THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER HETVANE CANAL DIVISION, RAIGADversusSAMSUDDIN ISMAIL DEVLEKAR AND ORS.

                                                                    35-FA-ST-13786-2023 With IAs.doc


                      Shabnoor
                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO.13786 OF 2023
                                                    WITH
                                    INTERIM APPLICATION NO.8934 OF 2024
                                                    WITH
                                    INTERIM APPLICATION NO.8935 OF 2024
         Digitally
         signed by
         SHABNOOR
SHABNOOR AYUB
AYUB
PATHAN
         PATHAN
         Date:
                      The Executive Engineer,
         2026.07.07
         17:40:17
         +0530        Hetvane Canal Division, Raigad               … Appellant
                                 V/s.
                      Samsuddin Ismail Devlekar & Ors.             … Respondents

                      Ms. Chaitrali Anand Deshmukh, for the Appellant.
                      Mr. A. R. Patil, Addl. GP, for the State – Respondents.


                                                  CORAM      : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                  DATED      : JULY 7, 2026
                      P.C.:
                      INTERIM APPLICATION NO.8934 OF 2024

                      1.      The applicant has filed the present Interim Application
                      seeking condonation of delay of 4 years and 320 days in preferring
                      the present appeal arising out of the Reference Award passed
                      under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

                      2.      The cause shown for condonation of such substantial delay is
                      stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
                      carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
                      extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
                      required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled
                      that while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an



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application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be
filed within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of
these principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.

3.       After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5 of
the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 22 March 2018. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed on 5
August 2020. This factual position itself shows that for a
considerable period after passing of the award, no steps were
taken by the applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory
explanation for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what
prevented the applicant from approaching the Court or taking
necessary steps immediately after pronouncement of the award.
Mere general statements without particulars cannot be treated as
sufficient cause, particularly when the delay runs into several
years.

4.       It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from March 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there



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is no explanation for the period commencing from March 2018 till
March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the
control of the applicant.

5.    Even for the period subsequent to March 2022, the
explanation furnished does not inspire confidence. The appeal
ultimately came to be filed on 4 May 2023. Thus, even after
normal functioning of Courts had resumed, there remained a
further period for which justification was required. The reasons
stated are that an advocate was required to be appointed and that
arrangements had to be made for payment of court fees. Such
explanations are of a general nature. Every litigant intending to
challenge a judgment is expected to take necessary steps for
engaging an advocate and arranging court fees within a reasonable
period. These are ordinary requirements of litigation and cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay
extending over several years. The application does not disclose any
circumstance showing why these procedural requirements could
not be completed earlier.

6.    The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation
is founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of
the Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies
upon such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present



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matter,   the      explanation   furnished   remains        incomplete.
Consequently, this Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has
been made out for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my
opinion, therefore, the application for condonation of delay cannot
be allowed.

7.    The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be rejected
and is rejected.

8.    In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal cannot be
entertained on merits.

9.    Accordingly, the present First Appeal as well as Interim
Application No. 8935 of 2024 for stay stand disposed of.


                                             (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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