ZARIF AHMAD (D} THROUGH LRS. & ANOTHERversusMOHD. FAROOQ

                     [2015] 1 S.C.R. 779


     ZARIF AHMAD (D} THROUGH LRS. & ANOTHER                           A
                                v.
                       MOHD. FAROOQ
               (Civil Appeal No. 666 of 2015)
                     JANUARY 27, 2015
                                                                      B
     [DIPAK MISRA AND .PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.)

     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

   s.107 - Power of remand and when the case be not                   c
remanded - Discussed.

     Or. 7, r. 3 - Description of immovable property - Suit for
permanent injunction - Contested by defendants on the
ground that suit plot belonged to them - Suit decreed -
Decree challenged on the ground that plot was not identifiable        D
in the suit - Held: Plot was described in the suit with its
boundaries and municipal numbers, therefore, it cannot be
said that plot was not identifiable - Since the suit was for relief
of permanent prohibitory injunction in respect of the plot which
was described with boundaries and its municipal number, it            E
cannot be said that the decree passed by the trial court was
un-executable - The documentary evidence sufficiently
proved that plaintiff was in possession over the suit plot and
for several years was paying the house tax on the basis of
house tax receipts and extracts of house tax Assessment               F
 Register - Trial court rightly decreed the suit.

     Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1. At the end of the plaint, plaintiff has not only
given the boundaries of the plot but also mentioned                   G
Nagar Panchayat (Town Area/Municipal) number of the
plot. There is no force in the argument of the defendants
that the land in suit is not identifiable. Had the land in
question been non identifiable, the Advocate
                            779                                       H
    780       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A Commissioner would not have given the report, relied by
  the defendants after inspection of the plot in question.
  The plea for the defendants was that no length and width
  of the land in question was mentioned in the plaint and
  as such, the decree passed by the trial co'urt was liable
B to be set-aside as the decree could not have been
  executed. Had it been a case of mandatory injunction
  requiring restoration of possession of land to the plaintiff
  or demolition of the construction raised by the
  defendants, what the defendants have pleaded could
C have been accepted but the present suit is for the relief
  of permanent prohibitory injunction in respect of the land
  which is described with boundaries and its municipal
  number. Therefore, it cannot be said that the decree
  passed by the trial court is un-executable. [Paras 8 to 10)
D [784-G; 785-A-E]

