Dr. Binod Singh @ Binod SinghversusThe State of Bihar

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                   Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 1734 of 2023
     ======================================================
     Dr Binod Singh @ Binod Singh Son of Late Jagdish Singh, Resident of
     Mohalla- Ashok Nagar, Road No. 11, Flat No. 304, Raj Ram Mohan Roy
     Apartment, P.S. Kankarbagh, P.O. Lohia Nagar, District and Town- Patna,
     Bihar.

                                                                ... ... Petitioner/s
                                     Versus
1.   The State of Bihar represented through the Additional Chief Secretary,
     Health Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2.   The Joint Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
3.   The Under Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
4.   The Indigenous Medicine, Government of Bihar, Patna.
5.   The Deputy Director (Homeopath), Indigenous Medicine, Government of
     Bihar, Patna.
6.   The Bihar State Homeopathic Board, Kadamkuan, Patna through its
     Registrar, the President, Bihar State Homeopathic Board, Kadamkuan,
     Patna.

                                               ... ... Respondent/s
     ======================================================
     Appearance :
     For the Petitioner/s   :      Mr Mrigank Mauli, Sr Advocate with
                                   M/s Radha Mohan Singh, Navin Kr Singh,
                                       Advocates
     For the Respondent/s   :      Mr Mujtabaul Haque, GP XII with
                                   Mr Manish Kr, AC to GP XII
     ======================================================
     CORAM: HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR

                                 ORAL JUDGMENT

      Date : 11-02-2026


                      Heard the parties.

                  2 The present writ petition has been filed for the

     following reliefs:

                        “a To quash and set aside (Annexure P/20)
                the rejection of appeal order dated the 17th May 2016
                (Memo No 576) [received by the petitioner in the
                month of November of 2022 from the office] issued
                under the signature of the Under Secretary of the
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                  Health Department, Government of Bihar, Patna
                  whereby and whereunder the appeal dated 7 August,
                  2013 (Annexure P/14) was rejected in compliance of
                  the order dated 27 August, 2014 (Annexure P/17)
                  passed in CWJC No 12677 of 2014 filed by the
                  petitioner under a non-reasoned and cryptic order.

                          b To quash and set aside Annexure P/12 i e
                  the order of punishment dated 20 th May 2013
                  (Notification No 482) whereby and where under a
                  punishment of censure as also withholding of five
                  annual increment with cumulative effect (major
                  penalty) was imposed upon the petitioner contrary to
                  the mandate of law.

                        c To direct for refund of the deducted annual
                  increment (s) as a consequence of setting aside of the
                  punishment order with interest.

                          d To declare that the enquiry report dated 21st
                  May 2012 (Annexure P/9) is in accordance with law
                  which proved that no misconduct was committed by
                  the petitioner.

                          e Any other relief or reliefs which the
                  petitioner be found entitled with the facts and
                  circumstances of the case.

                            f Cost of this litigation.

                         g Compensation for mental agony and losses
                  sustained by this petitioner.”

                        3 At the outset, learned Senior Counsel for the

        petitioner submits that while the petitioner was working as

        Government Homeopathic doctor, he was assigned the additional

        charge of Registrar of the Bihar State Homeopathic Board (for

        brevity, the Board) by an order contained in Memo No 751 dated

        16.07.2008 issued by the Health Department, Government of
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        Bihar, Patna. While he was working on the said post, in February

        2011 a complaint was filed by one Dr Prashant Banerjee of

        Kolkata on 18.02.2011 and 21.02.2011, upon which an inspection

        with respect to the affairs of the Board was carried out by the

        Deputy Director (Homeopath), Indigenous Medicine Directorate,

        Bihar, Patna who submitted his ex parte report dated 24.02.2011

        contained in Memo No 43. Based on the above mentioned report,

        a show cause notice was issued vide Memo No 254 dated

        24.03.2011 under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Department

        of Health, Government of Bihar, Patna on ten charges mentioned

        therein.      The petitioner submitted his show cause reply on

        06.04.2011 by denying each and every charge and gave reason for

        his denial.

