Holding

Dismissal under Standing Order 32 without a disciplinary enquiry and without recording specific reasons is illegal and invalid, necessitating reinstatement with back wages.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the dismissal of an assistant of Hindustan Steel Ltd. who was removed from service under Standing Order 32 on the ground that his continued employment was "inexpedient". The employer dispensed with the disciplinary enquiry prescribed in Standing Order 31 and did not record any specific reasons for bypassing the enquiry. The Court held that, although Article 311(2) of the Constitution allows dismissal without enquiry in limited situations, the authority must specify in writing why an enquiry is not reasonably practicable. Since the reasons given were vague and unrelated to the alleged misconduct, the dismissal violated the principles of natural justice and was illegal. Consequently, the order of removal was set aside, the employee was ordered to be reinstated, and back wages of Rs. 1.5 lakh were awarded. The Court also directed the employer to recast Standing Order 32 to bring it in line with constitutional requirements.

Issues considered

Whether Standing Order 32 authorises dismissal without a disciplinary enquiry without recording reasons.
Whether such dismissal contravenes the principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
Whether the employer must satisfy the court that holding an enquiry would be counter‑productive or cause irreparable damage.
Whether the dismissal is legally valid and whether the employee is entitled to reinstatement and back wages.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)
Income Tax Act, 1961s. Section 192, s. Section 89
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10

Subjects

natural justicestanding ordersdismissal without enquiryArticle 311public sector undertakingindustrial disputedisciplinary enquiryconstitutional lawemployment law

Judgment

428 .i

A WORKMEN OF HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. AND ANR.
v.
HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. AND ORS.
December 12, 1984.
B [D.A. DESAI AND V. KHALID, JJ.]
-' lnduJtrial Disputes Act 1947, Schedule 2, Item No. 3 and Schedule 2,
Item 6.
Public Sector UndertaklnT--Standing Order No. 32-General Manager
empowered to dismisJ workman without holding an enquiry if 'inexpedient or
c against the Interests of secli.Tlty to continue to employ the workman'-Such .
Standing Order whether 1/olatfve of the principles of natural justice-Dismissal
of employee without holding dCJmestic enquiry under the Standing Order-Whether
ralld, legal and pmnlsslble. ·

Constitution of India 1950 Article 311(2) provisos (b) and (c).

D Power to dlsmls1 ci-Jil servant without holding inquiry-When arises-
. Introduction of safeguard-That authority must specify reasons why not
reaJonably practicable to hold ilfquiry. 1
Practice aizd Procedure-Labour disputes-Adjudication of-Dismissal of
employee-Decision of employer to dispense with domestic enquir)" questioned-
Duty of employer to satisfy the court that holding of enquiry would be counter-
E productive or cause i"eparable and lrrel'ersible damage.

Standing Order 31 of the 1st Respon-dent/PubUc Sector Undertaking
prescribed a detailed procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct; and for
imposing major penalty, the employer had to draw up a chargesheet and
give an opportunity to the deUnquent work.man to make his representation

F
within 7 days. If the allegations were controverted, an enquiry had to be
held by an officer to be nominated by the management and in such an
enquiry reasonable opportunity of explaining and defending the alleged
-+
misccnduct had to be given to the workman. 1 Suspension of tbC delinquent
workman pending enquiry was also permitted. At the end of the enquiry, if
the charges were held proved, and it was provisionally decided to impose a
major___ penalty, the delinquent workman had to be afforded a further
reason~ble opportunity to represent why the penalty should not be imposed
G. -~on him.

Standing Order 32 provided for a special procedure in c3.se of a
workman was convicted for a criminal offence in a court of law or where
the General Manager was satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that
it was inexpedient or against the interests of security to continue to employ
the workmen•, viz., the y,.orkman could be removed or dismissed from
ll service without followin!J the procedure laid down in Standin~ Order No; 31,
WORKMBN v. HINDUSTAN STFEL LTD. 429

The appellant ao Assistant in the 1st Respondent-undertaking was A
removed from service on the ground that it was ~no longer expedient' to
employ him. The managem~nt dispensed with the depart1nental enquiry,
after looking into the secret report uf (1:1e of their officers th<lt the
appellant had misbehaved with the wife of an employee and that a com-
plaint in respect thereof had been lodged with the police.