       2. Order VII Rule 3, CPC pertains to the requirement
  of description of immovable property. The object of the
  said provision is that the description of the property must
  be sufficient to identify it. The property can be identifiable
E by boundaries, or by number in a public record of
  settlement or survey. Even by plaint map showing the
  location of the disputed immovable property, it can be
  described. Since in the present case, the suit property
  was described by the plaintiff in the plaint not only by the
F boundaries but also by the municipal number, and by
  giving its description in the plaint map, therefore it cannot
  be said that the suit property was not identifiable in the
  present case. There was no need on the part of first
  appellate court to remit the matter to the trial court to allow
G the parties to adduce evidence on the additional issue as
  neither issue on identifiability of land arises from the
  pleadings nor the evidence was lacking on record. [Paras
  11 and 12) [785-F; 786-A-B, D-E]
          3. Section 107 of C.P.C. empowers the appellate
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    ZARIF AHMAD (D) THROUGH LRS. v. MOHD.                781
                   FAROOQ
court to remand a case, but it simultaneously empowers         A
the appellate court to take additional evidence or to
require such evidence to be taken. Rule 24 of Order XU
C.P.C. provides that where evidence on record is
sufficient, appellate court may determine the case finally.
It is not a healthy practice to remand a case to trial court   B
unless it is necessary to do so as it makes the parties to
wait for the final decision of a case for the period which
is avoidable. Only in rare situations, a case should be
remanded e.g. when the trial court has disposed of a suit
on a preliminary issue without recording evidence and          c
giving its decision on the rest of the issues, but it is not
so in the present case. The documentary evidence on
record sufficiently proved that plaintiff was in possession
over plot no. 358, and for several years he was paying
the house tax as was found by the trial court on the basis     D
of house tax receipts and extracts of house tax
Assessment Register. The trial court rightly decreed the
suit in respect of plot no. 358. [Paras 13, 16] [786-F-H;
787-E]
    P Purushottam Reddy and Anr. v. Pratap Steels Ltd.         E
(2002) 2 sec 686: 2002 (1) SCR 586 - relied on.
                  Case Law Reference :
    2002 (1) SCR 586         Relied on              Para 14
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 666        F
of 2015.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.2008 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No.
520 of 2007.
                                                               G
    L. B. Rai, Shankar Divate for the Appellants.
    Suryanarayna Singh, AAG, Gaurav Jain, Abha Jain, Jaivir
Singh, Pragati Neekhra for the Respondent.
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.
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    782      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A        PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. 1. This appeal is directed
    against judgment and order dated 10.12.2008 passed by High
    Court of judicature at Allahabad whereby Second Appeal is
    allowed and the decree passed by Civil Judge (Junior
    Division), Havali, Saharanpur, in Suit No. 77 of 1999, is
B   restored.
        2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
    perused the papers on record.
        3. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff/respondent
C instituted suit (OS No. 77 of 1999) seeking permanent injunction
  against his brother defendanUappellant no. 1 - Zarif Ahmad and
  nephew Zamir Ahmad (defendant/appellant no. 2) to restrain
  them from interfering in possession of the premises in his
  occupation. It is pleaded by the plaintiff that the land shown at
  the foot of the plaJnt (Annexure P-1) with letters Ka, Kha; Ga,
0 Gha, Cha, Chha, which bears Nagar Panchayat plot no. 358
  is owned and possessed by him, and the adjoining land shown
  by letters Gha. Cha, Chha, and Jha bearing Nagar Panchayat
  plot no. 357 belongs to the defendants. It is further pleaded that
  plaintiff pays house tax of the property no. 358, and defendants
E have no concern with it. The defendants have constructed their
  house over the land shown by letters Gha, Cha, Chha, and Jha
  which is towards south of the plaintiffs land. It is alleged in the
  plaint that the defendants have threatened the plaintiff that they
  would forcibly take possession of the premises held by him.
F Consequently, the suit is filed.
        4. The defendants contested the suit, and filed written
  statement (copy-Annexure P-3) before the trial court. They
  denied the title and possession of the plaintiff over land in suit.
G It is stated in the written statement that the disputed land
  originally belonged to one Zamindar of town Behat, before
  abolition of Zamindari. The land in question was vacant piece
  of land, occupied by defendant no. 1 who constructed his
  residence and planted trees over it. He (defendant no. 1)
  continued his possession over the land and started paying
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     ZARIF AHMAD (D) THROUGH LRS. v. MOHD.                    783
          FAROOQ [PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
'house tax since 1979 when Town Area of Behat was notified.           A
 It is further pleaded by the defendants that original Khasra
 number of the plot in question was 734/2/3. It is further pleaded
 that the plaintiff has been given share in the house of his father
 in the ancestral property situated in town Kasban, and he lives
 with his family there. It is alleged by the defendants that the      B
 plaintiff got his name entered in the municipal record in
 connivance with the Chairman and Members of Town Area
 Committee, Behat, and got the disputed property numbered as
 358. It is further pleaded that the suit is bad for mis-joinder of
 defendant no. 2. With the above pleadings, the relief claimed        c
 by the plaintiff was opposed by the defendants.

     5. The trial court, on the basis of the pleadings of the
parties, framed the following issues:

     ( 1) Whether the plaintiff is owner and in possession of the     o
     suit property?

     (2) Whether the defendants are illegally interfering with the
     peaceful possession of the plaintiff by cutting the trees,
     demolishing the structure and forcibly taking possession
     of the property?                                                 E

     (3) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Sections
     38 and 41 of Specific Relief Act?

     (4) Whether the suit is undervalued and court fees paid is       F
     insufficient?             ·

     (5) Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of defendant no.
     2?

