
is nevertheless admissible to prove the character of
the possession of the person who holds under it......”
This Court then culled out the following principles:
(K.B. Saha Case, SCC p. 577, para 34)
“1. A document required to be registered, if
unregistered is not admissible into evidence under
Section 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used
as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in
the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 201
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of,
or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the
law required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not
itself required to be effected by a registered document,
that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or
interest in immovable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want
of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in
evidence and that to use a document for the purpose
of proving an important clause would not be using it
as a collateral purpose.”
To the aforesaid principles, one more principle
may be added, namely, that a document required
to be registered, if unregistered, can be admitted
in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for
specific performance.”
The aforementioned decision was followed by this Court in
Muruganandam v. Muniyandi (Died) through LRs7, wherein
the following passage is pertinent:
“9. Having considered the matter in detail, we are
of the opinion that the prayer of the appellant in the
interlocutory application falls under proviso to Section
49 of the Registration Act which provides that an
unregistered document affecting immovable property
may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit
for specific performance. The proviso also enables
the said document to be received in evidence of a
collateral transaction. Section 49 reads as follows:
“49. Effect of non-registration of documents required
to be registered.- No document required by section
17 [or by any provision of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882, to be registered shall –
7 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1067
202 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(a)affect any immovable property comprised therein,
or
(b)confer any power to adopt, or
(c)be received as evidence of any transaction affecting
such property or conferring such power, unless it has
been registered:
Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may
be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for
specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific
Relief Act, 1877 or as evidence of any collateral
transaction not required to be effected by registered
instrument.”
10. In Kaladevi (supra), this Court has held that an
unregistered document may be received as evidence
of a contract in a suit seeking specific performance.
…”
In the present case, Respondent No.1 has not instituted any
suit for specific performance. Moreover, the power of attorney
relied upon was unregistered and had already been revoked
prior to the execution of the sale deeds. Therefore, Respondent
No.1 cannot rely on the unregistered documents to assert any
proprietary rights and had no valid authority to execute the
impugned sale deeds.
9.2. Additionally, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
categorically provides that a contract for the sale of immovable
property does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on
such property. In the present case, the appellant has contended
that the agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014 was, in substance,
a transaction executed as security for the loan amount received
from Respondent No. 1, and was effectively in the nature of
a mortgage, and they are now ready and willing to repay the
loan amount and redeem the mortgaged property. As already
stated, the agreement to sell, power of attorney, and other
connected documents relied upon by Respondent No. 1 were
unregistered, and therefore, in law, cannot confer any title,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 203
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
interest, or ownership rights in respect of the subject property. It
is also significant to note that these documents were expressly
revoked by the appellant on 24.05.2022 and 27.05.2022 –
prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds. Moreover,
Respondent No. 1 has not filed any suit for specific performance
of the alleged agreement to sell, which further renders his claim
untenable. In the absence of a suit for specific performance,
the agreement to sell cannot be relied upon to claim ownership
or to assert any transferable interest in the property. This legal
position has been conclusively laid down by this Court in Suraj
Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana8, wherein, it
was held that unregistered agreements to sell, even if coupled
with possession, do not convey title or create any interest in the
immovable property. It was further clarified that such documents
are insufficient to complete a sale unless duly registered and
followed by appropriate conveyance. The relevant paragraphs
of the said judgment are extracted below:
“16. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a
contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does
not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such
property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A.
Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed: (SCC
pp.254-55, paras 32-33 & 37)
“32. A contract of sale does not of itself
create any interest in, or charge on, the
property. This is expressly declared in
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.
See Rambaran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra
[1967]1 SCR 293. The fiduciary character
of the personal obligation created by a
contract for sale is recognised in Section
3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in
Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal
obligation created by a contract of sale is
described in Section 40 of the Transfer of
Property Act as an obligation arising out of
8 (2012) 1 SCC 656
204 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
contract and annexed to the ownership of
property, but not amounting to an interest
or easement therein.
33. In India, the word `transfer’ is defined
with reference to the word `convey’. The
word `conveys’ in Section 5 of Transfer of
Property Act is used in the wider sense of
conveying ownership...
37....that only on execution of conveyance,
ownership passes from one party to
another....”
17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji
Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614] this Court held:
“10. Protection provided under Section
53-A of the Act to the proposed transferee
is a shield only against the transferor. It
disentitles the transferor from disturbing the
possession of the proposed transferee who
is put in possession in pursuance to such
an agreement. It has nothing to do with the
ownership of the proposed transferor who
remains full owner of the property till it is
legally conveyed by executing a registered
sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such
a right to protect possession against the
proposed vendor cannot be pressed in
service against a third party.”