                   4 It has further been submitted by the learned Senior

        counsel for the petitioner that in the meantime, the petitioner was

        put under suspension by an order dated 11.10.2011 issued by the

        Special Secretary to the Government, Department of Health,

        Bihar, Patna. The petitioner, being aggrieved with the order of

        suspension filed CWJC No 18745 of 2011, but during pendency of

        the writ petition, charge sheet was issued on 05.12.2011 wherein

        four charges were levelled against the petitioner. Upon issuance

        of the charge sheet, the petitioner preferred to withdraw the writ
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        petition filed by him and vide order dated 05.12.2011, CWJC No

        18745 of 2011 was permitted to be withdrawn. The petitioner

        appeared before the Enquiry Officer and filed his comprehensive

        written statement of defence on 17.01.2012, wherein he provided

        explanation for each and every charge and requested the Enquiry

        Officer to exonerate him from the charges levelled against him.

        The Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry, wherein the

        petitioner fully cooperated and after thorough enquiry, the Enquiry

        Officer submitted her report on 21.05.2012 whereby she found the

        charges to be not proved against the petitioner.

                 5 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further

        submits that the Disciplinary Authority, vide letter dated

        26.09.2012 asked clarification from the petitioner with regard to

        certain facts mentioned in the enquiry report dated 21.05.2012. It

        has further been submitted that the Disciplinary Authority, instead

        of asking for clarification from the Enquiry Officer, asked the

        same from the petitioner and without disagreeing from the enquiry

        report, submitted by the Enquiry Officer, directed the petitioner to

        clarify on the same and to submit his show cause within 15 days.

        In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted his show cause

        reply on 09.10.2012 wherein he gave his clarification/explanation

        to all the three points raised in the letter dated 26.09.2012.
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                 6 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits

        that by the impugned order contained in Memo No 16/M 1-

        38/2011-482 dated 20.05.2013 issued under the signature of the

        Joint Secretary to the Government, Department of Health,

        Government         of    Bihar,     Patna,    without   considering   the

        explanation/clarification submitted by the petitioner, he came to

        the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer has found the charges to

        be proved, although in the enquiry report submitted on

        21.05.2012, the Enquiry Officer found the charges to be not

        proved, proceeded to award punishment of censure as well as

        major penalty of withholding of five annual increment with

        cumulative effect and further revoked the suspension of the

        petitioner with immediate effect and directed the petitioner to give

        his joining in the Department. The petitioner filed his appeal

        before the Hon’ble Chief Minister, Bihar against the order of

        punishment dated 20.05.2013. The petitioner further filed a writ

        petition bearing CWJC No 8241 of 2013 against continuance of

        his suspension, but since in the meantime, final order was passed,

        therefore vide order dated 19.11.2013, the writ petition was

        dismissed as withdrawn.

                 7 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further

        submits that vide letter dated 05.02.2014 issued under the
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        signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, Department

        of Health, Government of Bihar, the appeal preferred by the

        petitioner was rejected on the ground that the same has been filed

        beyond the period of 45 days. Being aggrieved with the order

        dated 05.02.2014, the petitioner again preferred a writ petition

        which was numbered as CWJC No 12677 of 2014 and vide order

        dated 27.08.2014, the said writ petition was disposed of by

        remitting the matter back to the Appellate Authority to register the

        appeal of the petitioner and consider the same on merits and pass

        appropriate orders in accordance with law. The appeal preferred

        by the petitioner was taken up by the Under Secretary to the

        Government, Department of Health, Government of Bihar, Patna

        and without considering the points raised by the petitioner in his

        Memo of Appeal, the Appellate Authority proceeded to reject the

        appeal preferred by the petitioner without any justifiable basis and

        without application of his mind.

