Janardan SinghversusThe State of Bihar

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                    Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.6777 of 2025
     ======================================================
     Janardan Singh, son of Late Kamdeo Singh, Resident of Village- Malpur, P.S.-
     Maranchi, District-Patna, Bihar.

                                                                 ... ... Petitioner/s
                                        Versus

1.   The State of Bihar through the Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of
     Education, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2.   The Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of Education, Bihar, Patna.
3.   The Director, Primary Education, Department of Education, Bihar, Patna.
4.   The Regional Deputy Director of Education, Patna Division, Patna, Bihar.
5.   The District Education Officer, Patna.
6.   The District Programme Officer (Estab), District-Patna.

                                               ... ... Respondent/s
     ======================================================
     Appearance :
     For the Petitioner/s   :      Mr. Binod Kumar, Advocate
                                   Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate
     For the State          :      Ms. Sunita Kumar, AC to AAG- 13
                            :      Mr. Siddhartha Prasad, Amicus Curiae
     ======================================================
     CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH KUMAR
     ORAL JUDGMENT
      Date : 12-01-2026

                       This Court has heard Mr. Binod Kumar, learned

      Advocate for the petitioner and Ms. Sunita Kumar, learned

      Advocate for the State. Mr. Siddhartha Prasad, learned

      Advocated appeared as Amicus Curiae in pursuant to the order

      of this Court to assist on the point of law.

                       2. The challenge in the present writ petition is made

      to an order dated 16.09.2010 contained in Memo No. 4093,

      issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Patna by
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           2/15




         which the services of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher was

         dismissed under Rule 20(1) of the Bihar Government Servant

         (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter

         referred to as ‘the Rules, 2005’). The petitioner also sought a

         direction upon the respondents to grant all consequential

         benefits, including salary, pensionary benefits, gratuity, leave

         encashment, arrears of pension with interest for the period of

         service up to the date of retirement by calculating on the basis of

         last pay scale.

                         3. Briefly stated, the petitioner was appointed as an

         Assistant Teacher in Government Middle School on 06.04.1982

         and served without any adverse entries until he became an

         accused in a criminal prosecution arising out of Maranchi P.S.

         Case No. 17 of 2002 for the offences punishable under Sections

         302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was finally

         convicted by the trial court vide judgment dated 21.12.2009 and

         taken into custody after conviction.

                         4. Aggrieved with the judgment of conviction, the

         petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) No.232 of 2010

         before this Court. During the pendency of the Appeal his

         sentence and fine were stayed and enlarged on bail by the

         Appellate Court. In the aforesaid premise, the petitioner sought
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           3/15




         permission to rejoin his duty on 13.03.2010. In response thereof,

         the District Superintendent of Education, Patna called for a

         report. Further, the petitioner was asked to serve show-cause

         under letter no. 1669 dated 18.03.2010. The petitioner submitted

         his explanation/reply on 29.03.2010 with categorical assertion

         that the Appellate Court had stayed the sentence and enlarged

         him on bail during the pendency of the appeal. However, the

         reply of the petitioner did not find favour and the District

         Superintendent of Education, Patna issued an order dismissing

         the petitioner from service 16.09.2010 as contained in Memo

         No. 4093 (Annexure-P/4 to the writ petition), which is

         impugned herein.

                         5. The petitioner challenged the dismissal order by

         filing C.W.J.C. No. 13280 of 2011, which was disposed of on

         07.03.2012 with a liberty to seek reinstatement, if the petitioner

         is   exonerated by the Appellate             Court (Annexure-P/5).

         Subsequently, the learned Division Bench of the High Court

         allowed the appeal and acquitted the petitioner, as the

         prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable

         doubt and the petitioner was discharged vide order/judgment

         dated 20.08.2024.

                         6. Strengthening, with the order of acquittal, afore
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           4/15




         noted, the petitioner represented before the District Programme

         Officer (Establishment), Patna, District Education Office, Patna

         on 14.10.2024 seeking review of the order dated 16.09.2010, but

         no action has been taken. In the meanwhile, the petitioner has

         also attained the age of his superannuation in the year 2016 and

         has received amount of only GPF and GLI and his demand for

         pension, gratuity and leave encashment was not accepted. This

         Court is also apprised that the petitioner is a physically

         challenged and presently is undergoing treatment at Tata

         Memorial Hospital, Mumbai.

