Patna High Court
Pramanik KumarversusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- PURNENDU SINGH
Holding
The Court held that the authority acted without jurisdiction by not forwarding the objection as mandated by Section 15(2) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and therefore the order was quashed and the petitioner’s representation was to be disposed of by the District Collector.
Summary
The petitioner, owner of a small parcel of land in Patna, challenged a land acquisition order issued for the construction of a metro station. After a preliminary notification under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, he filed a statutory objection under Section 15, arguing that the land was needed only for a staircase and could be avoided. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the objection without forwarding it to the appropriate government, contrary to the proviso of Section 15(2). The High Court held that this omission was a jurisdictional error, violating the procedural safeguards of the Act and the petitioner’s right to property under Article 300A. Consequently, the Court directed the District Collector to consider the petitioner’s representation within three weeks and disposed of the petition.
Issues considered
- Whether the Land Acquisition Officer had jurisdiction to reject a Section 15 objection without forwarding it to the appropriate government as required by the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
- Whether the failure to forward the objection violates the procedural requirements of Section 15(2) and the principles of natural justice.
- Whether the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies.
- Whether the petitioner’s right to property under Article 300A is infringed by the acquisition order.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- land acquisition
- RFCTLARR Act
- Section 15 objection
- writ of certiorari
- Article 226
- property rights
- natural justice
- metro project
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1353 of 2026
======================================================
Pramanik Kumar Son of Late Rajeshwar Prasad Singh, resident of Village and
PO-Mohiuddinpur, PS-Fatuha, District-Patna (Bihar).
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue
and Land Reform, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of
Bihar, Patna.
3. The Director, Directorate of Land Acquisition, Department of Revenue and
Land Reform, Government of Bihar, Patna.
4. The District Magistrate cum Collector, Patna.
5. The Additional Collector, Patna.
6. The Disrict Land Acquisition Officer, Patna.
7. The Circle Officer, Circle Phulwarisharif, Patna.
8. The Managing Director, Patna Metro Rail Corporation Limited its Head
Office at Indira Bhawan, West Boring Road, Sri Krishnapuri, Patna, Bihar.
9. The Director, Patna Metro Rail Corporation Limited its Head Office at
Indira Bhawan, West Boring Road, Sri Krishnapuri, Patna, Bihar.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Anirudh Kumar Verma, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Sunil Kumar Mandal, SC 3
For the Patna Metro : Ms. Anukriti Jaipuriyar, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 31-01-2026
Heard Mr. Anirudh Kumar Verma, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner; Mr. Sunil Kumar Mandal,
learned Standing Counsel 3 for the State and Ms. Anukriti
Jaipuriyar, learned counsel of the Patna Metro.
2. The petitioner in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ
petition has sought inter alia the following relief(s), which is
reproduced hereinafter:-
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“1. That this petition is being filed
for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the
order dated 12.12.2025 passed in L.A. Case No.
2 of 2025-26 on the petition filed u/s 15 (1) of the
Act for the land acquired vide preliminary
notification issued u/s 11 (1) of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013 on 01.08.2025 inviting objection under
section 15 of the Act as the impugned order
passed by the authority without forwarding the
objection to the appropriate government
violating the mandate as enshrined in the provise
to the section 15(2) of the Act and further for
direction to forward he petitioner's objection
along with a reasoned report to the appropriate
government and stay of further acquisition
proceeding qua the petitioner's land and for any
other relief's deemed fit.”
3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner
claims title and possession over land bearing Khata No. 53, Plot
No. 1208 part measuring area under acquisition 0.02436 Acre,
situated at Mauza Jaganpura, Circle Patna, District Patna. The
said land was purchased by the petitioner’s mother vide
registered sale deed dated 09.04.1975 from Shree Bhagwan
Prasad and, after due mutation, the petitioner, being the sole
legal heir, is in peaceful possession as the recorded raiyat. A
preliminary notification dated 01.08.2025 was issued under the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
proposing acquisition of the petitioner’s land for construction of
Khemnichak Metro Station under the Patna Metro Rail Project,
inviting objections under Section 15 of the Act. The petitioner
filed a detailed statutory objection on 02.09.2025 contending
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that the acquisition was avoidable, as the land was proposed to
be used only for a staircase and access structure, and that
alternative design options were available whereby the staircase
could be constructed within the station premises itself, in
conformity with Section 8 of the Act mandating acquisition of
the bare minimum land and minimum displacement. The
petitioner was granted a hearing; however, instead of forwarding
the objection along with his report to the appropriate
Government as required under the proviso to Section 15(2) of
the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer rejected the objection on
merits by passing an order, observing that the land could have
been saved had the staircase been constructed within the station
premises. It is alleged that by doing so, the Land Acquisition
Officer assumed final adjudicatory powers not vested in him
under the statutory scheme, thereby nullifying the safeguard of
consideration by the appropriate Government. The petitioner
further contends that the Social Impact Assessment Report itself
acknowledges adverse impact on commercial land and essential
infrastructure, including a nearby hospital, and that partial
acquisition of the petitioner’s small holding would render the
remaining land unusable. Despite repeated representations to the
authorities seeking exemption of the land and even directions
Patna High Court CWJC No.1353 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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issued by the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and
Land Reforms, Bihar, no remedial action was taken. Aggrieved
by the rejection of his statutory objection and the alleged
violation of Sections 8 and 15 of the Act, the petitioner has
approached this Court.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner
submitted that a representation has already been filed a
representation before the District Land Acquisition Officer,
Patna which has not been entertained till date and seeks to file a
fresh representation before the District Collector- cum -
Magistrate, Patna for the relief(s) as prayed for in the present
writ petition.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for
not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed
and has directly approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the
writ petition is not maintainable.
6. Heard the parties.
7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi
judicial power on their administrative side often delay in
considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or
they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where
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they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled
principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an
effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into the
circumstances of the present case where
fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this
Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarising the above discussion,
this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1353 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
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v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
virtually a part of “due process”.
9. The law in this regard has been laid down by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
“ 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the
rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
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or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)
10. Now question arises whether this Court can
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents
have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well
settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499 this
Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the
High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope
of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
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something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”
11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A
of the Constitution of India tends to safeguard the invaluable
right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”
12. As per the constitutional mandate also, the State
cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance
with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay
compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law
in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya
Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in
2020(2) SCC 569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and
12.2 of the said judgment, which are inter alia reproduced
hereinafter;
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“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–
“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
14. In such circumstances, when the question of right
to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1353 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this
Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to
forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner
is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance
with law from the date of communication of this order.
15. Considering the aforesaid information, the District
Collector- cum - Magistrate, Patna, is directed to dispose of the
representation filed by the petitioner for the relief(s) as prayed
for in the present writ petition within three weeks in accordance
with law.
16. Accordingly, the present application stands
disposed of.
17. Interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
Ashishsingh/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 07.02.2026
Transmission Date NA
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