RAMDAS TUKARAM THITEversusM/S SPM AUTO COMP SYSTEMS PVT. LTD.

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                      Shabnoor
                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                       WRIT PETITION NO.11337 OF 2023

SHABNOOR              M/s. SPM Auto Comp Systems Pvt. Ltd.
AYUB
PATHAN                F-32, Industrial Area, Nagar Road, MIDC
Digitally signed by
SHABNOOR AYUB
PATHAN
Date: 2026.02.27
                      Ranjangaon, Taluka Shirur,
12:05:05 +0530
                      District Pune – 412 210.                   … Petitioner

                                         V/s.

                      Ramdas Tukaram Thite
                      At/Post Kendur (Thitemala).
                      Taluka Shirur, District Pune – 412 403.    … Respondent

                                                   WITH
                                       WRIT PETITION NO.11841 OF 2024

                      Ramdas Tukaram Thite
                      At/Post Kendur (Thitemala).
                      Taluka Shirur, District Pune – 412 403.    … Petitioner

                                         V/s.

                      M/s. SPM Auto Comp Systems Pvt. Ltd.
                      F-32, Industrial Area, Nagar Road, MIDC
                      Ranjangaon, Taluka Shirur,
                      District Pune – 412 210.                   … Respondent



                      Mr. Aumkar V.        Joshi,   for the Petitioner        in
                      WP/11337/2023,        and      for  Respondent          in
                      WP/1184/2024.
                      Mr. Avinash H. Fatangare, for the Petitioner in
                      WP/11841/2024,    and    for   Respondent    in
                      WP/11337/2023.




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                 CORAM               : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                 RESERVED ON         : FEBRUARY 20, 2026

                 PRONOUNCED ON : FEBRUARY 27, 2026
JUDGMENT:

1.   Both the Writ Petitions arise from a common Judgment and
Award passed by the learned Labour Court and, in view of the
commonality of issues involved, are being decided together by this
common judgment.

2.   Writ Petition No.11337 of 2023 challenges Part II of the
Award dated 21 April 2023 rendered by Labour Court No.4, Pune,
in Reference (IDA) No.45 of 2017, whereby the Reference came to
be partly allowed and the Respondent therein was directed to
reinstate the workman with continuity of service, together with
50% back wages and consequential benefits.

3.   Writ Petition No.11841 of 2024 arises out of Part I of the said
Award dated 21 April 2023, whereby the Labour Court held that
the domestic enquiry conducted against the Petitioner was legal,
fair and proper and that the findings recorded therein were not
perverse. The said Petition also questions Part II of the Award
insofar as it denies the remaining 50% back wages.

4.   For the sake of convenience, Writ Petition No.11841 of 2024
is treated as the lead Petition and the parties are referred to in
accordance with their nomenclature in the said Petition.

5.   The case of the Petitioner is that he was employed in the
Quality Department of the Respondent Company in the capacity of




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Final Inspector. One Mr. Pravin Pratap Singh was serving as Senior
Engineer in the same department and was the immediate superior
of the Petitioner. On 20 January 2015, the said Mr. Pravin Singh
lodged a written complaint with the Human Resources Department
alleging that one Mr. Rama Sambhre, along with certain associates,
had assaulted him. In the said complaint, it was further alleged
that the Petitioner had earlier extended threats in connection with
the complainant’s transfer to his original department, and an
apprehension was expressed regarding the Petitioner’s involvement
in the alleged incident. It further appears from the record that one
Mr. Amit Ahir submitted a written statement before the
Respondent Company stating that on 20 January 2015 at about
7:10 p.m., Mr. Rama Sambhre had inquired from him regarding
the time at which Mr. Pravin Singh would leave the company
premises and had requested that such information be conveyed. It
is alleged that after Mr. Pravin Singh left the premises, the said
information was communicated to Mr. Rama Sambhre.

6.   The Petitioner contends that on the basis of the aforesaid
complaint and statements, the Respondent Company initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him and, pending enquiry, placed
him under suspension by order dated 30 January 2015.