In the reference to the Industrial T1 ibun~tJ, the Tribunal held that as B
the employer dispensed with the disciplint1ry enquiry in exercise of the power
conferred by Standing Order 32, it cou:d not be said that the dismissal from
• service was not justified, and that if there were allegations of misconduct,
the employer \\las quite competent to pass an order of removal from service
without holding any enquiry in view of tbc provisions contained in Standing
Order 32, and rejected the reference.

' Allowing the appe:il, IJy the employee to this Court,
c
,. J HELD: 1. The reasons for dispensing with the enquiry do not spell
out what was the nature of the misconduct alleged to have been committed
by the appelJant and what prompted the General Manager to dispense with
the enquiry. [4370]

2. As there was no justification for dispensing with the enquiry, D
imposition of penaly of dismissal without the disciplinary enquiry as con ..
templated by Standing Order 31 is illegal and invalid. [437F]

• • 3. The respondent shall recall and cancel the order da1ed August 24,
1970 removing the appellant from service and reinstate him ac:d on the same
day the appellant shall tender resignation of his past which shall be accepted
by the respondent. The respondent shall pay as .ind by way of back wages E
and future wages, a sum of Rs. 1.5 lakhs to the appellant within 2 months
which shall be spread over frorn year to year commencing from the date of
removal from service. The appellant shall be entitled to relief utider Section
89 of the Income·trix Act, 1961 for which he shall make the necessary
application to the appropriate authority. who would consider granting of
relief. [438C·D; F]
F
4. Where an order casts a stigma or affi;!cts livelihood, before muking
the order, principks of natural justice in a reasonable opportunity to present
one's ca1>e and controvert the adverse evidence must have full phly. Even
the Con~titution which permits dispensing with the inquiry under Anicle
311 (2) a safeguard is introduced that the concerned authority must :-.pccify
reasons for its di::cision why it was not reaso11ably practicable to hold the
inquiry. [435 A-BJ

5. (i) Standing Order 32, nowhere _obligates the General Manage1 to G
record reasons for dispensing with the inquiry as prescribed by Standing
Order 31. On the contrary, the language of Standing Order 32 enjoins a
duty upon the General Manager to record reasons for his satisf«ctioo why it
was inexpedient or against the intereat of the security of the State to COD·
tinue to employ the workman. Ressons for dispensing with the enquiry and
reasoo5 for not continuing to employ the wokman stand, wholly apart from
each other. [43SC-1J]
430 SUPREMI! COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 !! C.R.
A (ii) A Standing Order which confers such arbitrary, uncc·,:· -· ....
drastic power to dismiss an employee by merely stating that it is inexpedient
or against tho interest of security to continue to empfoy the workman is
violative of the basic requirement of natural justice, as the General Manager
can impose penalty of such a drastic nature as to affect· the livelihood and
put a stigma _on the character of lbe workman without recording reasons
why disciplinary. enquiry is dispensed with and, what was the misconduct
. B alle&ed against the employee. [435D·J?]

6. When the decision of the employer to dispense with the enquiry is
questioned, the employer- -must. be in a position to satisfy the Court that
holding of the enquiry will be either counter-productive or may cause such
irreparable and irreversible d4mage which in the facts aad circumstances of
the ca'\e need not be suffered. This minimum requirement cannot aad
c should not be dispensed with. [436B·C]

L. Michael and Anr. v. M/s. Johnsron Pumps India Lrd., [1975] 3 SCR
489, referred to.

7. It is time for the 1st respondent-public sector undertaking to
recast Standing Order 32, and to bring it in tune with the philosophy or
D tho Constitution failing which the vires of the said Standing Order would
have to bo examined in an appropriate proceeding. [438D]
•
C!VIL APPELLATB JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1137 of . \
1981. _,._
From the Award dated 22nd December, 1978 of the 9th
Industrial Tribuual, West Bengal in Industrial Case No. X-7/74
E (G.O. No. 8231-IR-IR-IOL-3 (K)/73.
R.K. Garg, P.K. Chakravartl and A.K. Ganguli for the Appel·
!ants.
G.B. Pat, S. Chatterjee, Alta! Ahmed and A.K. Panda for the
Respondents.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·
· DESAI, J. In exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 10 of the
+
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Government of the State of West
Bengal as an appropriate Government referred the following dispute
to the Ninth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication. The
G reference reads as under :
"Whether the termination of services of Shri Manas
Kumar Mukherjee is jtLStified? To what relief, if any is he
entitled ?"