18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable
property by way of sale can only be by a deed of
conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of
conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required
by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable
property can be transferred.
19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is
not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale)
would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54
and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 205
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
transfer any interest in an immovable property (except
to the limited right granted under Section 53-A of the
TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of
sale, whether with possession or without possession,
is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts
that sale of immovable property can be made only
by a registered instrument and an agreement of
sale does not create any interest or charge on its
subject-matter.
Scope of power of attorney
20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer
in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable
property. The power of attorney is creation of an
agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee
to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor,
which when executed will be binding on the grantor
as if done by him (see section 1A and section 2 of
the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or
terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable
in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable
attorney does not have the effect of transferring title
to the grantee.
21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata [2005
(12) SCC 77], this Court held:
“13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially
governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason
of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally
appointed to act for the principal in one transaction
or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of
the principal generally conferring necessary authority
upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is
executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The
agent derives a right to use his name and all acts,
deeds and things done by him and subject to the
limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall
be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney
is, as is well known, a document of convenience.
…
206 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the
provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers of
Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have
noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so
as to enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except
in cases where power of attorney is coupled with
interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise of
his power under such power of attorney only acts in
place of the donor subject of course to the powers
granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the
power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a
fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of
trust is a matter between the donor and the donee.”
An attorney holder may however execute a deed of
conveyance in exercise of the power granted under
the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of
the grantor.
Scope of Will
22. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a
posthumous disposition of the estate of the testator
directing distribution of his estate upon his death.
It is not a transfer inter vivos. The two essential
characteristics of a will are that it is intended to
come into effect only after the death of the testator
and is revocable at any time during the life time of
the testator. It is said that so long as the testator is
alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is
written, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If
the testator, who is not married, marries after making
the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked.
(see sections 69 and 70 of Indian Succession Act,
1925). Registration of a will does not make it any
more effective.
Conclusion
23. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does
not convey any title nor create any interest in an
immovable property. The observations by the Delhi
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 207
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank [94 (2001)
DLT 841], that the “concept of power of attorney sales
have been recognized as a mode of transaction”
when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/
WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintendedly
misleading the general public into thinking that SA/
GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized
or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a
valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to
the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL
transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted
from an agreement to transfer, are not good law.
24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property
can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only
by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of
the nature of `GPA sales’ or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers’
do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor
can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of
immoveable property. The courts will not treat such
transactions as completed or concluded transfers
or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor
create any interest in an immovable property. They
cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to
the limited extent of section 53-A of the TP Act.
Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made
the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue
Records. What is stated above will apply not only to
deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property
but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease
can be validly transferred only under a registered
assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to
the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions
known as GPA sales.”
9.3. This Court reaffirmed the same position in Cosmos Co.
Operative Bank Ltd v. Central Bank of India & Ors9, where
it was reiterated that title and ownership of immovable property
9 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352
208 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
can only be conveyed by a registered deed of sale. The following
observations are significant:
“25. The observations made by this Court in Suraj
Lamp (supra) in paras 16 and 19 are also relevant.
…..
26. Suraj Lamp (supra) later came to be referred to
and relied upon by this Court in Shakeel Ahmed v.
Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526
wherein the Court after referring to its earlier judgment
held that the person relying upon the customary
documents cannot claim to be the owner of the
immovable property and consequently not maintain
any claims against a third-party. The relevant paras
read as under:—
“10. Having considered the submissions at the
outset, it is to be emphasized that irrespective of
what was decided in the case of Suraj Lamps and
Industries (supra) the fact remains that no title could
be transferred with respect to immovable properties
on the basis of an unregistered Agreement to Sell
or on the basis of an unregistered General Power
of Attorney. The Registration Act, 1908 clearly
provides that a document which requires compulsory
registration under the Act, would not confer any right,
much less a legally enforceable right to approach a
Court of Law on its basis. Even if these documents
i.e. the Agreement to Sell and the Power of Attorney
were registered, still it could not be said that the
respondent would have acquired title over the property
in question. At best, on the basis of the registered
agreement to sell, he could have claimed relief of
specific performance in appropriate proceedings. In
this regard, reference may be made to sections 17
and 49 of the Registration Act and section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
11. Law is well settled that no right, title or interest
in immovable property can be conferred without a
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 209
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
registered document. Even the judgment of this Court
in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) lays
down the same proposition. Reference may also be
made to the following judgments of this Court:
(i). Ameer Minhaj v. Deirdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar
(2018) 7 SCC 639
(ii). Balram Singh v. Kelo Devi Civil Appeal No. 6733
of 2022
(iii). Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit
Chand Mitra, SLP(C) No. 15774 of 2022.
