Patna High Court
Dinesh Chandra MandalversusThe Union of India
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- PURNENDU SINGH
Holding
The court directed the District Magistrate to verify the land records and, if acquisition is confirmed, to ensure payment of compensation under the 2013 Act, thereby granting the relief sought.
Summary
The petitioner, Dinesh Chandra Mandal, claimed ownership of 74½ decimals of land in Patam, Munger, inherited from his ancestors since 1938. He alleged that the Eastern Railway authorities occupied a substantial portion of this land for platform extension and track doubling without issuing any acquisition notice, following due process, or paying compensation, in violation of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Article 300A of the Constitution. No respondents appeared before the court. The High Court examined whether it could entertain the writ under Article 226 despite the existence of alternative remedies and whether the railway’s actions were beyond its jurisdiction. Relying on Supreme Court precedents concerning property rights, due process, and the duty to record reasons, the court held that the petitioner’s rights were infringed. It directed the District Magistrate to verify the land records, determine if acquisition had occurred, and, if so, to ensure payment of compensation as per the 2013 Act, thereby disposing of the petition with these directions.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 when an alternative statutory remedy exists.
- Whether the railway authorities' occupation of the petitioner’s land without notice or compensation violates Article 300A and the 2013 Land Acquisition Act.
- Whether compensation is payable to the petitioner for the alleged unauthorized acquisition.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- land acquisition
- compensation
- Article 300A
- Right to Fair Compensation Act
- writ of mandamus
- railway
- property rights
- Article 226
- due process
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.17999 of 2021
======================================================
Dinesh Chandra Mandal Son of Late Pancham Mandal Resident of Village-
Patam, Naya Tola Police Station-Patam District-Munger.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Union of India
2. The Chairman Railway Board delhi 256-A Raisina Road rajpath Area
Central Secretariat New Delhi.
3. The General Manager Eastern Railway, Kolkata Eastern Railway Fairlie
Place 17, Netajee Subhash Road Kolkata (West Bengal).
4. The Divisional Railway Manager Malda, D.R.M. office, D.R.M. Building,
Eastern Railway, Malda.
5. The Deputy Chief Enginer (Construction) Eastern Railway, Jamalpur,
Munger.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mrs. Sushmita Mishra, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : None.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 02-02-2026
No one appears on behalf of the respondent/s.
2. Heard Mrs. Sushmita Mishra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner.
3. The petitioner in paragraph no. 1 of the present
writ petition has sought, inter alia, following relief(s), which is
reproduced hereinafter:-
"(i) for the issuance of a rule in the nature of
writ of Mandamus for a direction upon the respondent
authorities to pay adequate compensation with due interest
to the petitioner for construction of northern side of
Railway Platform and extending it and doubling the track
at Patam Halt in the distrcit of Munger on major part of the
homestead land of the petitioner appertaining to Khata No.
525, Khesra No. 176, consisting an area of 74 1/2 decimal in
Mauza Patam P.S.- Muffasil Sub Registry Munger District
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Munger without initiating any land acquisition proceeding
much less issuance of any notice for proposed acquisition.
(ii) for a direction upon the respondent
authorities to follow properly the provisions contained in
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (For
short- The Act)."
4. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner
claims right, title, and possession over land appertaining to
Khata No. 525, Khesra No. 176, measuring 74½ decimals,
situated at Mauza Patam, P.S. Muffasil, Sub-Registry Munger,
District Munger, which was originally purchased by his
grandfather, late Bhaglu Mandar @ Bhaglu Mandal, through a
registered Sale Deed dated 15.09.1938, and thereafter devolved
upon his father, late Pancham Mandal, whose name was mutated
and rent receipts were issued, and upon his death, the petitioner
claims to have succeeded and remained in possession. The
grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent Railway
authorities, while undertaking doubling of the railway track and
construction/extension of the railway platform at Patam Halt
near Rail Mile/Pole Nos. 353/8, 353/9, 354, have occupied and
utilized a substantial portion of the said land without initiating
any land acquisition proceeding, without issuing notice, and
without paying compensation, despite the land being homestead
in nature and allegedly worth about Rs. 1.5 crores. It is stated
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that the petitioner, who presently resides at Bhagalpur, came to
know about the construction subsequently and issued a legal
notice dated 04.03.2020 demanding compensation with interest,
but no action was taken, compelling him to approach this Court
alleging violation of statutory provisions relating to land
acquisition and infringement of his constitutional right to
property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner submitted that the claim of the petitioner is based on
two evidences, which have not been disputed by the
respondent/s in spite of legal notice having been issued on
04.03.2020 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition). Jamindari return
is contained in 'Annexure-2 to the writ petition' and in respect of
continuous possession over the plot appertaining to Khata No.
525, Khesra No. 176, measuring total area of 741/2 decimal
situated in Mauza Patam, after vesting of the Jamindari to give
effect the settlement made in favour of the petitioner, rent
receipt has been brought on record by way of 'Annexure-4 to the
writ petition'. She further submitted that the land in question of
the petitioner has been acquired for widening of the Railway
Station without initiating any acquisition proceeding. The
petitioner is entitled for due compensation in accordance with
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the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as
amended up-to-date. She further submitted that recorded
evidence is in favour of the petitioner that petitioner is in
possession of the land but without following the due process of
law, petitioner has been deprived of his right over his property
as enshrined under Article 300 A of the Constitution of India,
which requires that dispossession can only be after following
due process of law. Learned counsel, in this regard, has relied on
the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Vidaya Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
reported in 2020(2) SCC 569.
6. No one has tendered appearance on behalf of the
respondent/s but this Court, on the basis of recorded evidence,
which has been brought by the petitioner, finds out that Circle
Officer has admitted the continuous possession of the petitioner
at least till the year 2020, for which, a revenue receipt has been
issued in favour of the petitioner for the Financial Year 2019-20
and the petitioner has claimed that after vesting of Jamindari
and settlement made by ex Jamindar, the continuous possession
cannot be questioned without following due process of law. The
petitioner has already filed objection by way of sending legal
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notice to the Chairman, Railway Board.
7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi
judicial power often delay in considering the representation filed
by the aggrieved person or they deliberately delay to even
adjudicate those cases where they exercise their adjudicatory
power, while, it is well settled principle of law that High Courts
should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious remedy is
available. Taking into the circumstances of the present case
where fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed,
this Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarising the above discussion,
this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
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justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
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also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
virtually a part of “due process”.
9. The law in this regard has been laid down by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
“ 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
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issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the
rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)
10. Now question arises whether this Court can
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents
have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well
settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499 this
Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the
High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope
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of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”
11. To consider whether the petitioner is entitled for
the reliefs as prayed for in the present writ petition, I find it apt
to refer mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India
which tends to safeguard the invaluable right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”
12. The State as per the constitutional provision
cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance
with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay
compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law
in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya
Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in
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2020(2) SCC 569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and
12.2 of the said judgment, which are inter alia reproduced
hereinafter;
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–
“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
14. The Petitioner may represent before the District
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Magistrate cum Collector, Munger, who is required to call for
revenue records from the Circle office and after providing
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, and upon verification of
the records and after holding physical verification of the land
described and claimed by the petitioner, give a specific finding,
whether the land, which has been acquired is subject matter of
the notification of acquisition, which has been taken for
construction of northern side of Railway Platform at Patam Halt
in the district of Munger.
15. In case, the land of the petitioner has been
acquired, the District Magistrate is required to take steps by
informing the Divisional Railway Manager, Malda, having
jurisdiction over the Eastern Railway, and the Land Acquisition
Officer, Munger for making payment of compensation to the
petitioner at the present M.V.R. prevailing in the area in
accordance with Act, 2013.
16. With aforesaid observation/direction, the
present writ petition stands disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
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Uploading Date 12.02.2026
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