CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERversusSATISH GYANOBA GAIKWAD

2026:BHC-AUG:9637
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                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                               87 WRIT PETITION NO. 3077 OF 2023

                                     CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                                VERSUS
                                     SATISH GYANOBA GAIKWAD
                                                   ...
               Mr. Satish S. Manale, Advocate for the Petitioner.
               Mr. V. P. Golewar, Advocate for the Respondent.
                                                   ...

                                        CORAM :          SIDDHESHWAR S. THOMBRE, J.
                                        DATE    :        4th MARCH 2026

               P.C.:-

               1.        Heard learned Advocates for the respective parties.

               2.        By the present petition, the Petitioner is aggrieved by the

               order dated 12.08.2022, passed by the learned Industrial Court

               Maharashtra (Latur Bench, Latur) in Complaint (ULP) No.17 of 2014,

               whereby the learned Industrial Court allowed the complaint filed by

               the Respondent-Employee.


               3.        Mr. Satish S. Manale, learned Advocate for the Petitioner

               submits that Respondent herein filed a complaint of Unfair Labour

               Practice by stating that he was appointed as a Watchman on daily

               wages from 06.09.1990 and when he demanded wages, he was not

               allowed to sign the muster role and, therefore, he filed I.D.A. No.13 of

               1998. He also filed a Complaint (ULP) No.39 of 1999 and the said

               complaint was allowed and the order passed by the Labour Court was
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confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in complaint. He contended that

since 1990, he has worked for more than 240 days in the year and is

entitled for permanency/regularisation.


         Pursuant to the notices, the Petitioner filed a written

statement and submitted that Respondent was appointed on a

temporary basis, the post on which the Respondent was appointed is

not a sanctioned post. The appointment is not made after following the

selection procedure under the Zilla Parishad Service Rules and the

appointment was issued by the concern authority without there being

any sanctioned post. He further submits that the Integerated Child

Development Project Scheme (ICDPS) is sponsored by the Central

Government and there are specific instructions that in case, office of

the Chief Development Project Officer (for short “CDPO”) is situated in

a Panchayat Samiti, no appointment of the Watchman is necessitated as

the post of Watchman is not available and approved for the office of

CDPO.


4.       He further submits that the learned Industrial Court without

considering the fact that Respondent was not appointed by the CEO, ZP,

rather he was appointed under the ICDPS scheme, by the CDPO,

therefore, the learned Industrial Court has committed error while

allowing the complaint.
                                  3 of 14        87-WP.3077.2023




5.        Per contra, Mr. V. P. Golewar, learned Advocate for the

Respondent-Employee invited my attention to the appointment order

issued by the Chief Executive Officer dated 07.08.1991, whereby it is

clear that the Petitioner was initially appointed as a Watchman under

the CDPS scheme from 02.08.1991 and 31.08.1991 by the Chief

Executive Officer, Latur and thereafter, he was continued by the Chief

Executive Officer from time to time.


6.        He further submits that the other similarly situated

employees, who were appointed under the scheme by Chief Executive

Officer himself, their services were regularised and, therefore, he

submits that the learned Industrial Court rightly allowed the complaint

and prayed to dismiss the writ petition.


7.        The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pandurang Sitaram

Jadhav and others Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Dairy Manager

and another, reported in [(2020) 17 SCC 393] observed in paragraphs

12, 13 and 14 as under:

          "12. In view of the aforesaid facts as also the legal
          pronouncements made subsequently, we have no doubt that
          these appellants before us would be entitled to the benefit
          of regularisation and mere delay in preferring the claim
          would not come in their way except that the benefit of
          regularisation would arise from the date the complaints
          were filed.

          13. The finding of an unfair labour practice by the Tribunal
          has in fact been confirmed by the learned Single Judge in
          the present case and the only two reasons for interference
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         by the Division Bench relating to Umadevi (3) case have
         already been explained in the aforesaid subsequent
         judgments.

         14. We thus, direct the respondents to regularise the
         appellants accordingly and the necessary orders be issued
         within three months from the date of the order. The benefits
         which the appellants would be entitled to should also be
         remitted to the appellants within the same period from the
         date of the complaints, though the earlier period would be
         counted for the purpose of calculation of benefits without
         the appellants being monetarily entitled for that period."

8.         The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the case of Shripal and
another Vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, reported in (2025 SCC OnLine
SC 221) has observed in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 as under:
         "16. The High Court did acknowledge the Employer's
         inability to justify these abrupt terminations. Consequently,
         it ordered re-engagement on daily wages with some
         measure of parity in minimum pay. Regrettably, this only
         perpetuated precariousness: the Appellant Workmen were
         left in a marginally improved yet still uncertain status.
         While the High Court recognized the importance of their
         work and hinted at eventual regularization, it failed to
         afford them continuity of service or meaningful back wages
         commensurate with the degree of statutory violation
         evident on record.

