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High Court of Gujarat

MOHANBHAI PARSHOTTAMBHAI PIPALIYAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

Disposal
36-MCA DISPOSED OF

Holding

The Court held that the 87‑day delay was sufficiently explained and therefore condoned.

Summary

The applicant filed a criminal revision seeking condonation of an 87‑day delay in filing a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The delay was attributed to the accused’s financial constraints and reliance on free legal aid, which caused procedural lag. The respondent argued that the cause of delay was not sufficiently explained. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s liberal approach in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353), emphasizing that substantial justice outweighs technical delays. Finding the explanation satisfactory, the Court condoned the delay and allowed the application.

Issues considered

  • Whether the 87‑day delay in filing the application can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Legislation cited

Subjects

condonation of delayLimitation ActSection 5substantial justiceprocedural delaycriminal revisioncourt discretion

Judgment

      R/CR.MA/1885/2026                           ORDER DATED: 05/05/2026




        IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO.
                          1885 of 2026
         In F/CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION/2880/2026
==========================================================
                    MOHANBHAI PARSHOTTAMBHAI PIPALIYA
                                  Versus
                         STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR. ANANTANAND J SINGH(10046) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR NISHITH P ACHARYA(9308) for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3,4
MR PRANAV DHAGAT APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
 CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
                  Date : 05/05/2026

                                  ORDER


1.      Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective
        parties.


2.      By way of this application under Section 5 of the Limitation
        Act, 1963, the applicant has prayed for condonation of delay
        of 87 days occurred in preferring the application.


3.      Learned advocate Ms. Rutvi Modi on behalf of learned
        Advocate Mr. Anantanand Singh for the applicant stated that
        the appellate Court granted the benefit of probation to the
        accused who were convicted by the learned Judicial Magistrate
        First Class, Khambha, District Amreli, by an order dated
        24.02.2023 for the offence under Section 447, 504, 506(2)
        read with Section 114 of the IPC without even calling for the
        Probation Officer’s report.


3.1     Advocate Ms. Modi submitted that the complainant came to


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     R/CR.MA/1885/2026                                     ORDER DATED: 05/05/2026




       know of the order at a later stage and since the accused was
       facing financial constrain, he could not engage a private
       advocate and thus, had to apply for free legal service from
       Gujarat High Court Legal Service Authority and the procedural
       aspect had led to the delay.


4.     Countering the arguments, learned Advocate Mr. D V Chauhan
       for the respondent submitted that the delay was required to
       be explained and the records suggests that the cause has not
       been      sufficiently   explained,        thus,   urged   to    reject       the
       application.

5.     In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
       Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC
       1353, it has been observed as under:-


                “3. The legislature has conferred the power to
                condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the
                Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable
                the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by
                disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression
                "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is
                adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply
                the law in a meaningful manner which subserves
                the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for
                the existence of the institution of Courts. It is
                common knowledge that this Court has been
                making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
                instituted in this Court. But the message does
                not appear to have percolated down to all the
                other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
                approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
                that:-


                1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit
                by lodging an appeal late.



                                    Page 2 of 3
       R/CR.MA/1885/2026                                                    ORDER DATED: 05/05/2026




                   2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
                   meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
                   threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
                   against this when delay is condoned the highest
                   that can happen is that a cause would be
                   decided on merits after hearing the parties.

                   3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does
                   not mean that a pedantic approach should be
                   made. Why not every hour's delay, every
                   second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in
                   a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

                   4. When substantial justice and technical
                   considerations are pitted against each other,
                   cause of substantial justice deserves to be
                   preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
                   vested right in injustice being done because of a
                   non-deliberate delay.

                   5. There is no presumption that delay is
                   occasioned deliberately, or on account of
                   culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.
                   A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting
                   to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

                   6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected
                   not on account of its power to legalize injustice
                   on technical grounds but because it is capable of
                   removing injustice and is expected to do so.”


6.        In view of the principles laid down in the above-referred
          decision, considering the averments made in the application
          and as the delay is sufficiently explained, the delay of 87 days
          occurred in filing the application deserves to be condoned and
          is hereby condoned.


7.        Accordingly, the present application is allowed.


                                                                                        (GITA GOPI,J)
PARMAR KRISH/53

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: PARMAR KRISH(HC02348), ENGLISH STENO GRADE-II\, at High Court of Gujarat on 05/05/2026 18:24:17
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