Bombay High Court
SWARUP DILIP CHOUDHURYversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THR. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY CO. OP. DEPT. AND ORS.
- Disposal
- Rejected
- Bench
- SHAILESH P BRAHME
Holding
The Court held that the petitioners were capable of complying with bye‑law 40(a) and that the Returning Officer was justified in rejecting their nominations.
Summary
The petitioners challenged the rejection of their nominations by the Election Decision Officer on the ground that they could not satisfy bye‑law 40(a) of the cooperative bank, which required maintaining a minimum deposit of Rs 50,000 for a continuous year, because the Reserve Bank of India had imposed a ban on the bank’s transactions. The Court examined whether the ban made compliance impossible and whether the court could read down or dispense with the mandatory bye‑law. It held that the ban was effective only from 7 October 2025, leaving a six‑month window in the preceding financial year during which the deposit could have been made, and therefore compliance was possible. The Court further ruled that the Returning Officer’s power under Rule 25 of the election rules to reject nominations for non‑compliance with a bye‑law is undisputed and cannot be overridden by the court. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed and the order of rejection upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether the RBI‑imposed ban on the bank rendered compliance with bye‑law 40(a) impossible for the petitioners.
- Whether a court may read down or dispense with a mandatory bye‑law of a cooperative society in election matters.
- Whether the Returning Officer had jurisdiction to reject nominations for non‑compliance with the bye‑law.
Legislation cited
- Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 — s. 152A(1)
Subjects
- Co-operative societies
- Election law
- Nomination rejection
- Bye‑law compliance
- Impossibility doctrine
- Reserve Bank of India ban
- Reading down of statutory provisions
- Section 152A
- Rule 25
Judgment
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
904 WRIT PETITION NO. 3138 OF 2026
Rahul Omprakash Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary,
Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents
905 WRIT PETITION NO. 3139 OF 2026
Omprakash Suryabaux Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary,
Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents
906 WRIT PETITION NO. 3140 OF 2026
Divyanshu Rajendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary,
Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents
907 WRIT PETITION NO. 3141 OF 2026
Swarup Dilip Choudhury ...Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Principal
Secretary Co. Op. Dept. And Ors. ...Respondents
908 WRIT PETITION NO. 3142 OF 2026
Manjulata Rajendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary,
Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents
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909 WRIT PETITION NO. 3143 OF 2026
Kirti Rajendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Principal
Secretary Co. Operative Dept. And Ors. ...Respondents
910 WRIT PETITION NO. 3144 OF 2026
Rajendra Bhardwaj Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary,
Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents
911 WRIT PETITION NO. 3145 OF 2026
Jui Lalmohan Sadhuka ...Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Its Secretary,
Cooperation Department And Ors. ...Respondents
912 WRIT PETITION NO. 3146 OF 2026
Malati Amarbahadur Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Principal
Secretary Co. Operation Dept. And Ors. ...Respondents
…..
Adv. Surel S. Shah, Senior Advocate a/w Adv. Vikrrant Shinde, Adv.
Ranjit Shinde and Adv. Bhavika Shinde, for Petitioners.
Adv. Ruturaj P. Pawar, for Respondent No.3.
Adv. Vedantika Naik, for Respondent No.4.
Mr. Sanjay D. Rayrikar, learned AGP in WP/3138/2026,
WP/3146/2026, Mr. Y. D. Patil in WP/3139/2026, WP/3144/2026, Mr.
A. P. Vanarase in WP/3140/2026, Mr. J. P. Patil in WP/3141/2026,
WP/3143/2026, Mr. R. P. Kadam in WP/3142/2026 and Mr. S. P.
Kamble in WP/3145/2026, for the Respondents-State.
…..
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CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J.
DATE : 17th JULY, 2026.
P.C. :
The matter is taken for final disposal with the consent of the
parties.
2. The petitioners have suffered orders of rejection of nomination
passed by respondent No.3 – Election Decision Officer/Scrutiny Officer,
which is a cause to approach before this Court.
3. By elaborate order, the preliminary objection raised by the
respondents for having alternate remedy of appeal under Section
152A(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was
overruled on 14.07.2026. I indicated to examine the matters on merits.