         17. In light of these considerations, the Employer's
         discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen stands in
         violation of the most basic labour law principles. Once it is
         established that their services were terminated without
         adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial
         Disputes Act, 1947, and that they were engaged in
         essential, perennial duties, these workers cannot be
         relegated to perpetual uncertainty. While concerns of
         municipal budget and compliance with recruitment rules
         merit consideration, such concerns do not absolve the
         Employer of statutory obligations or negate equitable
         entitlements. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump
         the legitimate rights of workmen who have served
         continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended
         period.

         18. The impugned order of the High Court, to the extent
         they confine the Appellant Workmen to future dally-wage
                                  5 of 14        87-WP.3077.2023




         engagement without continuity or meaningful back wages,
         is hereby set aside with the following directions:

         I. The discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen's services,
         effected without compliance with Section 6E and Section
         6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is declared
         illegal. All orders or communications terminating their
         services are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant
         Workmen shall be treated continuing in service from the
         date of their termination, for all purposes, including
         seniority and continuity in service.

          II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the Appellant
          Workmen In their respective posts (or posts akin to the
          duties they previously performed) within four weeks from
          the date of this Judgment. Their entire period of absence
          (from the date of termination until actual reinstatement)
          shall be counted for continuity of service and all
          consequential benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for
          promotions, if any.

          III. Considering the length of service, the Appellant
          Workmen shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages from
          the date of their discontinuation until their actual
          reinstatement. The Respondent Employer shall clear the
          aforesaid dues within three months from the date of their
          reinstatement.

          IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair
          and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant
          Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement,
          duly considering the fact that they have performed
          perennial municipal duties permanent posts. In assessing
          regularization, the Employer shall not impose educational
          or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements
          were never applied to the Appellant Workmen similarly
          situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that
          sanctioned vacancies for such duties exist or are require the
          Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary
          administrative processes to ensure these longtime
          employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages
          contrary to statutory equitable norms".

9.          Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Dharam
Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and Another , reported in (2025 SCC
Online 1735) observed in paragraph 17 to 20, as under:
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"17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that
the State (here referring to both the Union and the State
governments) is not a mere market participant but a
constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the
backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring
public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year
after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its
sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-
term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels
corrodes confidence in public administration and offends
the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency
certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a
talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to
organise work on lawful lines.

18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that "ad-hocism"
thrives where administration is opaque. The State
Departments must establishment registers, muster rolls and
outsourcing keep and produce accurate arrangements, and
they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer
precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the
work is perennial. If "constraint" is invoked, the record
should show what alternatives were considered, why
similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how
the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human is not
consequences of prolonged insecurity sentimentality. It is a
constitutional discipline that should inform every decision
affecting those who keep public offices running.

19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the
appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties,
and the material Indicating vacancies and comparator
regularisations, we issue the following directions:

         i.   Regularization     and     creation   of
         Supernumerary posts: All appellants shall
         stand regularized with effect from
         24.04.2002, the date on which the High
         Court directed a fresh recommendation by
         the Commission and a fresh decision by the
         State on sanctioning posts for the appellants.
         For this purpose, the State and the successor
         establishment (U.P. Education Services
         Selection Commission) shall create the or
         supernumerary posts in corresponding
         cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and
         Class-IV     (Peon/Attendant/Guard         or
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   equivalent)      without      any      caveats
   preconditions. On regularization, each
   appellant shall be placed at not less than the
   minimum of the regular pay-scale for the
   post, with protection of last-drawn wages if
   higher and the appellants shall be entitled to
   the subsequent increments in the pay scale as
   per the pay grade. For seniority and
   promotion, service shall count from the date
   of regularization as given above.

ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each
appellant shall be paid as arrears the full
difference between (a) the pay and admissible
allowances at the minimum of the regular pay-
level for the post from time to time, and (b) the
amounts actually paid, for the period from
24.04.2002        until     the      date      of
regularization/retirement/death, as the case may
be. Amounts already paid under previous interim
directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears
shall be released within three months and if in
default, the unpaid amount shall carry
compound interest at 6% per annum from the
date of default until payment.

iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has
already retired shall be granted regularization
with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of
superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under
clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity
and other terminal dues. The revised pension
and terminal dues shall be paid within three
months of this Judgment.

iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant
No. 5 and any other appellant who has died
during pendency, his/her legal representatives
on record shall be paid the arrears under clause
(ii) up to the date of death, together with all
terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently
with clause (1), within three months of this
Judgment.

v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary,
Higher Education Department, Government of
Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P.
Education Services Selection Commission or the
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               prevalent competent authority, shall file an
               affidavit of compliance before this Court within
               four months of this Judgment.


