Bombay High Court
Siemens Financial Services Private LimitedversusSaroj Diagnostic Laboratory LLP
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED OFF
- Bench
- GAUTAM A ANKHAD
Holding
The reference to Mumbai as the place of arbitration is deemed to designate Mumbai as the seat, conferring jurisdiction on the Bombay High Court to appoint an arbitrator.
Summary
Siemens Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. advanced a loan of Rs. 7.38 crore to Saroj Diagnostic Laboratory LLP, which defaulted on repayment. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause stating that disputes would be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with the "place of arbitration" being Mumbai, and also gave the courts in Mumbai jurisdiction over the agreement. The applicant served two invocation notices on the guarantors, who acknowledged receipt but did not respond, prompting a Section 11 application for appointment of an arbitrator. The respondents argued that the clause only identified a venue, not the juridical seat, and thus the Bombay High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. The court held that the express reference to Mumbai as the place of arbitration, together with the jurisdiction clause, unequivocally designated Mumbai as the seat, giving the court jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. Consequently, the application was allowed and Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur was appointed as sole arbitrator.
Issues considered
- Whether the reference to Mumbai as the "place of arbitration" in the agreement constitutes a designation of the seat of arbitration for purposes of Section 11 jurisdiction.
- Whether the Bombay High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration application.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s. 11, 12(1), 8
- Indian Stamp Act, 1899
Subjects
- Arbitration
- Seat of arbitration
- Place of arbitration
- Section 11 jurisdiction
- Commercial arbitration
- Loan agreement
- Guarantee
- Mumbai High Court
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.241 OF 2026
Siemens Financial Services Pvt. Ltd., ]
Registered Office at Worli, Mumbai ] .. Applicant
Versus
1. Saroj Diagnostic Laboratory LLP, ]
Address at Ernakulam, Kerala ]
2. Arun Jyotish KC, ]
Address at Kozhikode, Kerala ]
3. Alphilin Jose, ]
Address at Ernakulam/Kozhikode, Kerala ]
4. Remya Rachel George, ]
Address at Ernakulam/Pathanmthitta, Kerala ] .. Respondents
Mr. Nishant Chothani with Ms. Anushka Shetty, Advocates, i/by MLS Vani &
Associates, for the Applicant.
Mr. Paul Jacob, Advocate, i/by Khare Legal Chambers, for the Respondents.
CORAM : GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.
DATE : 2ND JULY 2026
P.C. :
1. The Applicant has filed this Application under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to adjudicate upon disputes that have
arisen between the Applicant and the Respondents under the Finance
Agreement dated 25th June 2024 ("Agreement"). The execution of the
Agreement is not in dispute. The relevant dispute resolution clause under the
Agreement reads as under:-
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“16(d) Governing law and Jurisdiction
This Agreement is governed by Indian Law and shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai.
16(e) Arbitration
All disputes, differences and/or claim arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement and the Schedule(s)
attached hereto or the performance of this Agreement
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996,
or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred
to the sole Arbitrator nominated/appointed by the Lender.
The place of arbitration shall be Mumbai and the award
given by such an Arbitrator shall be final and binding on
the parties to this Agreement.”
2. Mr. Chothani, learned counsel appearing for the Applicant, submits that
the disputes arise out of the Agreement under which the Applicant advanced a
loan of Rs. 7,38,00,000/- to Respondent No.1. Respondent Nos.2 to 4 executed
the Agreement as guarantors and jointly and severally, unconditionally and
irrevocably guaranteed repayment of the loan by Respondent No.1. The
Agreement also provides for creation of certain additional securities in favour
of the Applicant. Pursuant to the Agreement, Respondent No.1 availed of the
loan facility but thereafter committed defaults in repayment. Consequently, the
Applicant issued a recall-cum-invocation notice dated 17th June 2025, followed
by a further invocation notice dated 2nd March 2026.
3. Both notices were duly served upon the Respondents, and the
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acknowledgments thereof are annexed at Exhibits "E" and "F" to the paper-
book. The Respondents have neither disputed receipt of the notices nor denied
the invocation of the arbitration agreement or the underlying claims. Since the
Respondents failed to respond or take any steps pursuant to the invocation
notices, the Applicant has filed the present Application under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
4. Mr. Jacob, learned counsel appearing for the Respondents, does not
dispute the execution of the Agreement or the receipt of the notices dated 17 th
June 2025 and 2nd March 2026. The Application is opposed on the ground that
the Agreement merely stipulates Mumbai as the "place" of arbitration and does
not designate it as the "seat" of arbitration. According to him, in the absence of
an express agreement identifying Mumbai as the seat of arbitration, this Court
lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present Application. Reliance is
placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA
JV v. NHPC Limited1 and BBR (India) Private Limited v. S.P. Singla
Constructions Private Limited2 to submit that a mere reference to the "place"
of arbitration does not, by itself, amount to designation of the juridical seat. On
this basis, he prays that the present Application be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
1
(2020) 4 SCC 234
2
(2023) 1 SCC 693
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5. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and perused
the record. Clause 16(d) of the Agreement expressly provides that the
Agreement shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts at Mumbai. Clause
16(e), which contains the arbitration agreement, further stipulates that the place
of arbitration shall be Mumbai. The Agreement is clear and unequivocal. The
parties have consciously agreed that the arbitration proceedings shall be
conducted at Mumbai while simultaneously conferring jurisdiction upon the
Courts at Mumbai in respect of the Agreement. There is no contrary indication
in the Agreement suggesting that any other place was intended to be the
juridical seat of arbitration. The arbitration agreement was duly invoked by the
Applicant through notices dated 17th June 2025 and 2nd March 2026. The
Respondents admittedly received both notices and have not replied to the same.