7.   Thereafter, a chargesheet dated 4 February 2015 came to be
issued to the Petitioner alleging, inter alia, that although he was
not physically present at the time of the alleged assault, he was
responsible for the incident on account of alleged prior threats
extended to Mr. Pravin Singh. The chargesheet was issued under
Standing Order 24(k)(1). The Petitioner submitted his reply dated



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13 February 2015 denying the allegations in toto. A copy of the
said reply is annexed as Exhibit “D”. The Enquiry Officer thereafter
conducted the domestic enquiry and, after affording opportunity to
both sides, submitted his report dated 30 June 2016 holding the
Petitioner guilty of the charges.

8.    Upon receipt of the Enquiry Report, the Petitioner submitted
his defence statement contending that material admissions of
witnesses were ignored and that no evidence existed to sustain the
findings of guilt. According to the Petitioner, without proper
consideration of his representation, the Respondent terminated his
services by order dated 20 July 2016. It is further contended that
the order of termination was passed without issuance of a separate
show cause notice proposing dismissal and without granting an
opportunity to make a representation on the quantum of
punishment. The Petitioner submits that Clause 25 of the Model
Standing Orders contemplates several lesser punishments such as
censure, warning, withholding of increments or promotion,
reduction in rank, wage deductions or short suspension. However,
the show cause notice did not disclose the proposed punishment
and was silent regarding the contemplated penalty of termination.

9.    Being aggrieved by the said action, the Petitioner raised an
industrial dispute before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour.
Conciliation proceedings having failed, the Conciliation Officer
submitted a Failure Report under Section 12(4) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 on 21 December 2016.




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10.   Pursuant thereto, the appropriate Government referred the
dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court at Pune. The
Petitioner filed his Statement of Claim contending that he had
joined the Respondent Company on 20 May 2011 and had
rendered more than five years of clean and unblemished service till
his termination on 20 July 2016. He denied any involvement in the
alleged assault and alleged that the action was motivated,
particularly in view of his participation in union activities and
strike. It was further contended that there was no legal evidence
before the Enquiry Officer to sustain the finding of guilt. The
Petitioner accordingly sought reinstatement with continuity of
service and full back wages.

11.   The Respondent entered appearance and filed its Written
Statement denying the averments made in the claim. It was
contended that the Petitioner was employed in a supervisory
capacity and therefore did not fall within the definition of
“workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. It was further contended that the enquiry was conducted
strictly in accordance with law and that the findings recorded
therein were justified. Dismissal of the Reference was accordingly
sought.

12.   The   Labour    Court    framed    preliminary       issues      for
determination, namely, whether the domestic enquiry was legal,
fair and proper, and whether the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer were perverse. Upon hearing the parties, the Labour Court
held that the departmental enquiry was legal, fair and proper and
that the same had been conducted in consonance with the



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principles of natural justice. It further held that the findings
recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not perverse.

13.   The Petitioner states that after the Part I Award, he examined
himself before the Labour Court and reiterated that the allegations
levelled against him were false and baseless. He deposed that
despite sincere efforts, he was unable to secure alternate
employment after termination and was therefore entitled to full
back wages. He further contended that his past service record was
clean and unblemished and that the punishment of dismissal was
harsh, disproportionate and unsustainable. According to the
Petitioner, nothing adverse was elicited in cross-examination to
discredit his claim regarding his service record. The Respondent
did not adduce any additional evidence before the Labour Court.
Upon final hearing, the Labour Court, by Judgment and Award
dated 21 April 2023, held that the order of termination was illegal
and consequently directed reinstatement of the Petitioner with
continuity of service and 50% back wages.

14.   Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner employee
submitted that, according to the case set up by the Management,
the alleged assault occurred between approximately 7:00 p.m. and
10:30 p.m. It was contended that the Management seeks to infer
the Petitioner’s involvement in planning the incident solely on the
basis that at about 10:30 p.m. the Petitioner telephoned his
superior to inquire about his health and that, according to the
Management, only the Petitioner and the co-employee alleged to
have committed the assault were aware of the incident. It was
submitted that such an inference is purely speculative and cannot



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be sustained in law.

15.   Inviting attention to the statement of the Watchman dated
20 January 2015, learned Counsel submitted that the said
statement itself indicates prior knowledge of the incident on the
part of persons other than the Petitioner. As per the statement, the
co-employee alleged to have assaulted the superior had instructed
the Watchman to inform another co-employee when the superior
left the company premises, and in pursuance thereof the
Watchman had telephoned the said co-employee after the superior
departed. It was therefore submitted that the premise that
knowledge of the incident was confined only to the Petitioner and
the alleged assailant is factually untenable.