                 8 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits

        that the impugned orders are non-speaking and non-reasoned since

        no discussion has been made in the impugned orders with regard

        to the defence submitted by the petitioner.       The Disciplinary

        Authority, without considering the fact that the Enquiry Officer, in

        her enquiry report, clearly found the charges not to be proved
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        against the petitioner, without application of mind, recorded that

        the Enquiry Officer found the charges to be proved and on the

        basis of the same proceeded to pass punishment order against the

        petitioner. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further

        submits that since the impugned order and the appellate order also

        speaks about the issues, beyond the Memo of Charge and the same

        were taken into consideration, while passing the punishment order,

        which itself vitiates the punishment order.     The Disciplinary

        Authority further ignored the fact that the Enquiry Oficer, after

        enquiry, held the charges as not proved and instead of disagreeing

        with the enquiry report, through show cause asked only some

        clarification and without considering the same and while altering

        the charges, which is impermissible in law, proceeded to pass the

        punishment order.

                 9 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further

        submits that so far Jamuna Ram is concerned, it was the petitioner

        who had suspended him on 29.03.2011 after his arrest in

        connection with the vigilance case and his joining was accepted

        after release on bail, under the existing Rules, but his nature of

        assignment was changed and in fact later on Jamuna Ram was

        again put under suspension by the petitioner on 08.08.2011 and it

        was the petitioner who gave sanction for launching prosecution
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        against him in both the cases on 20.04.2011 and 25.08.2011

        respectively. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further

        submits that it was obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary

        Authority to issue show cause notice to the petitioner when he was

        altering the charges after submission of the enquiry report and

        further the so-called second show cause notice was not in

        accordance with law since no explanation was sought for from the

        petitioner rather a clarification was asked for from the petitioner.

        Even none of the authorities, i e the Disciplinary Authority and the

        Appellate Authority considered the point wise reply submitted by

        the petitioner and no reason was given by the Disciplinary

        Authority in the punishment order.

                 10 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relies on

        a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of

        Anant R Kulkarni -Versus- Y P Education Society reported in

        (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 515, wherein in Paragraphs No 18

        to 24, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as follows:

                         18. This Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Assn.
                  v NOIDA [(2011) 6 SCC 508 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri)
                  1015 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 1015 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S)
                  717 : AIR 2011 SC 2112], examined the issue, and
                  held that the competence of an authority to hold an
                  enquiry against an employee who has retired, depends
                  upon the statutory rules which govern the terms and
                  conditions of his service, and while deciding the said
                  case, reliance was placed on various earlier
                  judgments of this Court including B.J. Shelat v. State
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                  of Gujarat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 208 :
                  AIR 1978 SC 1109], Ramesh Chandra Sharma v.
                  Punjab National Bank [(2007) 9 SCC 15 : (2008) 1
                  SCC (L&S) 337] and UCO Bank v Rajinder Lal
                  Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S)
                  263 : AIR 2008 SC 1831] .
                         19. In State of Assam v Padma Ram Borah
                  [AIR 1965 SC 473], a Constitution Bench of this
                  Court held that it is not possible for the employer to
                  continue with the enquiry after the delinquent
                  employee stands retired. The Court observed : (AIR p
                  475, para 7)

                         “7. … According to the earlier order of the
                  State Government itself, the service of the respondent
                  had come to an end on 31-3-1961. The State
                  Government could not by unilateral action create a
                  fresh contract of service to take effect from 1-4-1961.
                  If the State Government wished to continue the
                  service of the respondent for a further period, the
                  State Government should have issued a notification
                  before 31-3-1961.”

                         While deciding the said issue, the Court placed
                  reliance on the judgment in R T Rangachari v Secy of
                  State for India in Council [(1936-37) 64 IA 40 :
                  (1937) 45 LW 139 : AIR 1937 PC 27] .

