XXXversusTHE UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

                [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1941 : 2025 INSC 943

                                 XXX
                                  v.
                      The Union of India & Others
                   (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699 of 2025)
                               07 August 2025
       [Dipankar Datta* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as to whether the writ petition be entertained at all
       having regard to the conduct of the petitioner-High Court Judge;
       does the In-house Procedure have legal sanction; is an inquiry
       and the consequent report in terms of the Procedure (which could
       be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-
       constitutional mechanism; does paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure
       foul clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Arts.217 and 218 of the
       Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of
       a High Court; did the CJI/the Committee constituted by the CJI
       act in terms of the Procedure or in deviation thereof; and is the
       requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the CJI
       to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the
       Prime Minister unconstitutional.

                                  Headnotes†
       Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” –
       Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Constitutional validity – Restatement of Values
       of Judicial Life dated 31st October, 1997 – Incident of fire at a
       store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to the petitioner-
       High Court Judge – Burnt currency notes discovered, and his
       conduct fell for scrutiny – “In-house Procedure” devised by
       the Supreme Court set in motion – Responses sought from the
       petitioner – Thereafter, three-member Committee constituted
       by the Chief Justice of India – Committee recorded that
       misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation
       of proceedings for removal of the petitioner from his office –
       In terms of the Procedure, the CJI forwarded the report of the
       Committee to the President and Prime Minister – Petitioner
       then filed writ petition being aggrieved by the Procedure to
       the extent it permits the Committee to opine as to whether the

* Author
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    misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal; and
    that the Procedure permits the CJI to intimate the President
    and the Prime Minister that the misconduct warrants initiation
    of proceedings for removal and sought declaration that his
    removal was unconstitutional and ultra vires Art.124 and 218
    and be quashed:
    Held: Conduct of the petitioner does not inspire much confidence
    to entertain the writ petition – Petitioner did not object to the
    photographs/video footage being uploaded, he participated in the
    inquiry without demur – Procedure could be seen as having a legal
    sanction – It is fallacious to argue that the Procedure is a parallel
    and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge – In-
    house inquiry or its report forming part of the Procedure in itself
    does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally
    ordained Procedure – Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal
    mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional
    mechanism – Argument that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional
    scheme for removal of Judges by taking recourse to Art.124 is
    unsustainable – No reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure
    in any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional
    provision – Right from the constitution of the Committee till
    intimations were given to the President and the Prime Minister by
    the CJI-its neither been shown nor is it a fact proved that either
    the CJI constituted Committee or the CJI acted in any manner in
    deviation of the Procedure, except when the photographs/video
    footage were uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court – As
    regards the requirement of para 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging
    the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President
    and the Prime Minister, no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the
    Procedure as infringing either any provision of the Constitution
    or the concept of separation of powers – Constitution of India –
    Art.14, 32, 121, 124, 211, 217, 218, 141 – Judges (Inquiry) Act,
    1968. [Paras 100-125]

    Constitution of India – Art.32 – Maintainability/Entertainability
    of the writ petition considering conduct of petitioner-High
    Court Judge as distinguished from waiver of rights:
    Held: Challenge to the constitutionality of paragraph 5(b) and 7(ii)
    of the Procedure has been raised in this writ petition only after
    the CJI had written to the President and the Prime Minister, while
    enclosing therewith copy of the Report of the Committee together
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1943

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     with the Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025, as required
     by the Procedure – According to the petitioner, uploading of the
     photographs/video footage, caused him immense harm, not only did
     it lower his reputation, he was convicted in the public eye without
     even a preliminary inquiry – However, the conduct of the petitioner
     to acquiesce to such uploading, participate in the inquiry without
     demur, and to question such uploading only after the Committee
     submitted its report to the CJI recording that there was sufficient
     substance in the allegations, baffles this Court – Submission
     that such uploading has had the effect of vitiating the enquiry is
     untenable – Though uploading of incriminating evidence available
     against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a step
     which the Procedure requires and while such uploading may not be
     considered to be proper, it is indeed fait accompli – No benefit can
     be claimed because of such uploading of the incriminating evidence
     at this stage, once in a duly constituted inquiry findings have
     been recorded as regards the failures/omissions of the Petitioner
     to abide by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life – If indeed
     any fault were found in the Procedure and questions were to be
     raised, the Petitioner ought not to have waited for completion of
     the fact-finding inquiry set in motion by the CJI – Conduct of the
     Petitioner, does not inspire much confidence to entertain the writ
     petition. [Paras 100, 105-107]

     Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” –
     Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Does the In-house Procedure have legal
     sanction – Whether an inquiry and the consequent report
     in terms of the Procedure (which could be unfavourable to
     the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional
     mechanism:
     Held: Procedure could be seen as having a legal sanction –
     Procedure has its roots in the law declared by this Court u/Art.141
     of the Constitution – ‘Law for the time being in force’ in sub-
     section (2) of s.3 of the Protection Act would include law laid down
     by this Court and that the term ‘otherwise’ read in conjunction with
     ‘such action’, appearing in the said sub-section, is wide enough
     to encompass measures that the Procedure contemplates – It
     is not the law that once the Committee constituted by the CJI
     records in its report that the conduct of the Judge under probe
     warrants initiation of proceedings for his removal and the CJI,
     in turn, upon accepting such report furnishes the same together
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    with his recommendation, if any, to the President and the Prime
    Minister, that would invariably in all cases result in initiation of
    proceedings u/Art.124(4) and (5) of the Constitution (for Supreme
    Court Judges) and Arts.217 and 218 read with Art.124 (for High
    Court Judges) and the inquiry under the Inquiry Act – Report or
    no report, recommendation or no recommendation, whatever
    is the case, the Parliament’s power to initiate proceedings for
    removal of a Judge for alleged misbehaviour or incapacity remains
    unfettered – Even though there could be a case where good
    grounds for initiation of proceedings do exist, the Parliament
    may in its wisdom elect not to go ahead to initiate proceedings
    for removal – Contrarily, even if it is reported by the Committee
    under the Procedure that there exists any of the two situations
    [para 5(a) or 5(c)] and the CJI, accepting such report, does not
    make any recommendation, nothing prevents the Parliament to
    initiate proceedings for removal if for reasons aliunde it considers
    necessary so to do – Notably, if the Parliament, despite strong
    indication of a Judge either having indulged in misbehaviour or
    suffering from incapacity, does not initiate any proceedings for
    removal, no proceeding in a judicial forum would perhaps lie
    for activating the Parliament to have such Judge removed from
    office – Power, competence, authority and jurisdiction of the
    Parliament to decide what is in the best interests of the nation
    is left untrammelled by the Procedure; hence, it is fallacious to
    argue that the Procedure is a parallel and extra-constitutional
    mechanism for removal of a Judge – Yet again, the in-house
    inquiry or its report forming part of the Procedure in itself does
    not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally
    ordained Procedure – Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal
    mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional
    mechanism. [Paras 110-117]

    Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” –
    Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure, if foul
    clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Art.217 and 218 of the
    Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge
    of a High Court:
    Held: Submission that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional
    scheme for removal of Judges by taking recourse to Art.124 is
    unsustainable – Procedure that has been laid down in the Procedure
    is fair and just which does not compromise judicial independence
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                              1945

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     either, a basic feature of our Constitution – Judge by his conduct
     of being fair and just is supposed to earn for himself as well as
     the judiciary the trust and respect of the members of the bar as
     well as the litigants and all other stakeholders – If a complaint
     of misconduct committed by a Judge is received and if at an
     inquiry conducted under the Procedure the allegations against
     such a Judge are found to have sufficient substance, he cannot
     claim any immunity-either by citing abrogation of his Fundamental
     Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a
     Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment-that his conduct
     is not open to be commented upon by the Committee or even by
     the CJI – No reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure in
     any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional
     provision. [Paras 119, 120]

     Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure –
     Whether CJI/Committee acted in terms of the Procedure or
     in deviation thereof:
     Held: Right from the constitution of the Committee till intimations
     were given to the President and the Prime Minister by the CJI, it
     has neither been shown nor is it a fact proved that either the CJI
     constituted Committee or the CJI acted in any manner in deviation
     of the Procedure, except when the photographs/video footage
     were uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court – Placing
     incriminating evidence available against a Judge under probe in
     the public domain is not a measure provided in the Procedure,
     either expressly or by implication – Inquiry under the Procedure
     is for the information and satisfaction of the CJI and the report
     of inquiry is confidential and, thus, such report cannot be made
     public – Entire process under the Procedure is confidential having
     ascertainment of truth as one of its objectives – Demands of being
     fair and transparent, in such cases, have to yield to the confidential
     nature of the process – Thus, uploading of the photographs/
     video footage on the website of this Court cannot be viewed
     as a necessary requirement of the “In-house Procedure”, thus,
     approved – However, nothing really turns on the uploading of the
     photographs/video footage since the Petitioner, did not have any
     grievance in relation thereto which is obvious from his failure to
     question such uploading at an appropriate time thereby allowing
     a situation to grow where the Court is faced with a fait accompli.
     [Para 121]
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    Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure –
    Requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the
    CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President
    and the Prime Minister – Constitutionality:
    Held: CJI, as the leader of the judiciary, apart from his various other
    duties owes a duty to the people of the country to keep the justice
    delivery system pure, clean and unpolluted – It is unreasonable
    to even think that despite an incident of the present nature, the
    CJI would wait for the Parliament to take action – It is up to the
    Parliament whether or not to activate Art.124 – Left to him, the
    CJI upon being informed of a Judge’s remissness does have the
    authority-moral, ethical and legal-to take such necessary action
    as is warranted to keep institutional integrity intact – Keeping in
    view such concerns and the legal position of the President being
    the ultimate appointing authority of Judges and the Prime Minister
    being the head of the Council of Ministers, upon whose aid and
    advice the President acts under the Constitution, coupled with
    receipt of complaints from the office of the President, the provision in
    para 7(ii) of the Procedure requiring the CJI to write to the President
    and the Prime Minister along with the report of the Committee
    to be quite in order, legal and valid – Office of the CJI not to be
    regarded as a post office that the report should only be routed
    through the CJI without his observations – This Court is unaware
    like the Petitioner of what the CJI remarked while forwarding the
    Report of the Committee and the Petitioner’s response dated 6th
    May, 2025 to the President and the Prime Minister – However, if
    the CJI has reiterated the finding of the Committee as contained in
    the Report and recommended initiation of proceedings for removal
    of the Petitioner from office, such a recommendation cannot be
    impeached on any valid and legal ground – Notwithstanding that
    the recommendation of the CJI carries much weight, one has to
    realize that the intimation given by the CJI, under the Procedure,
    is for the eyes of the President and the Prime Minister alone and
    not anyone else – Thus, no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the
    Procedure as infringing either any provision of the Constitution or
    the concept of separation of powers. [Paras 123-125]
    Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure”
    devised by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated
    15th December, 1999 through administrative resolution to deal
    with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting
    Judges, both of the High Courts and the Supreme Court –
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                                  1947

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     Genesis and contents of the in-house Procedure – Discussed.
     [Paras 41-47]

     Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) vis-à-vis In-house
     Procedure – Applicability:
     Held: Protection Act does not offend the constitutional scheme,
     and, being in addition to the extant provisions, does not affect
     the Supreme Court’s authority to take such action, as deemed fit,
     against a Judge of a High Court who is alleged to have indulged
     in misconduct in terms of the Procedure – To address the growing
     concern of incidents of misconduct, the Procedure has been craftily
     designed to discipline Judges internally for such misconduct that is
     sufficient to tarnish the dignity of his office as well as the institution
     to which he belongs – CJI’s discretion as to whether, where and
     when to act, mindful of the substance in the complaints received,
     would obviously be a regulated discretion; but, once the ball is
     set rolling by the CJI, it must end with his recommendation/advice
     to the President and the Prime Minister depending on what the
     Committee records as its findings – With the advancement in
     science and technology and all other spheres of work, it is quite
     possible to bring to the CJI’s notice how a particular Judge might
     have conducted himself inappropriately calling for strict action –
     Withdrawal of judicial work from a Judge is an extreme measure
     that the Procedure expressly permits – There are other measures
     too, which could be explored if Judges are found to deviate from
     the Code of Conduct – Given that the only formal mechanism
     for addressing judicial misbehaviour under the Constitution is
     impeachment by Parliament, it must be remembered that not all
     misbehaviour of Judges necessarily rise to the level of “proved
     misbehaviour” attracting Arts. 217 and 218 r/w. clauses (4) and (5)
     of Art. 124 – Constitution’s silence on cases that do not rise to
     the level of proven misbehaviour creates a significant structural
     vulnerability, which has since been addressed by the Procedure –
     Procedure acts as a check on Judges’ unbridled freedom of action
     and thereby seeks to prevent outcomes that could be harmful or
     unjust – Under the present set-up, impeaching the Procedure
     or any part thereof may itself be viewed as unreasonable and
     unjustified. [Paras 71-85]

     Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure –
     Nature of inquiry:
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    Held: Inquiry that is part of the In-house Procedure is designed
    to be a fact-finding inquiry as distinguished from guilt-finding
    inquiry, thus, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular
    disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee – Once
    the CJI constitutes the Committee, it is required to hold an inquiry
    into the allegations contained in the complaint in the manner that
    the Procedure ordains – Committee does have some leeway
    to devise its own Procedure consistent with the principles of
    natural justice – Though the Committee is not required to extend
    opportunity of cross-examination of the persons who come before
    it for giving their versions or opportunity to the Judge under probe
    to be represented by a lawyer, the Judge must be called upon to
    appear and given opportunity to have his say recorded – After
    concluding the inquiry, Committee may conclude and report to
    the CJI as regards the substance in the allegations contained in
    the complaint – Given its very nature, the Committee by preparing
    its report and recording its findings, effectively assists the CJI in
    arriving at a conclusion as regards the proposed action in a given
    case based thereon – Instant case falls within the second situation
    where Committee has recorded an opinion that there is sufficient
    substance in the allegations contained in the letter of the CJI and
    the misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation of
    proceedings for removal of the petitioner-High Court Judge – Thus,
    the nature of inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final as well as
    not violative of any principle of natural justice. [Paras 88-91, 94]
    Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Provisions relatable to removal of
    a Judge of a High Court from office – Process of impeachment
    of a Judge – Discussed. [Paras 28-40]

    Judiciary – Chief Justice of India – Role of the CJI – Explanation:
    Held: While the CJI is no doubt primus inter pares, first among
    equals and also does not exercise powers of superintendence over
    the High Courts and the Judges of the High Court, nonetheless,
    the CJI bears a significant moral responsibility as the foremost
    judicial officer to ensure that the judiciary of the country functions
    in a transparent, efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner –
    Although the CJI is the head of the institution, he too is not above
    the law which is supreme; hence, utmost care to be taken to
    ensure that any action of the CJI is not in deviation of the In-house
    Procedure which permits the in-house inquiry to be undertaken.
    [Paras 61, 69]
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                                1949

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


                               Case Law Cited
     C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee [1995] Supp. 3
     SCR 319 : (1995) 5 SCC 457; Supreme Court Advocates-on-
     Record Assn. v. Union of India [2015] 13 SCR 1 : (2016) 5 SCC 1;
     Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 190 :
     AIR 1964 SC 1854 – followed.
     Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India [1991]
     Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1991) 4 SCC 699 – distinguished and held
     inapplicable.
     Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 108 :
     (2003) 5 SCC 494 – relied on.
     Sahara India v. SEBI [2012] 12 SCR 256 : (2012) 10 SCC 603;
     Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General,
     High Court of Madhya Pradesh [2014] 13 SCR 300 : (2015) 4
     SCC 91; P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee [2011]
     10 SCR 1064 : (2011) 8 SCC 380; K. Veeraswami v. Union of India
     [1991] 3 SCR 189 : (1991) 3 SCC 655; D.C. Saxena (Dr) v. Hon’ble
     The Chief Justice of India [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5
     SCC 216; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand [1997] Supp. 6
     SCR 1 : (1998) 1 SCC 1; Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v.
     State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 939 : (1997) 1 SCC
     299; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat [2013] 5 SCR 200 :
     (2013) 4 SCC 301 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; Judges (Protection)
     Act, 1985.

                              List of Keywords
     Proceedings for removal of a Judge; Impeachment; Fire at a store-
     room; Burnt currency notes; Restatement of Values of Judicial
     Life dated 31st October, 1997; “In-house Procedure”; Procedure
     obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the
     President and the Prime Minister; Fact-finding exercise; Legal
     sanction; Fundamental Rights of the Judge of a High Court; No
     waiver of Fundamental Right; Judicial independence; Basic feature
     of Constitution; Misconduct committed by Judge; Photographs/
     video footage uploaded on the website of Supreme Court; Fait
     accompli; Guilt-finding inquiry; Principles of natural justice; Internal
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       mechanism; CJIs recommendation for initiation of proceedings of
       removal; Constitutional scheme; Separation of powers; Judicial
       misbehaviour; Primus inter pares; Committee constituted by CJI;
       Provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a High Court from
       office; Process of impeachment of a Judge; Role of the Chief
       Justice of India.

                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699
       of 2025
       Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Petitioner:
       Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, Siddharth Luthra,
       Sidddharth Aggarwal, Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advs., Ms. Stuti Gujral,
       Ms. Manisha Singh, Vaibhav Niti, George Pothan Poothicote,
       Ms. Jyoti Singh, Anurag Jain, Keshav Sehgal, Vishwajeet Singh,
       Prakarsh Kumar, Tasnimul Hassan.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       Dipankar Datta, J.

       Preface
1.     A deeply anguished Judge of the Allahabad High Court1 has petitioned
       this Court for enforcement of his Fundamental Rights under Articles
       14 and 21 of the Constitution of India by invoking his Fundamental
       Right to constitutional remedy guaranteed by Article 32 thereof.
2.     Lest any observation made by us denies the petitioner a level playing
       field in any future proceedings that he might face, we would tread
       the path cautiously and refer to, very briefly, only the bare facts
       leading to presentation of this writ petition as well as deal with only
       such of the several contentions, as urged, to the extent the same
       are absolutely necessary for our decision.


1    Petitioner
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         1951

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


      Facts
3.    Petitioner finds himself in an unsavoury situation. While the Petitioner
      was a Judge of the Delhi High Court, there was an incident of fire at
      a store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to him. On the date
      of the incident, the Petitioner was away from home. In the process of
      dousing the fire, certain burnt currency notes were discovered in the
      store-room. Such discovery gave rise to suspicion that the Petitioner
      may not have followed the universally accepted values of judicial life
      including those included in the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life
      dated 31st October, 1997; consequently, his conduct fell for scrutiny.
      Without wasting time, the “In-house Procedure” devised by the
      Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated 15th December, 19992
      was set in motion. The Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court3 vide letter
      dated 21st March, 2025 sought a response from the Petitioner. In his
      response dated 22nd March, 2025, the Petitioner’s defence, inter alia,
      was that no cash was ever placed in the store-room by him or his
      family members and he strongly denounced the suggestion that the
      cash belonged to him or his family members. Petitioner also stated
      that the same must have been planted in the store-room to frame
      him. However, the Petitioner neither denied the incident of fire nor
      discovery of the burnt currency notes. Upon receipt of the response,
      the same was considered. Inter alia, on 22nd March, 2025, a three-
      member Committee4 was constituted by the Chief Justice of India5.
      A press release of even date named the members of the Committee,
      and also disclosed that the CJ, DHC was asked not to assign judicial
      work to the Petitioner. At or about the same time, presumably on
      the orders of the CJI, certain documents/photographs/video footage
      linked to the fire incident and discovery of currency notes had been
      placed in the public domain. On 24th March, 2025, the Collegium of
      the Supreme Court recommended the Petitioner’s repatriation to his
      parent High Court. Immediately thereafter, the Committee set out to
      accomplish the task assigned to it. The fire ravaged store-room was
      inspected. Versions of several witnesses having some knowledge of


2    Procedure
3    CJ, DHC
4    Committee
5    CJI
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      and/or relation with the incident of fire/discovery of burnt currency
      notes were recorded by the Committee. Petitioner was furnished the
      versions of the witnesses. Thereafter, he was afforded an opportunity
      to state his case. An inquiry report6 dated 3rd May, 2025 of the
      Committee followed. On the basis of appreciation of the materials
      collected in course of the inquiry, the Committee recorded in the
      Report of having found sufficient substance in the allegations raised
      in the letter dated 22nd March, 2025 of the CJI. It was recorded by
      the Committee that misconduct found proved is serious enough to
      call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from his
      office. Vide letter dated 4th May, 2025, the CJI gave the Petitioner
      the option to resign or to seek voluntary retirement within 6th May,
      2025, failing which the competent authorities would be intimated to
      initiate action for removal. Petitioner responded on 6th May, 2025
      seeking reconsideration of the letter dated 4th May, 2025 and more
      time to submit a written representation upon thorough review of
      the Report. At the same time, the Petitioner further expressed his
      inability to either resign or seek voluntary retirement in the event
      his prayers for grant of additional time and reconsideration were not
      allowed. According to the Petitioner, acceptance of such advice could
      imply acquiescence to a process and outcome that he considered
      fundamentally unjust. Petitioner also urged that strict confidentiality
      be maintained by all stakeholders. The prayers, apparently, were
      not granted and a further press release of 8th May, 2025 came to
      be issued recording that in terms of the Procedure, the CJI had
      written to the nation’s Hon’ble President and Hon’ble Prime Minister
      and forwarded the Report of the Committee and the response of the
      Petitioner dated 6th May, 2025. What exactly were the contents of
      the CJI’s letter is, however, unknown to the Petitioner as well as us.
4.    In the prevailing circumstances, the Petitioner presented this writ
      petition on 17th July, 2025, claiming the following relief from the Court:
      a.      Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring Paragraphs
              5(b) and 7 of In-House Procedure dated 15.12.1999 to the
              extent that it enables the In-House Committee to inquire and
              comment on the existence of ‘serious misconduct warranting



6    Report
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                      1953

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


           removal’ and the Hon’ble CJI to intimate the same to the
           Hon’ble President and the Hon’ble Prime Minister for initiating
           proceedings for removal and other consequential action as
           being unconstitutional and ultra vires.
     b.    Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction declaring the
           intimation by the Hon’ble CJI to the Hon’ble President and the
           Hon’ble Prime Minister (as referred to in the Press Release
           dated 08.05.2025) for initiation of action for removal as being
           unconstitutional and ultra vires art 124 and 218 and quash the
           same.
     c.    Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction to quash and set
           aside the Final Report dated 03.05.2025 submitted by the
           Committee, and all consequential actions taken pursuant to
           the same.
     d.    Pass such other order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit
           in the facts and circumstances of the case.

     Arguments for the Petitioner
5.   Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by other
     senior counsel, advanced arguments at length in support of the writ
     petition. A brief note of submissions was also placed by Mr. Sibal
     before the Court, which duly captures the points of challenge and
     the contentions in support of the relief claimed.
6.   Mr. Sibal commenced his arguments by submitting that “it is a matter
     of moment”.
7.   According to Mr. Sibal, the Petitioner is aggrieved by the Procedure
     to the extent it permits the Committee to opine as to whether the
     misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal. He is
     also aggrieved because the Procedure permits the CJI to intimate
     the President and the Prime Minister that the misconduct warrants
     initiation of proceedings for removal.
8.   In course of his arguments, Mr. Sibal outlined what the Petitioner was
     not challenging. While fairly admitting that the Procedure itself is a
     valid in-house mechanism contemplated for the purpose of discipline
     by self-regulation by the higher judiciary, Mr. Sibal laid challenge to
     paragraphs 5(b) and 7 (ii) thereof on the ground that these are ultra
     vires the Constitution violating Articles 124 and 218 thereof. It was
1954                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       also fairly admitted that even though the Committee’s remit was to
       conduct a fact-finding exercise, the subsequent recommendation
       by the Committee regarding the necessity to initiate proceedings for
       removal of a Judge is unconstitutional.
9.     Moving ahead, Mr. Sibal accepted that he did not see any wrong in
       the CJI in advising the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court
       not to allocate judicial work to the Judge under probe or the CJI’s
       authority to forward the report of the Committee to the President and
       the Prime Minister along with intimation of the advice to the Chief
       Justice of the concerned High Court not to allocate judicial work to
       the concerned Judge.
10. While, however, confining the constitutional challenge to the validity of
    paragraphs 5(b) and 7 (ii) of the Procedure, Mr. Sibal contended that
    Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution are the only provisions under
    which a Judge of a High Court may be removed. In exercise of the
    powers under Article 124(5), the Parliament has enacted the Judges
    (Inquiry) Act, 19687. He argued that the constitutional provisions read
    with the Inquiry Act constitute a complete and comprehensive code
    which occupies the field of the process for removal.
11. Continuing further, Mr. Sibal stressed that the tenure of a High Court
    Judge is protected by the Constitution, and such a Judge is subject
    to the Constitution and the Constitution alone. Even Parliament
    is not permitted to discuss the conduct of any Judge either of the
    Supreme Court or of the High Courts except when a Motion for
    presenting an address is admitted. Hence, any procedure/process
    for removal, other than that provided for under Article 124, would
    be unconstitutional. As per the constitutional scheme, removal of
    a Judge from office is subject to the Judge being found guilty of
    proved misbehaviour or incapacity in an inquiry conducted under
    the Inquiry Act; however, the Procedure to the extent it could trigger
    proceedings for removal, without being bound by the constitutional
    rigours, is liable to be held ultra vires.
12. Mr. Sibal further argued that the removal process, set in motion
    by the Procedure with the Committee being empowered to make
    recommendation, lacks constitutional sanction or contemplation. As
    against the safeguards provided in the Inquiry Act, such as framing