12. The embargo put on registration of documents
would not override the statutory provision so as to
confer title on the basis of unregistered documents
with respect to immovable property. Once this is
the settled position, the respondent could not have
maintained the suit for possession and mesne
profits against the appellant, who was admittedly in
possession of the property in question whether as
an owner or a licensee.
13. The argument advanced on behalf of the
respondent that the judgment in Suraj Lamps
& Industries (supra) would be prospective is
also misplaced. The requirement of compulsory
registration and effect on non-registration emanates
from the statutes, in particular the Registration Act and
the Transfer of Property Act. The ratio in Suraj Lamps
& Industries (supra) only approves the provisions in
the two enactments. Earlier judgments of this Court
have taken the same view.”
9.4. Furthermore, in M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, this Court
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the statutory provisions
and precedents, and reaffirmed that an unregistered agreement
to sell does not and cannot by itself create or transfer any right,
title, or interest in immovable property. The following paragraphs
are pertinent in this regard:
“47. It is a settled law that a transfer of immovable
property by way of sale can only be by a deed
210 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of conveyance. An agreement to sell is not a
conveyance. It is not a document of title or a deed of
transfer of deed of transfer of property and does not
confer ownership right or title. In Suraj Lamp (supra)
this Court had reiterated that an agreement to sell
does not meet the requirements of Sections 54 and
55 of the TPA to effectuate a ‘transfer’.
…
51. Section 17(1)(b) prescribes that any document
which purports or intends to create, declare, assign,
limit or extinguish any right, title or interest, whether
vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred
rupees and upwards to or in immovable property
is compulsorily registerable. Whereas, section 49
prescribes that the documents which are required
to be registered under Section 17 will not affect any
immovable property unless it has been registered.
….
53. Even from the combined reading of the POA and
the agreement to sell, the submission of the appellants
fails as combined reading of the two documents would
mean that by executing the POA along with agreement
to sell, the holder had an interest in the immovable
property. If interest had been transferred by way of a
written document, it had to be compulsorily registered
as per Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. The
law recognizes two modes of transfer by sale, first,
through a registered instrument, and second, by
delivery of property if its value is less than Rs. 100/-.”
Accordingly, it is abundantly clear that the unregistered agreement
to sell dated 24.05.2014 cannot, under any circumstance, create
or convey any right, title or interest in favour of Respondent
No.1 under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The subsequent revocation of authority further nullifies any
claim to title based on such documents.
9.5. Furthermore, Section 23 of the Registration Act mandates that
any document required to be registered must be presented for
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 211
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
registration within four months from the date of its execution.
This requirement has not been fulfilled in the present case,
as the power of attorney and the agreement to sell, both
executed in 2014, remain unregistered. Despite the execution
of the agreement to sell on 24.05.2014, no attempt was made
by Respondent No.1 to have it registered within the stipulated
period. This inaction further supports the appellant’s contention
that the said agreement is not only inadmissible under
Sections 17 and 49 of the Act, but also legally ineffective due
to non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of timely
registration. The failure to seek specific performance or register
the document within the period prescribed under Section 23
renders the foundational document unenforceable in law. That
apart, the revocation of the Board Resolution and Power of
Attorney prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds
vitiates the authority under which those deeds were executed
by Respondent No.1. Accordingly, serious triable issues arise,
which must be adjudicated by a competent civil court.
9.6. However, the High Court erred in treating the second cause of
action – pertaining to the sale deeds registered on 19.07.2022 –
as merely “academic”, and proceeded to reject the plaint in
its entirety without undertaking a judicial examination of this
distinct issue. This approach is contrary to the well settled legal
principle that a plaint may be rejected under Order VII Rule
11 CPC only if, on a plain reading of the plaint, it discloses
no cause of action or falls within the other narrowly defined
grounds under the said provision, such as under-valuation,
insufficient court fees, or bar by any law. In this context, we
may place reliance on the judgment in Central Bank of India
(supra), wherein, this Court while examining the jurisdiction
of civil courts in disputes involving immovable property and
proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002, held that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety
merely because one of the prayers or reliefs sought is legally
untenable, so long as other reliefs are maintainable and based
on independent causes of action. The relevant paragraphs
are extracted below:
212 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs:
a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed
by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das
Prajapati.
b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed
executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of
the bank.
c) The third relief is for being handed over the
possession of the suit property.
24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take
the view that the third relief is barred by Section
17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must
survive because there cannot be a partial rejection
of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.
Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot
be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.
In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as
prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of
the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court’s
jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say
relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that
Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not
make any observations to the effect that relief B is
barred by law and must leave that issue undecided
in an Order VII, Rule 11 application. This is because
if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then
by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse
observations against relief B.”
