Bombay High Court
NAGESH VIKRAM BHOSALEversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Disposal
- DISPOSED OFF
Holding
The Court held that custody for newly added MCOC offences is permissible only with prior judicial authorization, that earlier bail does not bar re‑examination of the facts for the added charges, and that the prosecution’s evidence meets the stringent criteria of Section 21(4), justifying the rejection of bail.
Summary
The High Court considered three bail applications filed by Shrihari Hardas Chavan, Nagesh Vikram Bhosale and Siddesh Sadish Kale in connection with a robbery on 24‑25 January 2025 and subsequent addition of offences under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOC Act). The applicants had earlier been granted bail for offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) but were taken into custody after the prosecution obtained judicial permission to add MCOC charges. The court examined whether the earlier bail could be overridden without a fresh judicial order, whether the earlier bail precludes re‑examination of the facts for the MCOC offences, and whether the material on record satisfied the stringent conditions of Section 21(4) of the MCOC Act. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court held that a separate arrest without court approval is impermissible, but the court’s permission obtained on 13 June 2025 satisfied the procedural requirement. The court further held that the earlier bail does not bar consideration of the new charges and that the prosecution’s material, including identification parade evidence and antecedent charge‑sheets, was sufficient to deny bail under Section 21(4). Consequently, the bail applications were rejected and the trial was directed to proceed on an expedited basis.
Issues considered
- Whether, after bail had been granted for the original offences but before physical release, the investigating agency could take the accused into custody for the subsequently added MCOC Act offences without a fresh judicial order.
- Whether the grant of bail for the original offences prevents the Court from examining the facts of the occurrence while deciding bail under the MCOC Act.
- Whether the material placed by the prosecution satisfies the requirements of Section 21(4) of the MCOC Act to deny bail.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita — s. 480(5), 483(3)
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita — s. 309(6), 310(2), 324(4), 3(5)
- Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act — s. 21(4), 23(1)(a), 23(2), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4)
Subjects
- bail
- MCOC Act
- organised crime
- addition of charges
- prior bail
- identification parade
- Section 21(4)
- judicial custody
- parity
- community discrimination
Judgment
2026:BHC-AUG:46084
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48-BA-812-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
BAIL APPLICATION NO. 812 OF 2026
Shrihari Hardas Chavan …. Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra …. Respondent
WITH
BAIL APPLICATION NO. 626 OF 2026
Nagesh Vikram Bhosale .… Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra .… Respondent
WITH
BAIL APPLICATION NO. 818 OF 2026
Siddesh Sadish Kale .… Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra .… Respondent
…..
Mr. Chaitanya C. Deshpande a/w Mr. Avinash M. Reddy, Advocate
for Applicants in BA/812/2026 and BA/818/2026
Mr. Anil M. Gaikwad, Advocate for Applicant in BA/626/2026
Mr. K. K. Naik, APP for Respondent - State
…..
CORAM : HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 21st SEPTEMBER 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 01st OCTOBER 2026
ORDER :
1. These three applications seek regular bail in connection
with Crime No.63 of 2025 registered with Parner Police Station,
District Ahilyanagar, for the offences punishable under Sections
309(6), 310(2), 324(4) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 and Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2) and 3(4) of the Maharashtra
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Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (for short, “the MCOC Act”).
Since the applications arise out of the same crime and raise
common questions concerning the effect of the earlier orders of bail
and the subsequent addition of the offences under the MCOC Act,
they are being decided by this common order.
2. The prosecution states that, during the night
intervening 24th and 25th January, 2025, at about 2.00 a.m., four
masked persons forcibly entered the house of the informant,
Yogesh Khandu Sherkar, at Pathar Vasti, Sobalewadi, Taluka
Parner. They were allegedly armed with a wooden stick and an iron
rod. The inmates were threatened and assaulted. Gold ornaments
worn by the informant’s mother and grandmother were forcibly
removed. Cash and other articles were taken away and the
prosecution values the property at about Rs.2,75,000/-. The mobile
handset of the informant was damaged and the offenders allegedly
left the place with his TVS Star City motorcycle bearing
registration No.MH-16-CZ-6818. The FIR was lodged on 25 th
January, 2025 against four unknown persons.
3. The prosecution further states that the applicants and
the other accused were identified during investigation as persons
concerned with the occurrence. The first charge-sheet for the
offences under the BNS was filed on 6 th May, 2025. The
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investigating agency thereafter placed a proposal for invoking the
MCOC Act. Prior approval under Section 23(1)(a) of that Act was
granted by the Special Inspector General of Police, Nashik Range,
under Order No.998 of 2025 dated 7 th June, 2025. The sanctioning
authority subsequently granted sanction under Section 23(2) on
12th September, 2025. A further charge-sheet incorporating the
offences under the MCOC Act was thereafter filed.