Hindustan Steel Ltd. ('Employer' for short) dismissed Manas
ff Kqmar Mukherjee('W orkman' for short) without holding any inquiry
WORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN STBl!L LTD (D~sat, J.) 431
. .., and without giving any opportunity to the workman to question or A
correct the allegation of misconduct levelled against him and In
violation of principles of natural justice. The employer tried to
sustain its action by invoking its powers under Standing Order 32 of
the certified Standing Orders of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. S.0. 32

• •+
reads as under :

"32. Special Procedure in certain cases.
•
Where a workman has been convicted for a criminal
offence in a Court of Law or where to General Manager is
satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is c
inexpedient or against the interests of security to continue
to employ the workman, the workman may be removed or
dismissed from service without following the procedure
laid down in Standing Order 31."

S.0. 31 prescribed detailed procedure for dealing with cases of D
misconduct. Briefly stated, the procedure prescribed in S.O. 31 for
imposing major penalty is that the employer has to draw. up a
charge-sheet and give an opportunity to the delinquent workman to
make his representation within seven days. If the allegations are
controverted, an enquiry has to be held by an officer to be nominated
by the management and in such an enquiry reasonable opportunity E
of explaining and defending the alleged misconduct must be given
to the workman. The delinquent workman may also be given the
' assistance of a fellow employee. The procedure also permits
suspension of the delinquent workman pending enquiry. At the end
of the enquiry, if the charges are held proved, and it is provisionally
decided to impose major penalty, the delinquent workman has to be F
afforded a further reosonable opportunity to represent why the
penalty should not be imposed on him. According to the employer
it can dispense with such an enquiry in exercise of the power con-
ferred by S.0. 32. The scope and ambit of S.O. 32, will be presently
examined.
G
The Tribunal held that as the employer dispensed with the
disciplinary enquiry in exercise of the power conferred by S.O. 32, it
cannot be said that dismissal from service was not justified. The
Tribunal observed that even if there were allegations of misconduct,
the employer was quite competent to pass an order of removal from
service without holding any enquiry in view of the provision con- a
- -------------------------------------.

432 SUl'l\EMB COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.a.
A. tain:d in S.O. 32. The Tribunal concluded that the employer accused
the workl!lall of committing misconduct and proceeded' to pass the
order . of, removal from service without holding any enquiry into the
allegations.of.misconduct, it cannoti.be. said· to be -a colourable
. exercise of.. power and «the.workman.would not be entitled to any
B relief. The Tribunal accordingly rejected ··the ·reference. Hence ·this
appeal by special leave. .

The only question that mus! engage our attention. is what is
the scope and ambit of S.O. 32. It has already been extracted. Upon
its trl!e construction, the Standing Order does. not provide· that for
c reaso~s to bf? recorded in \Vriting, an enquiry into misconduct can
be dispensed with. S.O. 32 clearly confers power upon the General
Manager that . pn his being satisfied that it is inexpedient or against
the interest !Jf security.IQ continue to employ the workman.- ·then for
reasons to be recorded. in writing the workman may be ,removed or;
dismissed from' service without following the procedure laid down in
D
Standing Order 31. This archaic standing order reminiscent of the
· days of hire and fire is relied upon by a public sector. undertaking to
sustain an. utterly upsu>tainal:le order and to justify an action taken
in, violation .of the principles of natural jUJtice, an action which has
the , effect of: denying livelihood and caning a' stigma.• One can
appreci~t~ that in a given situation, and ~nquiry into .. misconduct
E
may, be. counter-productive. Constitution itsdf contemplates such a
situation when it enumerates situations in . which. a. punishment of
dismssal, rel'.l\ofl!l, or. reductiqn ;in .rank. can be impo~ed without
, .
holding'\ disciplinary eµquiry,_ J.et i~ be extracted :

· '.'311. '. Dismissal, .. removal. or reduction in rank of
F
,.persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or .a
• State~ +
' (1)

G (2) No such person as aforesaid/shall be dismissed:. or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in
which he has been informed of the charges against.him and
; :given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect
, . of
,those charges :
... ... ... .... ' ...
ff ... ... ... ...
~. t
... ""! ~!f '~" .
WOR.l(MEN v. HINDUSTAN' STBEL LTD (J)tsat, J.) 433

... Provided further that this clause shall not apply- A

(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank on the ground ~of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge ; or

. ~
(b) where the authority empowered to di.miss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
B

aome reason, to be recorded by that authority in
writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such
• inquiry ; or

(c) where the President or the Governor as the case may c
be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the
State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry."