16.   Learned Counsel further referred to the statements of
witnesses examined on behalf of the Management and submitted
that the evidence on record indicates that other employees were
aware of the incident even prior to 10:30 p.m., namely before the
Petitioner allegedly made the call to inquire about the superior’s
health. It was argued that the mere act of making a telephone call
to inquire about the health of a superior cannot, by itself, lead to
an inference that the Petitioner was privy to or involved in
planning the assault. On the question of motive arising from the
alleged grievance regarding transfer, it was submitted that the
Management has failed to produce cogent material to establish
that the Petitioner had avoided work or that his transfer was
occasioned by any misconduct attributable to him.




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17.   Learned Counsel then invited attention to the findings
recorded in the Enquiry Officer’s report and submitted that the
Enquiry Officer proceeded mainly on the premise that the
statements of the Management witnesses were consistent insofar
as they suggested that the Petitioner had repeatedly approached
the superior for cancellation of his transfer and was under the
impression that the transfer had been effected on the basis of a
report submitted by Mr. Praveen Singh. On that basis, the Enquiry
Officer inferred participation of the Petitioner in planning the
assault. It was submitted that the alleged telephone call was made
at about 11:00 p.m. and that the Enquiry Officer himself records
that the superior had not informed anyone about the assault.
Hence, the conclusion that the said call necessarily implied prior
knowledge and participation was contended to be based on
conjectures and surmises, unsupported by direct or substantive
evidence, and therefore amounting to a finding based on no
evidence.

18.   Learned Counsel further relied upon Clause 24(k) and
Clause 24(l) of the Model Standing Orders framed under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It was
submitted that Clause 24(k) contemplates misconduct relating to
drunkenness or riotous, disorderly or indecent behaviour within
the premises of the establishment, whereas Clause 24(l) concerns
acts subversive of discipline or good behaviour committed on the
premises of the establishment.

19.   It was submitted that the material on record clearly indicates
that the alleged assault did not occur within the employer’s



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premises, nor is there any evidence to establish that the alleged
planning of the incident took place within such premises.
Consequently, it was argued that the essential ingredients of
misconduct contemplated under the aforesaid clauses of the Model
Standing Orders are not satisfied and that the charges are
therefore unsustainable in law.

20.   In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed
on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v.
Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378; Kranti Associates
Private Limited and Another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and Others,
(2010) 9 SCC 496; Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and
Others, (2009) 2 SCC 570; and M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and Others, (1984) 1 SCC
1.

21.   Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the Management
invited attention to the material on record and submitted that the
co-employee had assaulted the superior, Mr. Praveen Singh,
pursuant to a plan allegedly conceived by the Petitioner and the
said co-employee, the motive being the Petitioner’s grievance
regarding his transfer, which according to him was based on a
report prepared by Mr. Praveen Singh. It was submitted that the
assault occurred at around 7:00 p.m., whereas the Petitioner
telephoned Mr. Praveen Singh at about 11:00 p.m. to inquire about
his health. It was further contended that Mr. Praveen Singh had
not disclosed the incident to any person prior to the said call and
that, therefore, the very act of the Petitioner calling to inquire
about his health demonstrates prior knowledge and involvement in



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the planning of the incident. Learned Counsel further referred to
the cross-examination of witnesses before the Enquiry Officer. It
was submitted that Mr. Praveen Singh stated in cross-examination
that the Petitioner had called him on 20 January 2015 to inquire
about his health. According to the Management, the Petitioner
denied in his own cross-examination that he had made such a call
on that night, thereby exposing inconsistency in his defence. On
that basis, it was contended that the Enquiry Officer rightly
concluded that the Petitioner, along with two other employees, had
conspired to assault their superior and that, despite the alleged
absence of knowledge on the part of others, the Petitioner’s call at
about 11:00 p.m. on 20 January 2015 clearly indicated his
involvement in planning and execution of the misconduct. In
support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed on the
judgments in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. N.K.
Singh, 2007 (1) CLR 193; R. Madaswamy and Another v. Indian
Express Newspaper, 2014 (5) Bom.C.R. 342; and Bajaj Auto
Limited v. Kalidas Devram Patil, 1999 (3) Mh.L.J. 857.

