Holding

The Court held that the omission resulted in gross discrimination that must be rectified by quashing the curtailment orders, though the scheme itself remains valid.

Summary

The petitioners, holders of stage‑carriage permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, challenged Scheme No. 50‑M which reserved certain routes for exclusive operation by the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. When the scheme came into force, the permits of some operators whose routes overlapped the reserved routes were curtailed, while other similarly situated operators were allowed to continue operating. The petitioners claimed that this selective curtailment amounted to hostile discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Regional Transport Authority’s omission in furnishing complete permit data caused gross discrimination that could not be brushed aside as mere oversight. While the Court refused to strike down the entire scheme, it ordered the curtailment orders against the petitioners to be quashed, subject to the condition that they hold valid permits and that any corridor restrictions imposed thereafter must not be discriminatory. The order thus rectified the discrimination without disturbing the broader nationalisation policy.

Issues considered

Whether the selective curtailment of stage‑carriage permits, while leaving other similarly situated permit‑holders unaffected, constitutes unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14.
Whether the error or omission by the Regional Transport Authority can be remedied without striking down the entire Scheme No. 50‑M.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 226, s. Article 32
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

Subjects

discriminationequal protectionMotor Vehicles Actstage carriage permitspublic interestnationalisationroute reservationconstitutional lawArticle 14administrative oversight

Judgment

234

A VISHUNDAS HUNDUMAL, ETC.
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

March 13, 1981
B [D.A. DESAI, A.D. KOSHAL AND A.P. SEN, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939~Scheme No. 50-M reserving notified routes for
exclusive operation by the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation-Certain.
operators'permits only were curtailed and they were prohibited fro•n operating their
stage carriages on a portion of their routes which were overlapping with the noti-
fied route leaving 19 others· untouched, through oversight-Whether such an action
c amounts to hostile discrimination.

Allowing the petitions, the Court

HELD : (I) Undoubtedly, the error or omission was on the part of the
Regional Transport Authority in the instant case, in not supplying full informa-
'
tion to the Special Secretary a bout all the valid permits in force at the relevant
D time and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled consequent upon the
approval of the scheme. This error or omission on the part of the Regional
Transport Authority has resulted in gross discrimination between the transport
operators in the same class in that some have their permits remaining intact
with right to ply their vehicles on the notified route and some others whose
permits are curtailed. When discrimination is glaring the State cannot take
recourse to inadvertance in its action resulting .in discrimination. [237 D-E &
E 238 B-C]

(2) Conceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged into
by inadvertence or oversight on the part of a governmental agency, the error
should be rectified. To. reject the whole scheme would be .destructive of a
wholesome effort towards nationalisation of bus transport which is generally
undertaken in public interest. In this case denial of equal protection, complai-
.F ned off flows from State action and has a direct impact on the fundamental
rights of the petitioners: A constructive approach by removing the discrimination
by putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have enjoyed
favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the Regional Transport
Authority will meet the ends of justice. The benefit of this order would be
available, if and only if, the petitioners have valid permits for operating stage
carriage and if such permits are there, they would be without restriction for
G operating on that part of the route of each of the petitioners which overlaps with
the notified route but it would be open to the Regional Transport Authority to im-
pose corridor restrictions; so, however, that such restriction does not suffer from
the defect of discrimination which is found to be constitutional. [238A-B-D, E-G]

Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan; [1963] 2 S.C.R. 152, distinguished.
H Special Leave Petitions
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDJGTIQN
(Civil) Nos. 6150 & 7$39/79.
VISHUN DASS v. M.P. (Desai, J.) 235

From the Judgment and Order dated 15-1-79 of the High A
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in C.W.C. No. I 5/79 and
M.P. No. 12/79 respectively.

AND

Writ Petitions Nos.435, 763 & 813 ·of 1979. B
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)

G. L. Sanghi, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and M. K. Dua for the
Petitioners.

Kameshwar Nath for the Respondent. c
S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent-(State)

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J. Petitioners in this group of petitions under Article
32 of the Constitution and petitions for special leave to appeal were
D
at the relevant time holders of stage carriage permits granted to
them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('Act' for short), and were
operating stage carriages on the routes for which permits were
granted. A Scheme No. 50-M was framed and publicised by the
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ('Corporation'
E
for short), covering certain routes including (i) Rewa-Shahdol; and
(ii) Satna-Ramnagar, which were to be reserved for exclusive opera-
tion· by the Corporation. After objections were invited and heard, the
scheme was finally approved and it came into force on January 20,
1979. On the approved scheme coming into force part of the
routes on which petitioners were operating overlapped with the F
notified routes. Consequently their permits were curtailed prohibiting
them from operating their stage carriages on a portion of their
routes which were overlapping with the notified route. This action
was challenged by filing writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Cons·
titution in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. A
Division Bench of the High Court rejected all the petitions except G
one. Hence some petitions for special leave and other writ petitions
filed by the petitioners who are operators of the stage carriages
and who are affected by the curtailment of their permits conse-
quent upon the approved scheme coming into force.

Number of contentions were raised before the High Court,
about the validity of the scheme, the procedure adopted while
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.R

A approving the scheme, the opportunity to raise objections and the
consideration of the objections. None of them found favour with
the High Court and the reasons which appealed to the High Court
rejecting those contentions are so convincing that we adopt them
and reject all those contentions.