                         7. Learned Advocate for the petitioner referring to

         the aforesaid facts, especially the judgment passed by the

         learned Division Bench whereby the petitioner has been

         acquitted and discharged vide order/judgment dated 20.08.2024

         submitted that once the very basis of the impugned order of

         dismissal is no more in existence and taken away by a

         competent Court, the petitioner cannot be deprived from all the

         service benefits including pension and other retiral benefits.

                         8. On the other hand, learned Advocate for the State

         submitted that the order of punishment of dismissal is though

         based on judgment of conviction passed by the trial court and

         the same has now been set aside, but bare perusal of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           5/15




         order/judgment dated 20.08.2024 it clearly shows that merely by

         offering the benefit of doubt, the learned Division Bench has set

         aside the judgment of conviction and sentence of the petitioner.

         So far the dismissal of the petitioner from service is concerned,

         the same was passed after considering the reply to the show-

         cause and, as such, he was entitled for only Provident fund

         amount and Group Insurance, for the period he has worked. The

         petitioner has not been granted clean acquittal and, as such, he is

         not entitled to get any monetary benefit, including the arrears of

         salary and pensionary or other benefits. In the aforesaid

         premise, learned Advocate for the State prays for dismissal of

         the writ petition.

                         9. Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent

         to take note of the fact that vide order dated 18.11.2025, this

         Court having considered the significance of the issue involved

         in the writ petition had requested Mr. Siddhartha Prasad, learned

         Advocate to assist the Court as amicus curiae.

                         10. Learned Amicus Curiae while assisting the

         Court on the point of law in order to answer the issue “as to

         whether an employee, who had been charged with a heinous

         offence and convicted during his service period leading to his

         dismissal from service can after having been acquitted by the
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           6/15




         Appellate Court is entitled to get the consequential benefits

         upon reconsideration of his order of dismissal”, has taken this

         Court through the various decisions of the Apex Court.

                         11. Primarily referring to a decision rendered in the

         case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintendent

         Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, reported in, (1996) 11

         SCC 603 it is submitted that the Apex Court while considering

         identical situation where an employee was dismissed from

         service solely on account of his conviction under Sections

         302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. After his subsequent acquittal

         by the High Court, reinstatement was granted, but the employee

         also claimed back wages. The Supreme Court categorically held

         that although reinstatement must follow an acquittal since

         dismissal was based only on conviction under the statutory

         rules, but the employee is not entitled to back wages, as he had

         disabled himself from service due to his own involvement in a

         criminal case and incarceration. The Court observed that “the

         question of back wages would arise only if the disciplinary

         action was independently taken and found to be unsustainable.

         Where the employee could not render service because of his

         conviction and imprisonment, back wages cannot be granted.”

         The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           7/15




                         12. In Union of India & Others Vs. Jaipal Singh,

         reported in, (2004) 1 SCC 121, the Supreme Court dealt with a

         fact that the employee who had been dismissed from service

         upon conviction under Section 302/34 of Indian Penal Code and

         was later acquitted in appeal. The High Court directed his

         reinstatement with full back wages, but the Supreme Court

         modified the same by holding that while reinstatement must

         follow an acquittal, since dismissal solely was based on

         conviction, the employee cannot claim back wages for the

         period     between       conviction      and   acquittal.   Relying   on

         Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) the Apex Court reiterated

         that where the prosecution was not initiated by the employer and

         the employee’s absence was a result of his own criminal

         involvement and conviction, the department cannot be faulted or

         burdened with paying wages for the period when his service was

         legally interrupted. The Apex Court clarified that back wages

         would accrue only from the date of acquittal and the earlier

         period would merely count for continuity of service but without

         monetary benefits.

