Patna High Court

Satyendra Kumar SinghversusThe State of Bihar

Decided: 29 January 2026
Disposal: DISPOSED
Bench: PURNENDU SINGH

Holding

The Court directed the District Magistrate to obtain records, afford a hearing, pass a reasoned order within three weeks, and ensure compensation if acquisition occurs, thereby disposing of the petition.

Summary

The petitioners, Satyendra Kumar Singh and Devendra Kumar, claim ownership and peaceful possession of 3 acres 30 decimals of land in Dhakani Bigha, Jehanabad, which they have cultivated since 1991. The Circle Officer declared the land "Gairmazarua" and barred cultivation without hearing, and the petitioners’ subsequent representations to the District Magistrate and Circle Officer were ignored. They filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus to stop acquisition of the land for a solid waste processing plant, to prevent interference with their livelihood, and to direct a change in alignment. The State argued the petitioners were responsible for not receiving compensation and that the petition was not maintainable. The Court held that the authorities must record reasons, afford a hearing, and pass a reasoned order within three weeks, and if acquisition proceeds, compensation must be paid at market value, disposing of the petition.

Issues considered

The legality of the Circle Officer's declaration of the land as Gairmazarua and restriction on cultivation without hearing.
Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief under Article 226 despite the existence of alternative administrative remedies.
Whether the State is obligated to pay compensation for acquisition of the petitioners' land.
Whether the High Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the authorities to refrain from acquiring the land.

Legislation cited

Bihar Tenancy Act — s. Section 40
Constitution of India — s. Article 226, Article 300A

Subjects

property rights
land acquisition
writ of mandamus
Article 226
Article 300A
natural justice
compensation
administrative law
Bihar Tenancy Act
Gairmazarua
solid waste processing

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1181 of 2026
======================================================
1. Satyendra Kumar Singh Son of Late Ram Pandit Singh, Resident of Village-
Dhakani Bigha, Post and Police Station- Makhdumpur, District- Jehanabad.
At present resident of Road No. 4, near Doon Public School, Shastri Nagar,
West, Police Station- Rampur, District- Gaya.
2. Devendra Kumar, Son of Late Ram Pandit Singh, Resident of Village-
Dhakani Bigha, Post and Police Station- Makhdumpur, District- Jehanabad.
At present resident of Road No. 4, near Doon Public School, Shastri Nagar,
West, Police Station- Rampur, District- Gaya.

... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land
Reforms Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
2. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector, District, Jehanabad.
3. The Sub-Divsional Officer, Sadar Jehanabad, District- Jehanabad.
4. The Circle Officer, Block Makhdumpur, District- Jehanabad.
5. The Junior Engineer, Construction Division, Makhdumpur, District-
Jehanabad.
6. The Station House Officer, Police Station- Makhdumpur, District-
Jehanabad.

... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Anil Kumar Singh
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Additional Advocate General (12)
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 29-01-2026
Heard Mr. Anil Kumar Singh, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the petitioners and learned AC to AAG-

12 for the State.

2. The petitioners in paragraph no. 1 of the present

writ petition have sought, inter alia, following relief(s), which is

reproduced hereinafter:-
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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"I. For issuance of a writ in the nature of
mandamus for commanding and directing the respondent
authority not to acquire the land of the petitioners
measuring an area 60 decimal land (total are 3 Acre 30
decimal), Thana No. 315, Khata No. 112, Plot No. 709
Mauza- Dhakani Bigha for construction of Solid Waste
Processing.
II. For issuance of an appropriate writ for
commanding and directing the respondent authority to not
interfere the Memo No. 1407 dated 26.6.2025 whereby it
has been directed to acquire the cultivated land in which
wheat plants are lying in the field of the said land by which
the petitioners is earning his livelihood.
III. For issuance of an appropriate writ for
directing the respondents to change the alignment for
construction of Solid Waste Processing through the
Gairmazarua land is available nearby to the petitioners
land/locality.
IV. For grant of any other relief/reliefs for
which the petitioners is legally entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case."