                        20. In State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram [(1969) 3
                  SCC 28 : AIR 1970 SC 214], this Court observed :
                  (SCC p 32, para 12)

                         “12. There can be no doubt that if disciplinary
                  action is sought to be taken against a government
                  servant it must be done before he retires as provided
                  by the said rule. If a disciplinary enquiry cannot be
                  concluded before the date of such retirement, the
                  course open to the Government is to pass an order of
                  suspension and refuse to permit the public servant
                  concerned to retire and retain him in service till such
                  enquiry is completed and a final order is passed
                  therein.”
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                          21. In Kirti Bhusan Singh v State of Bihar
                  [(1986) 3 SCC 675 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 703 : AIR 1986
                  SC 2116], this Court held as under : (SCC pp 678-79,
                  para 6)

                          “6. … We are of the view that in the absence of
                  such a provision which entitled the State Government
                  to revoke an order of retirement … which had become
                  effective and final, the order … passed by the State
                  Government revoking the order of retirement should
                  be held as having been passed without the authority of
                  law and is liable to be set aside. It, therefore, follows
                  that the order of dismissal passed thereafter was also
                  a nullity.”

                         22. In Bhagirathi Jena v Board of Directors,
                  OSFC [(1999) 3 SCC 666 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 804 :
                  AIR 1999 SC 1841] this Court observed : (SCC pp
                  668-69, para 7)

                          “7. … There is also no provision for
                  conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of
                  the appellant and nor any provision stating that in
                  case misconduct is established, a deduction could be
                  made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had
                  retired from service on 30-6-1995, there was no
                  authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the
                  departmental enquiry even for the purpose of
                  imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable
                  to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority,
                  it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the
                  appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on
                  retirement.”

                          23. In UP State Sugar Corpn Ltd v Kamal
                  Swaroop Tondon [(2008) 2 SCC 41 : (2008) 1 SCC
                  (L&S) 352], this Court dealt with a case wherein
                  statutory corporation had initiated proceedings for
                  recovery of the financial loss from an employee after
                  his retirement from service. This Court approved such
                  a course observing that in the case of retirement,
                  master and servant relationship continue for grant of
                  retiral benefits. The proceedings for recovery of
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                  financial loss from an employee is permissible even
                  after his retirement and the same can also be
                  recovered from the retrial benefits of the said
                  employee.

                          24. Thus, it is evident from the above, that the
                  relevant rules governing the service conditions of an
                  employee are the determining factors as to whether
                  and in what manner the domestic enquiry can be held
                  against an employee who stood retired after reaching
                  the age of superannuation. Generally, if the enquiry
                  has been initiated while the delinquent employee was
                  in service, it would continue even after his retirement,
                  but nature of punishment would change. The
                  punishment of dismissal/removal from service would
                  not be imposed.

                    11 The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further

       relies on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the

       case of United Bank of India -Versus- Biswanath Bhattacharjee

       reported in (2022) 13 Supreme Court Cases 329 wherein in

       Paragraphs No 17 to 19 and 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

       India, has held as under:

                          “17.      In one of the earliest decisions of
                  Union of India v H C Goel [1963 SCC OnLine SC
                  16 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] relating to
                  departmental proceedings, this Court observed that
                  where a public servant is punished for misconduct
                  after a departmental enquiry is conducted, a clear
                  case where interference under Article 226 of the
                  Constitution is warranted is when there is no evidence
                  to establish the official's guilt : (AIR pp 369-70, paras
                  22-23)

                          “22. … The two infirmities are separate and
                  distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may
                  be present. There may be cases of no evidence even
                  where the Government is acting bona fide; the said
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                  infirmity may also exist where the Government is
                  acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of
                  the Government not supported by any evidence may
                  be the result of mala fides but that does not mean that
                  if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the
                  conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will
                  not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is
                  why we are not prepared to accept the learned
                  Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides
                  are alleged against the appellant in the present case,
                  no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the
                  respondent.