                         13. Similarly, in the case of Baldev Singh Vs.

         Union of India, reported in, (2005) 8 SCC 747, reiterating the

         settled principle the Apex Court held that mere acquittal in a
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           8/15




         criminal case does not entitle an employee to arrears of salary or

         pension during the period he did not actually serve. The

         appellant, a soldier, had been dismissed upon conviction and

         later on acquitted has sought pay and pension benefits for the

         entire period from arrest to discharge. The Court rejected the

         claim by       holding that the principle of “no work, no pay”

         squarely applies, and subsequent acquittal does not erase the

         fact that he was absence from service due to his own

         involvement in the criminal case.

                         14. In Banshi Dhar Vs. State of Rajasthan,

         reported in (2007) 1 SCC 324, the Apex Court further reiterated

         and crystallized that grant of back wages upon acquittal is not

         automatic and must be determined on the facts of each case. The

         appellant was prosecuted for corruption under Section 5(1)(d) of

         the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 161 of the

         Indian Penal Code, placed under prolonged suspension, and

         later on dismissed upon conviction. Though he was ultimately

         acquitted, by that time he had already reached the age of

         superannuation and no departmental inquiry could be held. The

         Apex Court noted that the appellant remained under suspension

         for nearly 11 years, received subsistence allowance, and

         performed no work during the entire period. While he was
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                           9/15




         granted continuity for pensionary benefits under the Rajasthan

         Pension Rules, the Court held that back wages cannot be

         claimed as a matter of right, especially where serious charges

         were involved and the employee had not actually rendered

         service. Distinguishing Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra)

         but following the principle that each case turns on its own facts,

         the Apex Court held that acquittal does not automatically

         exonerate the employee or entitle him to full back wages and

         dismissed the appeal.

                         15. In State Bank of India Vs. Mohammed Abdul

         Rahim, reported in, (2013) 11 SCC 67, the respondent, an

         Assistant (Accounts) in SBI was convicted under Section 498-A

         of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry

         Prohibition Act, which led to his dismissal from service.

         However, in appeal, the Sessions Court acquitted him on the

         finding that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges

         beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent (Assistant) was

         reinstated but denied back wages, leading him to file a writ

         petition, which was allowed by the Single Judge and affirmed

         by the Division Bench. In appeal, the Apex Court on

         examination of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation

         Act, 1949, which imposes a statutory bar on a banking company
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                          10/15




         from employing or continuing to employ a person convicted of

         an offence involving moral turpitude, holding that the

         respondent’s conviction though later continued to exist on

         record and legally prevented the Bank from employing him

         during that period. The Apex Court clarified that while acquittal

         obliterates the conviction, it does not retrospectively erase the

         legal consequences flowing from the period when the conviction

         stood. The Court distinguished earlier cases such as Ranchhodji

         Chaturji Thakore. Jaipal Singh, Baldev Singh, and referred to

         Banshi Dhar, reiterating that grant of back wages is never

         automatic and must depend on the facts of each case. The Apex

         Court set aside the High Court’s direction for full back wages,

         however, he found entitled to wages only from the date he raised

         a formal demand for reinstatement.

                         16. Mr. Prasad, learned Amicus Curiae, finally

         referred a decision of the learned Division Bench of this Court

         rendered in the case of Bhagwan Ram Vs. The State of Bihar

         & Ors. in L.P.A. No. 322 of 2020. In the said case also, the

         employee was dismissed solely on the basis of a criminal

         conviction and no separate departmental inquiry was conducted.

         The conviction was subsequently set aside and the employee

         was acquitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on benefit of
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                          11/15




         doubt.

                         17. The learned Division Bench referring to the

         various decisions of the Apex Court held that where the

         dismissal is exclusively predicated on conviction and the

         conviction is later set aside, the dismissal order have to be

         quashed and the employee will be entitled to retiral/post-retiral

         benefits, although back wages for the intervening period may

         legitimately be denied where the employee had not rendered

         service     during     that    time      and/or   had   already   attained

         superannuation before acquittal.

