AMANUL EKRAMUL ANSARIversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

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                      Shabnoor
                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                        WRIT PETITION NO.1293 OF 2026
SHABNOOR
AYUB                  Amanul Ekramul Ansari                         … Petitioner
PATHAN
Digitally signed by
SHABNOOR AYUB
                                 V/s.
PATHAN
Date: 2026.02.02
                      The State of Maharashtra & Ors.               … Respondents
15:49:25 +0530




                      Mr. Anish Karande, Satchit Gor, Aaryan Gaur, Amit
                      Chavan, Shyam Singh i/b Tatsat Gor, for Petitioner.
                      Ms. Savina R. Crasto, for the State – Respondent Nos.1
                      to 3.
                      Mr. Shreepravad Parab, Respondent No.4.


                                                   CORAM      : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                   DATED      : FEBRUARY 2, 2026
                      P.C.:

                      1.      The present writ petition calls in question the legality and
                      propriety of the order passed by the Revisional Authority in
                      exercise of powers under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies
                      Act, 1960. The impugned order arises from proceedings initiated
                      under Section 22(2) of the said Act and reverses the determination
                      made by the Appellate Authority in relation to the petitioner’s
                      claim for membership.

                      2.      The petitioner asserts right, title and interest in respect of
                      the property forming the subject matter of the dispute on the basis
                      of a registered instrument dated 12 December 2019. Relying upon
                      the said conveyance, the petitioner submitted an application
                      seeking membership of Respondent No.4 society on 17 August



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2020. As no decision was communicated by the society within the
statutory period, the petitioner invoked the appellate remedy
under Section 22(2) of the MCS Act on 17 August 2020. The
Appellate Authority, by order dated 12 July 2021, directed that
membership be granted to the petitioner, having regard to the
material placed before it.

3.    The said order of the Appellate Authority was assailed by the
society by way of Revision Application No.575 of 2023 before the
State Government. The Revisional Authority, upon consideration of
the record, allowed the revision and set aside the appellate order.
It recorded a finding that the subject of purchase under the
registered document consisted of a basement and parking area and
did not answer the description of a “flat” within the meaning of
Section 154B(1)(13) of the MCS Act. On that reasoning, the claim
for membership was held to be unsustainable.

4.    Learned Advocate for the petitioner, placing reliance upon
the decision of this Court in Videocon Appliances Ltd. v. Maker
Chambers V. Premises Coop. Socy. Ltd., Writ Petition No.7471 of
2004 decided on 1 December 2005, submitted that the scope of
inquiry under Section 22(2) of the MCS Act is circumscribed. It
was urged that the Registrar or Appellate Authority, while
considering an application for membership, is not expected to
adjudicate upon the validity of title or to examine the legality of a
registered instrument. It was further contended that, in the
absence of any express communication rejecting the petitioner’s
application within the prescribed period, the petitioner acquired
the status of a deemed member. On this premise, it was argued



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that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction in
interfering with the order granting membership passed by the
Appellate Authority.

5.    Upon careful consideration of the rival submissions and the
statutory framework, I am unable to accept the contentions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The issue is no longer res
integra. In Uday Dalal & Ors. vs. Divisional Joint Registrar & Ors.,
Writ Petition No.15089 of 2025 with connected matters, decided
on 5 December 2025, this Court has examined the scheme of
Chapter XIII-B of the MCS Act in the context of housing societies.
It has been authoritatively held that the right to membership in
such a society does not arise from mere occupation or physical
possession of a portion of the building. The statute makes a clear
distinction between possession and lawful entitlement referable to
a recognised unit.

6.    The judgment clarifies that membership is conditioned upon
ownership, or a legally sustainable claim to ownership, of a “flat”
as understood under the Act. The expression “flat” correspond to a
unit contemplated in the sanctioned building plan. The statutory
design, particularly under Section 154B-5, imposes ceilings and
structural limitations which cannot be diluted by invoking the
concept of deemed membership. The deeming provision operates
within the boundaries of statutory eligibility. It cannot enlarge the
class of persons entitled to membership beyond what the Act
permits. Eligibility, therefore, flows from the sanctioned plan and
the nature of the unit recognised therein. If the unit itself does not
answer the statutory description, the question of automatic or



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deemed membership does not arise.

7.      Viewed in this light, the argument that silence of the society
confers an indefeasible right loses force. Deemed membership
cannot validate what the statute does not recognise in the first
place. The foundation must be lawful entitlement to a qualifying
unit.

8.      Turning to the facts of the present case, the architect’s
certificate annexed to the conveyance deed assumes significance.
The certificate indicates that the basement and parking spaces
claimed by the petitioner are situated outside the Floor Space
Index utilised for the construction of the building. This aspect is
not incidental. FSI determines the permissible built-up area and
reflects what has been sanctioned by the planning authority. Units
forming part of the sanctioned construction alone can be regarded
as independent flats for the purposes of the Act.

9.      If the basement and parking areas are outside the FSI
component and are treated, under the sanctioned plan, as common
areas or appurtenant facilities, they cannot acquire the character of
an independent “flat” within the meaning of Section 154B(1)(13)
of the MCS Act. A parking space or basement area, unless shown
in the sanctioned layout as a self-contained residential or
commercial unit, does not satisfy the statutory definition. The
conveyance deed, however carefully drafted, cannot override the
sanctioned plan or transform a common area into a separate flat
for the purpose of claiming membership.

10.     In these circumstances, the Revisional Authority cannot be



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said to have committed any error of jurisdiction or perversity in
interfering with the order of the Appellate Authority. Its conclusion
rests on the statutory definition and the material on record,
particularly the sanctioned plan and the architect’s certification.
No ground is made out for exercise of writ jurisdiction.

11.   The petition, therefore, stands dismissed accordingly.

12.   No costs.


                                             (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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