          20. We have framed these directions comprehensively
          because, case after case, orders of this Court in such
          matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling
          "reconsiderations," and administrative drift which further
          prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured
          for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that
          Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions,
          but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines,
          and verifiable compliance. As a constitutional employer, the
          State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must
          organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing,
          create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement
          judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these
          obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a
          conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and
          dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have
          set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full
          regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn
          affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to
          convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in
          engagement and transparency in administration are not
          matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and
          21 of the Constitution of India".


10.          The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Jaggo vs. Union of
India and Others, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826, has also observed
in paragraphs 9, 20 and 26 as under:


           "9. On the other hand, the following primary arguments
           have been advanced before us on behalf of the
           Respondents:

           (i)…………...

           (ii) Absence of Sanctioned Posts: They assert that the
           appellants were not appointed against any sanctioned
           posts. According to the respondents, without sanctioned
           vacancies, there can be no question of regularization or
           absorption into the permanent workforce.
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(iii)…………...

(iv)…………...

(v)…………...

(vi)…………...

20.…………… The said judgment sought to prevent
backdoor entries and illegal appointments that circumvent
constitutional requirements. However, where appointments
were not illegal but possibly "irregular," and where
employees had served continuously against the backdrop of
sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need
for a fair and humane resolution becomes paramount
Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service
performing tasks inherently required on a regular basis
can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or
temporary into a scenario demanding fair regularization. In
a recent judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar v. Union of
India, (2024) 1 SCR 1230, it was held that held that
procedural formalities cannot be used to deny
regularization of service to an employee whose
appointment was termed "temporary" but has performed
the same duties as performed by the regular employee over
a considerable period in the capacity of the regular
employee. The relevant paras of this judgment have been
reproduced below:

    "6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi
    (supra) by the High Court does not fit squarely
    with the facts at hand, given the specific
    circumstances under which the appellants were
    employed and have continued their service. The
    reliance on procedural formalities at the outset
    cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive
    rights that have accrued over a considerable
    period through continuous service. Their
    promotion was based on a specific notification
    for vacancies and a subsequent circular, followed
    by a selection process involving written tests and
    interviews, which distinguishes their case from
    the appointments through back door entry as
    discussed in the case of Uma Devi (supra).

    7. The judgment in the case Uma Devi (supra)
    also distinguished between "irregular" and
    "illegal"  appointments    underscoring  the
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                importance of considering certain appointments
                even if were not made strictly in accordance with
                the prescribed Rules and Procedure, cannot be
                said to have been made illegally if they had
                followed the procedures of regular appointments
                such as conduct of written examinations or
                interviews as in the present case..."

           26. ……….It categorically held that employees in irregular
           appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts
           and had served continuously for more than ten years,
           should be considered for regularization as a one-time
           measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is
           being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to
           indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in
           cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely
           lack adherence to procedural formalities. Government
           departments often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to
           argue that no vested right to regularization exists for
           temporary employees, overlooking the Judgment's explicit
           acknowledgment of cases where regularization is
           appropriate. This selective application distorts the
           judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing it
           against employees who have rendered indispensable
           services over decades."

11.           The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhola Nath Vs.

State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2026 INSC 99 , has held in

paragraph Nos.13.10 and 14, which read as under:-

      “13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade
      ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s contention that the
      mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement
      denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having
      availed of the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a
      decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having
      consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot,
      in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly
      discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal
      contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary,
      inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model
      employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the
      Constitution.
      FINAL CONCLUSION:
      14.      In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we
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      summarize our conclusions as follows:
      I.   The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the
           appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade
           under the nomenclature of contractual engagement and
           thereafter denying them consideration for regularization.
      II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement
           solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without
           either recording cogent reasons or passing a speaking order,
           is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
           Constitution.
      III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for
           regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees.
           Acceptance of contractual terms does not amount to waiver
           of fundamental rights, and contractual stipulations cannot
           immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny.
      IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual
           labels or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to
           justify prolonged ad-hocism or to discard long-serving
           employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity
           and constitutional governance.
      V.   In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the
           respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all
           the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they
           were initially appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to
           all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of
           this judgment.”

12.           In the above judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court has

considered the issue of regularization and held that if the daily wager

employee has worked for years together and subsequently, not given

benefit of permanency then it amounts to unfair labour practices. The

Respondent/Employee has proved before the learned Industrial Court

that he has completed 240 days of continuous service in one calender

year and therefore, the Industrial Court has rightly granted

permanency in his favour.

13.           Having heard learned Advocates for the respective parties
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and after going through the order passed by the learned Industrial

Court. There is no dispute about the fact that the Chief Executive

Officer appointed Respondent No.1 vide its order dated 07.08.1991.