7    Inquiry Act, hereafter
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                       1955

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     of charges, presentation of evidence in support of the charge(s),
     statement of defence, cross-examination of witnesses, strict proof,
     etc. – all of which are compliant with the overarching mandate of
     Article 14 – the Procedure contemplates such procedure as may
     be appropriate in the facts of a case. The Procedure does not
     obligate the Committee to follow the codified or defined rules of
     evidence and permits the Committee to adopt such procedure as
     necessary, potentially leading to holding a Judge guilty, not just of
     serious misconduct but also calling for his removal. Such process,
     based only on a preliminary or prima facie view, where the Judge
     is denied the procedural safeguards which are otherwise available
     in consonance with due process, is wholly arbitrary and violative of
     Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. The report of the Committee, Mr. Sibal further contended, could only
    be used by the CJI to take corrective measures within his domain.
    It cannot possibly interfere with the process envisaged under Article
    124. Separation of powers that is in-built in the Constitution demands
    that the judicial institution remains clear of the constitutional process
    undertaken for removal.
14. Finally, Mr. Sibal sought to again impress upon us that the Procedure
    to the extent it permits the CJI to trigger the initiation of removal
    process by the Parliament through his recommendation is bound
    to have its own impact. Though termed as a recommendation or
    advice, such recommendation/advice from a high constitutional
    functionary such as the CJI would clearly be far more than being
    merely persuasive and is bound to influence the decision making and
    evaluation process. It would act as a virtual death knell for a Judge,
    particularly based on a prima facie evaluation of the allegations.
    Such process would also circumvent the constitutionally prescribed
    mechanisms.
15. In any case, Mr. Sibal argued, uploading of the photographs/video
    footage on the website of the Supreme Court together with the
    Report of the Committee has the effect of convicting the Petitioner
    even before the procedure under Article 124 has been initiated. Such
    being the state of affairs, the powers of the CJI cannot extend to
    making such a recommendation. Hence, paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii)
    of the Procedure need to be set aside not only being violative of
    the constitutional scheme for removal of Judges but also because
1956                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


      they deprive the Petitioner of equal protection of the laws, thereby
      infringing his valuable right under Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. Having completed his address on the constitutional challenge, Mr.
    Sibal placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Indira Jaising v.
    Supreme Court of India 8 and Sahara India v. SEBI 9, to contend
    that the allegations against the Petitioner and the correspondence
    exchanged by and between him and the CJI as well as the evidence
    (photographs/video footage), ought not to have been put in the
    public domain. By so doing, not only has the good reputation of the
    Petitioner as a Judge (which he built by years of dedicated work) been
    tarnished, the public perception based on viewing of such evidence
    led to an exercise which has held the Petitioner guilty even before
    an inquiry according to fair procedure could commence and he being
    afforded the opportunity to raise an effective defence. Highly critical
    of uploading of the photographs/video footage on the website of this
    Court, Mr. Sibal contended that the Petitioner’s precious right under
    Article 21 stood abrogated right from the inception.
17. Relying heavily on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sub-
    Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India10, Mr.
    Sibal argued that the powers of the CJI in case of removal of a High
    Court Judge stand restricted. It was pointed out that as the CJI has
    no disciplinary control over Judges of the High Courts, the procedure
    for removal is not akin to removal of a delinquent employee. The
    CJI, it was contended, cannot have an authoritative say or partake
    in the process, which is otherwise the preserve of the Parliament.
18. Referring to the decision in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice
    A.M. Bhattacharjee11, Mr. Sibal urged that the observations made
    therein were only intended to fill the ‘yawning gap between proved
    misbehaviour and bad conduct inconsistent with the high office’. The
    Procedure, however, reaches far and beyond filling the gap and, in
    fact, attempts to kick-start the process under Article 124(5), which
    is the sole prerogative of the Parliament.



8    (2003) 5 SCC 494
9    (2012) 10 SCC 603
10   (1991) 4 SCC 699
11   (1995) 5 SCC 457
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                      1957

                          XXX v. The Union of India & Others


19. While concluding, Mr. Sibal prayed that paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the
    Procedure be declared ultra vires. He also prayed for a declaration
    that none including the Parliament be influenced either by the Report
    of the Committee or the recommendation/advice of the CJI.
20. We heard Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel assisting Mr. Sibal,
    submit at the very end that the Petitioner ought to have been given
    an opportunity of personal hearing by the CJI before making his
    recommendation/tendering his advice to the President and the
    Prime Minister. To support such submission, he referred to a similar
    opportunity that was extended by the then CJI to a Judge of the
    Calcutta High Court who also went through the same Procedure.
    Non-grant of such opportunity, according to him, breached principles
    of equality before law.

      Proceedings before the Court
21. Although the challenge read with the prayers in the writ petition
    relate to the constitutionality of the Procedure and the legality of
    the inquiry conducted by the Committee together with its Report,
    as part of the Procedure, Mr. Sibal rightly did not argue the second
    point12 and restricted his arguments on the point of constitutionality.
22. It is placed on record that the Petitioner not having objected to
    uploading of the photographs/video footage at the first available
    opportunity and having participated in the inquiry conducted by the
    Committee without raising any demur, we posed a query: why should
    we entertain the writ petition at such a belated stage, notwithstanding
    the challenge laid on the constitutional aspect, particularly when the
    inquiry had culminated in submission of the Report by the Committee
    to the CJI who, in turn, had written to the President and the Prime
    Minister while forwarding the Report together with the Petitioner’s
    response?
23. In answer thereto, Mr. Sibal submitted that since a constitutional
    challenge was being raised by the Petitioner and law being settled
    that there could be no waiver of a Fundamental Right, the Court
    may not decline interference and decide the writ petition based on
    the points argued by him.



12   we need not spell out the reasons therefor in the judgment
1958                                                                                     [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                                     Supreme Court Reports


24. During the course of hearing, we had also put it across to Mr.
    Sibal whether the Judges (Protection) Act, 198513 would have any
    application in the instant case. Faced with the Protection Act, Mr. Sibal
    sought to counter it by submitting two points. First, that no law as is
    referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3 - either the Constitution
    or any statutory enactment - confers such power on the Supreme
    Court; hence the Protection Act has no application. Secondly, since
    sub-section (2) of Section 3 includes Central Government/State
    Government, it would then mean that these authorities could also
    initiate proceedings for removal of a High Court Judge which would
    be wholly unconstitutional and could not have been the intention of
    the Parliament.
25. Upon hearing Mr. Sibal and Mr. Rohatgi, we did not consider it
    necessary to issue notice to the respondents and reserved judgment.

        Questions
26. Based on Mr. Sibal’s arguments as well as the facts on record, the
    following substantial questions of law arise for an answer:
        I.      Should the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to
                the conduct of the Petitioner?
        II.     Does the Procedure have legal sanction?
        III.    Is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the
                Procedure (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under
                probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism?
        IV.     Does paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure foul clauses (4) and (5)
                of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218# of the Constitution
                or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court?
        V.      Did the CJI/the Committee constituted by the CJI act in terms
                of the Procedure or in deviation thereof?
        VI.     Is the requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging
                the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President
                and the Prime Minister unconstitutional?


13    Protection Act
# Ed. Note: “foul clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218” instead of “foul Article 124
             and Article 125 read with Articles 217 and 218” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                      1959

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     Analysis and Findings with Reasons
27. Appreciating the merits of the arguments advanced on behalf of the
    Petitioner and expressing our opinion ought to be preceded by an
    examination of the provisions in the Constitution relating to removal of
    a Judge of a High Court from office, the law in terms whereof inquiry
    has to be held, the genesis of the Procedure, what this Procedure
    is all about, the role of the CJI, the nature of inquiry the Procedure
    contemplates, what impact does such inquiry have on a Judge of a
    High Court whose conduct is under probe, and other related issues
    including the aspect of applicability of the Protection Act. This would
    also necessarily require us to take note of the precedents in the field
    which find place in the compilation of judgments handed over by Mr.
    Sibal. In our view, such an exercise would significantly facilitate and
    aid answering the above questions effectively and thereby enable
    us to complete the task at hand appropriately.

     Constitutional Provisions and The Inquiry Act
28. That a Judge of a High Court cannot be removed from office except
    on the ground of proved misbehaviour or proved incapacity admits
    of no doubt. The provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a
    High Court from office are traceable to Articles 217 and 218 read
    with Article 124. Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read as follows:
           124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court
           …
           (4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from
           his office except by an order of the President passed after an
           address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority
           of the total membership of that House and by a majority of
           not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present
           and voting has been presented to the President in the same
           session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour
           or incapacity.
           (5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the
           presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof
           of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4).
           …
1960                                                          [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


29. Articles 217 (to the extent relevant) and 218 provide:
           217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge
           of a High Court
           (1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the
           President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation
           with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and,
           in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief
           Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold
           office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided
           in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age
           of sixty-two years:
           Provided that—
           (a)   ***
           (b)   a Judge may be removed from his office by the President
                 in the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the
                 removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court;
           (c)   ***
           (2)   ***
           (3)   ***
           218. Application of certain provision relating to Supreme
           Court to High Courts
           The provisions of clauses (4) and (5) of article 124 shall apply in
           relation to a High Court as they apply in relation to the Supreme
           Court with the substitution of references to the High Court for
           references to the Supreme Court.
30. The law that is referred to in clause (5) of Article 124 is the Inquiry Act.
31. The Constitution itself does not prescribe the procedure for the
    presentation of an address and for investigation and proof of the
    misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge but leaves it for the Parliament
    to regulate the same by law. In exercise of such powers, as discussed
    above, the Parliament enacted the Inquiry Act. The Inquiry Act, inter
    alia, provides for constitution of a committee which is to conduct an
    investigation/inquiry into the allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1961

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     levelled against the Judge. The procedure enumerated in the Inquiry
     Act is in consonance with the principles of natural justice in that,
     formal charges are framed, the Judge is provided with the supporting
     material for each charge, opportunity is extended to cross-examine
     witnesses as well as to present his defence. The committee has
     the same powers as that of a civil court under the Code of Civil
     Procedure, 1908, for summoning and enforcing the attendance
     of a person, examining a person on oath, requiring discovery and
     production of documents, receiving evidence on oath, issuing a
     commission for examination of witnesses or documents, and for all
     such other matters as may be prescribed. It is imperative to note that
     if the Judge is not found guilty of any charge(s) by the committee,
     then the pending Motion in the House or Houses of Parliament will
     not be proceeded with. Thus, it marks the end of the proceedings.
32. The process for impeachment of a Judge, however, is very rigid
    at all levels – starting with a Motion in the House, followed by an
    investigation/inquiry conducted by a committee comprising of persons
    of high calibre, adherence to fair procedure, then the necessity of
    approval by a majority of the Houses and finally the approval by
    the President whereafter a Judge can be removed from office by
    impeachment.
33. These provisions apart, there are two other similarly worded articles
    in the Constitution which, though not directly related to removal of
    a Judge of a High Court, impose restrictions on discussions in the
    Parliament/State Legislatures with respect to the conduct of a Judge
    of a High Court. They are Articles 121 and 211.
34. Mr. Sibal is right in his contention that apart from proviso (b) of clause
    (1) of Article 217 and Article 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of
    Article 124, there is no other provision in the Constitution relating to
    removal of a Judge of a High Court from his office. He is also right in
    contending that Article 121 even bars the Parliament to discuss the
    conduct of a Judge of a High Court except in the stated situation.
    Similar is the restriction imposed by Article 211.
35. A reading of the Constituent Assembly debates does not reveal any
    discussion or debate on any proposed measure, other than removal
    by the Parliament in the manner constitutionally ordained, if the
    conduct of a Judge of a High Court amounts to misbehaviour but
1962                                                                               [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                                   Supreme Court Reports


       does not amount to such misbehaviour as would warrant the severest
       measure of removal§ from office. The framers of the Constitution, in
       their wisdom, possibly might have thought that having regard to the
       status of a Judge, being a high constitutional functionary in whom
       the people would repose trust and faith for rendering justice, only
       such individuals possessing the highest standards of integrity and
       moral character, apart from legal acumen, would be considered for
       appointment to the judicial office; yet, should there be an exceptional
       situation calling for removal of a Judge from office and to ensure
       that the Constitution is not incomplete without an in-built mechanism
       for a disciplinary measure, provisions for removal (by impeachment)
       were incorporated. Indeed, it took Parliament long 18 (eighteen)
       years after the advent of the Constitution to enact the law wherefor
       it was empowered by clause (5) of Article 124. It is also noteworthy
       that the first process of removal of a Judge by impeachment did
       not see the light of the day till the early nineties of the last century,
       i.e., almost 4 (four) decades after the people proclaimed India as a
       sovereign democratic republic14. It does suggest that the framers of
       the Constitution were not amiss in thinking that an exceptional case
       for disciplining a Judge might seldom arise.
36. Nonetheless, times have changed and changed drastically. With the
    process of appointment becoming executive-centric, fissures in the
    system became apparent; aberrations of Judges started attracting
    notice. However, possibly because of the cumbersome process that
    a process for removal by impeachment involves, many a Judge could
    have escaped unscathed without such aberration being brought in
    the public domain.
37. There have, however, been certain reported instances since the
    eighties of the last century of Judges having indulged in (perceived)
    misbehaviour leading to some of them being disciplined internally
    by the Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts.
38. Till date, there have been only 4 (four) instances of Motions for
    removal of a Supreme Court/High Court Judges being admitted
    by the Parliament and not a single instance of the Motion being


