DEEPALI DINESH NAIKversusKRANTIVIR CHAFEKAR EDUCATION SOCIETY AND ORS.

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                      AGK
                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     WRIT PETITION NO.2419 OF 2008

ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
                      Deepali Dinesh Naik,
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
                      Adult, Occupation Service,
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.02.06
12:20:13 +0530        R/at: Ganaraj Society, Adesh Nagar,
                      Kalewadi, Pune 411 017.                     … Petitioner

                                         V/s.

                       1. Krantivir Chafekar Education Society,
                          Educational Institute, registered
                          under B.P.T. Act & Also under
                          Societies Registration Act, having
                          its office at Pandharicha Mala,
                          Chinchwad, Pune 411 033
                       2. Head Mistress,
                          Krantivir Chafekar School,
                          Chinchwad, Pune 411 030.
                       3. Shikshan Mandal Karyalaya,
                          Pimpri Chinchwad Corporation,
                          Prashashan Adhikari, Pimpri,
                          Pune 411 018.
                       4. The Education Officer,
                          Zilla Parishad, Pune 411 001
                       5. Pramila Dilip Deshmukh,
                          Age 42 years, Occupation Service,
                          R/at: Ganannand Maharaj Society,
                          Section No.27, D-3, P.C.N.T., Dev.
                          Authority, Nigdi, Pune 411 044          … Respondents




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Mr. Bhushan Tayade with Mr. A. Tayade for the
petitioner.
Mrs. D.S. Deshmukh, AGP for respondent No.4-State.
Mr. V.K. Bodhare i/by Mr. A.M. Joshi for respondent
No.5.


                     CORAM                 : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                     RESERVED ON           : JANUARY 29, 2026.

                     PRONOUNCED ON         : FEBRUARY 6, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.    By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner calls in question the
legality and correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 20
November 2007 delivered by the School Tribunal in Appeal No.
106 of 2003. The supervisory and writ jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked on the ground that the findings recorded by the Tribunal
suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record and warrant
judicial scrutiny.

2.    The factual backdrop giving rise to the present proceedings
may be stated thus. The petitioner came to be appointed as a
Teacher in respondent No. 1 primary school on 13 June 1986. At
the time of her initial appointment, she possessed the qualification
of S.S.C. and D.Ed. Subsequently, in April 1991, the petitioner
acquired the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Respondent No. 5 entered
service in the same primary school on 21 November 1994, holding
the qualifications of B.A. and B.Ed. from the inception of her
appointment. These foundational facts are not in dispute.




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3.    On 12 January 1999, respondent No. 5 instituted Writ
Petition No. 3824 of 1999 before this Court seeking placement in a
higher pay scale. The petitioner herein was not impleaded as a
party to the said writ petition. This Court allowed the writ petition
and directed that respondent No. 5 be placed in the pay scale of
Rs. 975 to 1,660 with effect from January 1996, accepting her
contention that she was the only trained teacher in the respondent
school at the relevant time. The order thus attained finality insofar
as respondent No. 5 was concerned.

4.    Thereafter, on 31 October 2003, the petitioner preferred
Appeal No. 106 of 2003 before the School Tribunal asserting her
entitlement to the graduate pay scale and seeking a direction to
the respondent Management to grant her such pay scale. In the
memorandum of appeal, it was specifically pleaded that the
seniority list maintained by the Management placed the petitioner
at Serial No. 4, whereas respondent No. 5 was shown at Serial No.
9. The petitioner raised a grievance that despite having acquired a
graduate qualification in the year 1991, she was not treated as a
trained graduate teacher, whereas teachers junior to her were
extended the benefit of the graduate pay scale. The appeal thus
rested upon the twin foundations of seniority and qualification.

5.    Respondent No. 5 resisted the appeal by contending, at the
threshold, that the same was not maintainable under Section 9 of
the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of
Service) Regulation Act, 1977, as the dispute did not relate to
termination, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, or supersession.
It was urged that respondent No. 5 possessed the qualifications of



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B.A. and B.Ed. on the date of her appointment and was, therefore,
rightly treated as a trained graduate from inception. It was further
contended that in Writ Petition No. 3824 of 1999, this Court had
set aside the order of the Director of Education and the
Educational Officer which had reduced her pay scale from Rs.
1,400 to 2,600 to that of an untrained graduate teacher in the
scale of Rs. 975 to 1,600. In view of the said adjudication, it was
submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to reopen or
indirectly challenge the position crystallised by the earlier writ
order.

6.       The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted
that     teachers   initially   appointed   with   S.S.C.     and    D.Ed.
qualifications,     who    subsequently     enhance   their     academic
qualification by acquiring a B.A. degree while in service, become
entitled to the graduate pay scale in accordance with the
applicable Government policy. It was urged that the petitioner,
having acquired her B.A. degree in the year 1991, fulfilled the
requisite criteria and ought to have been granted the graduate pay
scale from the relevant date. According to him, the benefit of
graduate pay scale is extended to the senior most eligible teachers
in the prescribed ratio of 75:25 between D.Ed. and B.Ed.
categories. On this premise, it was contended that the petitioner,
being senior and duly qualified, had a legal entitlement to be
placed in the graduate pay scale along with consequential
monetary and service benefits.

