VIPAN KUMAR DHIRversusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

                        [2021] 6 S.C.R. 1137                             1137


                       VIPAN KUMAR DHIR                                  A
                                   v.
                STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER
              (Criminal Appeal Nos.1161 – 1162 of 2021)
                         OCTOBER 04, 2021
            [N. V. RAMANA, CJI, SURYA KANT AND                           B
                         HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
       Bail – Dowry death alleged – Respondent no.2-accused, the
mother-in- law of the deceased charged u/ss.304B, 302 r/w 120B –
Anticipatory bail granted – Held: Offence alleged in the instant
case is heinous – High Court swayed by the fact that the accused         C
was co-operating with investigation – However, this is contrary to
the record as she remained absconding for more than two years
after being declared a proclaimed offender – She chose to join
investigation only after securing interim bail from the High Court –
Further, ground of parity with co-accused, her younger son (brother-
                                                                         D
in-law of the deceased) invoked by the High Court is unwarranted
– Allegations in the FIR against her and her younger son are
materially different – Impugned order set aside – Penal Code, 1860
– ss.304B, 302 r/w s.120B.
       Bail – Cancellation of vis-a-vis grant of – Distinction –
Discussed.                                                               E
       Disposing of the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1. The cancellation of bail is to be dealt on a different
footing in comparison to a proceeding for grant of bail. It is
necessary that ‘cogent and overwhelming reasons’ are present
for the cancellation of bail. Conventionally, there can be               F
supervening circumstances which may develop post the grant of
bail and are non-conducive to fair trial, making it necessary to
cancel the bail. Bail can also be revoked where the court has
considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material
available on record which renders the order granting bail legally        G
untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and
societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the
investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations,
where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent
the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of
                                                                         H
                                1137
1138            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 6 S.C.R.


 A     criminal justice system. While granting bail, especially anticipatory
       bail which is per se extraordinary in nature, the possibility of the
       accused to influence prosecution witnesses, threatening the family
       members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or creating other
       impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be overlooked.
       Each case has its own unique factual scenario which holds the
 B
       key for adjudication of bail matters including cancellation thereof.
       The offence alleged in the instant case is heinous. In the case in
       hand, the High Court seems to have been primarily swayed by
       the fact that the Accused was ‘co operating’ with investigation.
       This is, however, contrary to the record as the Accused remained
 C     absconding for more than two years after being declared a
       proclaimed offender on 23.04.2018. She chose to join
       investigation only after securing interim bail from the High Court.
       She kept on hiding from the Investigating Agency as well as
       Magistrate’s Court till she got protection against arrest from the
       High Court in the 2nd round of bail proceedings. The ground of
 D
       parity with co-accused, her younger son (brother-in-law of the
       deceased) invoked by the High Court is equally unwarranted.
       The allegations in the FIR against the Respondent-Mother-in-
       Law and her younger son are materially different.
             It is indubitable that some of the allegations against all the
 E     family members are common but there are other specific
       allegations accusing the Accused of playing a key role in the
       alleged offence. The High Court has wrongly accorded the benefit
       of parity in favour of the Accused. The impugned order of
       the High Court is set aside. The Accused is directed to surrender
 F     before the Trial Court. [Paras 9-12, 14 and 16][1141-B-C;
       1142-A-D, E-F, G-H; 1143-A, B, F]
             Daulat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana (1995) 1
             SCC 349 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 69; X vs. State of
             Telegana (2018) 16 SCC 511 : [2018] 4 SCR 466 –
             relied on.
 G
                              Case Law Reference
       [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 69        relied on              Para 9
       [2018] 4 SCR 466              relied on              Para 9

 H
    VIPAN KUMAR DHIR v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                           1139


      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal                        A
Nos.1161-1162 of 2021.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 28.01.2021 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M-22197-2020 (O&M)
and CRM-M-23495-2020 (O&M).
      Rakesh K. Khanna, Sr. Adv., S. S. Nehra, Arun Dagar, Vikrant            B
Nehra, R. K. Gupta, H. S. Sachdeva, Rajendra Verma, Advs. for the
Appellant.
     Sunil Chadha, Sr. Adv., Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Ms. Mandakini Singh,
Karanvir Gogia, Ms. Shivangi Singhal, Ms. Ashima Mandla, Akshay
Chadha, Anand Dilip Landge, Advs. for the Respondents.                        C