                          23. That takes us to the merits of the
                  respondent's contention that the conclusion of the
                  appellant that the third charge framed against the
                  respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence.
                  The learned Attorney General has stressed before us
                  that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in
                  mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the
                  determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is
                  shown that the view taken by the appellant is a
                  reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in
                  appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether
                  this Court would have taken the same view or not.
                  This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The
                  only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing
                  with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any
                  evidence on which a finding can be made against the
                  respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In
                  exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a
                  plea, the High Court cannot consider the question
                  about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in
                  support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter
                  which is within the competence of the authority which
                  deals with the question; but the High Court can and
                  must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in
                  support of the impugned conclusion. In other words,
                  if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is
                  accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the
                  charge in question is proved against the respondent?
                  This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It
                  will take the evidence as it stands and only examine
                  whether on that evidence legally the impugned
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                  conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are
                  inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well
                  founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is
                  implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the
                  respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is
                  based on no evidence.”

                          18. Apart from cases of “no evidence”, this
                  Court has also indicated that judicial review can be
                  resorted to. However, the scope of judicial review in
                  such cases is limited [TNCS Corpn Ltd v K Meerabai,
                  (2006) 2 SCC 255 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 265]. In B C
                  Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 :
                  1996 SCC (L&S) 80] a three-Judge Bench of this
                  Court ruled that judicial review is not an appeal from
                  a decision but a review of the manner in which the
                  decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the
                  individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
                  that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
                  necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The
                  court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
                  act as an appellate authority; it does not reappreciate
                  the evidence. The Court held that : (B.C. Chaturvedi
                  case [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], SCC
                  pp 759-60, paras 12-13)

                          “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
                  decision but a review of the manner in which the
                  decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to
                  ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and
                  not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority
                  reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
                  When an enquiry is conducted on charges of
                  misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is
                  concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held
                  by a competent officer or whether rules of natural
                  justice are complied with. Whether the findings or
                  conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
                  entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has
                  jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
                  fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on
                  some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the
                  Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as
                  defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
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                  When the authority accepts that evidence and
                  conclusion receives support therefrom, the
                  disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
                  delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
                  Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
                  act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
                  and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
                  evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
                  authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
                  officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
                  natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
                  prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
                  conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
                  authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
                  finding be such as no reasonable person would have
                  ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with
                  the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so
                  as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

                          13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge
                  of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
                  authority has co extensive power to reappreciate the
                  evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
                  disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence
                  and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
                  Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot
                  be permitted to be canvassed before the
                  Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H C Goel [1963
                  SCC OnLine SC 16 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964
                  SC 364], this Court held at p 728 that if the
                  conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
                  reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
                  suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
                  based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
                  be issued.”

                         19. Other decisions have ruled that being a
                  proceeding before a domestic tribunal, strict rules of
                  evidence, or adherence to the provisions of the
                  Evidence Act, 1872 are inessential. However, the
                  procedure has to be fair and reasonable, and the
                  charged employee has to be given reasonable
                  opportunity to defend himself (ref : Bank of India v
                  Degala Suryanarayana [(1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999
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                  SCC (L&S) 1036] a decision followed later in Punjab
                  & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh [(2010) 11 SCC 233 :
                  (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 758]). In Moni Shankar v. Union
                  of India [(2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S)
                  819] this Court outlined what judicial review entails
                  in respect of orders made by the disciplinary
                  authorities : (Moni Shankar case [Moni Shankar v.
                  Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC
                  (L&S) 819], SCC p 492, para 17)

                          “17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-
                  judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence
                  Act are not applicable in the said proceeding,
                  principles of natural justice are required to be
                  complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial
                  review are entitled to consider as to whether while
                  inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a
                  delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been
                  taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have
                  been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be
                  based on evidence which meet the requirements of
                  legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to
                  arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the
                  evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is
                  taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety,
                  meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely,
                  preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the
                  test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been
                  satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to
                  interfere.”