4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Surel
Shah, submitted that out of 45 nominations 44 are rejected by
Returning Officer on identical ground of non-compliance of bye-law
No.40(a). The circumstances are beyond control of the petitioners and
others and the compliance is impossibility. My attention is adverted to
ban imposed by Reserve Bank of India vide communication dated
06.10.2025. Various correspondence inter se amongst respondent No.4
– Bank and the respondent authorities is brought to my notice to show
that no fault can be attributed to the petitioners and others. It is
submitted that even representation was also made to the respondents
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either to dispense with the bye-law to relax the condition. It is further
submitted that no election is possible to be held if the respondents insist
for implementation of the bye-law in question, and the administrator
will be continued, which will be against democratic principles. It is
further submitted that even the respondent No.4 – Bank is also aware of
the difficulty and passed a resolution on 15.06.2026. It is submitted
that in a given situation bye-law No.40(a) be read down as directory or
it be dispensed with. The word ‘and’ occurring in sub-clause ‘a’ shall be
read as ‘or’. It is submitted that petitioners have huge share holdings
and there is no reason for them to not to deposit Rs.50,000/- or
maintain the said balance.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent No.3, Mr. Pawar, learned
counsel for the respondent No.4, Mr. Naik, and learned AGPs repeal the
above submissions. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar, submitted that the
bye-law or any qualifying condition cannot be waived or ignored by the
Returning Officer. It does not fall within purview of his power. It is
vehemently submitted that compliance of bye-law 40(a) was not
impossibility before imposition of ban. It was possible for the petitioners
to maintain the deposits. It is submitted that the petitioners could have
approached the competent authorities or competent forum for relaxing
or dispensing with the condition in question to qualify for nomination.
It is submitted that any interpretation, relaxation, modification or
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reading down of the relevant bye-law would amount to changing the
rules after game has commenced. It is submitted that the petitioners
were negligent and the compliance was possible for them.
6. The relevant provision 40(a)of bye-law is as follows :
“(40) ******
a) For bank category (Deposits in Cr) 100 to 500 Cr.
. He must hold shares of the Bank of aggregate value of
minimum RS.10,000/- (Rs. Ten thousand) and,
. In addition to above, he must be holding aggregate deposits
(in all types of accounts) of not less than Rs.50,000/- (Fifty
Thousand) for continuous period of minimum one year
during the immediately preceding financial year in which the
elections of the banks are to be held and he should also hold
such minimum prescribed deposit as on the date of
publishing the list of voters, in the Bank in his name or in the
name of the firm / company / society / trust, to whom he is
representing as a proprietor / Director / Office bearer /
Trustee.
. The members contesting from the Reserve Seats under
section 73 B and 73 C shall comply with 50% of the criteria
required for the general category.”
7. The petitioners nominations are rejected for non-compliance of
sub-clause (a) for not having maintained balance of Rs.50,000/- as
stipulated therein. The grievance of the petitioners is that due to ban
imposed by Reserve Bank of India, the banking transactions are halted
and it was not possible for the share holders, depositors or customers to
transact with the respondent No.4 Bank.
8. The ban was imposed by Reserve Bank of India vide letter dated
06.10.2025 with effect from 07.10.2025. The elections are scheduled in
financial year 2026-2027. The last financial year was 01.04.2025 to
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31.03.2026. The banking transaction was unaffected and open up to
06.10.2025. There was span of about 6 months for petitioners to
maintain the deposits to the tune of Rs.50,000/- in the last financial
year. It was not a case that the ban imposed by Reserve Bank of India
was covering the period of last financial year. I do not approve the
submission of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners that it was
impossible for the petitioners to comply with the condition of
maintaining deposits of minimum Rs.50,000/-.
9. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Surel Shah, has placed reliance
on common judgment passed by this Court on 25.06.2026 in Writ
petition No.2438 of 2025 in the case of Smt. Anita Vijaykumar sagre &
Ors. Versus The Returning Officer, and District Collector Shri Mahakali
Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.. In that case, there was enmass rejection
of nomination in the election of Multi-state Co-operative Society, a
Sugar Factory for not supplying the sugarcane for preceding three years
to the Society, which was the condition laid down vide bye-law
No.39B(1). The distinguishing feature of facts is that the Sugar Factory
was inoperative for more than five years being defaulter of Sangli
District Co-operative Bank. The defunct condition preceded for five
years and in that context this Court held that it was impossibility for
those petitioners to comply the condition. The facts of the present case
are different. Here period of 01.04.2025 to 06.10.2025 was available to
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satisfy the condition. Not only that but the petitioners could have
maintained the requisite balance by depositing the amounts prior to
01.04.2025. There was no prohibition in doing so. The reliance on the
above judgment would not enure to the benefits of the petitioners.
10. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar, has relied upon the judgment of
Co-ordinate Bench passed on 19.04.2011 in Writ Petition No.2683 of
2011. The issue germane before the High Court was as to whether the
compliance to the bye-law was impossibility or not. It was held that it
was possible for the members to supply sugarcane to that Sugar Factory.