This Court while considering the Writ Petition No.2946 of 2012,

recorded finding and dismissed the writ petition and the said order was

challenged by the Petitioner by filing Letter Patent’s Appeal No.19 of

2013 and the division bench of this Court, recorded the findings in

paragraph Nos.7 to 12, which read as under:-


    “7.      Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the
    Labour Court, Latur, the appellant herein preferred Revision
    (ULP) No.9/2011 before the Industrial Court at Latur. The said
    revision petition came to be dismissed with reasons vide
    judgment and order of the revisional Court dated 29.11.2011.
    Even before the Industrial Court, Latur, the appellant herein did
    not raise any ground pertaining to the said workman having-
    been, allegedly, illegally appointed, specific procedure for
    recruitment having not been followed, or that the Project on
    which he was engaged as a Watchman has come to an end. The
    record and proceedings from the Court below were called for and
    considered by the revisional Court.

    8.       The appellant raised an issue that the judgment in the
    case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v Umadevi and
    Others [(2006) 4 SCC 11, precludes the Labour Court from
    considering claims of of regularization or permanency against an
    employer falling within the definition "State" under the
    Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of
    Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The revisional Court
    considered the said judgment and, based on the view of the
    Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed in MSRTC Vs. Casteribe Rajya
    P.Karmachari Sanghatana (2009 III) CLR 262, concluded that the
    powers of the Industrial Court and Labour Courts are not
    denuded by the Umadevi's judgment. It is equally noteworthy
    that the claim of the workman was not for regularization or
    permanency, but was challenge his oral termination from
    employment in violation of the provisions of the Industrial
    Disputes Act, 1947.
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9.       The appellant herein preferred Writ Petition
No.2946/2012 before the learned Single Judge of this Court for
challenging the judgment and order dated 20.1.2011 delivered by
the Labour Court, Latur, and the judgment and order of the
Industrial Court, Latur, dated 29.11.2011. Even in the writ
petition, the appellant did not raise an issue as to whether the
workman was illegally appointed, or was engaged without of the
following the due procedure of law, or that the project work had
come to an end. Nevertheless, it had been proved before the
Labour Court, Latur, through the cross examination appellant's
witness, that the said Project is continued through the Zilla
Parishad, and it has not come to an end. The learned Single
Judge vide an order dated 22.11.2012, dismissed the writ
petition after hearing the parties. It is this order passed by the
learned Single Judge that has been assailed in this Letters Patent
Appeal.

10.         We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
To a specific query put to him as to whether the appellant had, at
any point of time, raised an issue as regards the engagement of
the workman in violation of a specific procedure be followed for
appointing Watchman, the learned Counsel, upon going through
the appellant's written statement filed in the Labour Court, Latur,
failed to point out a single sentence of pleading on this issue.

            Another query was put to him as to whether the
appellant had taken a plea that the Project on which the
workman was engaged as a Watchman had come to an end, so as
to attract Section 2(00) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
the learned Counsel, once again, went through the said written
statement, and failed to point out any pleading touching this
issue.

11.         We are conscious of the fact that the Scheme, on which
the workman was engaged as a Watchman was proved to have
been in continuation by the Central Government through the zilla
Parishad. So also, the learned Counsel did not contend before us
that the said Scheme has ended.. In fact, it is not the case of the
Appellant that the Scheme has come to an end. As such, we are
unable invoke Section 2(oo) (bb) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
since the said exception to the definition of retrenchment would
be applicable only if the project work comes to an end and the
services of the workman are no longer required.

12.        It has been one of the grounds in the appeal raised by
the appellant that there was delay in filing the complaint, which
ground was neither pleaded nor proved before the Labour Court
and Industrial Court. We also put specific query to the learned
                                              14 of 14             87-WP.3077.2023




                Counsel for the appellant as to how would he explain the
                minor /artificial breaks of one day or two days created the
                appellant each termination and subsequent appointment of the
                workman. We found that the learned Counsel merely harped on
                the fact of a break in service by a day or two; but, could not
                establish as to whether it was a by in justifiable break. Needless
                to state, we find such breaks to have been introduced by the
                appellant in order to truncate the rights of the said workman and
                prevent him from completing 240 days in the continuous
                employment no of the hesitation in employer. We, therefore, have
                disregarding these artificial breaks created by the appellant. The
                learned Counsel for the appellant failed to point out any
                perversity in the order of the learned Single Judge so as to
                convince us to cause an interference with the said order of the
                learned Single Judge.”
                14.




          15.            I have also gone through the evidence led by both the

          parties and more particularly after going through the appointment

          order, which was issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Latur, I find that

          there is no dispute about the fact that the Petitioner was working on

          daily wages for years together i.e. from 06.09.1990.


          16.            Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court

          in the above cited cases, I am not inclined to entertain the present

          petition. Hence I proceed to pass following order :


                                              ORDER

                (i)    The Writ Petition is dismissed.

                (ii)   No order as to cost.

                                               (SIDDHESHWAR S. THOMBRE, J.)

Tauseef