                          21. The Bank is correct, when it contends that
                  an appellate review of the materials and findings
                  cannot ordinarily be undertaken, in proceedings
                  under Article 226 of the Constitution. Yet, from H.C.
                  Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, 1963 SCC OnLine
                  SC 16 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364]
                  onwards, this Court has consistently ruled that where
                  the findings of the disciplinary authority are not based
                  on evidence, or based on a consideration of irrelevant
                  material, or ignoring relevant material, are mala fide,
                  or where the findings are perverse or such that they
                  could not have been rendered by any reasonable
                  person placed in like circumstances, the remedies
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                  under Article 226 of the Constitution are available,
                  and intervention, warranted. For any court to
                  ascertain if any findings were beyond the record (i.e.
                  no evidence) or based on any irrelevant or extraneous
                  factors, or by ignoring material evidence, necessarily
                  some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of
                  “no evidence” or perversity, cannot be rendered sans
                  such basic scrutiny of the materials, and the findings
                  of the disciplinary authority. However, the margin of
                  appreciation of the court under Article 226 of the
                  Constitution would be different; it is not the appellate
                  in character.”


           12 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further places

      reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court dated

      09.12.2025 passed in LPA No 285 of 2024 wherein in paragraphs

      No 8 to 13 the learned Division Bench has held as follows:

                         “8 it is pointed out by Mr Mriganj Mauli,
                  learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the respondent
                  that the charge sheet was served to the respondent in
                  the year 2010, the above mentioned file dated
                  15.04.1995 to 21.04.1995 was never produced before the
                  inquiry officer.

                         9 Next, he refers to the order sheet of the inquiry
                  proceedings from 28th November 2011. It is pointed out
                  by the learned Senior Counsel that in the order dated
                  28th November 2011 and even before the said date in all
                  orders there was counter signature of the delinquent
                  employee, however, the order dated 18.02.2011 fixing
                  the next date of inquiry proceeding on 25th March 2011
                  and the order dated 25th March 2011 wherein, the
                  inquiry proceeding was closed and the date was fixed
                  for passing of the order were not signed by the
                  respondent which amply shows that the said orders and
                  the closure of inquiry were passed behind the back of
                  the respondent, therefore, the respondent prayed for
                  supply of a copy of the order passed on 18 th February
                  2011 by a letter dated 23rd March 2011. The respondent,
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                  however, was not produced with the said orders. Thus,
                  it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the
                  inquiry proceeding is absolutely wrong, arbitrary and
                  contrary to the record of the department because of the
                  fact that the respondent was accepted as “Prakash
                  Parewa” in the year 1995 itself.

                          10 It is also pointed out by Mr Mauli, learned
                  Senior Counsel for the respondent that the delinquent
                  employee retired from service with effect from 31 st
                  October 2024 during the pendency of the appeal. A
                  question arose as to whether on his retirement the
                  inquiry proceeding could have been converted to
                  disciplinary proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar
                  Pension Rules. Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules
                  runs thus:-

                          “43 (b) The [Appointment authority of the post
                  held at the time of retirement] further reserve to
                  themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a
                  pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a
                  specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery
                  from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary
                  loss caused to Government if the pensioner is found in
                  departmental or judicial proceeding to have been guilty
                  of grave misconduct; or to have caused pecuniary loss
                  to Government by misconduct or negligence, during his
                  service including service rendered on re-employment
                  after retirement:”

                           11 On plain reading of the provision suggests
                  initiation of disciplinary proceeding even against a
                  retired employee when a gross pecuniary loss is caused
                  to the Government owing to the payment of pension
                  legally and the Government requires recovery of such
                  money or the money was subjected to grave misconduct
                  or to have cause pecuniary loss to the Government by
                  misconduct or negligence during his service.

                         12 The initiation of disciplinary proceeding
                  against a retired employee came up for consideration in
                  Radha Raman Sharma v State of Bihar, reported in
                  (2004) 13 SCC 787. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
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                  aforementioned decision refers to a proviso in the
                  following words:-

                            “Provided that-

                          a) such departmental proceedings, if not
                  instituted while the Government servant was on duty
                  either before retirement or during re-employment;

                         (i) shall not be instituted save with sanction of
                  State Government.

