Patna High Court
Lali Lal Sharan @ Mithlesh SharanversusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- PURNENDU SINGH
Holding
The court held that the petitioner is entitled to compensation and the respondents must issue a reasoned order and pay the compensation as per the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
Summary
The petitioner, a Sevait/Mahanth of a temple, claimed raiyati rights over 0.80 acre of land (S.P. No.29, Khata No.68) that was acquired for the NTPC Barh project but for which no compensation was paid. Earlier, a Bihar Land Ceiling Act order confirmed the land was not surplus and it was mutated in his name with rent receipts. Despite a prior court direction to approach the Collector for compensation, the petitioner’s 2010 application remained unacted upon, causing financial hardship. The High Court examined principles of reasoned administrative action, the applicability of Article 300A, and the necessity of compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It held that the respondents acted without jurisdiction by failing to pay compensation and ordered the Collector to issue a reasoned order and pay compensation based on prevailing market value within one week. The writ petition was consequently disposed.
Issues considered
- The respondents' failure to pay compensation constitutes an act beyond their jurisdiction.
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
- Whether the High Court can entertain the writ petition under Article 226 despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies.
- Interpretation of Article 300A of the Constitution concerning the right to property and the implied obligation to pay compensation.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- land acquisition
- compensation
- right to property
- Article 300A
- writ jurisdiction
- reasoned order
- NTPC
- Bihar
- raiayat rights
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.17395 of 2021
======================================================
Lali Lal Sharan @ Mithlesh Sharan Son of Ram Lakhan Das, resident of
Village-Pandarak, Police Station-Pandarak, District-Patna.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land
Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna.
3. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna.
4. National Thermal Power Corporation through the Managing Director,
N.T.P.C., New Delhi.
5. The Project Manager, N.T.P.C. Project, Barh, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Manish Kumar No2
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Rishi Raj Sinha (Sc19)
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 02-02-2026
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner and learned counsel for the State.
2. Petitioner has inter alia prayed for following reliefs
in the paragraphs No.1 of the writ petition:-
“That the present writ application is being filed
for appropriate writ/writs, order/orders,
direction/directions to the respondent Authorities
particularly the respondent no.3 District Land Acquisition
Officer, Patna to pay adequate payment to the petitioner in
view of the fact that land bearing plot no.29 appertaining to
khata No.68 has been acquired for N.T.P.C. Project at Barh
with the interest as same has been acquired much earlier
but no compensation amount has been paid to the petitioner
and/or for any other relief or reliefs to which the petitioner
may be found entitled to in course of hearing of this writ
application.”
3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the
Sevait/Mahanth of Lalji Bhagwan Thakurwari at Pandarak,
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District Patna, and claims raiyati rights over land appertaining to
S.P. No. 29, Khata No. 68, measuring 0.80 acre, situated at
Mauza Mamrakhabad, Thana No. 11, P.S. Pandarak, District
Patna, recorded in the name of the Thakurwari. The said land
was acquired for construction of a rail siding for the NTPC,
Barh project, but no compensation has been paid to the
petitioner on the ground that the land was allegedly declared
surplus. However, in Ceiling Case No. 1/8 of 1974-75/1984-84
under the Bihar Land Ceiling Act, the Additional Collector,
Patna, by order dated 26.03.1984, held that the land was not
surplus and dropped the proceeding, whereafter the land was
mutated in the petitioner’s name and rent receipts were issued.
The petitioner claims title and possession through a registered
sale deed dated 14.04.1949 and asserts that the revenue records
have consistently stood in his favour without dispute from any
quarter. Earlier, the then Sevait, Mahanth Ram Lakhan Das,
filed C.W.J.C. No. 7937 of 2020, in which this Court, by order
dated 10.05.2020, directed the petitioner to approach the
Collector, Patna, who was to verify whether the petitioner was a
raiyat in possession prior to acquisition and, if so satisfied, to
ensure payment of compensation. Pursuant thereto, the
petitioner approached the Collector in L.A. Case No. 02/2008-
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09 seeking payment, but despite the Court’s direction and
repeated steps taken by the petitioner, no compensation has been
released till date. Owing to non-payment, the petitioner, as
Sevait of the temple, is facing acute financial hardship in
managing daily religious activities, Puja and distribution of
prasad, and developmental works of the Thakurwari have also
come to a standstill.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner seeks to avail appropriate remedy in accordance with
law for the relief as sought for in the present writ petition, for
which the petitioner has already filed a detailed application
before the District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Patna on
24.05.2010 and since then, no action has been taken on the
application of the petitioner.
5. This Court is aware of the inaction on part of the
revenue authorities mainly Bara Babu and Chhota Babu ( UDC
and LDC) of the Collector’s office who at times intentionally
don’t place the application of the aggrieved person for being
adjudicated. Present is one case, on account of inaction of the
Collectors, who were posted at the relevant time to till date have
not been able to have control over their subordinates and the
office staffs, petitioner has been forced after 10 years to file
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writ petition before this Court and the same is pending since the
year 2021. The petitioner is aggrieved for determination of fair
compensation, for which he had already filed his application in
the year 2010 before the District Magistrate-cum-Collector and
no information has been given in the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the Collector, as to why, the Collector has not taken
any action on the application filed by the petitioner.
6. The authorities of the State Government are
required to abide by the rule of law. It is indeed unthinkable that
in a democracy governed by the rule of law the
executive/Government or any of its officers who possess
arbitrary power over the interests of the individual act of their
own wishes. Every action of the executive Government must be
informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That
is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal
requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no
difference whether the exercise of the power involves
affectation of some right or denial of some privilege.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
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The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarising the above discussion,
this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
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decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and
is virtually a part of “due process”.
9. The law in this regard has been reiterated by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
“ 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
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is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the
rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)
10. Now question arises whether this Court can
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents
have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well
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settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499 this
Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the
High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope
of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”
11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A
of the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the
invaluable right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”
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12. The State cannot disposes a citizen of his
property except in accordance with law and procedure
prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not
expressively included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is
well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya Devi Vs. The
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2020(2) SCC
569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said
judgment, which are inter alia reproduced hereinafter;
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–
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“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
14. In such circumstances, when the question of right
to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the
Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this
Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to
forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner
is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance
with law from the date of communication of this order. The
Collector concerned is directed to communicate the compliance
report by passing a reasoned order before the Additional Chief
Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, as well as,
to the concerned officer having jurisdiction of the NTPC.
15. In case, the petitioner is required to be
compensated, the required amount of compensation should be
paid to him, as per the provision of Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 without further delay on the basis of the
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prevailing MVR existing in the area, where the alleged land,
which has been claimed by the petitioner is found to be
acquired.
16. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
Sanjay/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 12.02.2026
Transmission Date NA
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