14   on 26th November, 1949
§ Ed. Note: “warrant the severest measure of removal” instead of “warrant the extreme measure of removal”
             in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                          1963

                       XXX v. The Union of India & Others


      carried through (although one cannot ignore that a couple of Judges
      strategically resigned prior to culmination of the proceedings).
39. Be that as it may, the Constitution was and is silent with regard to
    any disciplinary measure, short of removal by impeachment, should
    there be an aberration or bad conduct by a Judge of a High Court
    as distinguished from misbehaviour in the discharge of his judicial
    duties or administrative/non-judicial/official duties.
40. It is worthy of note that six years before the turn of the last century,
    the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court was compelled to demit
    office on the ground of alleged misbehaviour as a sequel to exertion
    of pressure by the local Bar Council/Bar Associations. A writ petition
    under Article 32 of the Constitution presented by a practising advocate
    changed the legal landscape of the country. The decision on such
    writ petition, which laid down a precedent and which we propose
    to consider a little later, has rightly been commented in one of the
    subsequent decisions of this Court as having sowed the seeds for
    the Procedure.

      The Procedure - its genesis and contents
41. The Procedure (commonly known as the “In-house Procedure”),
    which has been developed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court
    through an administrative resolution, serves as an internal mechanism
    to deal with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting
    Judges, both of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
42. Reading of paragraph 32 of the decision in Additional District and
    Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya
    Pradesh15 provides useful guidance as to how the Procedure came
    to be devised. It reads:
             “32. In furtherance of the directions issued in C.
             Ravichandran Iyer case, this Court constituted a committee
             comprising of three Judges of this Court, namely, Justices
             S.C. Agrawal, A.S. Anand (as he then was) and S.P.
             Bharucha (as he then was), and the then two seniormost
             Chief Justices of the High Courts i.e. Justices P.S. Misra
             and D.P. Mohapatra (of the Andhra Pradesh High Court


15   (2015) 4 SCC 91
1964                                                      [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          and the Allahabad High Court, respectively), to lay down
          the ‘In-House Procedure’, for taking suitable remedial
          action against Judges, who by their acts of omission or
          commission, do not follow the accepted values of judicial
          life, including the ideals expressed by the Supreme Court in
          the ‘Restatement of Values of Judicial Life’. The Committee
          submitted its report on 31-10-1997. The same was adopted
          with amendments, in a Full Court Meeting of the Supreme
          Court of India, on 15-12-1999. In the aforestated report,
          three sets of procedure for taking such suitable remedial
          action against Judges were laid down. The first, related to
          the Judges of the High Courts, the second, to the Chief
          Justices of the High Courts, and the third, to the Judges
          of the Supreme Court. …”.
43. At the outset, the Procedure itself records complaints made against
    Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court often being
    received either by the Chief Justices of the High Courts or the CJI.
    Such complaints, also made to the President of India, are generally
    forwarded to the CJI for being looked into. Considering the lack of
    any constitutional mechanism or otherwise based whereon measures
    could lawfully be taken when the CJI is seized of such complaints,
    the Full Court of the Supreme Court by its resolution dated 15th
    December, 1999 adopted the Procedure.
44. The process under the Procedure begins when a written complaint
    containing verifiable and specific allegations is received by the CJI
    or the Chief Justice of a High Court. What actions are required to be
    taken thereunder if the complaint is found to be of a serious nature
    have been provided in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Procedure.
45. Should the matter merit a deeper probe, the CJI would constitute a
    Committee consisting of two Chief Justices of the High Courts (other
    than the High Court to which the Judge belongs) and one High Court
    Judge (paragraph 3), and the Committee so constituted has the
    liberty to devise its own procedure consistent with the principles of
    natural justice (paragraph 4). The inquiry, being in the nature of a
    fact-finding exercise, entitles the Judge under probe to appear and
    have his say recorded. Since it is not a formal judicial inquiry and
    given its fact-finding and non-punitive character, examination/cross-
    examination of witnesses and representation by lawyers are excluded.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1965

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


46. Upon receipt of the report of inquiry from the Committee, the CJI is
    empowered to take one of three possible courses of action, depending
    on the nature and gravity of the findings qua the allegations. Firstly, if
    the Committee concludes that the allegations are unfounded or lacking
    in substance, the CJI may choose to close the matter [paragraph
    5(a) read with paragraph 6]. Secondly, if the inquiry reveals serious
    misconduct, the CJI may advise the Judge to resign his office or
    seek voluntary retirement [paragraph 7(i)]. If the concerned Judge
    elects not to do so, the CJI shall intimate the President and the
    Prime Minister that the allegations are serious enough to warrant
    initiation of proceedings for removal and hence, judicial work has
    been withdrawn [paragraph 5(b) read with para 7(ii)]. Thirdly, where
    the misconduct is established but it is not so serious as to warrant
    removal, the CJI may call the Judge concerned and advise him
    accordingly; the report of the Committee to be placed on record may
    also be directed [paragraph 5(c) read with paragraph 8].
47. Despite the decision in Additional District and Sessions Judge
    ‘X’ (supra) at paragraph 47 thereof having delineated the various
    steps in the Procedure through which the proceedings must pass,
    we have given a brief overview for our own understanding.

     Precedents
48. Having noted the genesis and the contents of the Procedure, we
    proceed to consider the precedents that have been cited which
    directly dealt with proceedings/initiation of proceedings for removal
    of a Judge of a High Court.
49. The decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sub-
    Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) is, incidentally, the
    sheet anchor of Mr. Sibal’s arguments.
50. At the same time, other decisions of this Court having a material
    bearing for deciding the question of constitutionality of the Procedure
    would also necessarily fall for consideration which we propose to
    consider in seriatim.
51. Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) had to consider
    issues of some importance bearing on the construction of Articles
    121 and 124 of the Constitution as well the provisions of the Inquiry
    Act. The occasion for the controversy raised in the proceedings, the
1966                                                       [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     issues arising for decision and the broad contentions raised by the
     parties are noted in paragraphs 3, 4 and 15, respectively, of the
     majority judgment authored by Hon’ble B. C. Ray, J. (as His Lordship
     then was). For the sake of completeness but, at the same time, to
     maintain brevity, we discern that the main issues arising for decision
     were (i) what is the legal position and status of a Motion for the
     removal of a Judge under a law made pursuant to Article 124(5) of
     the Constitution? (ii) whether the Doctrine of Lapse would apply to
     such a Motion upon the dissolution of the Lok Sabha? (iii) whether
     the matters arising out of or relating to a Motion for removal of a
     Judge in either House of the Parliament are at all justiciable before
     courts of law? and (iv) whether the Court should decline to exercise
     jurisdiction as its decision and its writ might become infructuous
     (in view of the fact that in the ultimate analysis, the final arbiter
     whether at all any Address is to be presented rests exclusively with
     the Houses of Parliament and which are wholly outside the purview
     of the courts)?
52. One of the contentions was Contention F, reading as follows:
          “Contention F:— The process of removal by means of a
          Motion for address to the President is a political remedy.
          But the fundamental right to move the Supreme Court for
          enforcement of fundamental rights take within its sweep the
          right to access to a court comprising of Judges of sterling
          and unsullied reputation and integrity which is enforceable.
          This judicial remedy is independent of the constitutional
          remedy and that the court has jurisdiction to decide as to
          its own proper constitution. In exercise of this jurisdiction
          it should examine the grounds of the alleged misbehaviour
          and restrain the Judge from judicial functioning.”
53. While rejecting the said contention, this Court, inter alia, held thus:
          “111. The relief of a direction to restrain the Judge from
          discharging judicial functions cannot be granted. It is the
          entire Constitutional Scheme including the provisions
          relating to the process of removal of a Judge which are to
          be taken into account for the purpose of considering this
          aspect. It is difficult to accept that there can be any right
          in anyone running parallel with the Constitutional Scheme
          for this purpose contained in clauses (4) and (5) of Article
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1967

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


           124 read with Article 121. No authority can do what the
           Constitution by necessary implication forbids. Incidentally,
           this also throws light on the question of interim relief in
           such a matter having the result of restraining the Judge
           from functioning judicially on initiation of the process under
           the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The Constitutional Scheme
           appears to be that unless the alleged misbehaviour or
           incapacity is ‘proved’ in accordance with the provisions
           of the law enacted under Article 124(5) and a Motion for
           presenting an address for removal of the Judge on the
           ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity is made,
           because of the restriction contained in Article 121, there
           cannot be a discussion about the Judge’s conduct even in
           the Parliament which has the substantive power of removal
           under Article 124(4). If the Constitutional Scheme therefore
           is that the Judge’s conduct cannot be discussed even in
           the Parliament which is given the substantive power of
           removal, till the alleged misconduct or incapacity is ‘proved’
           in accordance with the law enacted for this purpose, then it
           is difficult to accept that any such discussion of the conduct
           of the Judge or any evaluation or inferences as to its merit
           is permissible according to law elsewhere except during
           investigation before the Inquiry Committee constituted
           under the statute for this purpose. The indication, therefore,
           is that interim direction of this kind during the stage of
           inquiry into the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is not
           contemplated it being alien to our Constitutional Scheme.”
                                          (emphasis laid by Mr. Sibal)

54. Having read what Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
    (supra) ruled while not accepting Contention F, we proceed to take
    note of the next relevant decision, i.e., C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra).
55. Hon’ble K. Ramaswamy, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking
    for the Bench in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), after referring to
    previous decisions, reaffirmed the importance of the CJI as the head
    of the institution, when a matter questioning the integrity of a Judge
    arises, in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the decision. In very clear words,
    His Lordship suggested an in-house procedure to be followed by the
    Chief Justices of the High Courts or the CJI, when they are seized
1968                                                      [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


    of a complaint related to a Judge’s conduct. The CJI, upon receipt
    of information from the Chief Justice of a High Court could take such
    action as “deemed necessary or warranted”. Although, the concerned
    Judge in this case had demitted office before the judgment was
    delivered, this Court held that its statements were to be treated as
    a precedent. Relevant passages from the decision read as follows:
         “35. It is true that this Court has neither administrative
         control over the High Court nor power on the judicial side
         to enquire into the misbehaviour of a Chief Justice or
         Judge of a High Court. When the Bar of the High Court
         concerned reasonably and honestly doubts the conduct
         of the Chief Justice of that Court, necessarily the only
         authority under the Constitution that could be tapped is
         the Chief Justice of India, who in common parlance is
         known as the head of the judiciary of the country. It is of
         importance to emphasise here that impeachment is meant
         to be a drastic remedy and needs to be used in serious
         cases. But there must exist some other means to ensure
         that Judges do not abuse the trust the society has in them.
         It seems to us that self-regulation by the judiciary is the
         only method which can be tried and adopted. …
         ***
         40. Bearing all the above in mind, we are of the considered
         view that where the complaint relates to the Judge of the
         High Court, the Chief Justice of that High Court, after
         verification, and if necessary, after confidential enquiry
         from his independent source, should satisfy himself about
         the truth of the imputation made by the Bar Association
         through its office-bearers against the Judge and consult
         the Chief Justice of India, where deemed necessary, by
         placing all the information with him. When the Chief Justice
         of India is seized of the matter, to avoid embarrassment to
         him and to allow fairness in the procedure to be adopted
         in furtherance thereof, the Bar should suspend all further
         actions to enable the Chief Justice of India to appropriately
         deal with the matter. This is necessary because any action
         he may take must not only be just but must also appear
         to be just to all concerned, i.e., it must not even appear
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1969