4. Before the offences under the MCOC Act were added,
the applicants had applied for bail in respect of the offences under
the BNS. The applications were allowed on 9th June, 2025. The
applicants, however, had not been physically released from jail
because the bail formalities had not been completed and, in the
case of some applicants, custody in another crime was also stated
to be operating. The prosecution moved an application on 12 th
June, 2025 seeking their custody in the newly added offences. The
learned Court permitted the request on 13 th June, 2025 and the
applicants were produced from jail and taken in custody on 17 th
June, 2025. Their applications for bail after the addition of the
MCOC Act came to be rejected by the Special Court. They have
therefore approached this Court.
5. Learned Advocate for the applicants submits that the
FIR was lodged against unknown persons and none of the
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applicants was named in it. He submits that though the informant
is stated to have identified one or more applicants, the other
identifying witnesses did not support such identification.
According to him, there is no reliable recovery at the instance of
the applicants and the investigation is now complete. He submits
that the applicants were granted bail by the Sessions Court after
the charge-sheet for the original offences had been filed. The
prosecution did not challenge those orders and therefore the
merits of the original occurrence cannot now be reopened under
the guise of considering bail for the MCOC Act offences.
6. Learned Advocate for the applicants further submits
that the applicants stood released in law immediately upon the
orders of bail being passed on 9 th June, 2025, even though they
remained in jail for completing the bail formalities or because of
custody in another case. Consequently, they could not have been
arrested or detained for the subsequently added offences without
cancellation of the earlier bail, a fresh arrest, communication of the
grounds of arrest and a reasoned order of the Court which had
granted bail. He submits that merely obtaining the applicants’
production from jail could not amount to lawful arrest under the
MCOC Act.
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7. Learned Advocate also questions the very application of
the MCOC Act. He submits that most of the earlier crimes were
initially registered against unknown persons and that the
applicants were subsequently shown as accused merely because
they belong to the Pardhi community. He argues that the nature of
some previous offences, including allegations of petty theft, does
not demonstrate an organised crime syndicate or continuing
unlawful activity undertaken for pecuniary gain. He submits that
the sanctioning authority did not independently examine this
aspect. Reliance is also placed on the order dated 20th January,
2026 passed in Bail Application No.2514 of 2025 granting bail to
co-accused Ganesh Suresh Bhosale. It is submitted that the
applicants are similarly placed and are entitled to parity. Lastly, it
is submitted that the applicants have undergone incarceration for
about one year and seven months, the charge has not been framed
and the trial is unlikely to conclude shortly.
8. Learned APP opposes the applications. He submits that
the material collected during investigation prima facie shows that
the applicants acted as members of an organised crime syndicate
which repeatedly committed offences against persons and property
for pecuniary gain. The antecedent chart shows several charge-
sheets for offences punishable with imprisonment of three years or
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more, of which cognizance was taken within the preceding ten
years. He submits that the applicants were subjected to a test
identification parade and were identified. The informant’s
motorcycle was recovered during investigation; the fingerprints of
co-accused Ganesh Bhosale were found on the damaged mobile
handset; and the robbed ornaments were disposed of through
another co-accused. According to the learned APP, these
circumstances have to be read together and not in isolation.
9. Learned APP further submits that there was no
unilateral re-arrest by the police. An application seeking custody
was filed on 12th June, 2025; permission was granted by the
competent Court on 13th June, 2025; and only thereafter were the
applicants produced from jail and taken into custody on 17 th June,
2025. He submits that the law does not require the empty
formality of first releasing a person from the prison gate and
immediately arresting him again when he is already in lawful
custody and the Court has authorised his custody for the newly
added offences. As regards parity, he submits that the order
granting bail to Ganesh Bhosale proceeded on the assumption that
Siddhesh Kale had already been released on bail on the same
footing. Siddhesh’s earlier bail, however, concerned only the
offences under the BNS and his later bail application under the
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MCOC Act was rejected. The State has therefore sought
cancellation of the bail granted to Ganesh. The learned APP
submits that, having regard to the criminal antecedents and the
statutory restrictions under Section 21(4), the applicants are not
entitled to bail.