Reasons and analysis:

I)    On the conduct and scope of the domestic enquiry:

22.   The conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer essentially
proceeds on a chain of inferences drawn from the sequence of
events rather than on direct evidence. The Tribunal has noticed
that the Enquiry Officer treated the statements of management
witnesses as broadly consistent to the extent that they referred to
earlier disagreements between the petitioner and his superior




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regarding transfer and to the petitioner repeatedly approaching
the superior for cancellation of the transfer. These circumstances
may indicate dissatisfaction or strained relations. They may also
show that the petitioner felt aggrieved. However, in law, such
background circumstances by themselves do not establish
participation in a planned assault. Workplace friction is not
uncommon.     Unless     supported    by   clear    material       showing
preparation, communication, or active involvement, it cannot
automatically be converted into proof of conspiracy.

23.   The emphasis placed on the telephone call made by the
petitioner to his superior also requires careful scrutiny. The
Enquiry Officer treated this call as a significant circumstance,
drawing an inference that the petitioner must have had prior
knowledge of the assault. When examined closely, the call only
establishes that the petitioner contacted his superior at a late hour
and inquired about his health. The content of the call, as recorded,
is neutral. A telephone call, without accompanying evidence
showing intent or prior coordination, cannot by itself become
proof of planning or participation. The inference drawn from this
circumstance becomes weak when it is not supported by any
independent material showing that the petitioner had knowledge
unavailable to others.

24.   Further, the statement of the Watchman assumes importance
because it introduces a different factual possibility. According to
that statement, the alleged assailant had instructed the Watchman
to inform him when the superior left the premises, and the
Watchman accordingly communicated that information to alleged



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assailant. This part of the record indicates that information about
movements of the superior and about the surrounding events was
not confined to the petitioner and the alleged assailant alone.
Other witness statements also suggest that employees including
watchmen had knowledge of the incident before the time at which
the petitioner is said to have made the telephone call. Once such
material exists, the foundation of the inference drawn by the
Enquiry Officer becomes less certain.

25.   In disciplinary proceedings, an inference can be drawn only
when the surrounding circumstances reasonably point in one
direction and exclude equally plausible alternatives. Here, the
record presents more than one explanation. One explanation is the
one accepted by the Enquiry Officer, namely that the petitioner’s
call indicates prior knowledge. The other explanation, equally
plausible on the material available, is that knowledge of the
incident had already spread among employees and that the
petitioner’s call was merely an inquiry made after learning of the
event through ordinary workplace communication. When two
explanations are reasonably possible, fairness requires that the
more serious conclusion, particularly one suggesting conspiracy or
planned misconduct, should not be accepted without stronger
supporting evidence.

26.   It cannot be denied that the Enquiry Officer had before him
certain circumstances which were capable of creating suspicion
against the petitioner. The prior disagreements regarding transfer,
the allegation of threats, and the timing of the telephone call were
all treated as surrounding circumstances pointing towards possible



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involvement. These factors may legitimately raise doubt or
suspicion in the mind of an enquiry authority. However, the law
draws a clear distinction between circumstances that merely create
suspicion and material that actually establishes guilt. The
movement from suspicion to a finding of guilt requires a clear and
reliable link supported by evidence. That link, on close
examination, remains missing in the present case.

27.   The conclusion of guilt reached by the Enquiry Officer rests
largely on inference. The reasoning proceeds on the assumption
that because the petitioner called his superior late at night and
because there was earlier ill-feeling, he must have been aware of
or involved in the planning of the assault. This line of reasoning is
essentially circumstantial. No witness has stated that the petitioner
was seen planning the incident. No document, message, or
communication has been produced showing coordination between
the petitioner and the alleged assailant. There is no direct evidence
demonstrating that the petitioner instructed, encouraged, or
participated in the alleged act. The enquiry record therefore does
not contain material that directly connects the petitioner with the
planning or execution of the assault.

