YUNUS (BABOOBHAI) A HAMID PADVEKARversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY AND ORS.

                     [2009] 1 S.C.R. 689


       YUNUS (BABOOBHAI) A HAMID PADVEKAR                        A
                              v.
 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
                     AND ORS.
           (Civil Appeal No. 486 of 2009)
                                                                 B
                    JANUARY 28, 2009
       [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
                    GANGULY, JJ.]

    LANO ACQUISITION:                                            c
      Land acquired for Industrial development -
Representation of release of the land - Committee appointed
by Legislative Assembly for considering the representation -
Meanwhile Writ Petition filed in High Court - High Court         D
dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground that it was highly
belated - On appeal, Held: Unexplained delay coupled with
creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important
factor which weighs with the High Court - Hence no
interference called for - Maharashtra Industrial Development     E
Act, 1961 - S.39(2a).

     Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation
acquired certain lands including that of the appellant. A
representation was made by the appellant to the Collector
for release of the land. A Committee was appointed by the        F
Legislative Assembly to consider such representations.
Meanwhile, appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court
and it was dismissed on the ground that it was highly
belated. Hence the appeal.
                                                                 G
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. Delay or laches is one of the factors which
is to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of
                             689                                 H
    690          SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2009) 1 S.C.R.


A the Constitution of India, 1950. In an appropriate case the       --+
  High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
  if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the
  applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with
  the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
B prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental
  right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of
  the Court. [Para 8] [693-D-F]

       1.2. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
  belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is
C likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and
  bring in its trail new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
  exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect
  of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also
  injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when
D writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled
  with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is
  an important factor which also weighs with the High
  Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
  jurisdiction. [Para 11] [695-A-C]
E
          Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
  AIR 1970 SC 769; Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts AIR
  1967 SC 1450; Maharashtra State Transport Corporation v.
  Ba/want Regular Motor Service AIR 1969 SC 329; R.N Bose
F v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 470 and State of M.P. v.
  Nandla/ AIR 1987 SC 251, relied on.

        Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
    Hurde etc. (187 4) 5 PC 221, referred to.

G                        Case Law Reference:

          AIR 1970 SC 769           relied on           Para 8
          AIR 1967 SC 1450          relied on           Para 9
          AIR 1969 SC 329           relied on           Para 9
H
         YUNUS (BABOOBHAI) A HAMID PADVEKAR v. STATE                 691
               OF MAHARASHTRA THR. ITS SECTY.

            AIR 1970 SC 470              relied on              Para 10    A
            AIR 1987 SC 251              relied on              Para 11

            (1874) 5 PC 221              referred to            Para 8

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 486
                                                                           B
       of 2009.

           From the Judgment and Order dated 15.7.2004 of the High
 ~
       Court of Judicature at Bombay in writ Petition No. 1300 of

                                                                           c .
       2004.

             Rana Mukherjee, Bishwajeet Swain and Abhilash Kumar
       for the Appellant.

             Shruti Chaudhary, Swati Sinha, Jayasree Singh (for M/s.
       Fox Manda! and Co.) Aniruddha P. Mayee and Abhilash Kumar
_..,   for the respondents.                                                D

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Leave granted.

            2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a        E
       Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Writ
       Petition filed by the appellant on the ground that it was highly
       belated. It also noted that the appellant had received
 ~     compensation in respect of the land which was acquired.
                                                                           F
            3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

            In the year 1971 Maharashtra Industrial Development·
       Corporation (in short 'MIDC') acquired about 1250 acres of
       agricultural land situated at four villages in Ratnagiri district of
                                                                            G
       Maharashtra. Thirty eight acres of land belonging to the
..,.   appellant were acquired. It is the stand of the appellant that out
       of the acquired area, about 50% was under paddy cultivation
       and 25% was under cultivation of mango crops. In the
       appellant's land about 175 mango trees were there. In the year
                                                                            H
     692         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009) 1 S.C.R.


