Patna High Court
Amrendra SinghversusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- PURNENDU SINGH
Holding
The Court held that the writ petition is maintainable, the authorities must pass a reasoned order and pay compensation, and the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 in this circumstance.
Summary
The petitioners, Amrendra Singh and Satyendra Singh, claimed ownership of land acquired for the construction of NH 139 and alleged that no compensation had been paid despite filing a representation on 09-12-2025. The State argued that the petitioners delayed the process and that the writ petition was not maintainable. The High Court examined the principles governing writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the requirement of reasoned administrative orders, and the protection of property under Article 300A. Relying on precedents that allow the court to intervene when statutory remedies are ineffective or when there is a violation of natural justice, the Court held that the petitioners are entitled to compensation and that the authorities must pass a reasoned order within six weeks. The Court directed the District Magistrate to obtain records, hear both parties, and determine compensation at market value, disposing of the petition.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative statutory remedy.
- Whether the failure to pay compensation for land acquisition violates Article 300A of the Constitution.
- Whether the authorities' delay and lack of reasoned order constitute a jurisdictional defect.
- Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation for the acquired land.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of India — s. Article 226, Article 300A
Subjects
- writ petition
- mandamus
- land acquisition
- compensation
- Article 226
- Article 300A
- right to property
- reasoned order
- administrative law
- natural justice
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1203 of 2026
======================================================
1. Amrendra Singh Son of Anirudh Singh, Resident of Village- Rampur Kha-
juriya, Post Office- Rampur, Police Station- Dumariya Ghat, District- East
Champaran at Motihari.
2. Satyendra Singh, Son of Anirudh Singh, Resident of Village- Rampur Kha-
juriya, Post Office- Rampur, Police Station- Dumariya Ghat, District- East
Champaran at Motihari.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The District Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari.
3. The District Land Acquisition Officer, East Champaran at Motihari.
4. The Additional District Land Acquisition Officer, East Champaran at Moti-
hari.
5. The Circle Officer, Kesariya, District- East Champaran at Motihari.
6. Amit Kumar Singh, Son of Anirudh Singh, Resident of Village- Rampur
Khajuriya, P.O.- Rampur, P.S.-Dumariya Ghat, District- East Champaran at
Motihari.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sanjay Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Standing Counsel (16)
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 29-01-2026
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners and the learned SC 16 for the State.
2. The petitioners in paragraph no. 1 of the present
writ petition have sought, inter alia, following relief(s), which is
reproduced hereinafter:-
"(i) That the present writ petition has
been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of
mandamus commanding and directing the
respondent authorities to pay compensation
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
2/11
amount in respect of acquisition of the
petitioners’ land appertaining to Khata No.73,
Khesara No.962, measuring 4.35 decimals in the
name of petitioner no.1 and 4.35 decimals in the
name of the petitioner no.2 along with admissible
interest, and/order to pass any other appropriate
order or direction to which the petitioners may be
found legally entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
3. Brief facts of the case is that the petitioners claim
lawful ownership and peaceful possession over the land bearing
Khata No.73, Khesara No.962, measuring 4.35 decimal in the
name of petitioner no.1 and 4.35 decimals in the name of
petitioner no.2. The grievance of the petitioners is that the land
belonging to them has been acquired by the District
Administration for construction of NH 139 (W) from Sahebganj
to Areraj, however, no payment of compensation has been made
to them till date.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners informs that for the relief(s) as prayed for in the
present writ petition, the petitioners have already filed
representation before the Additional Land Acquisition Officer
on 09.12.2025, however, no action has been taken on the same
till date.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submitted that the petitioners themselves are
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
3/11
responsible for not receiving due compensation. Petitioners have
not denied the fact that other persons in the vicinity have not
been paid the due compensation. Petitioners have themselves
delayed and have directly approached this Hon’ble Court.
Accordingly, the writ petition is not maintainable.