     (6) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled?           G

    6. The parties adduced their oral and documentary
evidence before the trial court. On behalf of the plaintiff, PW1 -
Mohd. Farooq (plaintiff himself) and PW 2-ldrish were
examined. On the other hand, on behalf of the defendants,
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    784       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A DW1- Zarif Ahmad (defendant no. 1 himself). DW2-Safiq and
  DW3-Anita (Advocate Commissioner, who inspected the spot),
  were examined. It appears that plaintiff filed documents to show
  that in the Assessment Register of the Town Area, plot no. 358
  is recorded in his name whereas plot no. 357 is recorded in
B the name of defendant no. 1- Zarif Ahmad. He further filed
  receipts showing payment of house tax in respect of House no.
  358 from the year 1993 to 1997, by him. The defendants
  appear to have filed paper no. 19C (copy of khatauni), paper
  no. 20C (copy of khasra), paper nos. 21 C and 22C (copies of
c receipts of house tax of house no. 357), paper nos. 23C and
  25C (copies of extract of assessment of town area) and papar
  no. 26C (copy of order for sanctioning of site plan).

        7. The trial court, after hearing the parties and discussing
  the evidence, decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and
D decreed the suit vide judgment and order dated 30.7.2004
  (copy-Annexure P-4). Aggrieved by the said judgment and
  decree, defendants filed Civil Appeal no. 40 of 2004 before the
  District Judge, which was allowed vide judgment and order
  dated 2.3.2007 (copy-Annexure P-5) by Additional District
E Judge, Saharanpur. The plaintiff challenged the judgment of the
  first Appellate Court before the High Court in Second Appeal.
  The High Court, after hearing the parties, set-aside the order
  of the first Appellate Court, and restored the decree passed
  by the trial court. Hence, by way of special leave, the defendants
F have filed the present appeal.

       8. Learned counsel for the defendants argued before us
  that the property in suit was not identifiable, and the first
  Appellate Court committed no error of law in dismissing the suit.
G However, on perusal of plaint (copy-Annexure P-1), we find that
  at the end of the plaint, plaintiff has not only given the boundaries
  of the plot but also mentioned Nagar Panchayat (Town Area/
  Municipal) number of the plot. It is also clearly mentioned at the
  foot of the plaint that the house in question is situated in Mahalia
  - Sadakpur, Town Behat Nagar Panchayat, Tehsil Khas, District
H
    ZARIF AHMAD (D) THROUGH LRS. v. MOHD.                    785
         FAROOQ [PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]

Saharanpur, and in the plaint map, same is shown by letters          A
Ka, Kha, Ga, Gha, Cha, Chha. In our opinion, there is little force
in the argument of learned counsel for the defendants that the
land in suit is not identifiable. Had the land in question been
non identifiable, the Advocate Commissioner would not have
given the report, relied by the defendants (copy-Annexure P-2)       B
after inspection of the plot in question.

     9. It is contended by the learned counsel for the defendants
that no length and width of the land in question is mentioned in
the plaint. As such, the decree passed by the trial court was        C
liable to be set-aside as the decree could not have been
executed.

      10. We have considered the submission of leaned counsel
for the defendants but we are unable to agree with it for the
reason that had it been a case of mandatory injunction requiring     D
restoration of possession of land to the plaintiff or demolition
of the construction raised by the defendants, what the
defendants have pleaded before us, could have been accepted
but the present suit is for the relief of permanent prohibitory
injunction in respect of the land which is described with            E
boundaries and its municipal number. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the decree passed by the trial court is un-executable.

     11. Order Vil Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(for short "CPC"), which pertains to the requirement of
description of immovable property, reads as under:
                                                                     F

     "Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable
     property:- Where the subject matter of the suit is
     immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description
     of the property, sufficient to identify it, and in case such    G
     property can be identified by boundaries in a record of
     settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify s1,1ch
     boundaries or numbers."

     12. The object of the above provision is that the
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    786      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.

A description of the property must be sufficient to identify it. The
  property can be identifiable by boundaries, or by number in a
  public record of settlement or survey. Even by plaint map
  showing the location of the disputed immovable property, it can
  be described. Since in the present case, the suit property has
B been described by the plaintiff in the plaint not only by the
  boundaries but also by the municipal number, and by giving its
  description in the plaint map, from no stretch of imagination, it
  can be said that the suit property was not identifiable in the
  present case. In our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that
c the first Appellate Court has erred in law in dismissing the suit
  by holding that the land is n'ot identifiable. It appears that the
  first Appellate Court has wrongly framed the additional issue
  as to whether the property in dispute is identifiable or not
  particularly when there was no such plea in the written
  statement. We are in agreement with the High Court that there
0
  was no need on the part of the first Appellate Court to remit
  the matter to the trial court as contended by the defendants
  before it (High Court) to allow the parties to adduce evidence
  on the additional issue, as neither issue on identifiability of land
E arises from the pleadings nor the evidence was lacking on
  record.

