Bombay High Court

NINAD SURESH PANSAREversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Decided: 17 January 2026
Disposal: Allowed
Bench: R N LADDHA

Holding

The convictions under Section 279 IPC and Section 184 Motor Vehicles Act are quashed due to lack of proof of rash or negligent driving.

Summary

The applicant was charged for allegedly hitting a cyclist on 31 March 1999 and was convicted under Section 279 of the IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act for rash or negligent driving. The trial court found him guilty, and the appellate court upheld the conviction, prompting a revision petition. The High Court examined the prosecution’s evidence and noted the absence of any specific act showing rashness, lack of medical proof of injury, no independent witnesses, and an incomplete spot‑panchanama, concluding that the prosecution had not discharged its burden of proof. It held that mere involvement in an accident or speed alone does not satisfy the statutory elements of the offences. Consequently, the Court quashed the convictions and acquitted the applicant of both offences.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution proved the essential ingredients of Section 279 IPC – driving in a rash or negligent manner endangering human life.
Whether the prosecution established the elements of Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Whether the evidence on record, including medical reports and independent witness testimony, was sufficient to sustain the convictions.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 114(g)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 279, 338, 427
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — s. 134(b), 184

Subjects

rash driving
negligence
Section 279 IPC
Motor Vehicles Act
burden of proof
revision jurisdiction
acquittal

Judgment

Digitally
signed by
CHITRA
CHITRA SANJAY
SANJAY SONAWANE
SONAWANE Date:
2026.01.20
19:23:27
+0530

Chitra Sonawane. 21-REVN-205-2005.docx

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Revision Application No.205 of 2005

Ninad Suresh Pansare
Age 23 years, R/at Pansare
Bunglow, Near B.O.I. Naupada,
Thane (West). … Applicant
versus
The State of Maharashtra …Respondent
----
Ms Ekta Patil i/b Vrishali Raje, for the Applicant.
Ms Sangeeta D Shinde, APP, for the Respondent / State.
----
Coram: R.N. Laddha, J.
Date: 17 January 2026
P.C.:

This revision application takes exception to the judgment
and order dated 18 January 2005 passed by the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, in Criminal Appeal No.61 of
2004, whereby the learned Judge partly allowed the appeal and
confirmed the conviction of the applicant/ accused recorded by
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thane, in Summary
Criminal Case No.3433 of 1999, under Sections 279 of the
Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’) and Section 184 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘MV Act’).

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2. Briefly, it is the case of the prosecution that on 31 March
1999, at about 12:30 hours, Nilesh (PW-1), while riding his
bicycle on a public road near Anand Theatre, was hit by the
applicant’s motorcar, which was allegedly driven at high speed
in a rash and negligent manner, resulting in grievous injuries to
Nilesh and damage to his bicycle. The prosecution also alleged
that not only did the applicant drive the vehicle dangerously
but also failed to furnish the requisite information relating to
the accident to the concerned authorities.

3. After investigation, a charge sheet was filed, and the
applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During the
trial, the prosecution examined three witnesses, namely, Nilesh
Kashinath Palkar (PW-1), Bhagatrao Tukaram Salunke (PW-2),
and Pralhad Shamrao Shirsath (PW-3). As the prosecution
closed its evidence, the accused was questioned under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), as to
the incriminating circumstances found in the prosecution’s
witnesses, but he denied them as false. The accused did not lead
any evidence in his defence.

4. After appraisal of the evidence, while the learned trial
Court returned a finding of guilt against the accused for the
offences punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and Sections

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184 and 134(b) of the MV Act, it acquitted him of the offences
punishable under Sections 338 and 427 of the IPC. In appeal,
the learned appellate Court acquitted the applicant of the
offence punishable under Section 134(b) of the MV Act and
maintained the conviction for the other offences. Being
aggrieved and dissatisfied with the concurrent finding of
conviction, the applicant has preferred the present revision
application.

5. Ms Ekta Patil, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the applicant, submitted that the trial Court and the appellant
Court misread the prosecution evidence, failed to evaluate it in
proper perspective, and were influenced by a number of
assumptions that cannot be sustained on the material on record.
As a result, there has been a grave miscarriage of justice. It is
contended that the prosecution failed to examine independent
witnesses, and the alleged injury to the injured was not proved.
It is therefore urged that the conviction be set aside.

6. On the other hand, Ms Sangeeta Shinde, the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor representing the respondent/
State, supported the findings of the Courts below and
submitted that no perversity or illegality has been demonstrated
to warrant interference.