A bare perusal of the situations and contingencies in which a
<!isciplinary enquiry affording a reasonable opportunity of being
heard before imposing the en um e1ated penalty can be dispensed D
with will clearly show that the power is not given to dismiss remove
or reduce in rank the delinquent worker but the power conferred by
the afore-mentioned provision is to dispense with an enquiry before
imposing major penalty. Sub-art. (3) of Art. 311 provides that 'if, in
• It
respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it E
is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in
clause (2). the decision thereon of the authority empowered to
dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.'
Now the three situations contemplated bY the provision are such
that holc)ing of an enquiry would be counter-productive. Where the
penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is to be imposed
on'the ground of a conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal charge, obviously, the enquiry will be superfluous or a repeat
performance because a judicial tribunal has held the charges proved.
But wbere the authority empowered to impose the penalty is satisfied
for reasons to be recorded by it in writing to dispense with an
enquiry, the reasons so recorded must ex-facie show that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary enquiry. Similarly, G
where in the interest of the security of the State, the President
or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that it is not
expedient to hold such enquiry, the same can be dispensed with.
In the last mentioned situation, the highest executive of the
country, the President and the highest executive of State the
Governor alone is entitled to dispense with the inquiry, if it is
s11tisfled tfu\t in the interest of the security of the State, it is 11ot
434 SVPlllllll! COUl.T REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.
(
A expedient to hold such ·enquiry. Dispensing with the enquiry in the
lint. and third situation does not present a difficulty because in the
first situation there is a conviction by.a criminal court and in the
third situation, the highest executive in the Centre and the State is
empower.ed to dispense with the enquiry. It is in the second fact
situation ·that one mnst evaluate the width of discretionary power to
.dispense witb enquiry. The appointing authority is invested with
power to dispense with enquiry. And in case of persons belonging to
Class IV services, .the appointing authority may be some-one in the
lowor administrative hierarchy and such an officer is.invested with
such draconian powers. Where such a power is conferred, on an
authority entitled to impose penalty of dismissal or removal or
c reduction in rank, before it can dispense with the inquiry, it must
be satisfied' for. reasons to be 'recorded in writing· that it is not
reasonably prncticable to hold such an enquiry. Power to dispense
..with enquiry is conferred for a purpose and to effectuate the purpose
power can b<> exercised. But power is hedged in with a condition of
\I
D setting down reasons in writing why power is exercised. Obviously
therefore the reasons which would permit exercise of power must be
such as would clearly spell out that the inquiry if held would be
counter-productive. The duty to specify by reasons the satisfaction
for holding that the inquiry was not reasonably practicable cannot
be dispensed with> The reasons must be germane to the issue and
E would be subject to a limited judicial review. Undoubtedly Sub-art;
(3) of Art. 311 provides that the decision of the authority in this'
behalf is fin•!l. This only mean tliat the Court cannot inquire into
adequacy or sufficiency of reasons. But if the reasons ex-facie are'
not germane to· the issue namely of dispensing with enquiry the
Court in a petition for a writ of certiorari can always examine
F reasons ex·facieand if they are not germane to the issue rec:Ord a
finding that the pre-requisite for exercise of power having not 'been
satisfied, the <:xercis'e of power was bad or without jurisdiction. If
the court is satisfied that the reasons which prompted the concerned
autnority to record a finding that it was not reasonably pracl!cable
to hold 'the enquiry, obviously the satisfaction would be a veneer to
!)
dispense with the \inquiry and the .court may reject the same. What:
G
is obligatory is to specify the reasons for the satisfaction of. the
authority thatit was not reasonably practicable to hold such an
inquiry. Once the' reasons are specified and are certainly s~bject to