 A 1973, the Revenue and Forest Department of the Maharashtra
   Government passed a resolution inter-alia deciding to take
   steps in respect of surplus acquired land which remained
   unutilized for a period of three years from the date of taking over
   possession for resumption of such lands in accordance with the
 8 applicable rules and orders. In 1974, a Writ Petition was filed
   by the appellant challenging the Notification for acquisition and
   an arrangement was worked out in which 20 acres of
   appellant's land out of 38 acres were released. The lands were
   acquired for a Govt. company-Balco for setting up a
   manufacturing unit. Since Balco did not set up any unit, license
.c issued to it was cancelled. In the year 1982, appellant claims
   to have made representations alongwith similarly situated land
   owners for restoration of the acquired land to the original
   owners. In the year 1983, compensation was paid to 686 land
   owners. In 1984, again the appellant made a representation to
 D the Collector of Ratnagiri for release of the land. On 20. 7.1989
   a Committee was appointed by the Legislative Assembly for
   consideration of the proposal for handing back the acquired
   land to the original owners. Certain recommendations were
   made by the said Committee. On 20.8.1992 the land acquired
 E for Balco was allotted to another industrial group. Subsequently,
   the State Government asked the industrial group not to continue
   the construction activities in view of pendency of cases. On
   12.11.2002, representations were again made to hand back
   the land not utilized. It was the specific stand of the appellant
 F that in view of Section 39(2a) of the Maharashtra Industrial
   Development Act, 1961 (in short the 'Act') the land should be
   restored. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the
   ground that it was highly belated.

 G        4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
     appellant stated that the appellant was all through representing
     to the authorities and because of the recommendations by the
     Committee, the appellant waited for some time and ultimately
     when no worthwhile action was taken, he filed the writ petition.
 H
YUNUS (BABOOBHAI) A HAMID PADVEKAR v. STATE OF 693
MAHARASHTRA THR. ITS SECTY. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
    5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand            A
supported the judgment of the High Court.

      6. It is pointed out that the recommendations made in terms
of the resolution were not accepted by the Government. It was
decided that since definite policy has been formulated the land        B
is to be utilized for the industrial development, the same cannot
be surrendered to the original owners for cultivation purposes.
It is also pointed out that the so called representations do not
in any way assist the appellant to explain the long delay in filing
the writ petition.
                                                                       c
      7. It is also pointed out that Section 39(2a) is applicable
only in respect of the undeveloped land, and in the instant case
the. land in question is developed land.

       8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne   D
in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant      E
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite
party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is
still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (Al R 1970
SC 769). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially      F
and reasonably.

      9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde
etc. (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by this Court G
in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts (AIR 1967 SC 1450) and
Maharashtra State Transport Corporation v. Ba/want Regular
Motor Service (AIR 1969 SC 329), Sir Barnes had stated:

     "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an         H
    694           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A         arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
          practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party
          has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be
          regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
          conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving
B         that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
          it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
          afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
          of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if
          an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just,
c         if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
          amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity
          of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
          equitable. Two circumstances always important in such
          cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
          done during the interval which might affect either party and
D
          cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
          course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."

        10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this
  Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with
E Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been
  stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article
  226. It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union of India (AIR 1970
  SC 470) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without
  any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article
F 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is
  itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was
  the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should
  disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after
  inordinate delay.
G
        11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (Al R 1987 SC
  251) that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
  ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
  and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
H petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the
           YUNUS (BABOOBHAI) A HAMID PADVEKAR v. STATE OF 695
           MAHARASHTRA THR. ITS SECTY. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
            High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise A
   +        of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on
            a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit
            a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely
            to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its
            trail new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after B
            unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
            hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
   _..__    It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
           unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights
           in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with c
           the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
           jurisdiction.

                 12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
- ...      interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

           G.N.                                         Appeal dismissed .
                                                                                D