NIKHILSING RAMESHSING RAJPUT THRO DEVGANIYA DHAVAL MANSUKHBHAIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/SCR.A/10329/2026                         ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

          R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10329 of 2026

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     NIKHIKSING RAMESHSING RAJPUT THRO DEVGANIYA DHAVAL
                        MANSUKHBHAI
                            Versus
                   STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR ARJUNSINGH B CHAUHAN(11510) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR MANAN MAHETA, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE NOT RECD BACK for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
       and
       HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA

                           Date : 28/07/2026

                          ORDER
 (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI)


1.      The petitioner herein came to be preventively detained vide
the detention order dated 20.4.2026 passed by the respondent
authority as a “dangerous person” as defined under Section 2(c)
of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred as ‘the Act of 1985’).


2.      By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid order.


3.      This Court has heard the learned advocates appearing for
the respective parties.




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     R/SCR.A/10329/2026                               ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




4.      Learned advocate for the detenu submits that the grounds
of detention has no nexus to the “public order”, but is a purely a
matter of law and order, as registration of the offence cannot be
said to have either affected adversely or likely to affect adverse
the maintenance of public order as contemplated under the
explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, 1985 and
therefore, where the offences alleged to have been committed by
the detenu have no bearing on the question of maintenance of
public order and his activities could be said to be a prejudicial
only to the maintenance of law and order and not prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order.


5.      On the other hand, learned APP opposing the application
contended that the detenu is habitual offender and his activities
affected the society at large. In such set of circumstances, the
detaining       authority,   considering     the   antecedents     and     past
activities of the detenu, has passed the impugned order with a
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order.


6.      Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the respective parties, the issue arises as to whether
the order of detention passed by the detaining authority in
exercise of the powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is
sustainable in law?


7.      The order impugned was executed upon the detenu. In the
grounds of detention, a reference of criminal cases i.e. (i) for the
offence under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 352, 351(3), 54 of BNS
and Section 135 of GP Act with Palsana Police Station, (ii) for the

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     R/SCR.A/10329/2026                          ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




offence under Sections 309(4), 352, 54 of BNS with Kadodara
GIDC Police Station, (iii) for the offence under Sections 309(6),
352, 54 of BNS with Palsana Police Station, (iv) for the offence
under Sections 103(1), 115(2), 189(2), 190, 191(2), 126(2) of
BNS and Section 135 of GP Act with Palsana Police Station were
made and further it is alleged that the activities of the detenu as
a “dangerous person” affects adversely or are likely to affect
adversely the maintenance of public order as explained under
Section 3 of the Act of 1985.


8.      After careful consideration of the material, we are of the
considered view that on the basis of the criminal cases, the
authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that
the activities of the detenu could be termed to be acting in a
manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In our
opinion, the said offences do not have any bearing on the
maintenance of public order.


9.      The distinction between "public order" and "law and order"
has been carefully defined in a Constitution Bench judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v.
State of Bihar and Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709. In this judgment,
His Lordship Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly
defined the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion
of the judgment reads thus:


            "....Does the expression "public order" take in
            every kind of disorder or only some? The answer
            to this serves to distinguish "public order" from
            "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly
            takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed,


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      R/SCR.A/10329/2026                           ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




             must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the
             peace does not lead to public disorder. When two
             drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but
             not public disorder. They can be dealt with under
             the powers to maintain law and order but cannot
             be detained on the ground that they were
             disturbing public order. Suppose that the two
             fighters were of rival communities and one of
             them tried to raise communal passions. The
             problem is still one of law and order but it raises
             the apprehension of public disorder. Other
             examples can be imagined. The contravention of
             law always affects order but before it can be said
             to affect public order, it must affect the
             community or the public at large. A mere
             disturbance of law and order leading to disorder
             is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under
             the Defence of India Act but disturbances which
             subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate
             is entitled to take action under Rule 30(l)(b) to
             prevent subversion of public order but not in aid
             of maintenance of law and order under ordinary
             circumstances.


             It will thus appear that just as "public order" in
             the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said
             to comprehend disorders of less gravity than
             those affecting "security of State", "law and
             order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity
             than those affecting "public order". One has to
             imagine three concentric circles. Law and order
             represents the largest circle within which is the
             next circle representing public order and the
             smallest circle represents security of State. It is
             then easy to see that an act may affect law and
             order but not public order just as an act may
             affect public order but not security of the
             State...."

9.1      The concept of `public order' and `law and order' has been
dealt with in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee & Others v. The


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      R/SCR.A/10329/2026                                         ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852. In this case, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court had relied on the important work of Dr. Allen on
`Legal Duties' and spelled out the distinction between `public'
and `private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering
the material elements of crime, the historic tests which each
community           applies     are    intrinsic        wrongfulness        and      social
expediency which are the two most important factors which have
led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen
has distinguished `public' and `private' crimes in the sense that
some       offences        primarily   injure         specific   persons      and      only
secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the
public interest and affect individuals only remotely. There is a
broad distinction along these lines, but differences naturally arise
in the application of any such test.


9.2      The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babul Mitra alias
Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal & Others, (1973) 1 SCC 393
had an occasion to deal with the question of "public order" and
"law and order". The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that
the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and
"public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act
in question upon society. The Court pointed out that the act by
itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may
not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different.


9.3      In Commissioner of Police & Others, v. C. Anita (Smt.),
(2004) 7 SCC 467, the Hon’ble Supreme Court again examined
the issue of "public order" and "law and order" and observed
thus:



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      R/SCR.A/10329/2026                             ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




             "7. ....The crucial issue is whether the activities
             of the detenu were prejudicial to public order.
             While the expression "law and order" is wider in
             scope inasmuch as contravention of law always
             affects order, "public order" has a narrower
             ambit, and public order could be affected by only
             such contravention which affects the community
             or the public at large. Public order is the even
             tempo of life of the community taking the
             country as a whole or even a specified locality.
             The distinction between the areas of "law and
             order" and "public order" is one of the degree
             and extent of the reach of the act in question on
             society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb
             the even tempo of life of the community which
             makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the
             public order. If a contravention in its effect is
             confined only to a few individuals directly
             involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the
             public, it could raise problem of law and order
             only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of
             the terror wave unleashed by a particular
             eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as
             an act affecting "public order" from that
             concerning "law and order". The question to ask
             is:

                 "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life
                 of the community so as to amount to a
                 disturbance of the public order or does it
                 affect merely an individual leaving the
                 tranquility of the society undisturbed?"

                 This question has to be faced in every case on
                 its facts."

10.       For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered opinion
that the material on record are not sufficient for holding that the
alleged activities of the detenu have either affected adversely or
likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order and


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           R/SCR.A/10329/2026                                                           ORDER DATED: 28/07/2026




    therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining
    authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with
    law.


    11.           Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
    impugned dated 20.4.2026 passed by the respondent authority is
    hereby quashed. We direct the detenu to be set at liberty
    forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made
    absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.


                                                                                                     (GITA GOPI,J)



                                                                                              (L. S. PIRZADA, J)
    Maulik/S19



Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: MAULIK RAJESH PANDYA(HC00205), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 29/07/2026 10:58:44




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