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


           to have been taken under pressure from any quarter. The
           Chief Justice of India, on receipt of the information from the
           Chief Justice of the High Court, after being satisfied about
           the correctness and truth touching the conduct of the Judge,
           may tender such advice either directly or may initiate such
           action, as is deemed necessary or warranted under given
           facts and circumstances. If circumstances permit, it may be
           salutary to take the Judge into confidence before initiating
           action. On the decision being taken by the Chief Justice
           of India, the matter should rest at that. This procedure
           would not only facilitate nipping in the bud the conduct of
           a Judge leading to loss of public confidence in the courts
           and sustain public faith in the efficacy of the rule of law
           and respect for the judiciary, but would also avoid needless
           embarrassment of contempt proceedings against the office-
           bearers of the Bar Association and group libel against all
           concerned. The independence of judiciary and the stream
           of public justice would remain pure and unsullied. The Bar
           Association could remain a useful arm of the judiciary and
           in the case of sagging reputation of the particular Judge,
           the Bar Association could take up the matter with the Chief
           Justice of the High Court and await his response for the
           action taken thereunder for a reasonable period.
           41. In case the allegations are against Chief Justice of a
           High Court, the Bar should bring them directly to the notice
           of the Chief Justice of India. On receipt of such complaint,
           the Chief Justice of India would in the same way act as
           stated above qua complaint against a Judge of the High
           Court, and the Bar would await for a reasonable period
           the response of the Chief Justice of India.
           42. It would thus be seen that yawning gap between proved
           misbehaviour and bad conduct inconsistent with the high
           office on the part of a non-cooperating Judge/Chief Justice
           of a High Court could be disciplined by self-regulation
           through in-house procedure. This in-house procedure
           would fill in the constitutional gap and would yield salutary
           effect. Unfortunately, recourse to this procedure was not
           taken in the case at hand, may be, because of absence
           of legal sanction to such a procedure.
1970                                                       [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          43. Since the 1st respondent has already demitted the
          office, we have stated as above so that it would form a
          precedent for future.”
                                                     (emphasis ours)

56. After the Procedure was devised in 1999 by the Full Court, acting on
    the precedent set by C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), Indira Jaising
    (supra) happened to be the first reported decision that had the
    occasion to consider whether a report of the Committee, constituted
    by the CJI in terms of the Procedure, ought or should be placed
    in the public domain. Answering the question in the negative, what
    the Court said [speaking through Hon’ble S. Rajendra Babu, J. (as
    the Chief Justice of India then was)] provides valuable guidance.
    Relevant passages read as under:
          “2. In the Chief Justices’ Conference held in December
          1999, sixteen clauses formed part of the Code of Conduct
          in addition to the declaration of assets by the Judges
          and in-house procedure was suggested in the event of
          any complaint against any Judge. However, sanction for
          these guidelines is absent. In our constitutional scheme it
          is not possible to vest the Chief Justice of India with any
          control over the puisne Judges with regard to conduct,
          either personal or judicial. In case of breach of any rule of
          the Code of Conduct, the Chief Justice can choose not to
          post cases before a particular Judge against whom there
          are acceptable allegations. It is possible to criticise that
          decision on the ground that no enquiry was held and the
          Judge concerned had no opportunity to offer his explanation
          particularly when the Chief Justice is not vested with any
          power to decide about the conduct of a Judge. There is
          no adequate method or machinery to enforce the Code of
          Conduct. Article 124 provides for appointment of Judges
          of this Court and also their removal. Similarly, Article 217
          deals with the appointment and removal of the Judges
          of the High Court. In the Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968
          provisions are made for investigation into misbehaviour or
          incapacity of a Judge. It may be noted that since Judges of
          the superior courts occupy very high positions, disciplinary
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                             1971

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


           proceedings which exist in the case of all other employees
           cannot be thought of.
           3. The Committee referred to by the petitioner is stated
           to have been constituted as a part of in-house procedure.
           A Judge cannot be removed from his office except by
           impeachment by a majority of the House and a majority
           of not less than 2/3rds present and voting as provided
           by Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution of India. The
           Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has been enacted providing
           for the manner of conducting inquiry into the allegation
           of judicial conduct upon a M otion of impeachment
           sponsored by at least hundred Lok Sabha Members or
           fifty Rajya Sabha Members. The Presiding Officer of the
           House concerned has the power to constitute a committee
           consisting of three persons as enumerated therein. No
           other disciplinary inquiry is envisaged or contemplated
           either under the Constitution or under the Act. On account
           of this lacuna in-house procedure has been adopted for
           inquiry to be made by the peers of Judges for report to the
           Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India in case of a complaint
           against the Chief Justices or Judges of the High Court in
           order to find out the truth of the imputation made in the
           complaint and that in-house inquiry is for the purpose of
           his own information and satisfaction. A report made on
           such inquiry if given publicity will only lead to more harm
           than good to the institution as Judges would prefer to face
           inquiry leading to impeachment. In such a case the only
           course open to the parties concerned if they have material
           is to invoke the provisions of Article 124 or Article 217 of
           the Constitution, as the case may be. It is not appropriate
           for the petitioner to approach this Court for the relief or
           direction for release of the report, for what the Chief Justice
           of India has done is only to get information from peer
           Judges of those who are accused and the report made to
           the Chief Justice of India is wholly confidential. The said
           report is only for the purpose of satisfaction of the Chief
           Justice of India that such a report has been made. It is
           purely preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final. If the
           Chief Justice of India is satisfied that no further action is
1972                                                         [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


             called for in the matter, the proceeding is closed. If any
             further action is to be taken as indicated in the in-house
             procedure itself, the Chief Justice of India may take such
             further steps as he deems fit. Therefore, in the hierarchy
             of the courts, the Supreme Court does not have any
             disciplinary control over the High Court Judges, much less
             the Chief Justice of India has any disciplinary control over
             any of the Judges. That position in law is very clear. Thus,
             the only source or authority by which the Chief Justice of
             India can exercise this power of inquiry is moral or ethical
             and not in exercise of powers under any law. Exercise of
             such power of the Chief Justice of India based on moral
             authority cannot be made the subject-matter of a writ
             petition to disclose a report made to him.”
                                                       (emphasis ours)

57. This decision was followed by P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry
    Committee16. In this case, no part of the Procedure or any step
    taken in furtherance thereof was under challenge. The challenge in
    the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was to an order
    of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha constituting a three-member
    committee under Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act. The principle, nemo
    debet esse judex in propria sua causa, was sought to be invoked
    and a pointed challenge to the inclusion of a senior advocate in the
    committee in the category of ‘jurist’ was laid on the ground of bias.
    The petitioning judge had not approached the Court soon after the
    committee was constituted; on the contrary, he did so ten months
    later when he was notified of the charges. Based on such conduct,
    this Court held:
             “80. The issue deserves to be considered from another
             angle. Admittedly, the petitioner raised the plea of bias
             only after receiving the notice dated 16-3-2011 which was
             accompanied by the statement of charges and the lists of
             documents and witnesses. The petitioner’s knowledgeful
             silence in this regard for a period of almost ten months
             militates against the bona fides of his objection to the


16   (2011) 8 SCC 380
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1973

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


           appointment of Respondent 3 as member of the Committee.
           A person of the petitioner’s standing can be presumed to
           be aware of his right to raise an objection. If the petitioner
           had the slightest apprehension that Respondent 3 had
           prejudged his guilt or he was otherwise biased, then, he
           would have on the first available opportunity objected
           to his appointment as a member of the Committee. The
           petitioner could have done so immediately after the
           publication of the Notification dated 15-1-2010. He could
           have represented to the Chairman that investigation by
           a Committee of which Respondent 3 was a member will
           not be fair and impartial because the former had already
           presumed him to be guilty.
           81. … However, the fact of the matter is that the petitioner
           never thought that Respondent 3 was prejudiced or ill-
           disposed against him and this is the reason why he did not
           raise any objection till April 2011 against the inclusion of
           Respondent 3 in the Committee. This leads to an irresistible
           inference that the petitioner had waived his right to object
           to the appointment of Respondent 3 as member of the
           Committee. The right available to the petitioner to object
           to the appointment of Respondent 3 in the Committee
           was personal to him and it was always open to him to
           waive the same.”
58. Next in line is the decision in Additional District and Sessions
    Judge ‘X’ (supra). Hon’ble J. S. Khehar, J. (as the Chief Justice of
    India then was), speaking for the Court, went deep into the Procedure
    and observed that:
           “35. It is, therefore, apparent that the seeds of the “In-
           House Procedure” came to be sown in the judgment
           rendered by this Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer case. It
           is also apparent, that actions have been initiated under
           the ‘In-House Procedure’, which has the approval of the
           Full Court of the Supreme Court of India. And, based
           on the aforestated ‘In-House Procedure’, impeachment
           proceedings were actually initiated by Parliament under
           Article 124 of the Constitution of India. There can therefore
           be no doubt whatsoever, that in the above situation, the
1974                                                       [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


        ‘In-House Procedure’ is firmly in place, and its adoption
        for dealing with matters expressed by this Court in C.
        Ravichandran Iyer case is now a reality.
        36. Despite the above conclusion, it is imperative to take
        into consideration the observations recorded by this Court
        in Indira Jaising v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of
        India , as under : (SCC pp. 496-97, paras 2-3)
             “…………”
        A perusal of the observations made by this Court in the
        extract reproduced above, reveals that the existence of
        the ‘In-House Procedure’ is now an established means
        for inquiring into allegations levelled against a Judge of a
        superior court, through his peers. It is a confidential inquiry
        for institutional credibility under the charge of the Chief
        Justice of India. And therefore, its affairs are to be kept
        out of public domain. The proceedings under the above
        procedure being sensitive, are required to be inaccessible
        to third parties. And therefore, the prayer seeking the
        disclosure of the report submitted on the culmination of
        the ‘In-House Procedure’ was declined. The object sought
        to be addressed through the ‘In-House Procedure’, is to
        address concerns of institutional integrity. That would, in
        turn, sustain the confidence of the litigating public, in the
        efficacy of the judicial process.
        37. It is impermissible to publicly discuss the conduct of a
        sitting Judge, or to deliberate upon the performance of his
        duties, and even on/of court behaviour, in public domain.
        Whilst the ‘In-House Procedure’ lays down means to
        determine the efficacy of the allegations levelled, it is now
        apparent, that the procedure is not toothless, in the sense,
        that it can lead to impeachment of the Judge concerned
        under Article 124 of the Constitution of India. … But, that
        should not be understood to mean, that an individual
        concerned, who is called upon to subject himself/herself
        to the contemplated procedure, should be precluded or
        prevented from seeking judicial redress. It is now well
        understood, that an individual who subjects himself/herself
        to the jurisdiction of an authority, cannot turn around to find
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                              1975

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


           fault with it at a later juncture. If there is a fault, the same
           should be corrected, before one accepts to submit to the
           jurisdiction of the authority concerned. The submission of the
           petitioner in the present case, to the ‘two-Judge Committee’,
           would certainly have had the above effect. We are therefore
           satisfied to hold, that those who are liable to be affected by
           the outcome of the ‘In-House Procedure’, have the right to
           seek judicial redressal, on account of a perceived irregularity.
           The irregularity may be on account of the violation of the
           contemplated procedure, or even because of contemplated
           bias or prejudice. It may be on account of impropriety.
           The challenge can extend to all subjects on which judicial
           review can be sought. The objections raised on behalf of
           Respondent 3, in respect of the sustainability of the instant
           petition at the hands of Addl. D & SJ X, are therefore wholly
           untenable. The challenge to the maintainability of the instant
           writ petition, is accordingly declined.
           ***
           55. In view of the consideration and the findings recorded
           hereinabove, we may record our general conclusions as
           under:
           55.1. The ‘In-House Procedure’ framed by this Court,
           consequent upon the decision rendered in C. Ravichandran
           Iyer case can be adopted to examine allegations levelled
           against the Judges of the High Courts, Chief Justices of
           the High Courts and Judges of the Supreme Court of India.
           55.2. The investigative process under the ‘In-House
           Procedure’ takes into consideration the rights of the
           complainant, and that of the Judge concerned, by adopting
           a fair procedure, to determine the veracity of allegations
           levelled against a sitting Judge. At the same time, it
           safeguards the integrity of the judicial institution.
           55.3. Even though the said procedure should ordinarily
           be followed in letter and spirit, the Chief Justice of India
           would have the authority to mould the same, in the
           facts and circumstances of a given case, to ensure that
           the investigative process affords safeguards, against
           favouritism, prejudice or bias.
1976                                                      [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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          55.4. In view of the importance of the ‘In-House Procedure’,
          it is essential to bring it into public domain. The Registry
          of the Supreme Court of India, is accordingly directed to
          place the same on the official website of the Supreme
          Court of India.”
59. It is in the conspectus of the above noted precedents that the
    contentions urged by the Petitioner would fall for consideration.