3. Brief facts of the case is that the petitioners claim

lawful ownership and peaceful possession over land bearing

Thana No. 315, Khata No. 112 (Old Khata No. 34), Plot No.

709, measuring 3 acres 30 decimals, situated at Mauza Dhakani

Bigha, District Jehanabad, stating that 60 decimals of the said

land were purchased through a registered sale deed dated

11.01.1991 in the names of Smt. Gita Devi, Smt. Aashrita

Kumari, Smt. Anita Kumari, and Petitioner No. 2, Devendra

Kumar Singh, and that they have been cultivating the land since

the date of purchase, while the original raiyats, Late Surajnath

Singh and Most. Indrapadi Kuer, had earlier acquired the land

pursuant to an order passed under Section 40 of the Bihar
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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Tenancy Act in the year 1961. The grievance of the petitioners

arose when the Circle Officer, Makhdumpur, issued Memo No.

1407 dated 26.06.2025 declaring the land as Gairmazarua and

restraining the petitioners from cultivating it without initiating

any proceeding or affording an opportunity of hearing. The

petitioners thereafter submitted representations dated

03.07.2025, 21.11.2025, and 06.12.2025 before the District

Magistrate-cum-Collector, Jehanabad, and the Circle Officer,

but no action was taken. They contend that they have invested

substantial amounts in developing the land for cultivation, that

the livelihood of their family members depends upon it, and that

the impugned action is arbitrary and high-handed, leaving them

with no alternative efficacious remedy except to approach this

Hon’ble Court by way of the present writ petition.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioners informs that for the relief(s) as prayed for in the

present writ petition, the petitioners have already filed

representation on 21.11.2025 before the District Magistrate-

cum-Collector, Jehanabad, however, there is no information

whether any action has been taken on the same till date.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has not denied the

fact that other persons in the vicinity have not been paid the due

compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed and has directly

approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the writ petition is

not maintainable.

6. Heard the parties.

7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi

judicial power on his administrative side often delay in

considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or

they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where

they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, at the same time,

it is well settled principle of law that High Courts should not

exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious remedy is

available. Taking into circumstances of the present case where

fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this

Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India.

8. It is also well settled principle of law that every

administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has

been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates

(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:

“47. Summarising the above discussion,

this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and
is virtually a part of “due process”.

9. The law in this regard has been reiterated by the

Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.

Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,

paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,

which is as under:-

“ 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the
rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)

10. The principle of alternative remedies and its

exceptions has also been clarified in Assistant Commissioner

of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal

No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499. The Apex Court has

held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if

the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their

jurisdiction. It has observed as under:

“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”

11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A

of the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the

invaluable right to property.

“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”

12. The State cannot disposes a citizen of his

property except in accordance with law and procedure

prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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expressively included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of

India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is

well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya Devi Vs. The

State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2020(2) SCC

569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said

judgment, which are inter alia reproduced hereinafter;

“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”

13. The above proposition of law has again been

reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra

(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal

No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases

605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–

“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”

14. In such circumstances, when the question of right

to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the

Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this

Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to

forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner

is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance

with law from the date of communication of this order.

15. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector is directed

to call for the entire records from the Circle Officer,

Makhdumpur, relating to the land in question and after affording

due opportunity of hearing to both the parties, pass a reasoned

order and dispose of the representation filed on behalf of the

petitioners well within a period of three weeks from the date of

communication of this order, otherwise, this Court will take

action against all the authorities.

16. In case, the land of the petitioners are acquired,

then in that case, the petitioners are required to be paid due

compensation as per MVR determined at the rate of commercial
Patna High Court CWJC No.1181 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
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value of the land.

17. Accordingly, the present application stands

disposed of.

(Purnendu Singh, J)
Niraj/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE N/A
Uploading Date 05.02.2026
Transmission Date N/A

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