                         18. Now coming to the case at hand, it is writ large

         that the dismissal of the petitioner was strictly in terms with the

         mandate contained under Section 20(i) of the Rules, 2005,

         which provides that where a Government servant is convicted

         on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority may impose

         upon him any of the penalties specified in the Rules without

         holding any further departmental inquiry. The aforesaid Rule

         clearly empowers the authority to act solely on the basis of the

         conviction, and the punishment of dismissal, removal or

         reduction in rank can be imposed automatically upon recording

         of conviction by a competent criminal court.

                         19. Indubitably, the action of the respondents in
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                          12/15




         inflicting the punishment of dismissal is in consonance with

         Section 20(i) of the Rules, 2005, and in conformity with Clause

         (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of

         India, which clearly stipulates that where a government servant

         is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of

         conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge,

         the constitutional requirement of holding a departmental inquiry

         stands dispensed with. Thus, once the petitioner was convicted

         by the criminal court, the respondents were constitutionaly and

         statutorily empowered to terminate his services without any

         further enquiry, hence the respondents acted strictly under the

         afore noted provisions and the impugned order of dismissal was

         a natural consequence of the conviction recorded by the trial

         court.

                     20. However, this Court would fail in its duty if the

         submission of the respondent is not answered that the petitioner

         is not entitled for any monetary benefit since his acquittal is not

         honourable, rather based on benefit of doubt. It would be

         pertinent to take note of that the expressions like “benefit of

         doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to

         be understood as magic incantation. The Apex Court in the case

         of Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [(2024) 1 SCC
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                          13/15




         175], has cautioned that a Court of law will not be carried away

         by the mere use of such terminology. The conclusion that the

         acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration

         of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably

         failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after the

         reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court, in judicial

         review, is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and

         not go by the form of expression used.

                      21. Besides the facts as noted, in the present case, a

         bare perusal of the order passed by the learned Division Bench

         of this Court, it is evident that the appeal has been allowed after

         full consideration of the prosecution evidence. Above all, this

         Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the order of dismissal is

         not based upon any independent disciplinary proceeding, rather

         strictly in terms with the mandate of Section 20(1) of the Rules,

         2005, followed by conviction led by the learned Trial Court. The

         plea of the respondent would only be relevant if acquittal is on

         account of flawed prosecution but departmental inquiry and

         resultant punishment is based on adequate evidence. In the

         present case, such plea has not so much of relevance.

                         22. Once this Court finds that the order of

         punishment of dismissal is purely based upon primarily criminal
Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                          14/15




         case and no disciplinary action was independently taken and

         finally the appeal against the conviction ended in acquittal by

         the competent appellate court, the dismissal order based on

         conviction lost its effect. Accordingly, the impugned order, as

         contained in Memo No. 4093, dated 16.09.2010, issued by the

         District Superintendent of Education, Patna is hereby set aside.

                         23. Since during the interregnum period, the

         petitioner attained his age of superannuation, thus the question

         of reinstatement does not arise and only post-retiral benefits

         remains to be answered.

                         24. The judicial precedents and the rulings noted

         hereinabove categorically denied back wages for the period

         between dismissal and acquittal unless the prosecution was

         initiated by the Department independently, which is not the case

         here, the petitioner is hereby granted notional continuity of

         service for the limited purpose of computing benefits such as

         pension, gratuity, leave encashment and other admissible dues

         available under the Rules. However, the petitioner is held to be

         not entitled to back wages, salary, arrears or other monetary

         benefits for the period he remained out of service following his

         conviction.

                         25. The writ petition stands allowed to the extent
             Patna High Court CWJC No.6777 of 2025 dt.12-01-2026
                                                       15/15




                      indicated hereinaove. The parties shall bear their own cost.

                                      26. Mr. Siddhartha Prasad, learned Amicus Curiae

                      was appointed in the case to assist this Court. I put on record my

                      words of appreciation for able assistance rendered by him. As a

                      token of appreciation, this Court directs the Patna High Court

                      Legal Services Committee to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees

                      Five Thousand Only) to him towards his professional fees.



                                                  (Harish Kumar, J)
uday/-
AFR/NAFR                NAFR
CAV DATE                NA
Uploading Date          20.01.2026
Transmission Date       NA