     Other Topics
60. Dwelling on a few more topics having relevance and materiality would
    not be inapt. Hence, we venture to do that now while making our
    own observations to assist us in accomplishing our task.

     Role of the CJI
61. While the CJI is no doubt primus inter pares – first among equals –
    and also does not exercise powers of superintendence over the High
    Courts and the Judges of the High Court, nonetheless, the CJI bears
    a significant moral responsibility as the foremost judicial officer to
    ensure that the judiciary of the country functions in a transparent,
    efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner.
62. Petitioner has challenged the CJI’s recommendation for initiation of
    proceedings for removal (if at all such recommendation has been
    made, for we do not know what exactly was intimated to the President
    and the Prime Minister) on the ground that the CJI, under the
    constitutional scheme, has no authority to make such recommendation
    and moreover, such opinion would prejudice the Members of the
    Parliament and violate the spirit of separation of powers.
63. The Procedure contemplates withdrawal of judicial work of the
    Judge under probe. While forwarding the report of inquiry to the
    President/the Prime Minister, the CJI does so for indicating why
    judicial work is not assigned to the Judge, not as to why he should
    be impeached/removed. Withdrawing judicial work from a Judge
    is indeed an extreme measure and, therefore, has to be based on
    sound reasons; hence, the report of inquiry forms the plinth for the
    President and the Prime Minister to be intimated of such an action.
    This is an important distinction, not noticed by the Petitioner.
64. Assuming arguendo that the CJI endorsed the findings in the
    Report submitted by the Committee and did recommend initiation of
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                             1977

                        XXX v. The Union of India & Others


      proceedings against the Petitioner for removal from office, we have
      no hesitation to say that the CJI is not a mere post office between
      the Committee and the President/the Prime Minister that the Report
      is to be forwarded without any remarks/recommendation. The CJI is
      clearly an important person, if not the most, in the larger scheme of
      maintaining institutional interest and credibility to ascertain whether
      a Judge has indulged in misconduct. As per the Procedure, after
      receiving a complaint against a Judge or a report from the Chief
      Justice of the High Court of which he is a Judge, the CJI has to apply
      his mind to the nature of complaint/report together with supporting
      materials, if any. If the CJI believes that the matter requires a deeper
      probe, he is required to constitute a Committee for an in-house inquiry.
      The report of inquiry may, or may not, find the allegations against
      the Judge to be serious, so as to call for any measure. However, if
      it does, the CJI is under an obligation to forward the report to the
      President and the Prime Minister. We see no justification to hold that
      in so forwarding, the CJI may not give his own views.
65. Moreover, the President of India is not a stranger to the judicial
    process. In K. Veeraswami v. Union of India17, the Court noted that:
             “51. The President is not an outsider so far as judiciary
             is concerned. The President appoints the Judges of the
             High Courts and the Supreme Court in exercise of his
             executive powers. Clause (1) of Article 217 provides that
             every Judge of the High Court shall be appointed by the
             President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India,
             the Governor of the State, and in the case of appointment
             of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice
             of the High Court. Similarly the President appoints the
             Judges of the Supreme Court. Clause (2) of Article 124
             provides that every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be
             appointed by the President in consultation with such of
             the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts
             as the President may deem necessary for the purpose
             and in case of appointment of a Judge other than the
             Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be
             consulted. The President exercises this power with the aid


17   (1991) 3 SCC 655
1978                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          and advise of his Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the
          Constitution. (Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab [(1974)
          2 SCC 831 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 550 : (1975) 1 SCR 814]
          and S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87 :
          AIR 1982 SC 149] ). Parliament has no part to play in the
          matter of appointment of Judges except that the executive
          is responsible to the Parliament.”
66. We wish to go a bit further in observing that the President is not
    only not an outsider to the judiciary but also not an outsider to the
    Procedure itself. In the prefatory paragraphs of the Procedure, as
    devised by the Full Court, it has been acknowledged that complaints
    are received by the CJI from the office of the President. Having
    received such complaints from the President, it is quite but natural that
    the CJI would not only acknowledge receipt of such complaints but
    also apply his mind and respond to the same, wherever necessary.
67. Pausing here for a moment, what else is the CJI expected to do,
    if he is of the view that the matter requires a deeper probe? We
    hasten to add that where the Committee itself (constituted by the
    CJI) finds substance in the allegations and the misconduct found is
    serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal, the
    CJI does have the authority, in a fit and proper case, to endorse
    such finding while forwarding the report of inquiry.
68. Next, the argument that the Members of either or both houses of the
    Parliament could be influenced by the CJI’s opinion is not acceptable
    since the opinion is not forwarded either to the Speaker of the Lok
    Sabha or to the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. For arguments sake,
    even if it is assumed that Members of Parliament have had access
    to the recommendation/advice of the CJI, if any, nothing much turns
    on it. The Inquiry Act includes a specific mechanism which has to
    be statutorily followed before any address for impeachment is made
    in the House(s). The report of the Committee being preliminary
    in nature, ad hoc and not final, as held in Indira Jaising (supra),
    cannot affect the Petitioner in future proceedings unless such report
    is relied upon at a future stage of the proceedings/at the inquiry; if
    relied upon, the Petitioner would be free to exercise his rights as
    are available in law.
69. At the same time, it needs no emphasis that although the CJI is the
    head of the institution, he too is not above the law which is supreme;
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1979

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     hence, utmost care has to be taken to ensure that any action of the
     CJI is not in deviation of the Procedure which permits the in-house
     inquiry to be undertaken.

     The Judges (Protection) Act
70. The relevant provisions of the Protection Act are reproduced
    hereunder:
           “2. Definition.—In this Act, ‘Judge’ means not only every
           person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also
           every person— (a) who is empowered by law to give in
           any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment
           which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a
           judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority,
           would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons
           which body of persons is empowered by law to give such
           a judgment as is referred to in clause (a).
           3. Additional protection to Judges.—
           (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
           for the time being in force and subject to the provisions
           of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any
           civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or
           was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done
           or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or
           purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial
           duty or function.
           (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any
           manner the power of the Central Government or the State
           Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High
           Court or any other authority under any law for the time
           being in force to take such action (whether by way of
           civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise)
           against any person who is or was a Judge.”
                                                       (emphasis ours)

71. The Protection Act, we guess, may not have been brought to the
    notice of this Court in any of the previous decisions considered
    here by us. Viewed in that light, this decision could be the first of
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                           Supreme Court Reports


      judicial pronouncements by this Court touching Section 3(2) of the
      Protection Act vis-à-vis the Procedure; hence, we propose to deal
      with it in some detail while assigning reasons for our firm opinion on
      applicability of the Protection Act in the instant case.
72. First, the definition of a Judge in the Protection Act is an expansive
    one intended to take into its fold anyone empowered by law to give
    a definitive judgment in a legal proceeding. Therefore, the protection
    envisaged thereunder applies not only to the Judges appointed under
    the Constitution (i.e., the Supreme Court and the High Courts) and
    the Judges recognised by the Constitution (the district Judiciary) but
    also to judges of various tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies having
    powers of adjudication across the country.
73. Secondly, Section 3(1) of the Protection Act provides that no Court
    would entertain any civil or criminal proceeding against a judge acting
    in his official or judicial duty or function. In the case of D.C. Saxena
    (Dr) v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India18, it was observed that:
             “57. ….The protection of Articles 124(4), 121, 211, the
             Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 and the Judges
             (Protection) Act, 1985 is to ensure independence to the
             judiciary. Threat to judicial process is a challenge to the
             authority of the court or the majesty of justice. It would be
             ex facie contumacious conduct.”
74. While referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
    Protection Act, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand19
    noticed its object and purport as follows:
             “35. Even under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 immunity
             has been given to judicial officers in relation to judicial
             work done by them as well as for the judicial orders
             made by them. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
             for introducing the Bill in relation to the 1985 Act which
             reads thus is instructive:
             ‘Judiciary is one of the main pillars of parliamentary
             democracy as envisaged by the Constitution. It is essential


18   (1996) 5 SCC 216
19   (1998) 1 SCC 1
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                                   1981

                      XXX v. The Union of India & Others


             to provide for all immunities necessary to enable Judges
             to act fearlessly and impartially in the discharge of their
             judicial duties. It will be difficult for the Judges to function if
             their actions in court are made subject to legal proceedings,
             either civil or criminal.’ …”
75. A similar sentiment was noticed in the Constitution Bench decision in
    Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India20
    wherein it was observed:
             “724. Similarly, Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act,
             1985 provides, inter alia, that no court shall entertain or
             continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person
             who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed,
             done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or
             purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial
             duty or function. This is in addition to the protection given
             by Section 77 of the Penal Code, 1860…”
76. Indeed, Section 3(1) is subject to Section 3(2) and does not expressly
    prohibit a departmental proceeding or otherwise but bars entertainment
    and continuance of civil or criminal proceedings against a Judge as
    defined in Section 2 for any act, thing or word committed, done or
    spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act
    in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.
77. Section 3(2) starts with a non-obstante clause with reference to
    Section 3(1) and inter alia specifically ordains that the authorities
    mentioned therein are not denuded of the power to initiate civil,
    criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise against any Judge
    as long as the law in force allows them to do so. We place sufficient
    emphasis on the word “otherwise” as present in Section 3(2). The
    Procedure having provisions for an in-house inquiry, with which
    we are concerned, is admittedly not akin to any inquiry connected
    with a departmental proceeding since it lacks the bearings of a true,
    valid and legal departmental proceeding. It is a proceeding akin to a
    preliminary fact-finding inquiry intended to serve a specific purpose.
    However, the Procedure contemplating a fact-finding inquiry can
    and does very well fit in the mould of the word “otherwise”. It is a


20   (2016) 5 SCC 1
1982                                                      [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     cardinal principle that no word in a statute is superfluous. We need
     not burden our judgment with referring to precedents on this point.
78. We have noted the response of Mr. Sibal earlier that no law exists
    conferring power on the Supreme Court to initiate proceedings against
    a Judge of a High Court.
79. Attractive though at first blush, and accepting that a Judge cannot
    be removed from office except in the manner ordained by the
    Constitution, this submission of Mr. Sibal fails to take note of the
    legal position flowing from Article 141 of the Constitution. As noted
    in the decisions starting with C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), the
    “In-house Procedure” proposes to fill the gap in the constitutional
    mechanism and the ground realties present. Paragraph 43 of the
    decision quoted above provides the guiding light for this purpose.
    Parliament has saved the Supreme Court’s authority to initiate such
    proceedings and take such action as it thinks fit, provided there is
    a law for the time being in force in that regard by enacting sub-
    section (2) of Section 3; and, the law declared by the Court in C.
    Ravichandran Iyer (supra) is what bridges the breach.
80. Moreover, the 1999 Full Court resolution has been framed on the
    basis of this decision; therefore, there is full legal sanction to the
    Procedure when read in the light of guidance provided by Article
    141 of the Constitution.
81. It was also submitted that if we propose to interpret the Protection
    Act as conferring power to proceed against a Judge of a High
    Court, then the Central Government/State Government would also
    be able to initiate proceedings for such removal. While respectfully
    disagreeing with Mr. Sibal, we have no hesitation to hold that
    inclusion of the Central Government or the State Government or
    such other authority in sub-section (2) of Section 3 is for the simple
    reason that ‘Judge’, as defined in the Protection Act, is not limited
    to the Judges of the Supreme Court and/or the High Court but also
    includes judges conducting judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings
    in the Tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies, thereby ensuring that the
    protection granted under the Protection Act encompasses all such
    individuals having authority to exercise judicial power under the law.
82. In our considered opinion, the Protection Act does not offend the
    constitutional scheme present; and, being in addition to the extant
    provisions, does not affect the Supreme Court’s authority to take
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         1983