28.   When the foundation of a finding rests mainly on
assumptions drawn from a telephone call and from previous
workplace disputes, the conclusion becomes legally fragile. Past ill-
feeling may explain motive, but motive alone cannot substitute
proof of participation. Similarly, a telephone call, without more,
remains an ambiguous circumstance. It can support multiple
interpretations, and unless corroborated by stronger material, it



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cannot be treated as decisive evidence of guilt. For this reason, if
the order of dismissal were to stand solely on such reasoning, the
finding would remain open to serious legal challenge.

29.   At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the
fairness of the procedure adopted and the strength of the evidence
produced. The enquiry proceedings show that witnesses were
examined, the petitioner was given opportunity to cross-examine
them, and a formal record of proceedings was maintained. The
Labour Court was therefore justified in concluding that the
enquiry,   as   a   matter    of   procedure,     satisfied     the     formal
requirements of natural justice. The petitioner was heard. He had
opportunity to contest the allegations. The process itself cannot be
said to be arbitrary or one-sided.

30.   However, compliance with procedure does not automatically
validate the ultimate conclusion. Natural justice ensures fairness in
the method by which a decision is reached. It does not supply
missing evidence or          strengthen   weak inferences.            Even      a
procedurally fair enquiry must rest on material that reasonably
supports the conclusion arrived at. Where substantive evidence is
lacking, the mere fact that the enquiry followed proper steps
cannot cure that deficiency. In other words, procedural fairness
and evidentiary sufficiency are two separate requirements, both of
which must exist together before a serious finding of misconduct
can safely stand.

31.   Therefore, while the enquiry may be procedurally sound, the
evidentiary foundation supporting the gravest inference against




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the petitioner remains insufficient. The material on record may
justify suspicion, but it falls short of establishing guilt with the
degree of certainty required to sustain a finding that the petitioner
planned or participated in the assault.

II.   On applicability of Clauses 24(k) and 24(l) of the Model
Standing Orders:

32.   Clause 24(k) of the Model Standing Orders deals with
specific forms of misconduct such as drunkenness, riotous
behaviour, disorderly conduct, or indecent acts committed on the
premises of the establishment. Clause 24(l) similarly refers to acts
which are subversive of discipline or good behaviour, again with a
clear emphasis on conduct taking place on the premises. A plain
reading of both clauses shows that it is intended to regulate
behaviour that directly affects order, discipline, and working
conditions within the workplace itself. The essential element in
both provisions is the connection between the misconduct and the
premises of the establishment, because the purpose of these
clauses is to preserve discipline where employees work and
interact.

33.   When the facts of the present case are examined, certain
aspects become clear. The alleged assault, according to the
material placed on record and as admitted by both sides, did not
take place within the employer’s premises. The incident is stated to
have occurred outside the workplace after working hours. Equally,
there is no evidence showing that any planning or preparation for
the alleged assault took place inside the company premises. The




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charges framed against the petitioner are therefore based mainly
on conduct said to have occurred outside the establishment and on
allegations of prior threats arising out of workplace disputes.

34.   This distinction is important because misconduct under the
Standing Orders cannot be read in an unlimited manner. The
employer is entitled to regulate conduct affecting workplace
discipline, but the scope of disciplinary action must remain within
the boundaries of the clauses invoked. Both Clause 24(k) and
Clause 24(l) require a clear nexus between the act complained of
and the establishment, either by reason of place or by reason of
direct impact on discipline within the workplace. An incident
occurring outside the premises may, in some cases, still justify
disciplinary action if there is credible evidence showing that it
directly disturbed workplace discipline or that the planning and
execution were closely connected with the functioning of the
establishment. But such a conclusion cannot be presumed. It must
be supported by specific material.

35.   In the present case, that connecting material is absent. The
record does not show that the alleged planning was done inside
the company premises. No witness has stated that meetings,
discussions, or preparations relating to the incident took place at
the workplace. There is also no evidence that the petitioner
engaged in any riotous, disorderly, or indecent conduct on the
premises, which is the precise conduct contemplated under Clause
24(k). Similarly, the record does not disclose any act on the
premises that can be described as directly subversive of discipline
within the meaning of Clause 24(l). The allegations, at their



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highest, relate to events outside the establishment and to inferred
intentions rather than to misconduct within the workplace.