The Respondents have neither disputed the invocation of the arbitration
agreement nor questioned its validity or enforceability. In my view, the
objection with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is devoid of
merit.
6. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the referral Court is required to
undertake only a limited examination as to the existence of a valid arbitration
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agreement. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899,
in Re3 and in SBI General Insurance Company Vs. Krish Spinning 4, that the
referral Court ought not to venture beyond the existence of an arbitration
agreement. Since the existence of the arbitration agreement is not in dispute in
the present case, there is no impediment to the appointment of an Arbitrator.
7. The Respondents’ reliance upon the judgment in BGS SGS SOMA JV
(supra) is misconceived. Far from supporting the Respondents, the said
decision reinforces the Applicant's case. In paragraphs 61 and 82, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has categorically held as under:
“61. It will thus be seen that wherever there is an express
designation of a “venue” and no designation of any
alternative place as the “seat”, combined with a
supranational body of rules governing the arbitration, and
no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable
conclusion is that the stated venue is actually the juridical
seat of the arbitral proceeding.
82. On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it may be
concluded that whenever there is the designation of a place
of arbitration in an arbitration clause as being the “venue”
of the arbitration proceedings, the expression “arbitration
proceedings” would make it clear that the “venue” is really
the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, as the aforesaid
expression does not include just one or more individual or
particular hearing, but the arbitration proceedings as a
3
(2024) 6 SCC 1
4
(2025) 3 SCC (Civ) 567
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whole, including the making of an award at that place. This
language has to be contrasted with language such as
“tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts or the
parties” where only hearings are to take place in the
“venue”, which may lead to the conclusion, other things
being equal, that the venue so stated is not the “seat” of
arbitral proceedings, but only a convenient place of
meeting. Further, the fact that the arbitral proceedings
“shall be held” at a particular venue would also indicate
that the parties intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a
particular place, signifying thereby, that that place is the
seat of the arbitral proceedings. This, coupled with there
being no other significant contrary indicia that the stated
venue is merely a “venue” and not the “seat” of the arbitral
proceedings, would then conclusively show that such a
clause designates a “seat” of the arbitral proceedings. In an
international context, if a supranational body of rules is to
govern the arbitration, this would further be an indicia that
“the venue”, so stated, would be the seat of the arbitral
proceedings. In a national context, this would be replaced by
the Arbitration Act, 1996 as applying to the “stated venue”,
which then becomes the “seat” for the purposes of
arbitration.”
In the present case, the Agreement specifically provides that the place of
arbitration shall be Mumbai. Clause 16(d) expressly confers jurisdiction upon
the Courts at Mumbai. There is no provision in the Agreement suggesting any
different seat of arbitration. These provisions, read harmoniously, demonstrate
the parties intention to treat Mumbai as the juridical seat of arbitration.
8. Similarly the reliance upon BBR (India) is also misplaced. That decision
arose in an entirely different factual context where the arbitration agreement
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did not specify either the seat or the venue of arbitration, thereby requiring the
Court to determine the seat on the basis of other surrounding circumstances.
This is not the case here. The ratio of BBR (India) far from advancing the
Respondents' case, reiterates the principles laid down in BGS SGS SOMA JV.
9. In view of the above, there is no merit in the objection raised by the
Respondents regarding the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, this
Commercial Arbitration Application no. 241 of 2026 is allowed and
disposed of in the following terms:-
[A]. Hon’ble Shri Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur, Former Chief
Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, is hereby appointed
as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes and
differences between the parties arising out of and in
connection with or in relation to the Agreement referred to
above. The contact details of Hon’ble Shri Justice Dhiraj
Singh Thakur, the sole Arbitrator, are “Office Address :
Flat No.202, Surabhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.,
Oshiwara, Jogeshwari (West), Mumbai–400102; E-mail :
[email protected] and Contact
no.: 9419187734”.
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[B]. A copy of this order will be communicated to the learned
Arbitrator by the Advocate for the Applicant within a
period of one week from the date on which this order is
uploaded on the website of this Court. The Applicant shall
provide the contact and communication particulars of the
parties to the Arbitral Tribunal along with a copy of this
order.
[C]. The learned Arbitrator is requested to forward the statutory
Statement of Disclosure under Section 11(8) read with
Section 12(1) of the Act to the Advocate for the Applicant
so as to enable them to file the same in the Registry of this
Court. The Registry of this Court shall retain the said
Statement on the file of this Arbitration Application and a
copy of the same shall be furnished by the Advocate for
the Applicant to the Respondents.
[D]. The parties shall appear before the learned Arbitrator on
such date in physical or virtual mode as indicated, to
obtain appropriate directions with regard to conduct of the
arbitration including fixing schedule for pleadings,
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examination of witnesses, if any, schedule of hearings etc.
At such meeting, the parties shall provide a valid and
functional e-mail address along with mobile and landline
numbers of the respective Advocates of the parties to the
Arbitral Tribunal.
[E]. The fees of the learned Arbitrator shall be as per the Fourth
Schedule of the Act read with the Bombay High Court (Fee
Payable to Arbitrators) Rules, 2018.
[F]. All issues on merits of the claims and counterclaims are
kept open to be agitated before the Tribunal.
[G]. The arbitration shall be held at Mumbai.
[ GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J. ]
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