Therefore, the High Court’s wholesale rejection of the plaint,
without appreciating that the reliefs claimed flowed from multiple
and distinct causes of action – particularly one arising after the
revocation of the power of attorney – amounts to an improper
application of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Selective severance of
reliefs is impermissible where different causes of action are
independently pleaded and supported by distinct facts.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 213
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
9.7. Although the private respondents contend that the power of
attorney was notarized, a consent letter was executed, and the
transaction was reflected in the income tax records – while also
asserting possession over the subject property and alleging
that the suit was instituted merely to harass and disturb such
possession – these are all matters that require adjudication
during trial. Such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the
stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC. Therefore, these contentions, even if raised, do not furnish
a valid ground for rejection of the plaint at the threshold.
10. The appellant further contends that the mutation of the respondents’
names in the revenue records, based on disputed sale deeds,
cannot be treated as conclusive proof of title, which is a matter for
adjudication by a competent civil court. It is well settled that issues
relating to title of immovable property fall exclusively within the
jurisdiction of civil courts and not revenue authorities. Revenue entries
are administrative in nature and intended only for fiscal purposes.
This position has been consistently upheld by this court, including
in Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner and Jitendra v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (surpa). It is also to be reiterated that the issues
raised in the plaint pertain to ownership, validity of sale deeds, and
declaration of title, which are civil in nature and, therefore, triable
exclusively by a civil court. In view of this, the applicability of Section
207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 – which bars the jurisdiction
of civil courts in matters relating to khatedari rights and recovery
of possession based on tenancy – does not arise in the present
case. However, by rejecting the plaint and reversing the trial Court’s
well-reasoned order, the High Court assumed jurisdiction not vested
in it at this preliminary stage, thereby committing a jurisdictional error.
11. Another contention raised by the appellant is that the suit cannot be
dismissed merely on the ground of insufficient court fee. The law
mandates that the plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to rectify such
deficiency. Only upon failure to comply, can the plaint be rejected.
This principle was affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Tajender Singh Ghambhir and another v. Gurpreet Singh and
Others10, wherein, it was held as follows:
10 (2014) 10 SCC 702
214 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“7. While referring to the provisions of sub-sections (2)
and (3) of Section 6, we shall refer to “plaint” which for
the purposes of this discussion may be read to include
“memorandum of appeal” as well. Sub-section (2) of section
6 provides that in plaint in which sufficient court fee has
not been paid, such plaint shall not be acted upon unless
the plaintiff makes good the deficiency in court fee within
such time as may from time to time be fixed by the court.
Sub-section (3) provides that if a question of deficiency in
court fee in respect of any plaint is raised and the court
finds that the court fee paid is insufficient, it shall ask
the plaintiff to make good the deficiency within the time
which may be granted and in case of default, the plaint
shall be rejected. The main provision of sub-section (3)
mandates the court to record a finding whether court fee
paid is sufficient on the question being raised by the officer
concerned under section 24-A. It further provides that in
answer to that question if the court finds that court fee paid
is deficient, the court may allow the plaintiff to make up
that deficiency within time so fixed by the court. Then there
is a proviso appended to sub-section (3) which provides
that the court may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded,
proceed with the suit if security is given by the plaintiff for
payment of the deficiency in court fee within time that may
be granted by the court. It, however, requires the court
not to deliver the judgment till such time deficiency is not
recovered and if the deficiency in court fee is not made
good within such time as the court may from time to time
allow, the court may dismiss the suit or appeal.
8. The scheme of the above provisions is clear. It casts duty
on the court to determine as to whether or not court fee
paid on the plaint is deficient and if the court fee is found
to be deficient, then give an opportunity to the plaintiff to
make up such deficiency within the time that may be fixed
by the court. The important thread that runs through sub-
sections (2) and (3) of section 6 of the 1870 Act is that for
payment of court fee, time must be granted by the court and
if despite the order of the court, deficient court fee is not
paid, then consequence as provided therein must follow.”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 215
Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors.
12. Furthermore, the contention of the private respondents that the
appellant handed over the impounded documents, based on which
the sale deeds were executed and mutation effected, are again factual
matters to be examined at trial and not at the stage of Order VII Rule
11 CPC. That apart, the decisions relied upon by the respondents
are of no assistance as they are factually distinguishable.
13. In light of the above, we find that the trial court rightly held that
the issues are triable and that the application filed under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC was without merit. In contrast, the High Court erred in
overturning this finding and rejecting the plaint in its entirety.
14. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High
Court is set aside, and the order of the Additional District Judge is
restored. Consequently, the plaint is directed to be taken on the file
of the trial Court, which shall proceed with the suit in accordance
with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this judgment.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
15. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall stand closed.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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