limited judicial review as in a writ for certiorari, 'the court would
+
examine whether the reasons were germane to the issue or was
,,
B merely a cloak, davice '
or a pretence to dispense .with the
~ .
inquiry
..
WORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN STllBL LTD (Desai, J.) 435
and to impose the penalty. Let it not be forgotten what is laid down A
by a catena of decisions that where an order casts a stigma or affects
livelihood before making the order, principles of natural justice
namely a reasonable opportunity to present one's case and controvert
the adverse evidence must have full play. Thus even where the
Constitution permits dispensing with the inquiry, a safeguard is in-
B
troduced that the concerned authority must 1pecify reasons for its
decisi11n why it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.
Turning to S.O. 32, it nowhere obligates the General Manager
to record reasons for dispensing with the inquiry as prescribed by
S.O. 31. On the contrary, the language of S.0. 32 enjoins a duty
upon the General Manager to record reasons for his satisfaction c
why it was inexpedient or against the interest of the security of the
State to continue to employ the workman. Reasons for dispen•ing
with the inquiry and reasons for not continuing to employ the work-
man stand wholly apart from each other. A Standing Order which
confers such arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic power to dismiss an
employee by merely 1tatin1 that it is inexpedient or aaainst the D
interest of the security to continue to employ the workman are
violative of the basic requirement of natural justice inasmuch as that
the General Manager can impose penalty of such a drastic nature as
to affect the livelihood and put a stigma on the chai·acter of the
• • workman without recording reasons why disciplinary inquiry is
dispensed with and what was the misconduct alleged against the
employee. It is time for such a public sector undertaking as
Hindustan Steel Ltd. to recast S.O. 32 and to bring it in tune with
the philosophy of the Constitution failing which it being other
authority and therefore a State under Art. 12 in an appropriate
proceeding, the vires of S.O. 32 will have to be examined. It is not F
necessary to do so in the present case because even on the terms of
S.O. 32, the order made by the General Manager is unsustainable.
The view we are taking gets some support from a decision of
this Court. In a slightly different situation, this Court in L. Michael
& Anr. v. M/s Johnston Pumps India Ltd.(1) observed that discharge
simplicitor on the ground of Joss of confidence when questioned G
before a court of law on the ground that it was a colourable exer-
cise of power or it is a mala fide action, the employer must disclose
that he has acted in good faith and for good and objective reasons.
Mere ipse dixit of the employer in such a situation is of no signifi.
cance. Where a disciplinary enquiry is dispensed with on the specious
plea that it was not reasonable practicable to hold one and a penalty
(I) [1975) 3 S.C.R.489. H
436 stlfREME COUllT RilPOl\tS · il985) 2 S.C.R.
JI.' of dismissal or removal from service is. imposed, if the sa:ine is 'chal-
lenged on the ground that. it was a colourable exercise of power or
miila · fide action, the same situation would emerge and' the employer
rnustsiiiisfy the Court the good and objective reasons showing' both
proof of misconduct and valid and objective reasons for dispensing
with the enquiry. IIi our opinion, when the decision of the employer
to dispeiise'with enquiry is questioned, the employer must be in a
8
positfon· to satfsfy the· Court that holding of the enquiry will be
either couiiter··productive or may cause such ireparable and irreversi-
ble ·damage which·• in the facts and circumstances of the case need
not be suffered.. This minimum requirement cannot and should not
be dispensed with to control wide discretionary power and to guard
against the drastic power to inflict such a heavy punishment as
c denial of livelihood and casting a stigma without giving the slightest
opporturtity to the employee to controvert the allegation and even
without letting him know what is his misconduct.
Tuining to the' facts of the case, a bare perusal of the impug:
ned order is botli'instructive and 'provides ample material for po'in-
D ting oiithow tlle dr~stic power can be ·arbitrarily exercise,d ~ithout
keeping in' view the pre-requisite to be satisfied for exercise 'of tfi.e
power". ' The order reads as uilder : _
.. HINDUSTAN STEEL LIMITED
E DlJRGAPUR STEEL PLANT