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      SURYA KANT, J.
      1. Leave granted.
                                                                              D
      2. The challenge laid is to an order dated 28.01.2021 passed by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby anticipatory bail has
been granted to Respondent No.2 (hereafter ‘Respondent-Accused’),
who is the mother-in-law of the deceased and is charged under Sections
304B, 302 read with 120B of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”).
       3. The prosecution version in brief is that the appellant (hereafter   E
‘Complainant’), who is the father of the deceased, lodged an FIR dated
02.10.2017 against 7 accused persons, 4 of whom are members of the
in-laws family of the deceased including the Respondent-Accused. The
Complainant has alleged that his daughter was married to the son of
Respondent-accused on 28-07-2017. Soon thereafter, the accused family         F
members started to harass and physically torture the deceased on the
pretext of dowry demands. His daughter died an unnatural death on
02-10-2017 in suspicious circumstances. There are specific allegations
vis-a-vis Respondent-Accused alleging that she exploited the deceased
and deprived her of any chance to recuperate from the arduous domestic
chores. This was despite the fact that deceased was also working as a         G
full-time lecturer in the local government college. It was further alleged
that due to non-fulfilment of the dowry demands, the vicious cycle of
humiliation and abuse continued to be meted out to the deceased. The
deceased contacted the Complainant on 30-09-2017 and informed that
she had been again physically tortured because of her failure to meet         H
1140            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 6 S.C.R.


 A     their dowry demands. The Complainant assured that he would try to
       amicably settle this household squabble by coming to her marital home
       on the very next day. However, this assurance could never be materialised
       as the accused are alleged to have clandestinely administered poison to
       the deceased on 01.10.2017, which led to her unfortunate demise the
       following morning. It is to be noted that the factum of poisoning is
 B
       supported by medical evidence gathered by the Investigating Agency.
             4. Soon after the FIR was lodged, the Respondent-Accused moved
       an anticipatory bail application before the Sessions Court, which was
       rejected on 21.12.2017. Discontented, the Respondent-Accused
       approached the High Court for a similar relief, but the petition was
 C     dismissed as withdrawn on 08.03.2018. Meanwhile, on account of
       non-cooperation with the ongoing investigation, the SHO of the concerned
       police station applied for and got issued arrest warrants against the
       Respondent-Accused from Judicial Magistrate. However, the arrest
       warrant could not be executed as the Respondent-Accused had been on
 D     the run and she was thus declared an absconder on 23-04-2018 under
       Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, “Cr.P.C.”).
             5. The Respondent-Accused continued to evade her arrest until
       this Court granted anticipatory bail to her younger son Daksh Adya
       (brother-in-law of the deceased) on 22.10.2019. Thereafter, taking
 E     advantage of this subsequent event and presenting the same as a material
       change in circumstance, Respondent-Accused filed two petitions before
       the High Court, seeking quashing of the order that declared her a
       ‘proclaimed offender’ and further sought the relief of anticipatory bail.
               6. It is noted explicitly that during the pendency of the above-
 F     mentioned proceedings, the High Court granted interim bail to the
       Respondent-Accused on 03.12.2020 and pursuant thereto, she joined
       the investigation on 07.12.2020. Thereafter, vide the impugned order,
       High Court allowed both the petitions and set aside the order declaring
       the Respondent-Accused as an absconder and also granted her
       anticipatory bail. These reliefs were primarily allowed on two grounds -
 G     firstly that the Respondent-Accused had joined the investigation and
       undertook to remain present at each date of trial proceedings; secondly
       she was entitled to seek parity with the co-accused Daksh Adya whom
       this Court granted anticipatory bail.
              7. The aggrieved Complainant is before us, contending inter-alia,
 H     that the High Court has committed a grave error of law in over-looking
       VIPAN KUMAR DHIR v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                           1141
                       [SURYA KANT, J.]

the well-established principles which guide courts to exercise their             A
discretion in the matter of granting anticipatory bail. Learned State
Counsel has also supported the cause of Appellant-Complainant.
      8. We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties at length and
perused the relevant material placed on record.
                                                                                 B
       9. At the outset, it would be fruitful to recapitulate the well-settled
legal principle that the cancellation of bail is to be dealt on a different
footing in comparison to a proceeding for grant of bail. It is necessary
that ‘cogent and overwhelming reasons’ are present for the cancellation
of bail. Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstances which
may develop post the grant of bail and are non-conducive to fair trial,          C
making it necessary to cancel the bail. This Court in Daulat Ram and
others vs. State of Haryana1 observed that:
         “Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage
         and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered
         and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and                      D
         overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order
         directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted.
         Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail,
         broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or
         attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of           E
         Justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice
         or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any
         manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material
         placed on the record of the possibility of the accused
         absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation
         of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled             F
         in a mechanical manner without considering whether any
         supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer
         conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his
         freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial.”
      These principles have been reiterated time and again, more recently        G
by a 3-judge Bench of this Court in X vs. State of Telegana and
Another.2

1
    (1995) 1 SCC 349 at 4.
2
    (2018) 16 SCC 511 at 14-15.                                                  H
1142             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2021] 6 S.C.R.