                         (ii) shall be in respect of an event which took
                  place not more than four years before the institution of
                  uch proceeding; and

                          (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at
                  such place or places as the State Government may direct
                  and in accordance with the procedure applicable to
                  proceedings on which an order of dismissal from
                  service may be made.

                          (b) judicial proceeding, if not instituted while the
                  government servantg was on duty either before
                  retirement or during re-employment, shall have been
                  instituted in accordance with sub-clause (ii) of clause
                  (a); and

                         (c) the Bihar Public Service Commisson, shall
                  be consulted before final orders are passed.”

                          13 In the instant case, no allegation against the
                  respondent has been to the effect that he was guilty for
                  gross pecuniary loss or gross misconduct.”

                    13 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further

       places reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

       reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 2192 (Ravi Oraon -Versus- State

       of Jharkhand & Others and its analogous cases) wherein in

       paragraphs 32 and 33, it has been held as follows:
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                          “32 Why is this course of action shocking? The
                  appellants, in their replies to the show cause notices,
                  had categorically demonstrated that they were not
                  required to secure 45% marks in their intermediate
                  examination. They were required to secure more than
                  40% marks in the intermediate examination, which they
                  did secure. Confronted with this situation, the
                  respondents conveniently proceeded to terminate the
                  appellants' services by computing their marks after
                  excluding the marks secured in the vocational subject.
                  Significantly, the allegation that the appellants had
                  failed to secure 40% marks (after exclusion of marks
                  secured in the vocational subject) in the intermediate
                  examination did not even figure as an allegation in the
                  show cause notices. Therefore, findings were returned
                  by the respondents which were at variance with the
                  allegations levelled in the show cause notices. The
                  appellants having successfully defended the allegations,
                  the respondents were precluded in law from proceeding
                  with such notices. In the absence of fresh show cause
                  notices specifically requiring the appellants to explain
                  why the marks secured in the vocational subject should
                  not be taken into account for determining their overall
                  percentage, in our considered view, the appellants had
                  been denied a fair and reasonable opportunity of
                  hearing and the termination orders are wholly
                  unsustainable and stand vitiated being in violation of
                  the principles of natural justice.

                          33 The present is akin to a situation where the
                  noticee successfully defends the charge against him but
                  is made to suffer civil consequences because the notifier
                  finds the noticee guilty of a different charge in respect
                  whereof he is not put to notice. In such a case, the
                  finding of guilt which is at variance with the original
                  charge without proper opportunity to respond offends
                  due process and renders any order or action
                  unsustainable.”


                    14 Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner

       places reliance on a judgment dated 09.02.2026 passed in CWJC
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       No 16541 of 2022 by this Court wherein, after referring to

       different judicial pronouncements, this Court, in paragraphs No 25

       and 26 has held as follows:

                          “25 The disciplinary authority, while imposing
                  punishment upon the petitioner did not even consider
                  the fact that the enquiry officer while submitting his
                  enquiry report, has specifically mentioned that due to
                  efforts made by the petitioner, the deficit Court fee and
                  Registration fee were recovered and in these
                  circumstances he had recommended for exoneration of
                  the petitioner. The disciplinary authority without giving
                  any reason for differing with the report of the enquiry
                  oficer, went ahead and found the charges to be proved
                  against the petitioner and even did not give an
                  opportunity to submit second show cause reply, inflicted
                  the punishment of deduction of 10% of pension for a
                  period of five years.

                          26 The appellate authority did not appreciate the
                  enquiry report and the grounds taken by the petitioner
                  in his memo of appeal and rejected the appeal preferred
                  by the petitioner by holding that the grounds taken by
                  the petitioner is not maintainable or without any
                  reasoning.”

                    15 The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits

       that the petitioner has, in the meantime, superannuated on

       31.08.2024.