7.       In support of the above submissions, reliance was placed
upon the judgment of this Court in Kondiba Dagdu Mirashe v.



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State of Maharashtra, reported in 2002 (4) Mh.L.J. 840 , and the
decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and Others
v. Tukaram Tryambak Chaudhary, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1321 . It
was contended that the principles enunciated therein govern the
entitlement of teachers who acquire higher qualifications during
service and support the claim advanced by the petitioner.

8.    Per contra, the learned Advocate for respondent No. 5
opposed the writ petition and reiterated that a claim relating solely
to pay scale does not fall within the ambit of Section 9 of the
MEPS Act. It was submitted that the petitioner had expressly
confined her grievance to the question of pay scale and had not
alleged supersession. Consequently, the appeal before the Tribunal
was not maintainable in law. It was further urged that since this
Court had already granted the benefit of graduate pay scale to
respondent No. 5 in earlier proceedings, the petitioner could not
seek a parallel or conflicting relief. On these grounds, dismissal of
the writ petition was sought.

Reasons and analysis:

9.    The   Maharashtra    Employees     of   Private   Schools     Act
constitutes a self contained legislative framework governing the
field of employment in private educational institutions. It regulates
appointment, conditions of service, disciplinary action, and the
mechanism for redress of specified grievances. The Act is not a
skeletal enactment that requires supplementation from general
service jurisprudence except where the statute itself so provides.
The rights and liabilities of employees and managements alike




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must be traced to the text of the statute. Courts are not at liberty
to travel beyond that text in order to fill perceived gaps.

10.   Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools
(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 reads thus:

      “9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of private
      schools.
      (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or
      contract for the time being in force, any employee in a
      private school—
            (a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services
            are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by
            the order passed by the Management; or
            (b) who is superseded by the Management while
            making an appointment to any post by promotion,
           and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and
      may appeal against any such order or supersession to the
      Tribunal constituted under Section 8:
            Provided that no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in
      any case where the matter has already been decided by a
      Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such
      Court on the appointed date, or where the order of dismissal,
      removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in
      rank was passed by the Management at any time before the
      1st July 1976.”
11.   Section 9 confers a right of appeal upon an employee in
defined circumstances. The remedy so provided is neither inherent
nor incidental. It is a creation of the legislature. The Tribunal
derives its jurisdiction exclusively from the statute and must
operate within its bounds. If the statute does not confer a remedy




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for a particular category of grievance, the Tribunal cannot assume
jurisdiction in relation to to the category of grievance not provided
specifically. Legislative intent as expressed in the language
employed must prevail.

12.   A plain reading of Section 9 shows that clauses (a) and (b)
specify the orders against which an appeal shall lie. The reading of
the provision makes it clear that the contingencies are set out in
clear terms. It does not use words of wide amplitude such as “any
order affecting service conditions.” Instead, it identifies particular
kinds of action. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius applies in this context. Where the legislature expressly
mentions certain grounds of appeal, it impliedly excludes others.
The Tribunal, therefore, cannot assume a general supervisory role
over all service related decisions of the Management. Its authority
is specified. To read into Section 9 a power to entertain every form
of service grievance would amount to amending the statutory
provision.

13.   Insofar as clause (a) is concerned, the expression “reduced in
rank” must be understood in its established meaning service
jurisprudence. Reduction in rank contemplates placing a employee
lower in the hierarchy of posts. It presupposes the existence of a
cadre and a prior status held by the employee. There must be a act
of the Management whereby the employee is placed in a post
lower than the one previously occupied. Such an order ordinarily
carries civil consequences and is generally associated with
disciplinary action, though it may arise in other contexts as well.




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14.   The essential element is the change in rank. The employee
must have held a particular position and, by virtue of the
impugned order, must have been demoted to a lower one. In the
absence of a specific order effecting such demotion, the concept of
reduction in rank cannot be invoked. A mere dissatisfaction with
emoluments, increments, or placement in a particular pay scale
does not satisfy this requirement. Unless there is a alteration in the
rank status of the employee, clause (a) remains inapplicable. It
follows that the scope of Section 9 must be confined to cases
where the statutory conditions are clearly fulfilled.

15.   The difference between promotion and grant of a higher pay
scale must be clearly understood before deciding the issue of
jurisdiction. These two matters may appear similar at first glance,
but in service law they stand on different footing.

16.   Promotion means moving to a higher post. When a person is
promoted, the nature of work changes. Duties become wider.
Responsibility increases. Status in the institution rises. A teacher
who is promoted may become a Head Master or may be placed in
a post carrying supervisory powers. Such movement changes the
position of the employee in the service hierarchy. It affects rank. It
may also affect authority over others. Therefore, promotion is not
merely about money. It is about elevation in the cadre structure.

17.   On the other hand, placement in a higher pay scale does not
always change the post. A person may continue to work in the
same position, perform the same duties, and yet receive higher
salary because of revised pay rules, additional qualification, or




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length of service. Many times, Government issues resolutions
stating that teachers who acquire higher educational qualification
will be entitled to a certain pay scale. In such cases, the post
remains the same. Only the scale of pay is altered in terms of
policy. There is no movement in hierarchy.