6. Heard the parties.
7. It is commonly seen that the Officers having quasi
judicial power in its administrative side often delay in
considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or
they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where
they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled
principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an
effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into
circumstances of the present case where
fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this
Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
4/11
The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarizing the
above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend
has always been to record reasons,
even in administrative decisions, if
such decisions affect anyone
prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority
must record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of
reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must
not only be done it must also appear
to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial
and quasi-judicial or even
administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that
discretion has been exercised by the
decision-maker on relevant grounds
and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually
become as indispensable a
component of a decision-making
process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-
judicial and even by administrative
bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the
process of judicial review by superior
courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend
in all countries committed to rule of
law and constitutional governance is
in favour of reasoned decisions based
on relevant facts. This is virtually the
lifeblood of judicial decision-making
justifying the principle that reason is
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
5/11
the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-
judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common
purpose which is to demonstrate by
reason that the relevant factors have
been objectively considered. This is
important for sustaining the
litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-
judicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decision-
making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding
is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of
decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or
“rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be
equated with a valid decision-making
process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision-making not
only makes the judges and decision-
makers less prone to errors but also
makes them subject to broader
scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to
record reasons emanates from the
broad doctrine of fairness in
decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a
component of human rights and was
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
6/11
considered part of Strasbourg
Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs.
Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and
Anya v. University of Oxford34,
wherein the Court referred to Article
6 of the European Convention of
Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons
must be given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law
jurisdictions judgments play a vital
role in setting up precedents for the
future. Therefore, for development of
law, requirement of giving reasons
for the decision is of the essence and
is virtually a part of “due process”.
9. The law in this regard has been reiterated by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
Paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
“19. While a High Court would
normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and
efficacious alternate remedy is available, the
existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself
bar the High Court from exercising its
jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This
principle has been crystallized by this Court in
Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of
Trademarks, Mumbai and Harbanslal Sahni v.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh
& Ors a two judge Bench of this Court of which
one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud)
has summarized the principles governing the
exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
7/11
the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court
has observed:
“28. The principles of law which
emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226
of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised
not only for the enforcement of fundamental
rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The
High Court has the discretion not to entertain a
writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the
power of the High Court is where an effective
alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved
person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate
remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been
filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there
has been a violation of the principles of natural
justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a
legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in
an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ
petition should not be entertained when an
efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which
itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for
enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had
to that particular statutory remedy before
invoking the discretionary remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion
of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases
where there are disputed questions of fact, the
High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a
writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the
controversy requires the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be
interfered with.”
10. Now question arises whether this Court can exercise
its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
8/11
the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents have
acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well settled by
the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of State
Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 5121
of 2021), State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr.,
reported in (2005) SCC 6 499. The Apex Court has held that a
writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing
authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. It
has observed as under:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation
of infringement of fundamental rights or when on
the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are
shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do
not possess can be the grounds on which the writ
petitions can be entertained. But normally, the
High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in
a case, something going to the root of the
jurisdiction of the officer, something which would
show that it would be a case of palpable injustice
to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the
remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2
SCC 355: AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court
had entertained a petition despite availability of
alternative remedy and heard the parties on
merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the
High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of
non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the
High Court finds that factual disputes are
involved and it would not be desirable to deal with
them in a writ petition.”
11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
9/11
the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the
invaluable right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of
property save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.”
12. The State cannot disposes a citizen of his
property except in accordance with law and procedure
prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not
expressively included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is
well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya Devi Vs. The
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2020(2) SCC
569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said
judgment, which are inter alia reproduced hereinafter;
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when
the right to property was a fundamental
right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the
right to private property [State of W.B. v.
Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 ,
which could not be deprived without due
process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution
(Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,
however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1
SCC 353 in a welfare State, and a
constitutional right under Article 300-A of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
10/11
the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The State
cannot dispossess a citizen of his property
except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300-A, can be inferred
in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–
“ 16. The right to property ceased to be
a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-
fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right in a welfare State,
and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of
the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a
citizen of his property except in accordance with
the procedure established by law. The obligation
to pay compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that
Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
14. When the question of right to property as per the
provision of Article 300A of the Constitution of India comes to
the knowledge of this Court that due process of law has not been
Patna High Court CWJC No.1203 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
11/11
complied the Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
Constitution of India.
15. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector, East
Champaran at Motihari before whom the petitioners have
already filed their representation is directed to call for the entire
records from the Circle Officer, Kesariya, relating to the land in
question and after affording due opportunity of hearing to both
the parties, pass a reasoned order and dispose of the
representation filed on behalf of the petitioners well within a
period of six weeks from the date of communication of this
order, otherwise, this Court will take action against all the
authorities.
16. In case, the land of the petitioners are acquired,
then in that case, the petitioners are required to be paid due
compensation as per MVR determined at the rate of commercial
value of the land.
17. Accordingly, the present application stands
disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
chn/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 06.02.2026
Transmission Date NA
Checking your session…