                    16 Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-

       State submits that the reasoned order, as contained in Memo No

       576 dated 17.05.2016, does not suffer from any illegality and has

       been passed in compliance of the order dated 27.06.2016 passed in

       the petitioner’s previous writ petition bearing CWJC No 2677 of
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       2014 after thorough consideration of the merits of the case. The

       learned State Counsel further points out that pursuant to the

       complaint submitted by one Prashant Banerjee against the

       petitioner regarding his functioning as the Registrar of the Board, a

       detailed enquiry was conducted by the Deputy Director,

       (Homeopath), Indigenous Medicine Directorate, Bihar, Patna on

       the charges/allegation/complaint and a detailed report/enquiry

       report was submitted vide Memo No 43 dated 24.02.2011 and,

       thereafter, the Joint Secretary, Health Department, Government of

       Bihar, Patna issued a show cause notice to the petitioner seeking

       his explanation against the charges and irregularities found against

       him.

                    17 It has further been submitted that the Memo of

       Charge dated 05.12.2011 contained altogether eight charges which

       were grave in nature and, thereafter the Joint Secretary, Health

       Department, Government of Bihar, Patna who was appointed as

       the Enquiry Officer, submitted the enquiry report on 21.05.2012

       with a finding that the charges against the petitioner does not

       appear to be proved and thereafter, the copy of the enquiry report

       was submitted to the petitioner upon which second show cause

       notice was issued, differing with the enquiry report. Pursuant

       thereto, the petitioner submitted his show cause reply dated
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       09.10.2012, whereupon the competent authority proceeded to pass

       the final order dated 20.05.2013 by which the petitioner has been

       inflicted with the punishment of censure and stoppage of five

       increments with cumulative effect.

                    18 After having heard the learned counsel for the parties

       and after going through the materials available on record, I find

       that initially the petitioner was asked to show cause vide letter

       dated 24.03.2011 wherein ten charges were levelled against him

       and the same were duly replied by the petitioner, by giving

       detailed explanation to each and every charge, but while issuing

       Memo of Charge, some of the charges were altered and the

       petitioner submitted his reply to the same, whereupon the enquiry

       was conducted by the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer

       submitted her report wherein she found none of the charges to be

       proved against the petitioner. After submission of the enquiry

       report, no second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner,

       rather a clarification in the form of second show cause notice was

       issued on 26.09.2012, wherein certain new allegations were

       levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner duly submitted his

       reply to the said so-called second show cause notice, but the same

       was not considered and the Disciplinary Authority upon his own

       came to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner were
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       found to be proved, proceeded to impose punishment against the

       petitioner.     Further, the appellate authority, while rejecting the

       appeal of the petitioner did not consider a single point or the

       explanation submitted by the petitioner and in a mechanical

       manner rejected the appeal of the petitioner. It appears that the

       Disciplinary Authority without following the due process of law i e

       that if he was in disagreement with the enquiry report, then it was

       incumbent upon him to give his reasons for such disagreement and

       to issue show cause notice to the delinquent for the same and then

       to proceed further, but in the present case, the same has not been

       followed.

                     19 Accordingly, the order impugned contained in Memo

       No 16/M 1-38/2011-482 dated 25.02.2013 issued under the

       signature of the Joint Secretary, Department of Health,

       Government of Bihar, Patna and the appellate order contained in

       Memo No 16/M 1-38/2011-576 dated 17.05.2016 issued under the

       signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, Department

       of Health, Government of Bihar, Patna deserve to be set aside and

       are, accordingly, set aside.

                     20 The petitioner shall be granted the benefits within a

       period of three months from the date of production/receipt of a

       copy of this order. The above mentioned directions have been
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                    given, taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner has

                    retired on 31.08.2024 and therefore, there is no justification in

                    remitting the matter afresh to the authorities concerned for

                    proceeding afresh.

                                 21 The writ petition is allowed in the aforementioned

                    terms.

                                 22 Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed

                    of.

                                                  (Ritesh Kumar, J)
M.E.H./-
AFR/NAFR                       NAFR
CAV DATE                         NA
Uploading Date               17.02.2026
Transmission Date                NA