36.   The employer’s argument appears to proceed on the
assumption that because the parties involved were employees and
because the alleged motive arose from workplace issues, the
incident automatically falls within the scope of the Standing
Orders. Such an approach cannot be accepted without caution. If
the requirement of connection with the premises or with
workplace discipline is diluted, the scope of disciplinary
jurisdiction would become unlimited. The Standing Orders must
therefore be interpreted in accordance with their language and
purpose, which is to regulate conduct affecting the internal
discipline of the establishment.

37.   Viewed from this perspective, the reliance placed by the
employer on Clause 24(k) and Clause 24(l) suffers from a legal
infirmity. The factual matrix does not satisfy the essential
ingredients of either clause. The incident occurred outside the
premises. The alleged planning is not shown to have occurred
within the workplace. There is no proven on-premises misconduct
of the nature contemplated by the provisions. In the absence of
such foundational facts, the charges framed under these clauses
cannot be sustained in law.

38.   On the point of grant of 50% back wages, it becomes
necessary to examine the relief in the light of the principles laid
down by the Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti
Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya,(2013) 10 SCC 324. The said




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judgment authoritatively clarifies that in cases of wrongful
termination, reinstatement with continuity of service and full back
wages is the normal rule. Departure from this rule is permissible
only where the facts of the case justify reduction, and such
departure must rest on clear reasons supported by material on
record.

39.   In the present case, the Labour Court has already held the
termination to be illegal and has directed reinstatement with
continuity of service. The reasons recorded in the earlier analysis
show that the finding of guilt against the petitioner was based
mainly on inference and suspicion. The enquiry may have satisfied
procedural requirements, but substantive evidence linking the
petitioner to the alleged planning or participation in the assault
was not established with certainty. There is no finding that the
petitioner committed proved misconduct warranting major penalty.
Equally, this is not a case where the Labour Court exercised power
under Section 11-A only to reduce punishment while accepting
proved misconduct. The effect of the findings is that the dismissal
could not legally stand.

40.   Once this position is accepted, the principles in Deepali
Gundu Surwase assume direct relevance. The Supreme Court has
clearly held that where the employee is not proved guilty of
misconduct, or where the action of the employer is found
unjustified, there is ample justification for grant of full back wages.
The burden then shifts to the employer to establish that the
employee was gainfully employed during the intervening period
and earning wages comparable to those drawn earlier. In the



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present matter, the petitioner has specifically deposed that despite
efforts he could not secure alternative employment after
termination. The respondent management did not lead any
evidence to show gainful employment or comparable earnings. No
material has been placed on record to dislodge the petitioner’s
statement. In law, once the employee makes such a statement, the
burden lies on the employer to prove the contrary, and failure to
discharge that burden ordinarily results in award of full back
wages.

41.   The Supreme Court has also cautioned that denial of full
back wages in cases of wrongful termination effectively grants a
premium to the employer’s unlawful action, because the employee
remains out of service without fault while litigation proceeds. The
delay in adjudication cannot be used against the workman. The
present case travelled through conciliation, reference, enquiry
findings, and writ proceedings over a considerable period. The
petitioner cannot be penalised for systemic delay.

42.   In this background, the operative part requires modification.
The direction limiting back wages to 50% does not align with the
settled legal position governing wrongful termination where
misconduct is not proved and where the employer has failed to
establish gainful employment of the workman. The normal rule
must therefore apply.

                             ORDER

      (i)   Writ Petition No.11841 of 2024 is allowed and Writ
      Petition No.11337 of 2023 is dismissed.



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      (ii)   The Judgment and Award dated 21 April 2023 passed
      by Labour Court No.4, Pune in Reference (IDA) No.45 of
      2017 is modified to the extent indicated herein.

      (iii) The order of termination dated 20 July 2016 issued by
      the Respondent Management is quashed and set aside.

      (iv) The Petitioner employee shall be reinstated in service
      with continuity of service for all purposes.

      (v)    The Petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages from
      the date of termination till the date of actual reinstatement,
      together with all consequential monetary and service
      benefits.

      (vi) The Respondent Management shall compute and pay
      the arrears of back wages and consequential benefits within
      a period of twelve weeks from the date of this order.

      (vii) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as
      to costs.

43.   Both the writ petitions stand disposed of in the above terms.
There shall be no order as to costs.


                                              (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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