The relevant paragraph No.10 of the said judgment reads as under :
“10. As Karkhana itself could not function, no member could
supply the sugarcane to Karkhana in later two years. However, it
is not in dispute that Karkhana functioned in the year 2007-
2008 and hence, as per the provisions of bye-law 17A(2) r/w
Byelaw No.29GH(1), the respondent no.1 ought to have
supplied his sugarcane at least in first year i.e. 2007-2008 to
Karkhana. Respective respondent no.1 could not supply the
sugarcane accordingly and certificate issued by Karkhana in this
respect is not in dispute. The record shows that in the year
2007-2008, the crushing operation started on 06.01.2008 and
continued till June, 2008. Moreover, the respondent no.1 has
not given any explanation in this respect and has not pointed
out any unavoidable circumstance or then just and sufficient
reason expressing inability to supply sugar cane to factory.”
I also propose to adopt the same view for recording that it was
not impossibility for the petitioners to comply the conditions.
11. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Surel Shah, has placed reliance
on the judgment of Division Bench in the case of Yeshawant Khashaba
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Dubal & Ors. Versus Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Maryadit &
Ors.1 to buttress that, if the compliance of any bye-law is impossibility,
the relevant provisions be read down appropriately. The Division Bench
was considering the validity of bye-law, the compliance of which alleged
to have been impossibility. In that context, the view was taken to read
down the provision. In the present matter, the orders passed by
Returning Officer are under consideration. Neither the Returning Officer
nor this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, can have power to read down any provision of
bye-law. Rather, it was open to the petitioners to approach competent
authority or the Division Bench to bring it to the notice that concerned
bye-law was impossibility and it was required to be relaxed or
dispensed with. This judgment will also not help the petitioners.
12. The petitioners have relied on a correspondence dated
30.06.2026 issued by Reserve Bank of India extending the ban upto
07.10.2026. When the election program was declared, the ban was
operational. The letter dated 15.06.2026 issued by respondent No.4 –
Bank to the Commissioner would indicate the request made to grant
exemption from concerned bye-law. Thereafter, the Deputy Registrar
also addressed a letter dated 03.07.2026 to the respondent No.4 – Bank
opining to go for amendment to the concerned bye-law. On 06.07.2026,
the representation was made by the petitioners to the respondents for
1 1991 C.T.J. 230
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relaxing the conditions. Neither the bye-law was declared to be
dispensed with or relaxed. The petitioners could have approached
competent forum or the Court ventilating grievance of onerous bye-law.
In the absence of such endeavour, the respondent No.3 – Returning
Officer had no alternative than to adhere to the bye-laws.
13. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar has adverted my attention to
judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Writ Petition No.5228 of 2023
passed on 12.04.2023 to show that scope of the Returning Officer is
very restricted. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as follows :
“13. Therefore, it is necessary to see whether the Respondent
No.1, in the first place, had no jurisdiction whatsoever to pass
the impugned order observing that the Petitioner was not
qualified to contest the election. In this context, in my opinion,
Rule 25 of the said Election Rules is extremely important which
is already reproduced hereinabove. Sub-rule (2) of the said
Rule 25 clearly Abtauthorizes the Returning Officer to examine
the nomination for papers, and more importantly, to decide all
objections which may be made to any nomination and after
summary inquiry, if any, he can reject the nomination on any of
the following grounds that the candidate was disqualified for
being chosen to fill the seat by or under the Act, the Rules and
the bye-laws. Thus, whether the candidate has violated any
bye-law and, therefore, has incurred disqualification can be
decided by the Returning Officer. Whether he commits any
error in arriving at his conclusion is a totally separate issue
which can be gone into in the election petition but the very fact
that he has the power to consider this particular ground of
violation of any bye-law and to give a decision on that issue is
clearly provided for under this Rule 25 of the said Election
Rules.”
I find that respondent No.3 is justified in rejecting the
nomination.
14. The election program was published on 16.06.2026. The
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petitioners or the stakeholders could have approached the competent
forum against the bye-law 40(a). Any reading down of the mandatory
provision or dispensation of the qualifying condition would be changing
of the rules after the game has begun. Any endeavour on the part of this
Court to declare that rule in question is directory would offend the
above principles. Useful reference can be made to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Manjusree Versus State of
Andhra Pradesh & Anr2, more specifically to paragraph No.32. The
learned counsel, Mr. Pawar, is right in contending that, if this Court
grants any relaxation or reads down the concerned provision then that
may deprive the aspiring persons who going by bye-law 40(a) did not
file nomination, as they found themselves to be disqualified.
15. For the reasons stated above, I find that no case is made to grant
any relief to the petitioners. Writ petitions are dismissed. Rule is
discharged.
[ SHAILESH P. BRAHME]
2 (2008) 3 SCC 512
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