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     such action, as deemed fit, against a Judge of a High Court who is
     alleged to have indulged in misconduct in terms of the Procedure.
83. In interpreting the Protection Act, we are once again reminded of
    the “yawning gap” in the procedure as noticed in C. Ravichandran
    Iyer (supra), on ‘who’ sets the ball rolling. If we were to accept the
    contention of Mr. Sibal, the Supreme Court and the CJI would be
    powerless to initiate any action even on the face of allegations of
    gross misconduct against a sitting Judge of a High Court which
    cannot be the legislative intention. To address the growing concern
    of incidents of misconduct, the Procedure has been craftily designed
    to discipline Judges internally for such misconduct that is sufficient to
    tarnish the dignity of his office as well as the institution to which he
    belongs. The recognition that self-imposed ethical norms are integral
    to the judiciary’s credibility, forms the cornerstone of the non-statutory
    but wholly legal internal procedure for maintaining discipline and, by
    extension, integrity of the institution. On this construction, we hold that
    the CJI’s discretion as to whether, where and when to act, mindful
    of the substance in the complaints received, would obviously be a
    regulated discretion; but, once the ball is set rolling by the CJI, it must
    end with his recommendation/advice to the President and the Prime
    Minister depending on what the Committee records as its findings.
84. It does not require any emphasis that judicial officers in every rank,
    and more specifically, the Judges in the higher echelons of the
    Judiciary owe huge obligation to the people of this country. No Judge,
    either of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, being above the law,
    acting in the discharge of his judicial or administrative/non-judicial
    or official duties in a manner attracting a possible complaint of not
    abiding by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (widely regarded
    now as the Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and
    the High Courts) has to be shunned. Frivolous complaints being
    lodged by disgruntled litigants, lawyers and others, though cannot
    be avoided, the path of probity also can never be abandoned by a
    Judge. Any thought of there being absence of disciplinary measure
    other than removal by impeachment (which has never fructified over
    the years despite occasions calling for it) and therefore escaping
    unscathed despite committing a misbehaviour or indulging in bad
    conduct/misconduct, is what is normal, should be eschewed. With the
    advancement in science and technology and all other spheres of work,
    it is quite possible to bring to the CJI’s notice how a particular Judge
1984                                                         [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     might have conducted himself inappropriately calling for strict action.
     Withdrawal of judicial work from a Judge is an extreme measure that
     the Procedure expressly permits. There are other measures too,
     which could be explored if Judges are found to deviate from the Code
     of Conduct. The Judges should, therefore, act cautiously and exercise
     their discretion wisely, to evade creation of a situation where initiating
     action becomes imperative. The judiciary in India is characterised
     by judicial independence; however, judicial independence signifies
     flexibility of judicial thought and the freedom to adjudicate without
     external and internal pressure, and not unfettered liberty to act as
     one might wish. Just as judicial independence is fundamental, so too
     is judicial accountability; compromising one compromises the other.
85. Given that the only formal mechanism for addressing judicial
    misbehaviour under the Constitution is impeachment by Parliament, it
    must be remembered that not all misbehaviour of Judges necessarily
    rise to the level of “proved misbehaviour” attracting Articles 217 and
    218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124. The Constitution’s
    silence on cases that do not rise to the level of proven misbehaviour
    creates a significant structural vulnerability, which has since been
    addressed by the Procedure. The Procedure acts as a check on
    Judges’ unbridled freedom of action and thereby seeks to prevent
    outcomes that could be harmful or unjust. Under the present set-up,
    impeaching the Procedure or any part thereof may itself be viewed
    as unreasonable and unjustified. Expressing our imprimatur of the
    Procedure, we close our discussion on the Protection Act without
    spilling further ink on this issue.

     The nature of Inquiry under the Procedure
86. We wish to now dwell on the nature of inquiry that the Procedure
    contemplates.
87. The inquiry that is part of the Procedure is designed to be a fact-
    finding inquiry as distinguished from a guilt-finding inquiry; and it
    is, therefore, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular
    disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee.
88. To repeat, Indira Jaisingh (supra) terms the report of the in-house
    inquiry as preliminary in nature, ad-hoc and not final.
89. Once the CJI constitutes the Committee, it is required to hold an
    inquiry into the allegations contained in the complaint in the manner
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                       1985

                        XXX v. The Union of India & Others


      that the Procedure ordains. The Committee does have some leeway
      to devise its own procedure consistent with the principles of natural
      justice. Though the Committee is not required to extend opportunity of
      cross-examination of the persons who come before it for giving their
      versions or opportunity to the Judge under probe to be represented
      by a lawyer, the Judge must be called upon to appear and given
      opportunity to have his say recorded. After concluding the inquiry, the
      Committee may conclude and report to the CJI that (a) there is no
      substance in the allegations contained in the complaint, or (b) there
      is sufficient substance in the allegations contained in the complaint
      and the misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation
      of proceedings for removal of the Judge, or (c) there is substance
      in the allegations contained in the complaint but the mis-conduct
      disclosed is not of such a serious nature as to call for initiation of
      proceedings for removal of the Judge.
90. Given its very nature, the Committee by preparing its report and
    recording its findings, effectively assists the CJI in arriving at a
    conclusion as regards the proposed action in a given case based
    thereon.
91. Admittedly, this is a case falling within the second situation where the
    Committee has recorded an opinion that there is sufficient substance
    in the allegations contained in the letter of the CJI and the misconduct
    disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation of proceedings for
    removal of the Petitioner.
92. Insofar as the purpose that a preliminary enquiry seeks to serve, there
    are multiple decisions of this Court on the point. A Constitution Bench
    in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India21 observed that a
    preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie
    case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very
    necessary that the two should not be confused. In Narayan Dattatraya
    Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra22, it has been held that
    a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the inquiry conducted
    after the issue of charge-sheet; once regular inquiry is held under
    the rules, the preliminary inquiry loses its importance and whether
    the preliminary inquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by
    observing principles of natural justice remains of no consequence.


21   AIR 1964 SC 1854
22   (1997) 1 SCC 299
1986                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


      Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat23 is one other decision where
      this Court categorically observed that the material collected in a
      preliminary inquiry has no relevance once a regular inquiry has started
      and no material obtained during such preliminary enquiry can be used
      against the delinquent employee, if such employee had no occasion
      to cross-examine the concerned witnesses. All these decisions are
      authorities on the point that generally, in the sphere of disciplinary
      proceedings against delinquent officers/employees, the concept of
      a preliminary inquiry contrasted with an inquiry, which is part of a
      disciplinary/ departmental enquiry, is different. The raison d’être of
      a preliminary enquiry is to determine whether a full-fledged inquiry
      is at all needed based on the materials collected in course thereof.
93. That the “In-house Procedure” is not toothless and may very well
    trigger initiation of proceedings in the Parliament for removal is
    acknowledged in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’
    (supra); however, no action for removal can be taken merely on the
    basis of the Committee’s report since the Inquiry Act contemplates
    a full-fledged inquiry against the concerned Judge. To that extent,
    the report of the Committee may not carry much weight. Even
    though the report might record that there is sufficient substance in
    the allegations, the Inquiry Act does not debar the Judge charged
    with misbehaviour to raise an effective defence by presenting such
    evidence as are admissible and relevant once the evidence of the
    witnesses supporting the charge are recorded. Needless to say,
    if any reliance is placed by the Committee under the Inquiry Act
    upon the report of the Committee prepared under the Procedure,
    the Judge charged has a right to be informed whereupon it shall be
    open to him to raise such points as to non-reliability/non-acceptability
    thereof as are available in law. All rights of a Judge charged with
    misbehaviour have, necessarily to be traced to the Inquiry Act as
    well as rules of fair play so as to facilitate a fair, reasonable and
    adequate opportunity of hearing. Nonetheless, the lack of opportunity
    of a fair hearing in the Procedure cannot prejudice the concerned
    Judge given the nature of the inquiry.
94. In line with the previous decisions, we have no hesitation to hold that
    the nature of inquiry in the instant case is preliminary, ad-hoc and
    not final as well as not violative of any principle of natural justice.


23   (2013) 4 SCC 301
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                          1987

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     Why is the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
     (supra) not applicable?
95. Reliance placed by Mr. Sibal on the decision in Sub-Committee
    on Judicial Accountability (supra) is, in our considered view,
    misplaced. That decision is distinguishable both on facts and on law
    for the following reasons:
     First, the issue which arose in such case was materially different
     from the one in the present case. The questions which were required
     to be answered by this Court in the said decision have been noted
     earlier in paragraph 51 (supra). Anything and everything said in a
     decision, while answering the questions which might arise, do not
     form a precedent. It is settled law that a decision is an authority for
     what it decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and
     not every observation found therein, nor what logically follows from
     every observation made in the decision.
     Secondly, the Constitution is not a static document. Constitutional
     Courts are obligated to interpret the Constitution in the light of evolving
     standards and institutional needs. The decision in C. Ravichandran
     Iyer (supra) marked a turning point by recognising the necessity of
     an “In-house Procedure” to address complaints against Judges. The
     decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra),
     rendered years earlier, could not have envisioned the framework
     developed in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) simply because of the
     nature of problem that the latter had to solve.
     Thirdly, C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), while being one amongst
     few authoritative pronouncements by this Court acknowledging
     the primacy of the CJI in preserving the institutional integrity of the
     judiciary, categorically held that the CJI may take preliminary steps
     when credible allegations arise, without encroaching upon the domain
     of the Parliament under Article 124(4). The role assigned to the CJI
     in this context is entirely distinct and was never under contemplation
     in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra).
     Fourthly, in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), though the concerned
     judge had tendered his resignation and demitted office before the
     judgment was pronounced, the Court nonetheless proceeded to lay
     down the legal foundation for an in-house mechanism and setting
     it as a precedent for all future cases. The Court’s stance makes it
1988                                                       [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     evident that Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) is
     not applicable to the issue of “In-house Procedure”.
     Fifthly, the Protection Act did not exercise the consideration of the
     Court in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra).
     Sixthly and finally, the evolution of the law post C. Ravichandran Iyer
     (supra) has seen consistent affirmation of the in-house mechanism of
     discipline by self-regulation by this Court. The Procedure has since
     received judicial endorsement in at least three subsequent decisions.
96. The scope of the present matter, to a discerning eye, goes
    beyond the principles laid down in Sub-Committee on Judicial
    Accountability (supra), which did not have the occasion to address
    the permissibility or validity of an in-house mechanism. In any event,
    we do not see any observation in Sub-Committee on Judicial
    Accountability (supra) made by the Court precluding the judiciary
    from instituting internal, non-punitive mechanisms for the purpose
    of fact-finding and disciplinary introspection by self-regulation. The
    constitutional silence on internal mechanisms, in our opinion, cannot
    be seen as a prohibition but rather it provided a space for responsible
    judicial innovation which has stood the test of time.
97. For all the foregoing reasons, the ruling in Sub-Committee on
    Judicial Accountability (supra) cannot be read as a limitation upon
    the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the CJI, particularly
    in matters concerning internal judicial discipline and the preservation
    of institutional integrity.
98. Mr. Sibal’s contention relying on Sub-Committee on Judicial
    Accountability (supra) is, thus, rejected.

     Answers
99. Resting on the observations/findings given above, our endeavour to
    answer the questions is rendered easy.

     Answer to Question (i)
100. The question of entertainability of the writ petition assumes
     importance, keeping the conduct of the Petitioner in perspective as
     distinguished from a waiver of his rights. It has been noted that not
     only did the Petitioner not object to the photographs/video footage
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1989

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     being uploaded, he participated in the inquiry without demur. In his
     representation dated 6th May, 2025 addressed to the CJI too, there
     was no whisper of the Procedure fouling any constitutional provision.
     Challenge to the constitutionality of paragraph 5(b) and paragraph 7
     (ii) of the Procedure has been raised in this writ petition only after
     the CJI had written to the President and the Prime Minister, while
     enclosing therewith copy of the Report of the Committee together
     with the Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025, as required by
     the Procedure.
101. We had repeatedly asked Mr. Sibal as to why the Petitioner waited
     to invoke the writ jurisdiction. Why did the Petitioner not object to the
     photographs/video footage being uploaded? Should the Petitioner
     not have approached the Court earlier without submitting to the
     jurisdiction of the Committee? Once the Petitioner submitted to
     the jurisdiction, is it not to be presumed that he did so expecting a
     favourable outcome and the writ petition came to be filed only when
     the outcome was not palatable to him? Having regard to the caution
     sounded in paragraph 37 of Additional District and Sessions Judge
     ‘X’ (supra), was it not incumbent for the Petitioner to point out any
     perceived fault or flaw in the Procedure before submitting to the
     jurisdiction of the Committee? In view of P.D. Dinakaran (1) (supra),
     does the Petitioner pass the test of acting bona fide?
102. P.D. Dinakaran (1) (supra) emphasised that the petitioning judge
     should not have waited for 10 months to approach the Court when
     he had objection regarding inclusion of a member in the committee
     as a jurist. Mr. Sibal’s argument that there cannot be a waiver of a
     Fundamental Right is unexceptionable. However, what was said in
     paragraph 81 of the decision is important. The Petitioner can well be
     held disentitled to relief based on his tardy conduct but not, perhaps,
     on the ground of waiver.
103. Mr. Sibal was, however, heard to submit that if the Petitioner had
     approached it earlier, the Court could well have declined interference
     on the ground that the writ jurisdiction may be invoked if at all the
     report of inquiry were adverse to his interest.
104. We do not consider this answer worthy of acceptance. There are
     umpteen decisions of this Court ruling that when the vires of a
     provision is under challenge in a writ petition, it forms one of the four
1990                                                         [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     exceptions to the self-imposed restraint, propounded by decisions of
     this Court, of not entertaining a writ petition because an alternative
     remedy is available to the petitioner. Then again, there are good
     number of decisions of this Court to the effect that challenge in a writ
     petition to a show-cause notice for stalling inquiries or investigative
     processes is not to be entertained unless the Court is satisfied that
     the notice is non-est for total lack of jurisdiction of the notice issuing
     authority to inquire into/investigate facts. This Court, in criminal
     matters, even entertains challenges to criminal proceedings after
     police reports (charge-sheets) have been filed and interfered in fit
     and proper cases. There does hardly exist any strait-jacket formula
     that the Courts would be loath to interfere or refuse to entertain a
     writ petition since the proceedings are yet to draw to a conclusion.
     Every case coming before the Court for adjudication would necessarily
     depend on its own facts and the nature of challenge, i.e., whether
     challenge to the vires of a provision has been raised on prima facie
     strong grounds or whether a total lack of jurisdiction is shown to exist
     in the notice issuing authority even to inquire into or investigate facts;
     and, there can be no rule of universal application that the Courts
     must invariably decline interference for no better reason than that
     the proceedings, out of which the challenge stems, are pending. It
     was, therefore, not open to the Petitioner to believe that the Court
     would have refused to entertain the writ petition had he approached
     earlier, which made him wait.
105. Uploading of the photographs/video footage, according to the
     Petitioner, caused him immense harm. Not only did it lower his
     reputation, he was convicted in the public eye without even a
     preliminary inquiry. It could be so. However, what baffles us is the
     conduct of the Petitioner to acquiesce to such uploading, participate
     in the inquiry without demur, and to question such uploading only
     after the Committee submitted its report to the CJI recording that
     there was sufficient substance in the allegations. The argument of Mr.
     Sibal that such uploading has had the effect of vitiating the enquiry
     is untenable. Though uploading of incriminating evidence available
     against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a step
     which the Procedure requires and while such uploading may not be
     considered to be proper, it is indeed a fait accompli. No benefit can
     be claimed because of such uploading of the incriminating evidence
     at this stage, once in a duly constituted inquiry findings have been
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         1991