Ref. No. Order/PF/MN 1215 24th August; 1970

ORDER
Having considered the matter fully, I am satisfied tha't'
it is no l~nger.expedient to employ Shri Manas Mukherjee;
F Assistant, Order Department, Durgapur Steel· Plant any
rtltilier. ·
It is therefore ordered that Shri Manas Mukherjee be
removed from the service of the Company with effect from
24; 8. 1970.
G· . He' _is·. allo'.wed/three months' salary which he may
c(lle~t' ftolli'' th'cf' cash section of the Finance Department
by"21>:" 8.' 1970:
Sd/-
ii Maj. Gen.
it Director'1riGlilir8e.
WORKMEN v. ll!NDVSTAN STEllL LTD (Desai, J.) 437

The expression 'no longer expedient' as used in the order A
clearly spells out the fact that some enquiry was·starled. What
prompted the General Manager to close the enquiry, one cannot
gather from the order. But our attention was invited 10 Ann. R-2
which according to the respondents specifies the reasons recorded
in writing for dispensing with the enquiry. Briefly, in Ann. R-2,
. it is stated that the authority concerned has looked into the secret 8
report sent to him by Shri P S. Rao Naidu, Planning & Ptogress
Officer, Order Dept!. and the comments of DGM thereon. He ·has
also stated that he has looked into the report received from Sr. AO
(E) and the copy of the complaint lodged by Smt. Gita Majumdar,
wife of an employee in the plant with the police. These recitals
heve been considered sufficient to dispense with tho enquiry. If Smt. c
Gita Majumdar did file a report with the police making accusation
against the appellant, she would have to be examined in the criminal
case. She could have been more conveniently called before the
enquiry officer, and the secret reports remain secret. The reasons
for dispensing with the enquiry do not spell out what was the natur~
of the miscondllct alle,etl to llave been c01maitted by th.• appellant
D
and what prompted the General Manager to dispense with the
enquiry. It is difficult to hold that the recitals of the order spell
out some objective reasons and the reasons were germane to the
question of dispensing with the enquiry. Frankly speaking, we arc
not satisfied in this case that for valid, objective and relevant reasons,
• the en<1uiry was dispensed with. E
An attempt was made to urge that some annexures to the
counter-affidavit would show certain comrlaints received against the
appellant. Wo decline to look into them as they were not given to
the appellant in the course of enquiry to meet or explain the same.
We consider them irrelevant at this stage.

- Once we hold that there was no justification for dispensiug with
the enquiry, imposition of penalty of dismissal without disciplinary
F

enquiry as contemplated by S. 0. 31 would be illegal and invalid.
Two options are thereupon open to us. One would be lo
permit the General Manager, if he is so minded to hold the discipli-
nary enquiry and come to his own dec;sion and the second would 0
be to remit the matter to the Labour Court to permit the respon-
dent-employer if it is entitled in law to substantiate the charges of
misconduct before the Tribunal.
• The order removing the appellant from service was passed
way back on August 24, 1970. More than 14 years have rolled by. H
r; 438 " 'i SUPIWD ·couRT REPORTS ' {19851 2 s.c.a.
1.A In such a situation, to startthe wh'?le thing de. nevo wouldmeither
.be 1.of a.ny help, to the appellant nor would be conducive.to.the
maintenance of .1discipline in the plant. Undoubtedly, once, a
workman is removed from setrvice a stigma attaches to him, and. if •
the order is held to be not, in consonance with the provisions of the
relevant standing,orders at any rate, the stigma has to be removed.
B
!: ' i' '' ; . ' . ·.
. . Haveing givSJ1. the Jll!lt!e~ our anxious consideration, we dispose
of the appeal as und~r. , .,
'
. ' :, ->•:
'
.,
. The respondent shall recall and cancel the order dated August
24, · 1970 reniovirig the appellant from service and reinstate him and
«in
. .the same' day
_,
the appellant shall tender resignation
-- ,- '·
of his post
which shall be accepted by the responoent. The respondent shall pay
,.
as and by way of back' wages and future \iiages, a sum of Rs 1,50,000
to ; the appellant w,ithin 2 months from today to be spread
over from year to year commencing from the date of removal from
service. 'We give '<ine more 'opportunity to the respondent to recast
D its'Stiinding Order32 within a period of two weeks'to be brought at
() best in conformitf'wlth tlie second proviso to sub'art. (2) of Art.
311 failing whicli'lts validity
, .l' ••
be re-examined by this C:>urt. will
E The allllount OfRs I, 50,000 directed to be paid to ·the appel-
lant by the respondent comprises' backwages, and all other allowc
ances admissible to him from year to year from 1970 upto the end
of 1984. 111e amount shall be spread ove~ from year to year. If
because of the lump..sum payment as directed herein the respondent
is required to deduct income-tax as enjoined by Sec. 192 of the
\;
F Jllcollle-tax Act, i96 I, th~ appellant shall be entitled to reliefu'llder
Sec: 89 of the lncoaie Tax Act, 1961. For this purpose, the 'a'ppel-
lant , shall make an•application required by Sec. 89 read with Ruleas
'.)
21A to the appropriate authority, who would consider granting of
relief to .the •appellant ·under Sec. 89. of the Income-tax Act. The
proceeding. in this behalf shall be disposed of withi11 a period of six
months. :fh11 appeal is disposed of in these terms with no.,ord~r.as
G to costs. .,

!
'
\ ...
N. v:K. Appeal allowed.

,, \.-, .:r;
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