10. The rival submissions give rise to three connected
questions. The first is whether, after bail had been granted for the
original offences but before the applicants were physically
released, the investigating agency could take them into custody for
the subsequently added MCOC Act offences without a fresh judicial
order. The second is whether the grant of bail in the original
offences prevents this Court from examining the facts of the
occurrence while deciding bail under the MCOC Act. The third is
whether the material placed by the prosecution satisfies the Court
that the applicants can be released consistently with Section 21(4)
of the MCOC Act.
11. The legal position governing addition of graver
cognizable and non-bailable offences after grant of bail is settled by
the Supreme Court in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand , (2019)
17 SCC 326. The Supreme Court recognised four permissible
courses. The accused may surrender and seek bail for the added
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offences. The investigating agency may seek an order for arrest
and custody by invoking the powers then contained in Sections
437(5) or 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Corresponding powers are now found in Sections 480(5) and
483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The
Court may direct the accused to be arrested and committed to
custody, with or without formal cancellation of the earlier bail
depending upon the facts. What is impermissible is a unilateral
arrest by the investigating agency for the added offences without
obtaining an order from the Court which had granted bail. These
principles have recently been reiterated in Sumit v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and another, AIR 2026 SC 905.
12. The grant of bail and physical release from prison are
related but distinct events. An order granting bail removes the
authority to detain the accused in that case once its conditions are
fulfilled. It does not, however, wipe out lawful custody in another
case, nor does it extend by implication to a serious non-bailable
offence subsequently added to the same crime. At the same time,
the police cannot take advantage of the accused being physically
present in jail and treat that circumstance as a substitute for
judicial permission. What the law insists upon is judicial scrutiny
before the liberty granted by the earlier bail order is curtailed on
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account of the added offence. Once such judicial permission is
obtained, the law does not require a meaningless exercise of
releasing the accused from one gate of the prison and arresting
him again at the same place.
13. In the present case, the chronology recorded before the
Court shows that, after the orders of bail dated 9 June 2025, the
prosecution applied for custody on 12 th June, 2025. The
application was allowed on 13th June, 2025. The applicants were
thereafter produced from jail and their custody was taken on 17 th
June, 2025. Thus, the investigating agency did not act solely on its
own authority. Judicial permission intervened before custody was
taken for the added offences. In these circumstances, a separate
physical release and re-arrest was not necessary. Nor was
cancellation of the earlier bail an invariable precondition, since the
earlier bail continues to govern the original offences while the
entitlement to bail for the added MCOC Act offences has to be
decided afresh. The first submission of the applicants therefore
cannot be accepted.
14. The second submission also requires a distinction. The
orders dated 9th June, 2025 granting bail for the original offences
have neither been cancelled nor set aside. This Court is not sitting
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in appeal over those orders and cannot reconsider the same
material merely to reach a different conclusion on bail for the BNS
offences. Nevertheless, the occurrence of 25th January, 2025 is
alleged by the prosecution to be the organised crime committed by
the syndicate. The evidence connecting each applicant with that
occurrence is therefore directly relevant when the Court examines
whether the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2) and 3(4) of the
MCOC Act are prima facie disclosed. Consideration of that material
for this limited statutory purpose does not amount to reviewing or
cancelling the earlier orders of bail.
15. Section 21(4) of the MCOC Act imposes restrictions in
addition to the ordinary considerations governing bail. Once the
Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely
to commit an offence while on bail. In Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing
Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294, the Supreme
Court explained that the Court is not required to record a finding of
acquittal at the stage of bail. The material has to be examined on
broad probabilities to determine whether the accusation, so far as
the particular accused is concerned, is inherently improbable. At
the same time, the twin conditions cannot be diluted or omitted
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from consideration. This requirement has again been emphasised
in Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 2 SCC 797.
16. It is equally settled that, for establishing continuing
unlawful activity, the earlier charge-sheets need not all be against
every individual who is subsequently shown to be a member of the
syndicate. The relevant inquiry is whether more than one
qualifying charge-sheet concerning the activity of the organised
crime syndicate was filed within the preceding ten years and
cognizance was taken, and whether there is prima facie material
connecting the particular accused with that syndicate or with an
offence committed on its behalf. This position follows from Zakir
Abdul Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 20 SCC 408.
Therefore, the mere circumstance that several FIRs were initially
registered against unknown persons does not make the subsequent
charge-sheets irrelevant. Equally, registration of numerous FIRs
by itself cannot replace proof of qualifying charge-sheets,
cognizance and nexus with the syndicate.