B The only contention that survives for our consideration is that
while cancelling and/or curtailing certain permits for routes
parts of which overlapped with the notified routes there were other
permit holders in the same class having stage carriage permits for
certain routes parts of which were overlapping with the notified
route and yet in the case of petitioners their permits were curtailed
c prohibiting them from operating their stage carriages on that portion
of the route for which they had permit which was overlapping with
the notified route while others in all 19 who, though similarly situ-
ated, were favourably treated by neither curtailing nor cancelling
their permits and were permitted to ply their stage carriages on the
routes for which they had permits passing _over a portion of the
D notified route without any let or hindrance. The contention is that
this is hostile discrimination by executive act without any valid
criteria for picking and choosing and that the discrimination is so
writ large on its face that the Corporation and the State Government
did not try to justify the same before either the Special Secretary
who heard the objections or the High Court and took convenient
E refuge under the plea of. unconscious and unintentional discrimina-
tion through oversight relying upon _Ramnath Verma v. State of
R(,jasthan.(1) Those 19 operators who received a favourable ye:t
unjustified treatment are listed at page 45 in Special Leave Petition
No. 6150/79. Neither the learned counsel for the Corporation nor
F Mr. Gambhir for the State of Madhya Pradesh attempted to justify
classification amongst operators holding stage carriage permits and
plying vehicles on routes part of which was overlapping with the -~
\
notified route.
Before we examine what has been laid down by this Court in
Ramn~th Verma's case (supra) it would be advantageous to recall how
G the Special Secretary appointed to hear objections and approve the
scheme dealt with this contention of the petitioners. In paragraph
13 of his order he has observed as under :-
"It is clear from the evidence that certain permits which
were valid on the date of the publication of the scheme
H were left out and have not been included in the scheme'

(I) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 152
VISHUN DASS v. M.P. (Desai, J.) 237

which was published under section 68-C. The question to A
be considered is whether the permits have been left out by
the Corporation consciously and whether this is an act of
conscious discrimination. And also if it is conscious dis-
crimination, what will be its effect. The law relating to
left out permits has been laid down by the Supreme Court
in Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan". B

After referring to the facts in Ramnuth Verma' s case (supra), he held
that error or omission was on the part of the Regional Transport
Authority in not supplying particulars of all those permits which
were valid, and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled conse-
quent upon the approved scheme coming into force and on this
c
account the Corporation cannot suffer and the whole scheme cannot
be struck down. For almost identical reasons the High Court has
negatived this contention.

Undoubtedly, the error or omission was on the part of the D
Regional Transport Authority in not supplying full information to
the Special Secretary about all the valid permits in force at the
relevant time and which were either to be curtailed or cancelled
consequent upon the approval of scheme. This error or omisson on
the part of the Regional Transport Authority has resulted in gross
discrimination between the transport operators in the same class in E
that some have their permits remaining intact with right to ply their
vehicles on the notified route and some others whose permits are
curtailed. That this is discrimination between persons in the same
·class does not call for any discussion. Maybe, the discrimination may
arise out of error or omission on the part of a governmental agency
but the question is : Can it be overlooked on that account? Ramnath F
Verma' s case (supra) cannot help the respondents in this behelf
because a Constitution Bench of this Court held in that case
that d\scrimination under Art. 14 is conscious discrimination
and not accidental discrimination that arises from oversight which
the State is ready to rectify. We did not find any willingness on the
part of the State authorities to rectify the error either in the High G
Court or before this Court. There was some vague suggestion of
another scheme which was under examination which may ultimately
result in rectification of this discrimination. No concrete or ade-
quate information was laid before the Court as to whether that
scheme is pending and how Jong would it take to reach its final des- H
tination. And further, there is no guarantee that it will be approved
We, however, take note of a submission by Mr. Gambhir, learned
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 3 S.C.R.

A counsel for the State Government that the said scheme would be
finalised wihin a period of six months.

Conceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged
into by inadvertence or oversight on the part of a governmental
agency, by this order we only propose to rectify the same and not
B reject the whole scheme. Such an approach would be destructive of
a wholesome effort towards nationalisation of bus transport which
is generally undertaken in puclic interest. When discrimination is
glaring the State cannot take recourse to inadvertence in its action
resulting in discrimination. The approach is, what is the impact of
State action on the fundamental rights of citizen. In this case de-
c nial of equal protection is com plained of. And this denial of equal
protection flows from State action and has a direct impact on the
fundamental rights of the petitioners. We, therefore, propose to
take a constructive approach by remov;ng the discrimination by
putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have
enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the
D Regional Transport Authority.

Accordingly we hereby direct that order/conditions in permits
curtailing the permits of the petitioners prohibiting them from
passing over the overlapping portion of their route with the notified
route be quashed and declared to be of no consequence till all the
operators including those excluded similarly situated are similarly
E
treated.
Before concluding it may be noticed that we were told that the y
petitioners' permits have expired. This order is not to be interpreted.
or used for even remotely or indirectly suggesting that under the
effect of this order or as a result of this order petitioners are entitled to
F renewal of their permits. The benefit of the order hereinabove made
would be available, if and only if, the petitioners have valid permits
for operating stage carriages and if such permits are there, they
would be without restriction for operating on that part of the route
of each of the petitioners which overlaps with the notified route but
it would be open to the Regional Transport Authority to impose
G corridor restrictions. SP, however, that such restriction does not
suffer from tJ-.e defect of discrimination which we have held by this
judgment to be unconstitutional.
Order accordingly. We allow the special leave petitions and
the writ petitions to the extent hereinabove indicated with no crder
H as to costs.

S.R. Petitions cllowed