18.   These two concepts, though sometimes resulting in higher
salary, cannot be treated as identical. A higher pay scale does not
automatically mean promotion. When an employee contends that
after acquiring a higher qualification she became entitled to a
graduate pay scale, the dispute is essentially about the correct
application of Government policy or service rules. The Court or
authority has to examine whether the employee fulfills the
conditions laid down in the relevant Government Resolution. The
issue is whether the policy covers the employee and from which
date benefit should be granted. Such a dispute does not amount to
supersession in promotion. Supersession arises only when a
promotional post exists and a junior is preferred over a senior in
that promotional exercise. If there is no promotion to a higher post
and the grievance is confined to salary scale, the matter does not
fit within the limited categories mentioned in Section 9 of the Act.

19.   If every dispute relating to pay, increments, or monetary
benefits is allowed to be brought before the School Tribunal under
Section 9, the scope of that provision would expand far beyond
what the legislature intended. The Tribunal would then become a
general forum for all kinds of financial claims between employees
and management. The Act does not confer such wide jurisdiction.
The right of appeal under Section 9 is restricted to specific



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situations such as termination, reduction in rank, or supersession
in promotion. Therefore, unless the claim regarding higher pay
scale is directly connected with denial of promotion to a higher
post in favour of a junior, it cannot be treated as a case of
supersession.

20.   In the present matter, the facts are largely undisputed. The
petitioner was appointed as a teacher. She later improved her
qualification by obtaining a graduate degree. She now says that
because of that qualification and her seniority, she should have
been granted the graduate pay scale. She does not point to any
order by which she was removed, dismissed, terminated, or
reduced to a lower post. She also does not place before the Court
any promotion order showing that a junior teacher was promoted
to a higher post while she was ignored.

21.   The record does not show that any separate promotional
post was filled and that the petitioner was denied consideration for
the same. There is no material to indicate that her rank in the
cadre was altered or that she was pushed down in hierarchy. She
continues to serve on the same post as before. Her complaint is
confined to salary scale.

22.   The dispute, therefore, is about whether she is entitled to a
higher pay scale on account of acquiring higher qualification and
on the basis of seniority. This question may involve examination of
Government Resolutions and service rules. However, it does not
amount to reduction in rank. Nor does it amount to supersession in
promotion as contemplated under Section 9 of the Act.




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23.   Section 9 provides a limited right of appeal in specific
situations. It does not confer a general right to approach the
Tribunal for every service related grievance. Since the petitioner’s
case does not fall within the categories of dismissal, removal,
termination, reduction in rank, or supersession in promotion, the
appeal itself was not maintainable before the School Tribunal.

24.   In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Tribunal could not have assumed
jurisdiction under Section 9 in a dispute which essentially concerns
grant of pay scale. The statutory conditions for invoking appellate
jurisdiction were not satisfied on the admitted facts.

25.   The learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied upon two
decisions to support his case. The first is the judgment of this
Court in Kondiba Dagdu Mirashe. The second is the decision of the
Supreme Court in Tukaram Tryambak Chaudhary. According to
him, these judgments lay down that when a teacher acquires
higher qualification while in service, such teacher becomes entitled
to the benefit of a higher pay scale in accordance with Government
policy. It is submitted that in those cases the Courts examined the
effect of Government Resolutions dealing with grant of graduate
pay scale to teachers who improved their qualification after joining
service. The Courts held that if the policy permits grant of higher
scale and the teacher fulfills the prescribed conditions, the benefit
cannot be denied arbitrarily. On that basis, it is argued that the
petitioner, having acquired a B.A. degree during service and being
senior, cannot be deprived of the graduate pay scale.




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26.   However, even if the legal principles laid down in those
judgments are accepted, one important aspect must be kept in
mind. Those decisions deal with entitlement to pay scale under
Government policy. They consider whether a teacher who obtained
higher qualification is eligible for monetary benefit. They do not
enlarge the scope of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the MEPS Act.
The question whether a teacher is substantively entitled to a
particular pay scale is different from the question whether the
School Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide such dispute under
Section 9. Therefore, while the judgments relied upon may be
relevant on the issue of eligibility under policy, they do not
automatically answer the preliminary issue of maintainability. The
present case must first satisfy the statutory requirement under
Section 9 before the merits of entitlement can be examined. That
distinction cannot be overlooked.

27.   For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds that
the grievance raised by the petitioner does not fall within the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon the School Tribunal under
Section 9 of the MEPS Act. The dispute relates to grant of a
particular pay scale and does not involve dismissal, removal,
termination, reduction in rank, or supersession in promotion. The
statutory conditions necessary to invoke the appellate remedy
were not satisfied.

28.   In absence of jurisdictional foundation, the claim cannot be
entertained in these proceedings. The submissions advanced on
merits do not alter this legal position.




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29.   Accordingly, the writ petition is devoid of merit and stands
dismissed.

30.   No order as to costs.


                                           (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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