17. The papers placed before the Court include the approval
and sanction orders referring to the previous charge-sheets and
recording that the offences were committed, singly or jointly, by
members of the alleged syndicate for unlawful pecuniary gain. The
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prosecution also relies on the antecedent chart and on the
circumstance that several accused figure together in more than
one prosecution. At this stage, the Court is not examining the
ultimate validity of the sanction or deciding whether every
previous accusation will result in conviction. The material is,
however, sufficient to prevent the Court from recording that the
allegation of continuing unlawful activity by a syndicate is
inherently improbable.
18. As regards the present occurrence, the FIR was
admittedly against unknown persons. That circumstance requires
careful scrutiny of the subsequent identification, but it does not by
itself render the identification unacceptable. The prosecution relies
on the test identification parade and on the witnesses who
identified the accused. The applicants point out that all witnesses
did not identify every applicant. That is a matter affecting the
weight of the evidence and will have to be tested at trial. The
papers also disclose a dispute as to whether recovery of the
informant’s motorcycle is attributable to Siddhesh Kale or Shrihari
Chavan. No final finding on that recovery can be recorded in these
proceedings. Similarly, the fingerprint allegedly found on the
informant’s damaged mobile handset is attributed to co-accused
Ganesh Bhosale and cannot be treated as incriminating material
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personally recovered from any of the present applicants. Even
after excluding that circumstance from their individual
assessment, the identification material, the prosecution’s case
regarding their association with the other accused and the
antecedent material cannot be said to be so deficient that
reasonable grounds exist for believing that the applicants are not
guilty of the MCOC Act offences.
19. The submission that the applicants were implicated
because they belong to the Pardhi community has been considered.
A person’s caste, tribe or community can never constitute
incriminating material and no adverse inference can be drawn
from it. The prosecution must stand or fall only on legally
admissible evidence. In the present case, however, the allegation of
discriminatory implication is not, at this stage, supported by
material sufficient to displace the identification, the charge-sheets
and the alleged inter se association relied upon by the prosecution.
The applicants will be at liberty to establish that defence during
trial, when the witnesses and the investigating officers can be
tested by cross-examination.
20. The order dated 20th January, 2026 granting bail to
Ganesh Suresh Bhosale has also been considered. Parity is a
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relevant consideration, but it is not an abstract or mechanical
formula. The said order relied substantially on the circumstance
that Siddhesh Kale had been granted bail by the Sessions Court.
The order granting bail to Siddhesh was passed before the MCOC
Act was invoked and did not decide his entitlement under Section
21(4). Indeed, his subsequent application under the MCOC Act was
rejected. The factual foundation on which parity was extended to
Ganesh is therefore not available in the present applications.
Moreover, the antecedents and the material connecting every
accused with the alleged syndicate require individual examination.
The order in Ganesh’s case consequently does not, by itself, satisfy
the twin conditions in favour of these applicants.
21. The applicants have remained in custody for a
considerable period, the investigation is complete and the charge
has not yet been framed. These circumstances weigh in favour of
an early trial. However, the custody undergone till now, when
viewed against the nature of the accusation and the material
presently available, is not by itself sufficient to override Section
21(4). Upon an overall consideration, this Court is unable to record
reasonable grounds for believing that the applicants are not guilty
of the alleged offences under the MCOC Act. In view of the
antecedent material relied upon by the prosecution, the Court is
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also unable to record the further satisfaction that they are not
likely to commit an offence while on bail. The statutory conditions
are therefore not fulfilled.
22. These observations are only for deciding the present
applications. The trial Court shall evaluate the evidence
independently and shall not treat any prima facie observation in
this order as a concluded finding. At the same time, continued
detention cannot be allowed to become a substitute for trial. Having
regard to the period already undergone and the number of accused
and witnesses, the Special Court must give due priority to the
proceeding. 23. Hence, the following order:
ORDER
(i) Bail Application Nos.626 of 2026, 812 of 2026 and 818
of 2026 are rejected.
(ii) The learned Special Judge shall endeavour to frame the
charge as expeditiously as possible and preferably
within four weeks from receipt of this order, unless
prevented by any legal impediment attributable to the
accused.
(iii) The trial shall thereafter be taken up on priority and an
endeavour shall be made to conclude it within one year.
The prosecution and all the accused shall cooperate and
shall not seek unnecessary adjournments.
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(iv) If the trial does not make substantial progress within
the aforesaid period for reasons not attributable to the
applicants, it shall be open to them to apply afresh for
bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration and delay.
Such applications shall be decided on their own merits
and in accordance with the legal position then
prevailing.
(v) All observations made in this order are prima facie and
confined to the decision of these bail applications.
(HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR)
JUDGE
Tandale
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