         13. No doubt, Section 107 of CPC empowers the
  appellate court to remand a case, but it simultaneously                ,
  empowers the appellate court to take additional evidence or
F to require such evidence to be taken. Rule 24 of Order XLI
  C.P .C provides that where evidence on record is sufficient,
  appellate court may determine the case finally. It is not a healthy
  practice to remand a case to trial court unless it is necessary
  to do so as it makes the parties to wait for the final decision of
G a case for the period which is avoidable. Only in rare situations,
  a case should be remanded e.g. when the trial court has
  disposed of a suit on a preliminary issue without recording
  evidence and giving its decision on the rest of the issues, but
  it is not so in the present case.                             ·
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   ZARIF AHMAD (D) THROUGH LRS. v. MOHD.                         787
        FAROOQ [PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
    14. In P. Purushottam Reddy and another vs. Pratap                   A
Steels Ltd, this Court has observed in paragraph 11 as under:

     "11. In the case at hand, the trial court did not dispose of
     the suit upon a preliminary point. The suit was decided by
     recording findings on all the issues. By its appellate
                                                                         B
     judgment under appeal herein, the High Court has recorded
     its finding on some of the issues, not preliminary, and then
     framed three additional issues leaving them to be tried and
     decided by the trial court. It is not a case where a retrial is
     considered necessary. Neither Rule 23 nor Rule 23-A of
     Order 41 applies. None of the conditions contemplated by            C
   · Rule 27 exists so as to justify production of additional
     evidence by either party under that Rule. The validity of
      remand has to be tested by reference to Rule 25. So far
     as the objection as to maintainability of the suit for failure
     of the plaint to satisfy the requirement of Forms 47 and 48         D
      of Appendix A CPC is concerned, the High Court has itself
      found that there was no specific plea taken in the written
      statement. The question of framing an issue did not,
     therefore, arise. However, the plea was raised on behalf
      of the defendants purely as a question of law which, in their      E
      submission, strikes at the very root of the right of the
      plaintiff to maintain the suit in the form in which it was filed
      and so the plea was permitted to be urged. So far as the
      plea as to readiness and willingness by reference to
      clause (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963          F
      is concerned, the pleadings are there as they were and
      the question of improving upon the pleadings does not
      arise inasmuch as neither any of the parties made a prayer
      for amendment in the pleadings nor has the High Court
      allowed such a liberty. It is true that a specific issue was       G
      not framed by the trial court. Nevertheless, the parties and
      the trial court were very much alive to the issue whether
      Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was complied with
      or not and the contentions advanced by the parties in this
      regard were also adjudicated upon. The High Court was              H
    788        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A         to examine whether such finding of the trial court was
          sustainable or not - in law and on facts. Even otherwise
          the question could have been gone into by the High Court
          and a finding could have been recorded on the available
          material inasmuch as the High Court being the court of first
B         appeal, all the questions of fact and law arising in the case
          were open before it for consideration and decision".

         Therefore, the High Court rightly rejected the contention of
    the defendants on the above point.

C       15. Our attention is also drawn by the learned counsel for
    the defendants, to the copy of the report of Advocate
    Commissioner (Annexure P-2) in which the Advocate
    Commissioner has reported that the defendants were found in
    possession of the disputed property.
D
       16. However, in our view, Advocate Commissioner's
  report, in the present case, is against the weight of the oral and
  documentary evidence on record which sufficiently proves that
  plaintiff was in possession over plot no. 358, and for several
E years he was paying the house tax as was found by the trial
  court on the basis of house tax receipts and extracts of house
  tax Assessment Register. It is not disputed that plot no. 357
  belonging to the defendants was in south of plot no. 358, and
  house of the defendants was situated over their plot. The trial
  court has decreed the suit only in respect of plot no. 358.
F
        17. For the reasons, as discussed above, we find no
  illegality with the impugned order whereby the High Court has
  allowed Second Appeal, and restored the decree passed by
  the trial court. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No order
G as to costs.
    Devika Gujral                                      Appeal dismissed