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7. This Court has given anxious consideration to the rival
submissions canvassed across the Bar and perused the records.

8. It is a settled principle of law that negligence or rashness
cannot be inferred merely from the occurrence of an accident.
The gravamen of the offence lies not in the accident per se, but
in the existence of culpable rashness or negligence that
occasioned it. Excessive speed, by itself, is insufficient to
conclusively establish rash or negligent driving. The burden
squarely rests upon the prosecution to prove, by cogent
evidence, that the accused was driving in a rash and negligent
manner and that such conduct directly resulted in the injury.
Such culpability cannot be presumed ipso facto, nor can it be
inferred solely by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

9. Upon a perusal of the testimony of PW-1, it transpires that
PW-1 has merely alleged that the accident occurred due to the
accused’s driving; however, he has not attributed any overt act
such as driving on the wrong side, sudden swerving, violation
of traffic rules, or loss of control suggestive of rash conduct. In
his cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that there was normal
traffic on the road at the relevant time, which negatives the
inference of a manner of driving so dangerous as to endanger
human life. Significantly, PW-2 has categorically deposed that

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the vehicle was not being driven on the wrong side of the road.
This testimony directly undermines the prosecution’s case that
the accused acted in a manner falling within the mischief of
Section 279 IPC. Further, PW-2 also admitted that he informed
the authorities belatedly, thereby affecting the spontaneity and
credibility of the prosecution’s version as to the manner of
driving.

10. Equally material is the absence of medical corroboration.
Though PW-1 claimed to have sustained a fracture, PW-3, the
investigating officer, admitted that no injury certificate or
medical certificate was collected during the investigation. In the
absence of medical evidence, the prosecution has failed to
establish not only the nature of the injury but also its nexus
with any alleged rash and negligent act of the accused/
applicant.

11. It is also pertinent to note that no independent witness has
been examined, despite PW-1 admitting the presence of normal
traffic at the spot. The non-examination of independent
witnesses, without any explanation, assumes importance in a
prosecution under Section 279 IPC, where the manner of
driving is the core issue and must be proved by clear,
consistent, and reliable evidence. The investigation conducted

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in the present case leaves much to be desired. The spot
panchanama (Exhibit 22) is bereft of detailing the skid marks,
braking distance and point of impact. Such evidence assumes
critical importance in cases alleging rash and negligent driving
and its absence materially weakens the prosecution’s case. The
prosecution has also failed to produce any mechical inspection
report of the vehicle to rule out the possibility of mechanical
failure. The failure to examine independent witnesses, despite
their admitted availablity, attracts an adverse inference under
Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act.

12. To bring home an offence under the said provision, the
prosecution must establish that the accused was driving the
vehicle in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human
life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury. Rashness connotes a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the consequences, while
negligence implies failure to exercise the reasonable care
expected of a prudent driver. Mere involvement of a vehicle in
an accident, or the fact that injury has been caused, does not
ipso facto satisfy the statutory ingredients of Section 279 IPC.

13. The Courts below appear to have inferred rashness and
negligence merely from the occurrence of the accident and the
allegation of speed, which approach is legally unsustainable.

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Speed, by itself, is not synonymous with rashness or negligence
unless it is shown to be excessive, having regard to the road
conditions, traffic situation, and surrounding circumstances. No
such evidence has been led by the prosecution in the present
case.
.
14. Section 184 of the MV Act contemplates driving in a
manner dangerous to the public having regard to all
circumstances of the case, in the absence of any evidence
relating to traffic density, road condition, visibility, or statutory
speed limits applicable at the relevant place and time, the
essential ingredients of the said provision remain unproved.
The conviction under Section 184 of the MV Act, therefore,
appears to be consequential rather than independent, flowing
mechanically from the finding under Section 279 IPC, which
itself is unsustainable.

15. Where the conviction is founded on presumptions rather
than proof of the essential ingredients of the offence, and
where material evidence has been overlooked or
misappreciated, interference by this Court in its revisional
jurisdiction is not only permissible but warranted. The findings
recorded by the Courts below, in the present case, are thus
vitiated by legal infirmity and perversity.

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16. In light of the foregoing, this Court deems it fit to allow
the present revision application. Accordingly, the judgment and
order dated 18 January 2005, passed by the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, in Criminal Appeal No.61 of
2004, and the judgment and order dated 4 September 2004,
passed by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thane, in
Summary Criminal Case No.3433 of 1999, convicting the
applicant are quashed and set aside. The applicant is acquitted
of the offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and
184 of the MV Act.

(R.N. Laddha, J.)

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17 January 2026

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