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     recorded as regards the failures/omissions of the Petitioner to abide
     by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life.
106. Even otherwise, inquiry had been initiated against the Petitioner
     in terms of the Procedure which itself has been affirmed by this
     Court multiple times before. If indeed any fault were found in the
     Procedure and questions were to be raised, the Petitioner ought
     not to have waited for completion of the fact-finding inquiry set in
     motion by the CJI.
107. The conduct of the Petitioner, therefore, does not inspire much
     confidence for us to entertain the writ petition.
108. We could have closed the writ petition based on our observation as
     above. However, we do not wish to tread the easy route but would
     rest our conclusions based on the answers to the other questions too.

     Answer to Questions (ii) and (iii)
109. These questions being related, are taken up for consideration together.
110. Mr. Sibal has referred to the decision in Indira Jaising (supra) to
     urge that the only source or authority of the CJI to exercise the
     power of ordering an inquiry is moral and ethical. According to him,
     the Procedure has no legal sanction.
111. We are of the firm opinion that the argument is unacceptable for
     twin reasons, based on two key tenets.
112. The first reasoning rests on the rulings of this Court in the decisions
     noted above affirming the Procedure, with which we are ad idem.
     Significantly, C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) in express terms made it
     abundantly clear that the yawning gap between proved misbehaviour
     and bad conduct inconsistent with the high office of a Judge of a
     High Court could be disciplined by self-regulation through “In-house
     Procedure” which, in turn, while filling up the constitutional gap,
     would yield salutary effect. Even though the respondent Judge had
     demitted office as the Chief Justice, but noting the absence of legal
     sanction to such procedure, the Court ruling is a revelation that its
     statements should form a precedent for the future. Once the dicta
     in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) constitutes a precedent, it is law
     declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is judicial legislation
     that emerged because of the vacuum in the field of disciplining a
1992                                                         [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     Judge who shows signs of delinquency. Additional District and
     Sessions Judge ‘X’ (supra) traced the history of the Procedure and
     stamped its approval. Merely because in Indira Jaising (supra) the
     source of authority was held to be moral and ethical would not assist
     the Petitioner. We unhesitatingly hold that might have originated as
     moral and ethical authority gradually transformed into legal authority
     of the CJI in view of C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra).
113. There is one other compelling reason for us to hold that the Procedure
     could be seen as having a legal sanction. Sub-section (2) of Section
     3 of the Protection Act has been noticed by us, above. Although
     sub-section (1) of Section 3 extends protection to Judges and
     restrains courts from entertaining and continuing proceedings – civil
     or criminal – in respect of any act, thing or word committed, done or
     spoken by a Judge when, or in the course of, acting or purporting
     to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function, the
     same is subject to sub-section (2). In terms thereof, a person who
     is or was a Judge is not immune from proceedings being initiated by
     the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme
     Court or any High Court or any other authority, as the case may
     be, under any law for the time being in force. The action that could
     lawfully be taken against anyone, who is or was a Judge, might be
     civil, criminal, departmental proceedings or otherwise; but, such an
     action, has to be at the instance of the named authority only if it is
     conferred with such authority by law.
114. That the Procedure has its roots in the law declared by this Court
     under Article 141 of the Constitution admits of no doubt. Accordingly,
     we hold that ‘law for the time being in force’ in sub-section (2) of
     Section 3 of the Protection Act would include law laid down by
     this Court and that the term ‘otherwise’ read in conjunction with
     ‘such action’, appearing in the said sub-section, is wide enough to
     encompass measures that the Procedure contemplates.
115. The contention that the Procedure lacks legal sanction must,
     accordingly, fail.
116. Having held so, we are inclined to the view that it is not the law
     that once the Committee constituted by the CJI records in its report
     that the conduct of the Judge under probe warrants initiation of
     proceedings for his removal and the CJI, in turn, upon accepting
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                        1993

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     such report furnishes the same together with his recommendation,
     if any, to the President and the Prime Minister, that would invariably
     in all cases result in initiation of proceedings under Article 124(4)
     and (5) of the Constitution (for Supreme Court Judges) and Articles
     217 and 218 read with Article 124 (for High Court Judges) and the
     inquiry under the Inquiry Act. Report or no report, recommendation
     or no recommendation, whatever is the case, the Parliament’s
     power to initiate proceedings for removal of a Judge for alleged
     misbehaviour or incapacity remains unfettered. Even though there
     could be a case where good grounds for initiation of proceedings
     do exist, the Parliament may in its wisdom elect not to go ahead to
     initiate proceedings for removal. Contrarily, even if it is reported by
     the Committee under the Procedure that there exists any of the two
     situations [para 5(a) or 5(c)] and the CJI, accepting such report, does
     not make any recommendation, nothing prevents the Parliament to
     initiate proceedings for removal if for reasons aliunde it considers
     necessary so to do. Notably, if the Parliament, despite strong indication
     of a Judge either having indulged in misbehaviour or suffering
     from incapacity, does not initiate any proceedings for removal, no
     proceeding in a judicial forum would perhaps lie for activating the
     Parliament to have such Judge removed from office. The power,
     competence, authority and jurisdiction of the Parliament to decide
     what is in the best interests of the nation is left untrammelled by the
     Procedure; hence, it is fallacious to argue that the Procedure is a
     parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge.
117. Yet again, the in-house inquiry or its report forming part of the
     Procedure in itself does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the
     constitutionally ordained procedure. Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a
     removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional
     mechanism. We reiterate that “a stitch in time saves nine”.
118. Questions (II) and (III), thus, stand answered.

     Answer to Question (IV)
119. More than once, we have observed above how the Procedure found
     its way into the system. The Procedure having been discussed and
     affirmed in multiple precedents since C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra)
     and we having expressed our agreement therewith, the argument
     that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional scheme for removal
1994                                                        [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     of Judges by taking recourse to Article 124 is unsustainable. Our
     observations, while dealing with the relevant topics, do provide ample
     reasons why the Procedure or the inquiry contemplated thereunder
     has not been considered to be in violation of any provision of the
     Constitution, much less Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The
     procedure that has been laid down in the Procedure is fair and just
     which does not compromise judicial independence either, a basic
     feature of our Constitution. A judge by his conduct of being fair and
     just is supposed to earn for himself as well as the judiciary the trust
     and respect of the members of the bar as well as the litigants and
     all other stakeholders. If a complaint of misconduct committed by a
     Judge is received and if at an inquiry conducted under the Procedure
     the allegations against such a Judge are found to have sufficient
     substance, he cannot claim any immunity - either by citing abrogation
     of his Fundamental Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for
     removal of a Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment - that
     his conduct is not open to be commented upon by the Committee
     or even by the CJI.
120. We see no reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure in any
     manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional provision.

     Answer to Question (V)
121. We have noticed each and every stage through which the proceedings
     against the Petitioner have passed. Right from the constitution of
     the Committee till intimations were given to the President and the
     Prime Minister by the CJI - we have neither been shown nor is it
     a fact proved that either the CJI constituted Committee or the CJI
     acted in any manner in deviation of the Procedure, except when
     the photographs/video footage were uploaded on the website of the
     Supreme Court. We wish to observe here that placing incriminating
     evidence available against a Judge under probe in the public domain
     is not a measure provided in the Procedure, either expressly or
     by implication. Indira Jaising (supra) holds in clear terms that the
     inquiry under the Procedure is for the information and satisfaction
     of the CJI and the report of inquiry is confidential and, therefore,
     such report cannot be made public. That being the clear position,
     we are inclined to hold the entire process under the Procedure too
     as confidential having ascertainment of truth as one of its objectives.
     The demands of being fair and transparent, in such cases, have to
     yield to the confidential nature of the process. Thus, uploading of
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                       1995

                    XXX v. The Union of India & Others


     the photographs/video footage on the website of this Court cannot
     be viewed as a necessary requirement of the “In-house Procedure”
     and, thus, approved. But, then again, nothing really turns on the
     uploading of the photographs/video footage since the Petitioner,
     as observed above, did not have any grievance in relation thereto
     which is obvious from his failure to question such uploading at an
     appropriate time thereby allowing a situation to grow where the Court
     is faced with a fait accompli. Even in this writ petition, no relief is
     claimed in respect of such uploading.
122. Now that nothing is pending at the end of the Supreme Court and/
     or the CJI, the Petitioner may exercise his rights in accordance with
     law as and when an appropriate occasion arises.

     Answer to Question (VI)
123. The CJI, as the leader of the judiciary, apart from his various other
     duties owes a duty to the people of the country to keep the justice
     delivery system pure, clean and unpolluted. It is unreasonable to
     even think that despite an incident of the present nature, the CJI
     would wait for the Parliament to take action. As observed before,
     it is up to the Parliament whether or not to activate Article 124.
     Left to him, the CJI upon being informed of a Judge’s remissness
     does have the authority – moral, ethical and legal – to take such
     necessary action as is warranted to keep institutional integrity intact.
     Any adverse impact on the credibility of the institution could prove
     dear. It is keeping in view such concerns and the legal position of
     the President being the ultimate appointing authority of Judges and
     the Prime Minister being the head of the Council of Ministers, upon
     whose aid and advice the President acts under our Constitution,
     coupled with receipt of complaints from the office of the President
     that we find the provision in paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure
     requiring the CJI to write to the President and the Prime Minister
     along with the report of the Committee to be quite in order, legal
     and valid. We repat, the office of the CJI is not to be regarded as
     a post office that the report should only be routed through the CJI
     without his observations.
124. We say again, we are unaware like the Petitioner of what the CJI
     remarked while forwarding the Report of the Committee and the
     Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025 to the President and the
     Prime Minister. However, if indeed, the CJI has reiterated the finding
1996                                                      [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


     of the Committee as contained in the Report and recommended
     initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from office,
     such a recommendation cannot be impeached on any valid and
     legal ground. Notwithstanding that the recommendation of the CJI
     carries much weight, one has to realize that the intimation given by
     the CJI, under the Procedure, is for the eyes of the President and
     the Prime Minister alone and not anyone else.
125. Therefore, we see no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure
     as infringing either any provision of the Constitution or the concept
     of separation of powers.
126. Before we conclude, one other contention is left to be dealt with
     which was advanced by Mr. Rohatgi. It could be true that the then
     CJI granted an opportunity of hearing to the Judge of the Calcutta
     High Court under probe. However, it must be realised that it was a
     step going beyond the Procedure. Here, the CJI has scrupulously
     followed the Procedure which does not envisage a hearing to be
     given to the Judge under probe after he has expressed his inability
     to resign or voluntarily retire. Even though a hearing ‘could have
     been given’, it cannot be equated with ‘should have been given’ in
     the absence of any such express obligation in the Procedure. The
     contention, thus, fails to impress us.

     Conclusion
127. For the foregoing reasons, no interference is called for. The writ
     petition stands dismissed.

     Result of the case: Writ Petition dismissed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain