Holding

The licences are revocable, no indefeasible right of renewal exists, and the Board’s termination of the licences for a public purpose is lawful and non‑arbitrary, so the appeals are dismissed.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the termination of licences granted by the Paradeep Port Trust (the Board) for manual and mechanically operated iron‑ore storage plots. The appellants claimed an indefeasible right to renew their licences and alleged that the Board’s decision violated constitutional principles. The Court held that the licences were merely licences under the Easements Act, revocable at the Board’s will, and that the Board’s policy‑guided decision to reclaim the land for modern port facilities was a legitimate public purpose, not arbitrary or irrational. No vested right of renewal existed under the Major Port Trusts Act or the land‑policy guidelines, and the Board’s discretion was exercised in accordance with the 2004 and 2010 policy directions. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the Board’s termination orders and dismissed all the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether any indefeasible legal right exists for the appellants to renew or continue use of the allotted plots.
Whether the Board is justified in terminating the licences to develop port facilities and generate higher revenue.
Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 to grant relief despite the Board’s policy‑based decision.
Whether the allotments constitute licences or leases under Section 49 of the Major Port Trusts Act and the Easements Act.
Whether the Board’s decision amounts to an arbitrary or irrational exercise of power violating Articles 14 and 12 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 12, s. 136, s. 14, s. 226, s. 32
Indian Easements Act, 1882s. 52, s. 60
Indian Ports Act, 1908
Major Port Trusts Act, 1963s. 111, s. 49
Tariff Authority for Major Ports (under Section 47A of the Major Port Trusts Act)

Subjects

Major Port Trusts Actlicence revocationpublic purposeArticle 136 jurisdictionland policy guidelinesEasements Actrenewal of licencearbitrarinessconstitutional lawpublic trust doctrine

Judgment

[2013) 17 S.C.R. 801

YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. A
v.
AUROGLOBAL COMTRADE P. LTD. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 11229 of 2013)
DECEMBER 17, 2013.
B
[H. L. GOKHALE AND J. CHELAME;SWAR, JJ.]

MAJOR PORT TRUSTS ACT, 1963:

s. 49 rlw s. 111 - Conditions for use of land belonging to c
Board - Held: Board is bound by policy directions given by
Government of India from time to time u/s 111 - Land Policy
guidelines, 2004 forbid sale or lease of land and enable the
Board only to grant or renew a licence - The 2010 policy
guidelines restrict the authority of the Board to renew the D
licences for only two terms - The tenure of any licence is
stipulated to be for a maximum period of 11 months - Thus,
the policy only enables the Board to renew licences granted
but does not create any vested right in favour of licensor -
Therefore, allotment of plots in dispute is only by way of a E
licence, as defined u/s 52 of Easements Act, 1882 - Land
Policy for Major Ports, 2004- Land Policy for Major Porl:s,
2010 - Easements Act, 1882~s. 52.

s. 49(3) - Discretion of Board to permit .use of its
properties - Held: Sub-s. (3) of s. 49 authorises the Board to F
lease its properties either by auction or by inviting tenders -
The expression 'the Board may' occurring in the sub-section
indicates that lease is the highest of rights that may be created
on the properties - It does not eliminate the discretion of
Board to permit use of its properties by any arrangement G
which transfers a lesser or no interest (such as a licence) in
the property - Leave and licence.

Easements Act, 1882:
801 H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A ss.52 and 60 - Licence - Held: A licence is revocable
at the will of grantor which is the essence of a licence - The
Act categorically declares that a licence can be revoked by
grantor except in the contingencies specified u/s 60(a) and
(b) - In the instant case, none of the appellants have any
s indefeasible right of renewal either under Easements Act or
under Land Policy guidelines - Appellants failed to establish
that decision of Board to terminate their licences is otherwise
violative of any of substantive right - Decision of the Board
needs no interference.
c Renewal of licence in respect of land belonging to Board
- Held: A public body like the respondent Board cannot
arbitrarily decline to renew a licence - If it decides not to renew
any licence either with respect to a class of licences or with
reference to a specific area of the land, normally such a
D decision cannot be said to be either irrational or arbitrary
unless there are other compelling reasons to indicate that the
decision has no rational purpose to be achieved - In the
instant case, entire parcel of land which was allotted to the
various licensees of manually operated plots is proposed to
E be utilised by the Board for creating modern operational
facilities in connection with activities of the Port and
termination of licences of mechanically operated plots would
save the Board from huge financial loss - Such a decision
cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational exercise of authority
F of a public body, having regard to the object sought to be
achieved by Board - Therefore, proposed course of action by
Board neither infringes any legal right of appellants nor does
it amount to an arbitrary exercise of auth.ority by Board -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 12 and 14 - Approbate
G and reprobate.

Constitution of India, 1950:

Art. 136 - Jurisdiction under - Preliminary objection as
regards new grounds raised- Held: Jurisdiction under Art. 136
H
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 803
COMTRADE P. LTD.
is discretionary only to be exercised in order to ensure that A
injustice is not perpetuated - One of the important attributes
of discretionary jurisdiction is that such jurisdiction is not
exercised where it is likely to be a futile exercise - Therefore,
accepting preliminary objection and refusing to consider the
ground newly raised by the Board would only "drive parties to B
fresh litigation" rendeting present adjudication a futile
exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court - Issue, can be
decided by Supreme Court to prevent a possible damage to
the programme proposed to be undertaken by Board and its
"speedy accomplishment"- Subsequent events. c
Arts. 32, 136 and 226 - Notices of termination oflicences
based on a decision of High Court in a case in which
appellant-noticees were not parties - Held: Interfering with the
notices of termination of licences on the ground that the
notices were initially based on a decision of High Court to D
which appellants were not parties, would not be in the larger
public interest- Even otherwise, Court proposed to deal with
the matters as if they were petitions under Art. 32 and
permitted the appellants to place all the material which would
be available to them in law in defence even if the impugned E
termination orders were not to be based on the decision of
the High Court - Appellants failed to place before the Court
any material to establish that the decision of Board to
terminate their licences is otherwise violative of any of the
substantive right - Practice and Procedure. F

By notice dated 2-6-2011, Paradeep Port Trust (the
'Board') invited applications for allotment of 20 manual
iron ore plots of different.sizes. Respondent no. 1 in C.A.
No. 112329 of 2013 (Auroglobal) was declared to be one G
of the successful bidders and was allotted one manual
iron ore storage plot subject to various terms and
conditions. After utilising the same for about a year,
respondent no.1 approached the High Court by way of a
writ petition, inter alia, to seek declarations that it had a
' H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A right of renewal of the allotment of the plot; that the
pricing modality arrived at through the tender was
contrary to the tender conditions and the conditions for
renewal in the tender were violative of Arts. 14, 16 and 19
of the Constitution of India. The High Court by an interim
B order dated 2.8.2012, held that the Board did not follow
a uniform and consistent procedure in making allotment
of various plots of lands, and that plots could be allotted
only on the basis of an auction to the highest bidders. It
also found fault with the Board for having renewed
c certain licences granted earlier. Pursuant to the said
order, the Board cancelled licences of 48 manually
operated iron ore storage plots and 11 mechanically
operated storage plots. Licensees of 38 manually
operated plots category and 7 of the mechanically
operated plots category filed the appeals. Respondent
0
No. 1 also filed C.A. No. 11273 of 2013, but on different
grounds.
'
During the pendency of the instant appeals, the
Board altered the basis of its decision and decided to rest
E on the need of (i) the land in the dispute (covered by the
manually operated plots) for providing better facilities and
(ii) mechanically operated plots for securing better/higher
revenue. A preliminary objection was raised by the
appellants that neither of the two grounds, relied upon
F by the respondent Board in the instant proceedings were
the grounds on which either the High Court directed the
eviction of the appellants or the 'quit notices issued by
the respondent Board were founded and, therefore, the
Supreme Court may not embark upon an examination of
G those questions as a court of ·first instance.

The following questions arose for consideration of
the Court:
(1) Whether there was any indefeasible legal right in
H favour of any one of the appellants for renewal of the
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 805
COMTRADE P. LTD.
licence g~anted or continued use of plots allotted to A
them? ""'
(2) Irrespective of the answer to the above question,
whether the Board was justified to terminate the
allotments on the ground that it proposed to utilise the
B
land in dispute for providing better amenities in
connection with the obligations imposed upon the Board
by law?
(3) Whether the Court would be justified in law to
decline granting relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under c
Art. 136 of the Constitution of India either on the ground
that the appellants had no indefeasible right of renewal
or on the ground that irrespective of the rights of the
appellants, the purpose sought to be achieved by the
Board in proposing to resume the disputed lands was a
public purpose which 'should override the interest of any D
of the appellants?
Disp·osing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 is discretionary only to be E
exercised in order to ensure that injustice is not
perpetuated. One of the important attributes of
discretionary jurisdiction is that such jurisdiction is not
exercised where it is likely to be a futile exercise i.e. where
the relief might be of no use to the applicant because it F
would still be open to the competent authority to achieve
the result sought to be achieved by the disputed action
leaving the defeat i.e. by following the proper procedure
etc. In the instant case, nothing in law prevents the Board
from calling upon the appellants to desist from use of the G
land in dispute. Such a course of action is the declared
intention of the Board. [para 35] [829-B-C; 830-A-B]
1.2. Therefore, accepting the preliminary objection
and refusing to consider the ground newly raised by the
Board would only "drive the parties to fresh litigation" H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A rendering the present adjudication a futile exercise of the
jurisdiction of this Court. The issue can be decided by
this Court to prevent a possible damage to the
programme proposed to be undertaken by the Board and
its "speedy .accomplishment". Besides, this Court in
B either granting or declining to grant a relief in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Art. 136 can take note of the
developments either of fact or law which leave an impact
on the r1ghts and obligations of parties before the Court.
Even otherwise, this Court proposed to deal with the
c matters as if they were petitions under Art. 32 and
permitted the appellants to place all the material which
would be available to them in iaw in defence even if the
impugned termination orders were not to be based on the
decision of the High Court. [paras 36 and 59] [830-C-F,
D 842-0]
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs . .The Motor & General
Traders 1975 (3) SCR 958 =
(1975) 1 SCC 770 and
Rameshwar and Others vs. Jot Ram and Another etc. 1976
=
(1) SCR 847 (1976) 1 sec 194 - relied on.
E
2.1. In view of the fact that most of the licences in
favour of the appellants came to be granted pursuant to
a process of either an auction or tender, those allotments
cannot be said to be inconsistent with the principles of
F law laid down by this Court in 2G case in the absence of
any other circumstance vitiating the allotment. [para ~7]
[825-G-H]
Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others v. Union
=
of India and others 2012 (3) SCR 147 (2012) 3 SCC 1 -
G referred to.

2.2. Insofar as the allotment of plots made on
application (prior to 2005), the Board came out with a
clear explanation that there was hardly any competition
H at that point of time for the allotment of plots. Therefore,
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 807
COMTRADE P. LTD.
there is no reason to find any fault with such allotrm~nt A
on the ground that the allotment was made withou~
following the pro.i:;edure of auction or tender. Moh!!
particularly, in the absence of any dispute regarding the
correctness of the assertion of the Board that there was.
hardly any demand at that point of time for allotment <>f B
plots. [para 27) [825-H; 826-A-B]

3.1. The plots in dispute are property vested in a
public body (statutory corporation) performing important
public functions. In the matter of. creating rights and/or C
conferring privileges such a body is required to act in
public interest under some rational policy. The Boarct is
bound by the policy dire.:;tions given by the Government
of India from time to time u/s 111 of the Major Port Trusts
Act, 1963. [para 39) [831-D-E]
D
3.2. The Land Policy guidelines, 2004 forbid sale or
lease of land and enable the Board only to grant or renew
a licence without any limitation on the number of
renewals. The 2010 policy guidelines clearly restrict the
authority of the Board to renew the licences for only two E
terms. The tenure of any licence is stipulated to be for a
maximum period of 11 months. In either case, from the
language of the policy guidelines it is clear that the policy
only enables the Board to renew the licences granted but
·does not create any vested right in favour of the licensor. F
Even the letter of allotment makes it clear that what is
granted is only a licence. (See Footnote 6) Therefore, the
allotment of plots in dispute is only by way of a licence,
as defined u/s 52 of the Easements Act, 1882. [para 41]
[832-B-D]
G
3.3. Licence by definition does not create any interest
in the property. A licence only gives a right to the grantee
to use the immovable property of the grantor. There is no
transfer of any interest in such property In favour of the
grantee. Under s. 60, a licence is revocable at the will of H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A the grantor which is the essence of a licence. The
Easements Act categorically declares that a licence can
be revoked by the grantor except in the two
contingencies specified u/s 60(a) and (b). No such
exceptions are pleaded or demonstrated by the
B appellants. Therefore, it must be held that none of the
appellants have any indefeasible right of renewal either
under the Easements Act or under the said Land Policy
guidelines. [para 42] [832-E; 833-A; 834-A-B]

3.4. However, a public body like the respondent
C Board cannot arbitrarily decline to renew a licence. No
public body under our Constitutional system is vested
with such arbitrary powers. If the Board decides not to
renew any licence either with respect to a class of
licences or with reference to a specific area of the land,
D normally such a decision cannot be said to be either
irrational or arbitrary unless there are other compelling
reasons to indicate that the decision has no rational
purpose to be achieved. [para 43] [834-B-D]

E R.O. Sheffy vs. Airport Authorities, 1979 (3) SCR 1014 =
(1979) 3 sec 489 - relied on.
3.5. In the counter filed by the respondent Board
before this Court, it is stated that the entire parcel of land
which was allotted to the various licensees of the
F manually operated plots from time to time by the Board
in favour of iron ore exporters, (except a small portion of
the land allotted in favour of the Odisha Mining
Development Corporation), is proposed to be utilised by
the Board after terminating the licences of the appellants
G for creating certain modern operational facilities in
connection with the activities of the Port. Such a decision
cannot be said to be arbitrary or an irrational exercise of
authority of a public body, having regard to 'the object
sought to be achieved by the Board of creating modern
H amenities. The exception in favour of the Odisha Mining
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 809
COMTRADE P. LTD.
Development Corporation cannot amount to A
discriminatory treatment of the appellants, since that
Corporation is admittedly a State owned Corporation and
forms a class by itself. Therefore, the proposed course
of action by the Board to terminate the licences neither
infringes any legal right of the appellants nor does it B
amount to an arbitrary exercise of the authority by the
Board. [para 44] [834-E; 835-A-D]
3.6. The Board desires to utilise the parcel of land in
dispute for a purpose which is authorised by law and
serves better the larger interests of nation - including the C
interests of the exporters and importers such as the
appellants. Setting aside the, order under appeal on the
ground of breach of natural justice would be a futile
exercise. The respondent Board/licensor can always
terminate/revoke the licences. The proposed revocation D
of licences would not amount to an irrational or arbitrary
decision, rejecting the new plea of the Board or any
ground would only lead to protracted litigation
consuming considerable time and delay in execution of
the project, by the Board. Such a delay would not E
subserve public interest. The appellants were given a
wholesome opportunity by this Court to establish their
legal right, to prevent the Board from terminating their
licences. [para 47] [835-G-H; 836-A-D]
F
4.1. The appellant in C.A. 11273 of 2013 (respondent no.
1 in C.A. No. 11229 of 2013) acquired the licence knowing
fully well the terms and conditions subject to which the
licence is offered by the Board. So they cannot take the
benefit of the offer and renounce the corresponding
obligation (~pprobate and reprobate). Further, the appellant G
can'\ot be said to have discrimiilated against, since the
other licencees who are paying a lower 'licence fee' had
secured the licenses at a point of time when there was no
competition and the market conditions were different. [para
51] [837-G-H; 838-A] H
' 210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A Hari Shankar & Ors. Vs. Dy. Excise & Taxation
=
Commissioner & Ors. 1975 (3) SCR 254 (1975) 1 SCC 737,
Sh yam Lal & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCC 336 and
State Bank of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Jage Ram & Ors. 1980 (3)
=
SCR 746 (1980) 3 SCC 599 - referred to.
B
4.2. Section 49(3) authorises the Board to allot plots
either by following the procedure of auction or inviting
tenders and demand amounts higher than those
contemplated under sub-s (1). It cannot be said that once
C the Board resorts to the process of auction or inviting
tenders, the Board can only allot a plot on lease but not
a licence. Sub-s. (3) of s. 49 authorises the Board to lease
its properties either by auction or by inviting tenders.
There is no warrant to read into the language of said sub-
section a legislative intention that in every case where the
D Board undertakes the process of auction or inviting
tenders, it is bound,{obliged to grant a lease of its
properties. The expression 'the Board may' occurring in
the said sub-section indicates that the lease is the highest
of rights that may be created on the properties, by the
E Board under the said provision. It does not eliminate the
discretion of the Board to permit use of its properties by
any arrangement which transfers a lesser or no interest
(such as a licence) in the property. [paras 52 and 54] [838-
F-G; 839-A-D]
F
4.3. C. A. 11267 of 2013 filed by Odisha Mining
Corporation Ltd., one of the licensees of the respondent
Board, stands disposed of in view of a specific statement
made at the bar on behalf of the Board that it does not
G propose to terminate the licence of the appellant as the
plot of land. allotted to the appellant is not required for the
purpose of its proposed developmental project. [para 56]
t839-F-G]
4.4. As regards the civil appeals filed by licensees of
H the 7 mechanically operated iron ore plots, each one of
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 811
COMTRADE P. LTD.
them enjoyed the benefit of the allotment of plot by virtue A
of successive renewals. There is no reason to interfere
with the decision of the Board to terminate the licences
for the reasons: Firstly, a licence does not create any
indefeasible legal right. Secondly, there is no irrationality
in the decision of the Board, even from the· point of view B
of the: fact that the Board is a public body (the State within
the meaning of Art. 12) and, therefore, obliged to act
rationally. The Board's decision to terminate the licences
is consistent with the policy guidelines of 2010. Thirdly,
the Board in its additional affidavit dated 25.11. 2013 has c
stated to the effect that keeping in view the growth rate
of iron ore traffic, non- availability of mechanically
operated plots to the Port Trust will entail huge financial
loss to the Port, and there is no reason to do)Jbt the said
assertion. [para 57) [839-H; 841-C-G; 842-B] .
D
5.1. Interfering with the notices of termination of
licences in each one of these cases on the ground that
the notices were initially based on a decision of the
Orissa High Court to which the appellants were not
parties, would not be in the larger public interest. [para E
58] [842-B-C]

5.2. The appellants failed to place before this Court
any material to establish that the decision of the Board
to terminate their licences is otherwise violative of any of F
the substantive right. In the circumstances, this Court
declines to interfere with the decision of the Board. [para
60) [842-E-F]

Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special
Reference No.1of2012 2012 (9) SCR 311=(2012)10 SCC G
1 - cited.

Case Law Reference :
2012 (3) SCR 147 referred to para 20
H

-·
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A 2012 (9) SCR 311 cited para 21
1975 (3) SCR 958 relied on para 34
1976 (1) SCR 847 relied on para 34
B 1979 (3) SCR 1014 relied on para 43
1975 (3) SCR 254 referred to para 50
(1977) 1 sec 336 referred to para 50

1980 (3) SCR 746 referred to para 50
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
11229 of 2013.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2012 of the
D High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in WPC No. 11785 of 2012.
WITH

C.A. No. 11230, 11231, 11232, 11232-11234, 11235, 11236,
11237, 11238, 11239, 11240, 11241, 11242, 11243, 11244,
E 11245, 11246, 11247, 11248, 11249, 11250, 11251, 11252,
11253, 11254, 11255, 11256, 11257, 11258-11259, 11260,
11261, 11262, 11263, 11264-11265, 11273, 11266, 11267,
11268, 11269, 11270-11271, 11272, 11278, 11274, 11275,
11276-11277, 11279, 11280, 11281, 11282, 11283 of 2013.
F
Kedar Nath Tripathy, Khaitan & Co., L.R. Singh, Milind
Kumar, Jyoti Mendiratta, Parmanand Gaur, Rakesh K. Sharma,
Raj Kumar Mehta, Siddhartha Chowdhury, A. Venayagam
Balan, Mukul Kumar, Vinodh Kanna B for the Appellant.

G Sharmila Upadhyay, Mukul Kumar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. Leave granted in all the SLPs.

H
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 813
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
2. All these SLPs arise out of an order of the Orissa High A
Court made in Miscellaneous Case No. 11005 of 2012 in Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 11785 of 2012 on 2nd August, 2012. The
said writ petition was filed by the appellant in the appeal arising
out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 38013 of 2012 i.e. Mis.
Auroglobal Comtrade Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as B
Auroglobal).

3. Since the appeals at hand require examination of the
rights and obligations arising under the Major Port Trusts Act,
1963, we deem it appropriate to examine the scheme of the C
said Act, insofar as it is irrelevant.

Paradeep Port is a majo; port as defined under Section
3 sub-Section (8) 1 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908. The activities
of all major ports including the Paradeep Port are regulated by
various enactments such as the Indian Ports Act, 1908 and the D
Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Acf')
etc. The Act stipulates under Section 3 that the Central
Government shall cause to be cons~tuted a Board of Trustees
with respect to each of the major ports. Such Boards are
declared to be bodies corporate. The second respondent in the E
appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.26321 of 2012 (also a
respondent in all the appeals), described (wrongly) as
Paradeep Port Trust is one such Board of Trustees constituted
under Section 3 of the Act. But for the sake of convenience
hereinafter will be referred to as the 'Board'. Each such Board F
is authorised under Section 37 to compel any sea-going vessel
within the port or "port approaches'., to use the various facilities
provided by the Board. Section 35 enumerates the various
facilities and services at the port which can be undertaken by
G
1. 3(8) "major port" means any port which the Central Government may by
notification in the Official Gazette declare, or may under any law for the
time being in force have declared. to be a major port.
2. Section 2(r) of Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 - 2(r) " port approaches", in
relation to a port, means those parts of the navigable rivers and channels
leading to the port, in which the Indian Ports Act is in force; H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A the Boards. Section 48 of the Act authorises the framing of a
"scale of rates" for any one of the services rendered by a Board.
Such a scale of rate is required to be notified in the official
gazette. The scale of rates is required to be framed by the Tariff
Authority for Major Ports constituted under Section 47A3 .
B
4. Section 49 of the Act, 1963, as it stands today reads
as follows:-

"49. Scale of rates and statement of conditions for use
of property belonging to Board- (1) The Authority shall
c from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette,
also frame a scale of rates on payment of which, and a
statement of conditions under which, any property
belonging to, or in the possession or occupation of, the
board, or any place within the limits of the port or the port
D approaches may be used for the purposes specified
hereunder-

3. 47A. Constitution and incorporation of Tariff Authority for Major Ports. - (1)
With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification
E
in the Official Gazette, appoint there shall be constituted for the purposes
of this Act an Authority to be called the Tariff Authority for Major Ports.
(2) The Authority shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid having
perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name
sue and be sued.
F 3) The head office of the Authority shall be at such place as the Central
Government may decide from time to time.
(4) The Authority shall consist of the following Members to be appointed by the
Central Government, namely:-
(a) A Chairperson from amongst persons who is or who has been a Secretary
to the Government of India or has held any equivalent post in the Central
G Government and who has experience in the management and knowledge
of the functioning of the ports;
(b) A Member from amongst economists having experience of not less than
fifteen years in the field of transport or foreign trade;
(c) a Member from amongst persons having experience of not less than fifteen
years in the field of finance with special reference to investment or cost
H analysis in the Government or in any financial institution or industrial or
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 815
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
(a) approaching or lying at or alongside any buoy, A
. mooring, wharf, quay, pier, dock, land, building or
place as aforesaid by vessels;

(b) entering upon or plying for hire at or on any wharf,
quay, pier, dock, land, building, road, bridge or B
place as aforesaid by animals or vehicles carrying
passengers or goods;

(c) leasing of land or sheds by owners of goods
imported or intended for export or by ..steamer
agents; C
(d) any other use of any land, building, works, vessels
or appliances belonging to or provided by the
Board.

(2) Different scales and conditions may be framed for D
different classes of goods and vessels.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1 ),
the Board may, by auction or by inviting tenders, lease
any land or shed belonging to it or in its possession or E
occupation at a rate higher than that provided under sub-
section (1)."

5. It is necessary to notice here that sub-Section (3) was
inserted by Act 17 of 1982 with effect from 31.5.1982. For the
F
present, it is sufficient to note that Section 49 also authorises
the authority constituted under Section 4 7A to frame a "scale
of rates" for using any property either belonging to or in the
possession or occupation of the Board. The.distinction between
Sections 48 and 49 is that while Section 48 deals with the scale
of rates for the services to be rendered by the Board, Section G
49 deals with the scale of rates for the utilisation of the property
(both moveable and immovable) of the Board.

6. However, sub-Section (3) authorises the Board to collect
amounts higher than those prescribed under the scale of rates H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A contemplated under sub-Section (1) either by resorting to a
process of auction or inviting tenders in the contei..1 of the use
of the property belonging to the Board. The relevance of the
said sub-Section will be discussed later.

B 7. Chapter IX of the Act contains provisions which
authorise the Government of India to exercise supervisory
control as specified in the various provisions of the said
Chapter over the activities of the boards constituted under the
Act. Relevant in the context of the present litigation is Section
111 4 of the Act which declares that both, the authority
C constituted under Section 4 7A and the Boards constituted
under the Act are bound "by such directions on questions of
policy" as the Central Government may give in writing from time
to time.

D 8. In exercise of the authority under Section 111, it appears
that the Central Government issued certain directions to all the
major ports except Kolkata 'and Mumbai styled as Land Policy
for Major Ports initially in the year 2004 which was modified in
the year 2011.
E
9. In the first of the above-mentioned policies, the
Government took note of the fact that under Section 34 of the
Act, the Board of a major port can lease out 'its immovable
property'. However, under the poJicy, the Central Government
directed that "no lease or sale of land inside the custom bound
F area should be permitted", but should be given on licence basis
only.

111. Power of Central Government to issue directions to Board - (1) Without
G prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, the Authority and every
Board shall, in the discharge of its functions under this Act, be bound by
such directions on_ questions of policy as the Central Government may give
in writing to it from time to time:
Provided that the Authority or the Board, as the case may be, shall be given
opportunity to express its views before any direction is given under this
H sub-section.
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 817
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
10. In the policy directions issued under the Land Policy A
for Major Ports, 2010, there is a slight shift in the policy
regarding the land inside the custom bound area. Under the
2010 Policy, it is stated that "normally land inside custom
bound area should be given on licence basis only". Thus, it
can be seen that while the 2004 Policy prohibited giving out of B
the land inside the custom bound area by any mode other than
·licence, the 2010 Policy stipulated licensing is' the normal rule,
implying there could be exceptions to the rule.

Facts leading to the Litigation
c
11. Pursuant to the order dated 2nd August, 2012 of the
Orissa High Court, the Board cancelled the licences of 48
manually operated iron ore storage plots and 11 mechanically
operated storage plots. It appears from the additional affidavit
filed by the Board on 25th November, 2013, of the 59 licences D
purported to have been cancelled by the Board, only 38
licences of the manually operated plots category and 7 of the
mechanical category are before us.

12. It appears from the material on record 5 that there are E
5. Page 9 of the counter affidavn filed on behalf of Paradeep Port in SLP(C) No.26321/
2012
2.13 Prior to cancellation of licence in respect of iron plots w.e.f. 21.08.2012, there
were three types of manual iron ore plot holders in Paradeep Port Trust namely:
SI. No. Type of plot No. of Allottees Allotted During F
1 Non-auction plot 15 2003 to May 2005
2 Auction plot 52 June, 2005 to
May, 2011
3. Plots allotted 13 June 2011
throuah tender onwards
It is relevant to state that during the initial period, the iron ore plots were allotted on G
payment of normal licence fees as per Port Scale of Rates (SOR). Due to surge in
demand for iron ore in the international market, demands for the plots also increased
in Paradeep Port. Accordingly Paradeep Port Trust vide resolution no. 31/2005-06
dated 28.05.2005 decided to introduce auction for allotment of manual iron ore plots
for export of iron ore. Subsequently since there were lot of interested parties,
Paradeep Port Trust decided to introduce the system of allotment of plots
H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.

A three classes of plot holders who manually handle iron ore
exports in the Paradeep Port; (i) 15 plot holders who were
allotted plots prior to May, 2005, (ii) 52 plot holders who were
allotted plots from June, 2005 to May, 2011 on the basis of
auction; and (iii) 13 plot holders who acquired plots under the
B system of tendering process subsequent to June, 2011.

13. By notice dated 2nd June, 2011, the Paradeep Board
invited applications from interested iron ore exporters, traders
etc. for allotment of 20 manual iron ore plots of different sizes.
Auroglobal was one of the parties who responded to the said
C tender notice and eventually became the successful bidder for
one of the plots [plot no. 1-5 (C group) admeasuring 5,500 sq.
mtrs.]

14. By letter dated 1st August, 2011 6 , ttie Paradeep Board
D informed Auroglobal that it had been declared to be one of the
successful bidders for the allotment of one manual iron ore
storage plot subject to various terms and conditions. Relevant
for our purpose are conditions Nos. 1, 2 and 4.

E 15. After securing allotment of the plot, Auroglobal utilised
the same for about a year and eventually approached the ~rissa

through tender w.e.f. June-July 2011. In all the cases the respective plot
F holders are required to pay licence fees as per the Scale of Rate (SOR)
i.e. Rs. 9/- per sq. mtr per month, whereas the plot holders in the second
category as mentioned above, the allotees are required to pay one time
premium amount over and above the licence fees and for the third category,
the tender value is required to be paid every eleven month towards licence
fees apart from the licence fees as per the Scale of Rate (SOR) i.e. Rs. 9/
- per sqmtr per month subject to fulfillment of other conditions. A statement
G containing the details of auction price and licence fee paid by these parties
are placed as Annexure-R/2 which runs from page 228 to 230."
Relevant portion of the allotment letter issued to the petitioner in SLP(C)
No.26321/2012
1. You are allotted plot No. l-5(C group) measuring 5,500 Sq. mtr. for a period
of 11 (eleven) months from 01.08.2011 to 30.06.2012.
H '' .
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 819
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
High Court by way of Writ Petition No. 11785 of 2012, some A
time in July, 2012 with prayers as follows:-

I. To hold and declare that the petitioner has a rigtlt
of renewal of the allotment with respect to plot NO.
1-5 inside the Port area; B
II. Holding and declaring that the pricing modality
arrived at through the tender is contrary to the
tender conditions and the conditions for renewal in
the tender are violative of Articles 14, 16 and 19 of
the Constitution. of India; c
Ill. set aside imposing/demanding of licence fee by the
opp. Parties for renewal under the tender
conditions,
D
IV. direct the opposite parties to renew and extend the
allotment of the plot without demanding additional
licence fee under Annexure-5;

v. to quash the letter dated 05.07.2012 under
Annexure-9 E

16. Along with the said writ petition, M.C, No. 11005 of
2012 came to be filed for certain interim relief. It is in the said
M.C., the order under appeal came to be passed. By the said
order, the High Court opined that the Paradeep Board did not
F
follow a uniform and consistent procedure in making allotment
of various plots of lands to various parties and that plots could
be allotted only on the basis of an "auction to the highest bidders.
It also foi.md fault with the Paradeep Board for having renewed
certain licences granted earlier7 •
G
5. Therefore, from the aforesaid decision, it is clear that in respect of the
property which is owned by the Paradeep Port Trust, licence cannot be
granted in favour of persons after expiry of licence period by way of renewal.
Uniform and consistent procedure must be followed to auction the plots
inviting tenders from general public fixing certain terms and conditions.
H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A 17. Pursuant to the above-mentioned order of the High
Court, notices were issued by the Board (at least to some of

The plots may be required to be allowed in favour of eligible persons who
offer the highest licence fee in respect of the plots as the same being the
public property. If that price is not given the tender Accepting Authority need
B
not accept it and can re-tender it. The aforesaid procedure will fetch more
revenue to the State Exchequer to protect the public interest. The statement
in the additional affidavit filed by the Chairman of the Trust today disclose
the number of plots allotted in favour of certain licencees by way of renewal.
The same is not permissible in law as laid down by the apex Court in
catena of cases referred to above. The petitioners in these cases are
c discriminated by the Port Trust as it has granted licences to the similarly
placed persons by way of renewal whereas these petitioners have
participated in the public auction got licence to their plots on the bid amount
offered by them which amount is much more than the scale of rates fixed
in favour of the other licencees. Their only grievance is regarding the
condition incorporated by the traffic manager. apart from the auction price,
the rates which are fixed by the Tariff Authority of Major Ports. In addition to
D the auction mentioned In the financial bid by the petitioners that portion
according to them is arbitrary and it is a discrimination between the
petitioners and the licencees who have got the benefit of renewal. There
is no auction price. They are only paying the rates fixed by the TAMP.
Therefore. at this stage we have passed this order to see that the public
property is protected for which the Port Trust is required to look after its
affairs properly and fix the correct revenue to its property for having granted
E licensing right in favour of the eligible persons. It is brought to the notice
of this Court that largesse are conferred on the basis of the policy of TAMP
without auctioning the property of the Port Trust by granting licence by way
of renewal which is contrary to the law laid down by the apex Court in the
aforesaid cases. That apart in a substantial number of cases interim orders
passed by this Court where the licence period is expired long back and
F the licencees are continuing in the Port Trust property. is the submission
of Mr. S.K. Padhi, Learned senior counsel which shocks the conscience
of this Court. For implementation of our direction. Mr. Padhi learned senior
counsel appearing for the opposite parties seeks three weeks time. The
same is granted.

G The amount that may be collected on the basis of the condition of the tender
call notice, as mentioned above, will be subject to the final decision that
may be rendered by this Court in these cases. Public auction price may
be given the Port to collect the rates fixed by the TAMP.
List this matter along with W.P.(C) Nos. 10339, 12295, 12296, 11783 in
three weeks
H
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 821
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
the appellants herein) 8 , the substance of which (s t)lat th,e A
allotment order made earlier was cancelled and called upon the
allottee to hand over vacant possession of the pJpt within 15
days from the date of the letter. ·

18. Hence, this batch of SLPs by the various-allottees.
B
19. Auroglobal also preferred an SLP on slightly different
grounds. We propose to deal with the case of Auroglobal
separately. We first deal with the cases of appellants other than
Auroglobal. ,, ·
c
20. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that the High
Court grossly erred in coming to the conclusion that the
allotments made in favour of various appellants are in violation
of the law declared by this Court in various decisions relied
D
Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper application."
8,. Relevant portion of the notice issued to Mis Yazdani International (P) Ltd.,
the petitioner in SLP(C) No.26321/2012
PARADEEP PORT TRUST
TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT E
NO. TDfTM/GEN-01(Pt.1)/2012/3344 Dated: the 21st Aug., 2012
To
M/s. Yazdani International (P) Ltd.
N-4/135 IRC Village Nayapalli,
Btfubaneswar - 751 015. F
Sub.: Cancellation of Manual Iron Ore Storage Plot No. G-8 in
Compliance to order of the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa.
Dear Sir(s),
In obedience to order did. 02.08.2012 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of
Orissa in Misc. Case No. 110005 of 2012 arising out of W.P.(C) No.11785 G
of 2012 (copy enclosed), the manual iron ore storage plot No. G-8
measuring 3000 sq. mis. Which was allotted by auction June 2010 and
again renewed in your favour upto 28.02.2013 is hereby cancelled with
immediate effect.
Further .................. hand over the vacant possession of plot within 15
(fifteen) days .. .. .. -
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · (2013] 17 S.C.R.

A upon by the High Court in its order including Centre for Public
Interest Litigation and others v. Union of India and others
(2012) 3 SCC 1 [also known as 2G case). Most of the
appellants (details of which are available on record and not in
dispute) came to be allotted with plots of land either pursuant
B to a process of auction or tender where each of the appellant
had to pay substantial amounts to the Board for securing the
allotment of the plots, apart from agreeing to pay the amounts
stipulated by the scale of rates prescribed by the Tariff Authority.
Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the principles
c of law laid down by this Court in the various judgments referred ·
to by the High Court starting from Dayaram Shetty to '2G
case' is without any factual basis. The allotments made in favour
of the appellants are in consonance with the law laid down in
2G's case.
D 21. It is also argued on behalf of the appellants that in the
subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Natural
Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No.1 of 2012,
(2012) 10 SCC 1, the Constitution Bench of this Court clearly
held that in the matter of alienation of the property by the State
E or conferment of largesse, auction is a preferred mode of
securing compliance with the commands of the Constitution
under Article 14 of the Constitution but-not the only mode. It is
argued that even if auction is the only mode of distributing State
largesse or alienating property of the State which passes the
F test of Article,14, most of the appellants, as already indicated,
have secured allotment of plots either through the process of
auction or of tenders which is nothing but a variant of the system
of auction. Therefore, allotments made in their favour could not
be faulted. It is further submitted that the conclusion of the High
G Court that the "licence cannot be granted in favour of persons
after expiry of the licence period by way of renewal" 9 is without
any basis in law. Renewal of licence is a matter of contract
between the parties. If the initial allotment of a plot on licence

H 9. See Footnote 7· (~upra)
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 823
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
•
basis is otherwise in accordance with law, renewal of such "A
arrangement is a matter which ought to be' governed by the ·
terms of the agreement between the parties. There is nothif.lg
in law or in any of the decisions of this Court relied upon by
i the High Court which requires the State or its instrumentaliti~s
not to enter into any contract or arrangement which is renewabla B
periodically. Learned counsel also submitted that each .of the
appellants have a right to renewal of the allotment made to them
and there is nothing in any one of the judgments of this Court
relied upon in the order under appeal which militates against
such right of renewal of the ~llotment which is otherwise validly c
obtained. ·it is submitted that any view of law to th~ contrary
would not cinly be impracticable but also detrimerifat to :tlie
larger public interest as such short term arrangements:would
not be conq~ciye to. the overall economic; growth of the country.
It is further submitted by the appellants. that none of the D
appellants were parties before the High Covrt and the order of
the High Court is in flagrant violation of the audi alteram partem
rule. If only the appellants had an opportun,ity to present their
cases before the High Court, the appellants would have placed
on record all relevant facts to substantiate their arguments
mentioned earlier. Therefore, on this ground alone the order E
under appeal is required to be set aside. Lastly they submitted
that the order is neither sought by Auroglobal, who was the
petitioner before the High Court, nor is within the scope of the
final relief sought by Auroglobal in the writ petition.
F
22. With regard to the limited number of plots allotted
· without following either the auction route or the tender route it
is submitted that such allotments were made prior to 2005 at
which point of time there was not much demand for allotment
of plots by the Board, therefore, the allotments were or;i • G
application basis. Hence, such allotments cannot be ·faulted ..

23. Mr. Rohinton Nariman, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Board argued that (i) none of the appellants
have a 'right of renewal' as their possession is only a permissive
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.

A possession (a licence) which does not create any interest in
the property to enable them to· claim a "right" of renewal. (ii) As
on today the Board needs the entire area of land (occupied,
by these various appellants by virtue of the allotment orders
given in their favour earlier) for the purpose of developing the
B port for the creation of modern Deep Draught Coal and Iron Ore
berths with 10 millions capacity each. The submission is based
on the pleadings before this Court. 10 The Board therefore, does
not propose to continue or renew the licences of the appellants
irrespective of the fact whether the order under appeal is
c
10. Counter fried by the Port Trust in SLP(C) No.26321i2012
·· .......... It is also a matter of fact, that the Port has signed Concession
Agreements with Mis. Es&ar Paradeep Terminals Ltd. and Mis Blue Water
Iron Ore Terminal Pvt. Ltd. for development of Deep Draught Coal and Iron
Ore'Berth <espectively with 10 Million tons capacity each. After completion
D of the project, the Port would be able to handle cape size vessels of 1.25
lakh DWT as against present vessel size of maximum 70,000 DWT. Since
both the berths will be fully mechanized with draught of 16.1 mtrs. berth-
day output will be much more than the existing facilities and will result in
faster turn round of vessels. However. for the purpose of development of
these two facilities, the entire area of about 2.32 lakh sq.mtr. allotted to
the manual iron ore exporters is required to be vacated for handing over
E the project site to the BOT operators. Vacating the iron ore plots have
become essential in view of Environmental Clearance granted by MOEF
for the BOT projects. Since this is a developmental activity of the Port to
meet the future traffic requirement, the Port can ill afford to delay in vacating
the land. allotted to the iron ore exporters ........... "
Para 6 of I.A. No.4 filed by the Port Trust in SLP~) No.26321i2012
F "6. That it is to state that since.the Paradeep Port Trust has desired to
retain the plot in question for its own use and purpose i.e. for construction
of Iron Ore Berth and Coal Berth respectively, the port trust had entered
into an Concession Agreement dated 01.07.2009 with respect to Iron Berth
and dated 10.11.2009 with respect to Coal Berth, with Mis. Blue Water Iron
Ore Terminal Private Lim~ed and with Essar Paradeep Terminal Limited
respectively on BOT basis. The Paradeep Port Trus\ was awaiting the
G clearance from the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF), which was
granted on 02.07.2012 a copy of MOEF clearance dated 02.07.2012 is
annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-A/4 which runs from page 15
to page 18. The Paradeep Port Trust was accordingly to take over the
plots and handover the possession to the above two BOT operators, when
the present order dated 31.08.2012 was passed directing the parties to"
H maintain status quo.".
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 825
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]

'tenable or not, this Court may not exercise its extraordinary A
discretion under .•.Article 136 to enable the appellants to cling
on to the property over which they have no substantive right.

'24. The first question which is to be examined is whether
this Court is required to set aside the order under appeal and B
also the consequential notices issued by the respondent/Board
to the various appellants on the ground· that the order under
appeal is made in breach of the rule of audi alteram partem.

25. None of the appellants herein (except Auroglobal) was
a party to the proceedings before t~e High <;:ourt. Therefore, C
there was no occasion for the High.Court fo examine the twin
questions whether the respective allotments made in favour of
each of the appellants herein are in accordance with law and
whether the appellants have any legally indefeasible right of
renewal of such allotments or to continue use of the respective D
plots allotted to them. In the normal course, the order under
appeal is required to be set aside on the simple ground that
the same ~)is in breach of principles of natural justice. But we
:• !" ·,

do not propose to do so for reasons to follow. •
E
26. The undisputed facts in these batch of matters are that
most of the appellants were allotted plots either pursuant to an
auction or through the process of tender system, the details of
which are already taken note of (See footnote 5). It is also not
in dispute that each of the plots, which are the su~ject matter
F
of these appeals was ,allotted, on a licence.

27·. Before we deal with the new ground urged by the
Board, we would like to deal with the question of the legality of
the initial allotment in favour of each of these appellants. In view
of the fact that most of the licences in favour of the appellants G
herein came.to be granted pursuant to a process of either an
auction or tender, those allotments, in our'view, cannot be said
to be inaonsistent with the·principles of law laid down by this
Court in 2G case in the absence of any other circumstance
vitiating the allotment. Insofar as the allotment of plots made on · H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS , (2013] 17 S.C.R.

A application (prior to 2005), the Paradip Port Trust came out with
a clear explanation that there was hardly any competition at thaf
poiM of time for the allotment of plots. Therefore. we qo not SE!e
any reason to find any fault with such allotmeni on the ground
that the allotment was made without followingtbe:pi-ocedure of
B auction or tender. More particularly, in the abser;ice of any
dispute regarding the correctness of the assertion of the Board
that there was hardly any demand at that point.~f time for.
allotment of plots. : "· ·

28. The opinion of the High Court - that a renewal of the
C licence in dispute without following the procedure of auction is
inconsistent with the principles laid down in the 2G case - as
an absolute proposition of law could be examined in
appropriate case. Such a scrutiny is not required for the present
as the Board do~s not propose to renew the licences.
D
29. However, it is the submission of the·· Board that this
Court need not examine the legality of the order under appeal
for two reasons - (1) none of the appellants have either any
indefeasible right of renewal or to continue the use of the
E_ respective plots allotted to them and the Board is entitled in law
·to revoke the licences at any time and debar the appellants from
entering and using the plots in dispute (2) The Board proposes
to revoke the licences and resume possession of the land
(manually operated iron ore plots) in dispute for the purpose
F of developing the same and providing better facilities
connected with the operations of the Board .

. 30. To examine the tenability of the above submissions,
the following questions are required to be examined.

G (1) Whether tt~ere is any indefeasible legal right in
favour of any one of the appellants for renewal of
the licence granted or continued use of plots
allotted to them?

(2) Irrespective of the answer to the above question,
H
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 827
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
whether the Board is justified to terminate the A
· allotments on the ground that it proposes to utilise
the land in dispute for providing better amenities in
connection with the obligations imposed upon the
Board by.Jaw?
B
(3} Whether this Court would be justified in law to
decline granting relief in exercise of its jurisdiction
i.n;H:ler Article 136 of the Constitution of India either
on the grouncl that ,\he appellants have no
indefeasible right of renewal or on the ground that C
.irrespective of the rights of the appellants, the
purpose sought to be achieved by the Board in
proposing to resume the disputed lands is a public
purpose which should override the interest of any
of the appellants?
b
31. We therefore, called upon the appellants to address ·
us on the above questions.

32. We made it clear to the appellants that this Court will
consider the defence, if any, of each of the appellants to the E
proposed termination oftheir licences on a new ground now
set up by the respondent Board and invited them to make their
submissions in that regard. Such suggestion was made in view
of the possibility that if the appellants did not have any
substantive defence against the prqposed termination of the
licences, interference with the order under appeal on the ground F
that there is a procedural lapse would only have the effect of
protracting the litigation thereby enabling the appellants to
continue occupation of public property and deprive the Board
of higher revenue.
G
33. A preliminary objection is raised by the appellants for
examination of the above-mentioned questions. The appellants
argued that neither of the two grounds, now relied upon by the
respondent Board, are the grounds on which either the High
Court directed the eviction of the appellants nor the quit notices H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

.A i~ued by the respondent Board are founded." Therefore, this
Court may not embark upon an examination of those questions
as a Court of 1st instance. According to the appellants, such
an examination would take the appellants by surprise. Without
prejudice to the preliminary objection, the learned counsel for
i3 the appellants also argued that they have a right of renewal of
the licences and/or to continue in possession of the land in
dispute.

34. In response to the preliminary objection, it is argued.
on behalf of the Board that this Court in exercise of its
C jurisdiction under Article 142 can undertake· such an
examination in an appropriate case to render complete justice
in these batch of matters. Shri Nariman relied upon Pasupuleti
Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders {(1975) 1
SCC 770]11 • and Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and
D Another etc. {(1976) 1 SCC 194]1 2 b, in support of this
submission.
11 a. Rameshwar and Others 'O's. Jot Ram and Another etc. ((1976) 1 SCC
194] - para (7) The realism of our processual justice bends our
jurisprudence to mould, negate or regulate reliefs in the light of exceptional
E developments having a material and equitable import, occurring during the
· pendency of the litigation so that the Court may not stultify itself by granting
what has become meaningless or does not, by a myopic view, miss
decisive alterations in fact-situations or legal positions and drive parties
to fresh litigation whereas relief can be given right here. The broad
principle, so stated, strikes a,, chord of sympathy in a court of good
cpnscience. But a seeming virtue may prove a treacherous vice unless
F judicial perspicacity, founded on well-grounded rules, studies the plan of
the statute, its provisions regarding subsequent changes and the possible
damage to the social programme of the measure if later events are allowed
to unsettle speedy accomplishment of a restructuring of the land system
which is the soul ol the whole enactment. No processual equity can be
permitted to sabotage a cherished reform, nor individual hardship thwart
social justice. This wider perspective explains the rulings cited on both
G sides and the law of subsequent events on pending actions.
1b Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC
770 - para (4) - We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about
ihe jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being
. subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our
processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as
H 'on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 829
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.) - .

35. We reject the preliminary objection for the following A
reason:-

lhe jurisdiction under Article 136 is discretionary. It is
settled by catena of decisions of this Court that the jurisdiction
under Article 136 is purely discretionary only to be exercised B
in order to ensure that injustice is not perpetuated. One of the
important attributes of discretionary jurisdiction is that such
jurisdiction is not exercised where it is likely to be a futile
exercise i.e. where the relief might be of no use to the applicant
because it would still be open to the competent authority to
achieve the result sought to be achieved by the disputed action
c
leaving the defeat i.e. by following the proper procedure etc. 12•
Though the statement of the principle in the references in the

D
principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the
judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is
brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind
to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies
bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or !airplay is
violated, with a view to promote substantial justic" - subject, of course, to E
the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can
we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
tq confine it to the triaL Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent
other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice.
Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this
equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the F
right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally
and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many
cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and .developments
subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of
fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed ..
12a In some cases the courts have refused applications for mandamus to
restore to office.persons who have been irregularly removed, on the ground G
that the remedy might be of no use to the applicant, because it would still
be open to the competent authority to remove him by the proper procedure.
There are also decisions in licensing cases to like effect (de Smith's
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition Pg. 561.)
12b. Seervai H.M., Constitutional Law of India [Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd.,
3rd Edn. Vol.2 (1984) para 16.279 page 1367]. H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R.

A footnote are made in the context of the jurisdiction of the Court
to issue mandamus, the principle applies proprio vigore to the
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Such being the principle of law, even if the present batch of
appeals are to be allowed, as prayed for, on the ground that
B the orde.r under challenge is made in breach of th~ .rul~ of. atiq;
alterarr)p,artem, nothing in law prevents the Board from calliljlg
upon the appellants to desist from use of the land in d.ispute,
Such a course of action is the declared intention of the Board.
In such an event, once again the High Court and this Court
c would have to examine the questions framed above.
36. Therefore, accepting the preliminary objection and
refusing to consider the ground newly raised by the Board
would ooly "drive the parties to fresh litigation" rendering the
present adjudication a futile exercise of the jurisdiction of this
D Court. The issue can be decided here and now to prevent a
possible damage to the programme proposed to be
undertaken by the Board and its "speedy accomplishment".

The two decisions (See Footnote 11) relied upon by the
E Board are a clear authority for the proposition that this Court
in either granting or declining to grant a relief in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 136 can take note of developments
either of fact or law which leave an impact on the rights and
obligations of parties before the Court.
F 37. We shall first deal with the question of element of
surprise as it is the duty of this Court to scrupulously ensure
the "rules of fairness to both sides", in every case. Such duty
is more rigorous in the instant case because of the fact that
the respondent Board has come out with a new ground for
G denying the relief to the appellants - the legality of which we will
have to consider as the court of first instance.

38. The Board seeks to debar the appellants from using
the land in dispute. Such a decision of the Board rested on the
H
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 831
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
ord~r of the Hi9h Court under ch,allenge. But during the A
pendency of the present proceedings the Board altered !fie ·
basis of its decision and decided to res~ on the need of (i) the
. land in the dispu_te (covered t>y the manually operated plots) for
providing better facilities and (ii) mechariically operated plots
for securing better/higher revenue. Tl;\e legality of such B
proposed action of the Board would depend on (a) the true
character of the legal relationship between the appellants and
the. Board; (b) whether such relationship confers a right on the
appellants to continue use of the disputed property either for
eternity or for a definite period; (c) the legal authority of the c
Board to terminate such relationship; and (d)' the procedure
required to be followed for such termination.

39. To answer the above question we examine the nature
of the legal rights flowing from such allotments~ The plots in
dispute are property vested in a public body (statutory D
corporation) performing important public functions. In the matter
of creating rights and/or conferring privileges such a body is
·required .to act in public interest under some rational policy. We
have already notice.d that the Board is bound by the policy
directions given by the Government of India under Section 111 E
of the Act, and that the Government of India from time to time
issued policy guidelines. In the policy guidelines issued in 2004,
the following were the directives:

"(b) No sale or lease should be permitted. Land should be F
given on licence basis only. The licence may be up to a
maximum period of 11 months and shall normally be in
accordance with the Schedule of Rates (SoR)/rates
approved by the competent authority. At the discretion of
the Chairman, such licence may also be given by inviting G
tenders. The licence can be renewed at the expiry of the
previous licence period. Each renewal of licence shall be
treated as fresh licence."

40. When it came to 2010, it is specifically laid down that
H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A the "licence can be renewed by the Chairman twice" 13 subject
to either the prior approval or subsequent ratification of the
board.

41. It can be seen from the policy guidelines that while the
B 2004 policy forbids sale or lease of land, the 2010 policy makes
it the normal rule subject to exceptions. The 2004 Land Policy
guidelines enable the Board only to grant or renew a licence
without any limitation on the number of renewals. The 2010
policy guidelines clearly restrict the authority of the Board to
renew the licences for only two terms. The tenure of any licence
C is stipulated to be for a maximum period of 11 months. In either
case, from the language of the policy guidelines it is clear that ·
the policy onl~ enables the Board 'to renew the licences granted
but does not create any vested right in favour of the licensor.
Even the letter of allotment makes it clear that what is granted
D is only a licence. (See Footnote 6) Therefore, we are of the
opinion that the allotment of plots in dispute is only by way of a
licence, as defined under Section 52 of the Easements Act,
1882 14 •

E 42. As rightly pointed out by Shri Nariman, licence by
definition does not create any interest in the property 15 . A

13. Normally, land inside custom bound area shall be given on licence basis
only. The licence may be granted by the Chairman. It may be granted up to
a maximum period of 11 months and shall normally be in accordance with
the Scale of Rates (SoR)/ rates approved by the competent authority. Any
F concession shall be given only with the approval of the Board. At the
discretion of the Chairman, such licence may also be given by inviting
tenders. The licence can· be r.enewed by the Chairman twice. Further
renewal shall be with the approval of the Board or by the Chairman, subject
to ratification by the Boards. Each renewal of licence shall be treated as a
fresh licence.
'
G 14. "52. "Licence" defined - Where one person grants to another, or to a definite
number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or uporr #le
immoveable property of the granter, something which would, in the absence
of.such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement
or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence."
15. Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Vs. R.N. Kapoor [AIR 1959 SC 1262] - (27)
H [There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. S. 105 of
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 833
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
licence only gives a right to use the immovable property of the A
granter, to the grantee. There is no transfer of any interest in
such property in favour of the grantee. On the other hand, under
the Transfer of Property Act, an interest either limited or
uh limited is created in favour of the transferee depending upon
the nature of the transfer (sale, mortgage or lease etc.). Under B
Section 6016 , a licence is revocable at the will of the granter
which is the essence of a licence 17 . The Easements Act
the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease out of immoveable property
as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in
consideration for a price paid or promised. Under S. 108 of the said Act, C
the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is
therefore a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called
the leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property
during the term ofthe lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that ;
right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas S. 52 of the Indian Easements
Act defines a licence thus:
. "Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons,
D
a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the
granter, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful,
and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the
property, the right is called a licence."
' .
Under the aforesaid section,] if a document gives only a right to use the
property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in E
possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The legal
possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but
the licencee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular
purpose. But for the permission his occupation would be unlawful. It does
not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. There is,
therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is F
clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred ........ .
16. ''60. Licence when revocable - A licence may be revoked by the'grantor,
unless -
(a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in
force;
(b) the licencee, acting upon the lilcense, has executed a work of a G
permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution."

17. Mrs. M.N. Clubwala and another vs. Fida Hussain Saheb and others [AIR
1965 SC 610] - (12) While it is true that the essence of a licence is that it
is revocable at the will of the grantor the provision in the licence that the
licencee would be entitled to a notice before being ·required to vacate is H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.

A categorically declares that a licence can be revoked by the
granter except in the two contingencies specified under Section
60(a) & (b). No such exceptions are pleaded or demonstrated
by the appellants. Therefore, it must be held that none of the
appellants have any indefeasible right of renewal either under
B the Easements Act or under the above mentioned policy .

. 43. However, that does not mean that a public body like
the respondent Board can arbitrarily decline to renew a licence.
It is well settled by a .catena of decisions of this Court that no
C public body under our Constitutional system is vested with such
arbitrary powers, as Was pointed out by this Court in R.D.
Sheffy Vs. Airport Authorities, (1979) 3 SCC 48918 • If the Board
decides not to renew any licence either with respect to a class
of licences or with reference to a specific area of the land,
normally such a decision cannot be said to be· either irrational
D or arbitrary unless there are other compelling reasons to
indicate that the decision has no rational purposl:!'·to be
achieved.

44. In the counter filed by the respondent Board (in this
E batch of appeals), it is stated that the entire parcel of land which

not inconsistent with a licence. [In England it has been held that a
contractual licence may be revocable or irrevocable according to the
express or implied terms of the contract between the parties. It has further
been held that if the licencee under a revocable licence has brought
property on to the land, he is entitled to notice of revocation and to a
F reasonable time for removing his property, and in which to mare
arrangements to carry on his business elsewhere. (see Halsbury's Laws
of England, 3rd edn. Vol. 23, p. 431). Thus the mere necessity of giving a
notice to a licencee requiring him to vacate the licenced premises would
not indicate that the transaction was a lease....... "
18. Para 10 - " ...... It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by
G the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should
possess arbitrary power over t~e interests of the individual. Every action of
the executive Government must be informed with reason and should' be
free from arbitrariness. That is the very essense of ttfe rule of law and its
bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes
no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some
H right or denial of some priv;lege."
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 835
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.)
was allotted to the various appellants who are licencees of the A
manually operated plots (and others, who are not before us),
from time to time by the Board in favour of iron ore exporters,
(except a small portioo of the land allotted in favour of the
Odisha Mining Development Corporation), .is proposed to be
utilised by the Board after terminating the licences of the B
appellants herein for creating certain modern operational
facifities in connection with the activities of the Port. Such a
decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or an irrational exercise
of authority of a public body, having regard to the object sought
to be a«hieved by the Board of creating modern amenities. The c
excE:f>liorf in· ·favour of the Odisha Mining Development
Corp6ration. c~r\hot, In our opinion, amo1,mt to discriminatory
trei3trfient of \tie appellants, sfr\ce that Corporation is admittedly
a State owned Corporation and forms a class by itself.
Therefore, the proposed course of action by the Board lo 0
terminate neither infringes any legal right of tho/<lppellants nor
amounts to an arbitrary exercise of the autt1ority by the Boa.rd.

45. We also place on record that the appellants submitted
that the concession agreements on BOT basis dated
01.07 .2009 ended in litigation and therefore the proposed E
project of the Board is not likely to materialise. In response it
is submitted by the Board that even if the parties with whom
the BOT arrangement was entered into eventually default in their
obligation, the Board would explore alternatives to proceed with
the project but will not abandon the same. · F

46. We are left with the question whether this Court would
be justified in the above mentioned circumstances in declining
lo interfere with the order under appeal and deny relief to the
appellants .. G
· 47, The Board desi.res to utilise the parcel of land in
dispute• (in this batch of cases) for a purpose which is
authorised by law and serves better the larger interests of nation

19. Footnote No.10. H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A - including the interests of the exporters and importers such
as the appellants. Setting aside the order under appeal on the
ground of breach of natural justice would be a futile exercise
as explained earlier. The respondent Board/licensor can
always terminate/revoke the licences. In view of our conclusion
B that the proposed revocation of licences would not amount to
an irrational or arbitrary decision, rejecting the new plea of the
Board or any ground would only lead to protracted litigation
consuming considerable time and delay in execution of the
project, by the Board. Such a delay would not subserve public
c interest. This Court shall not contribute to such delay on the
ground of some perceived procedural irregularity, particularly
when the appellants have no substantive right. The appellants
were given a wholesome opportunity by this Court to establish
their legal right, to prevent the Board from terminating their.
licences.
0
48. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.38013 of 2012
is filed by Auroglobal Comtrade Pvt. Ltd, which was the
petitioner in W.P. (C) No.11785/2012 in the High Court of
Orissa. The appellant was allotted a plot by the Board pursuant
E to a process of tender in which the appellant became the
successful bidder quoting an amount· of Rs.3,06,29,759/-. A
licence for the use of the plot for 11 months was granted by
the respondent Board under a letter dated 1st August, 2011,
after collecting the abovementioned amount. The appellant
F made two representations in the months of April and June 2012
to the Board seeking a reriewal of the licence. The. Board again
called upon the appellant to deposit Rs.3,06,29, 759/- for
renewing the licence. Challenging the demand, the appellant
approached the High Court seeking reliefs already noted earlier
· G in the judgment (see i:iara 14).