 A            10. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bail
       can also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors
       or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the
       order granting bail legally untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct
       of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court
       when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few
 B     situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to
       prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of
       criminal justice system. This Court has repeatedly viewed that while
       granting bail, especially anticipatory bail which is per se extraordinary in
       nature, the possibility of the accused to influence prosecution witnesses,
 C     threatening the family members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or
       creating other impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be
       overlooked.
              11. Broadly speaking, each case has its own unique factual scenario
       which holds the key for adjudication of bail matters including cancellation
       thereof. The offence alleged in the instant case is heinous and protrudes
 D     our medieval social structure which still wails for reforms despite multiple
       efforts made by Legislation and Judiciary.
              12. In the case in hand, the High Court seems to have been
       primarily swayed by the fact that the Respondent-Accused was
       ‘co-operating’ with investigation. This is, however, contrary to the record
 E     as the Respondent-Accused remained absconding for more than two
       years after being declared a proclaimed offender on 23.04.2018. She
       chose to join investigation only after securing interim bail from the High
       Court. She kept on hiding from the Investigating Agency as well as
       Magistrate’s Court till she got protection against arrest from the High
       Court in the 2nd round of bail proceedings.
 F
              13. Even if there was any procedural irregularity in declaring the
       Respondent-Accused as an absconder, that by itself was not a justifiable
       ground to grant pre-arrest bail in a case of grave offence save where
       the High Court on perusal of case-diary and other material on record is,
       prima facie, satisfied that it is a case of false or over-exaggerated
 G     accusation. Such being not the case here, the High Court went on a
       wrong premise in granting anticipatory bail to the Respondent-Accused.
              14. The ground of parity with co-accused Daksh Adya invoked
       by the High Court is equally unwarranted. The allegations in the FIR
       against the Respondent-Mother-in-Law and her younger son Daksh
 H     Adya are materially different. It is indubitable that some of the allegations
    VIPAN KUMAR DHIR v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                             1143
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

against all the family members are common but there are other specific          A
allegations accusing the Respondent-Accused of playing a key role in
the alleged offence. The conduct of the Respondent-Accused in
absconding for more than two years without any justifiable reason should
have weighed in mind while granting her any discretionary relief. These
facts put her on a starkly different pedestal than the co-accused with
whom she seeks parity. We are, thus, of the considered view that the            B
High Court has wrongly accorded the benefit of parity in favour of the
Respondent-Accused. It has to be borne in mind that the deceased met
with a tragic end within three months of her marriage. While it is too
early to term it an offence under Sections 302 or 304B I.P.C., but the
fact remains that a young life came to an abrupt end before realizing any       C
of her dreams which were grimly shattered. She died an unnatural death
in her matrimonial home. The Respondent-Accused is the mother-in-
law of the deceased. The Investigating Agency, therefore, deserves a
free hand to investigate the role of the Respondent-Accused, if any, in
the unnatural and untimely death of her daughter in-law.
       15. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent-Accused may                D
be right in contending that the Appellant-Complainant has widened the
net and included even other than the family members of the in-laws of
the deceased. According to him, the entire version of the Appellant-
Complainant should be seen with suspicious eyes as he being a retired
District Attorney, has a legally trained mind. We do not deem it necessary      E
to comment upon this contention at this stage. Suffice to mention that
the needle of suspicion revolves around only against the Respondent-
Accused and her family members while at this stage the others have
been found innocent by the investigating agency.
       16. In light of the above discussion and without expressing any
views on merit, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court               F
dated 28.01.2021 and direct the Respondent-Accused to surrender before
the Trial Court within a period of one week. We make it clear that the
observations made herein above are limited for the purposes of present
proceedings and would not be construed as any opinion on the merits of
the case. We also clarify that after the surrender, the Respondent-             G
Accused will be free to seek regular bail before the concerned Trial
Court and any such prayer shall be decided as per law, without being
influenced by this order.
       The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
Divya Pandey                                             Appeals disposed of.   H