49. The writ petition was filed essentially on the ground that
one of the tender conditions contained in para 5 of the tender
notice dated 2.6.2011 is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution of India, therefore void ab initio. Consequently,
H
YAZDANI ~TERNATIONAL P. l:TD~ v. AUROGLOBAL 837
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
demand of the bid amount afresh for renewal of the licence is A
also illegal. Though it is not clearly spelt out in the writ petition,
the legal basis of attack on para 5 aUhe tender. notice is that
while the licencees, who secured allotmentS;-prior to 2005,
continued to P.ay a fixed licence fee of Rs.9/- per sq. ft per
month under the ',scale of Rates' fixed by the Tar,iff Authority B
created under Section. 4 7 A of. the Act, the appellant is
compelled to pay substantially higher amount, apart from the
amount fixed by the Tariff Authority. The size and use of the plot
allotted to the appellant is similar to that of the allottees prior
to 2005. ·. c
50. The above submission of the appellant is sought to be
repelled by the Board on the princip[e that the appellant secured
the licence- pursuant to tender notice with eyes wide open and
in full knowledge of the terms and conditions under which
licences are offered. The petitioner enjoyed the benefit of the D
·licence for a year (and still continues in occupation of the
property pursuant-to tt!E)" interim orders of this Court, for about
a year); and now the appellant cannot tum back and challenge
the conditions subject to which the licence was granted to it In
· support of the said submission, the Board relied upon the E
following judgments. Hari Shankar & Ors. Vs. Dy. Excise &
Taxation Commissioner & Ors,, (1975) 1 SCC 737, Shyam
Lal & Ors. Vs. ·state of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCt 336' and State
Bank of Haryana & Ors. Vs. JafJe Ram & Ors., (1980) 3 SCC
599. . i=
51. We reject the submission of the appellant for two
reasons. Firstly, the appellant acquired the licence knowing fully
well. the terms and conditions subject to which the licence is
offered by the Board. So they cannot lake the benefit of the offer G
and ren~unce the .~orresponding obligation (approbate and
reprobate). ·Secondly', the claim of the appellant that they are
being discriminated against is required to be rejected since
those licencees who are paying a lower 'licence fee' had
sec;ured th,)Se licenses .at a point of time when there was no
H
.
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A competition. The market conditions were different. Things or
events seemingly similar and at par need not always be so.
There can be facets which distinguish. The present situation is
one of them ..

B 52. One of the grounds pleaded in the appeal and argued
before us by Shri C.A. Sundaram, learned ~P.nior counsel
appearing for the appellant that -

·· .......... tpere is distinction between lease and license and
both are dealt with separately. License comes under
C Section 49(1)(d) i.e. any other use. Section 49(3) of the
Major Port Trust Act says that the board may lease any
land at a rate higher than that provided under Section
49(1 ). Thus. only in respect of lease the port trust can
change a rate higher than the scale of rates· approved by
D TAMP. Clause 6.1.1(a) of the Land Policy 2010 clearly
states that license can be granted by inviting tender but
renewal will have to be under the scale of rates approved
by TAMP."

e: It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that:
Section 49(1) authorises the collection of licence fees in
accordance with the scale of rates framed by the Tariff Authority
for the various uses (of the property of the Board) specified
under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 49 sub-section(1 ). Section
49, sub-section (3) authorises the Board to allot plots either by
F following the procedure of auction or inviting tenders and
demand amounts higher than those contemplated under sub-
section (1 ). The learned counsel argued that having regard to
the language of sub-section (3). once the Board resorts to the
process of auction or inviting tenders. the Board can only allot
G a plot on lease but not a licence.

53. Though, the Port Trust sought to repel the submission
on various grounds, we do not propose to examine those
defences in extenso.
H
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 839
Ce>MTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.)
54. We reject the submission since we do not see any A
warrant for placing such restriction on the authority of the Board,
from the language of Section 49 sub-section (3). The opening
clause of sub-section (3)~
"Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ). the B
Board may, by auction or by inviting tenders, lease ..... ."
authorises the Board to lease its properties either by •
auction or by inviting tenders. There is no warrant to_read into
the language of said sub-section a legislative intention that in
every case where the Board undertakes the process of auction c
Or inviting tenders, it is bound/obliged to grant a lease of .its
·properties. The expression 'the Board may' occurring in the
said sub-section, to our mind indicates that the lease is the
highest of rights that may be created on the properties, by the
Board under the said provision. It does not eliminate the D
discretion of the Board to permit use of its properties by any
arrangement which trc1nsfers a lesser or no interest (such as a
licence) in the property .
.55. On the above analysis, we see no merits in the claim
of the appellant. For the same reason as given for dismissing E
the appeals, the appeal of the Auroglobal is also dismissed,
as the plot allotted to this appellant is also required for the
developmental project proposed to be undertaken by the
respondent Board.
56. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.28841/2012 is F
filed by Odisha Mining Corporation Ltd., one of the licensees
of the respondent Board. This matter can be disposed of in
view of a specific statement made at the bar on behalf of the
Board that the Board does not propose to terminate the licence
of the appellant as the plot of land allotted to the appellant is G
not required for the purpose of its proposed developmental
project. Accordingly, this appeal stands disposed of.
57. Coming to the 7 mechanically operated iron ore plots,
they were allotted on different dates the details of which are as
follows: H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A
s. Plot Holder Initial Renewals
No. & SLP No. Allotment

1. Bagadiya Brothers 01.08.2011 Last
renewal
B upto
28.02.2013

SLP No. 28842/2012
(Manual Iron Ore
c plot holder)

2. Rungta Mines Ltd. 04.06.2011 and Last
25.07.2005 renewed on
01.04.2012
upto
0 SLP No.27512/2012 28.02.2013

3. M/s Core Minerals 2001 and 2004 Last renewal
granted in
E July 2012
SLP No.27511/2012 upto
30.09.2012

4. Essel Mining Allotment Last renewal
and Industries by various upto
F 30.09.2012
Ltd. allotment
orders from
June 2001 to
SLP No.27516/2012 July 2005

G 5. JSW lspat Steel Ltd. 13.02.2012 Last
renewed
upto
SLP No. 26922/2012 30.09.2012
YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 841
COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.]
6. Orissa Mining 16.05.1996 A
Corporation Ltd. 04.04.1997, -
SLP No.28841/2012 20.08.1997

'J. Taurian Iron ?!< 2003 Last
Steel Ltd. .- "- renewed B
upto
'
SLP No.32005/2012 30.09.2012

Each one of them enjoyed the benefit. of the allotment of ·
plot by virtue of successive renewals. We have already taken C
note of the fact that under the 2004 policy guidelines the
licences granted by the Port Trust could be renewed without any
limitation on the number of renewals that could be granted.
However, under the 2010 p_olicy, the number of renewals was
restricted to two: From the material on record, it appears that
each one of these appellants (mechanically operated plot D
licencees) enjoyed a number of renewals. We see no reason ·
tojnterfere with the decision of the Board to terminate the
licences for the following reasons - firstty, a licence does not
create any indefeasible le9al right. Secondly, we do not see
any irrationality in the decision of the Board, even from the point E
of view of the fact that the Board is a public body (the State
within the meaning of Article 12) and therefore, obliged to act
•
rationally. The Board's decision to terminate the licences is
consistent with the policy guidelines of 2010. Thirdly, in view
of the assertion of the Board in its additional affidavit dated F
25th November, 2013, " ......... the existing iron ore traffic which
is showing a growth rate of 159.56% during current financial
year (upto October 2013) in comparison to the iron ore traffic
handled during the same period of the previous financial year,
it is submitted that non-availability of mechanical plots to the G
Paradip Port Trust will entail huge financial loss to the port which
is a major port under Government of India. This will also result
in idling of the existing iron ore handling plant for which
significant money has been spent and dedicated facilities have
been created for efficient and effective handling of iron. ore
H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 .s.C.R.

A traffic. This will also result in diversion of iron ore traffic to nearby
private Ports which is already happening due to non availability
ofMechanical plots to Paradip Port Trust'', we do not see any
reason to doubt the said assertion.

58. Interfering with the notices of termination of licences
8
in each one of these cases on the ground that the notices were
initially based on a decision of the Orissa High Court to which
these appellants were not parties, would not be in the larger
public interest.

C 59. We have already made it c;lear earlier in this judgment
that we propose to deal with these petitions as if they were
petitions under Article 32 and permitted the appellants to place
all the material 'which would be available to them i.n law in
defence even if the impugned termination orders were not to
D be based on the decision of the High Court.

60. Except arguing that the decision of the Orissa High
Court is in violation of principles of natural justice, the appellants
failed to place before this Court any material to establish that
the decision of the Board to terminate their licences is otherwise
E violative of any of the substantive right. In the circumstances,
we decline to interfere with the decision of the Board. All the
appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
Rajendra Prasad Appeals disposed.