PRESTIGE PROPERTIES AN ASSOCIATION OF PERSONS COMPRISING OF 1)M.M. MEHTA 2)N.M.GOTHI 3)F. M.MEHTAversusTHE DEPUTY DISTRICT REGISTRAR OF COOPERTIVE SOCIETES

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                      AGK
                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3457 OF 2026
                                                  AND
                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3365 OF 2026
                                                  AND
                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3367 OF 2026
                                                  AND
                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3387 OF 2026
                                                  AND
                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3441 OF 2026
                                                  AND
                                      WRIT PETITION NO.3442 OF 2026


ATUL                  Prestige Properties, An association of
GANESH
KULKARNI              persons comprising of
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.03.24
                      (1) Mukesh Makandas Mehta
13:26:16 +0530
                      (2) Nancy Mehta Gothi
                      (3) Forum Mukesh Mehta
                      having address at Silver Utopia,
                      Ground Floor, Cardinal Gracious
                      Road, Chakala, Andheri (East),
                      Mumbai 400 099                                 … Petitioner

                                            Vs.

                        1. The District Deputy Registrar of
                           Cooperative Societies – 3,
                           MHADA Room No.69, Gruha Nirman
                           Bhavan, Ground Floor, Kala Nagar,
                           Bandra (West), Mumbai 400 051
                        2. The District Registrar of Cooperative
                           Societies, K/East Ward,
                           being the authority under the
                           Maharashtra Cooperative Societies



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     Act, 1960, K/East Ward Office,
     2nd Floor, Brihanmumbai Municipal
     Corporation Building, Azad Road,
     Gundavali Gaothan, Andheri (East),
     Mumbai 400 069.
 3. Silver Utopia Premises Cooperative
    Society Limited, A cooperative
    society formed under the provisions
    of the Maharashtra Cooperative
    Societies Act, 1960 having registration
    No.MUM/WKE/HSG/O/16436/
    2023-24/2024, Silver Utopia,
    Cardinal Gracious Road, Chakala,
    Andheri (East), Mumbai – 400 099
 4. The Special Recovery and Sales
    Officer, attached to the Mumbai
    District Cooperative Housing Federation
    Limited, 19 Bell Building, Sir P.M. Road,
    Opp. Laxmi Building, Fort,
    Mumbai – 400 001         ALSO AT
    Kannamwar Nagar 2, Near Building
    No.77, Old Police Station, Opposite
    ICICI Bank, Vikhroli (East),
    Mumbai – 400 083
 5. The State of Maharashtra,
    through Ministry of Cooperation &
    Textile, represented through the
    Government Pleader, High Court,
    Appellate Side, Mumbai.                       … Respondents


Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate i/by Mr. Pranav
Desai, Mr. Sahil Ansari, and Mr. Kailash N. Baug for the
petitioner.
Ms. S.S. Jadhav, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, & 5-
State in WP/3365/2026



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Mr. S.L. Babar, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, & 5-
State in WP/3367/2026.
Smt. Mamta Shrivastava, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2,
4, & 5-State in WP/3387/2026.
Mr. A.A. Alaspurkar, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, &
5-State in WP/3441/2026.
Smt. S.D. Chipade, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, &
5-State in WP/3442/2026.
Smt. A.A. Purav, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, & 5-
State in WP/3457/2026.
Mr. Ashish Kamat, Senior Advocate with Mr. Jai
Chhabria, Mr. Veer Ahsar, Mr. Sudarshan Satalkar, and
Ms. Palomi Vatsyayan i/by Federal & Co., for
respondent No.3.


                  CORAM                   : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                  RESERVED ON             : MARCH 18, 2026.

                  PRONOUNCED ON           : MARCH 24, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.   Since all these writ petitions involve common questions of
law as well as fact, they are being disposed of by this common
judgment. For the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, the
facts necessary for adjudication are being referred to from Writ
Petition No. 3457 of 2026, which is treated as the lead matter.

2.   By these writ petitions, the petitioner has called in question
the legality and validity of the order dated 31 December 2024
passed by respondent No. 2 and the order dated 23 February 2026
passed by respondent No. 1. The petitioner has also impugned
notices issued by respondent No. 4, namely, notices before
attachment dated 15 April 2025 and 21 January 2026.


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3.    The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present writ
petitions, as set out by the petitioner, are as follows. The petitioner
is the owner of six commercial units situated in the building
known as “Silver Utopia” at Chakala, Andheri (East), Mumbai. The
petitioner developed the said building, obtained a part Occupancy
Certificate in the year 2012, and continued to maintain the
premises until the purchasers formed a co-operative society known
as Silver Utopia Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. Disputes arose
between the two members of the petitioner AOP from the year
2014, which culminated in Commercial Suit No. 193 of 2018
before this Court. In the said proceedings, an interim consent order
dated 24 February 2020 came to be passed, whereby the petitioner
was directed to pay maintenance charges in respect of its six units
to “Prominent Facility and Management Services” through Escrow
Account No. 701277612, at the rate of Rs. 8,62,000/- per month
plus GST. The petitioner asserts that the said payments were duly
made and that the amounts so paid included proportionate charges
towards common areas. It is further the case of the petitioner that
Mr. Kamlesh Shah, a former member of the AOP, failed to disclose
to the Court the existence of the said co-operative society, and
consequently,    the   petitioner       continued     to    discharge        its
maintenance obligations through the aforesaid arrangement. The
consent order also required Mr. Shah to formalize an agreement
with the maintenance agency and to furnish complete disclosure of
tax invoices and accounts. According to the petitioner, such
disclosures were never made.




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4.    The petitioner thereafter instituted contempt proceedings in
the said suit seeking disclosure of information regarding the
society and the maintenance of the building from Mr. Kamlesh
Shah. It is the petitioner’s case that Mr. Shah remained silent on
the existence of the society, which led the petitioner to bona fide
believe that it continued to be responsible for managing the affairs
of the building. In compliance with the orders of this Court, the
petitioner continued to make regular payments to the said
maintenance agency in respect of all six units up to March 2022. It
is further stated that even at the stage of filing final consent terms
in March 2022, the petitioner’s present members were unaware of
the existence of the society and had independently undertaken
maintenance of the common areas appurtenant to their premises.

5.    Respondent No. 3 initiated recovery proceedings against the
petitioner alleging outstanding maintenance dues in respect of
common areas pertaining to the petitioner’s units for the period
from January 2020 to June 2023. It is stated that similar recovery
proceedings were instituted by the said society in respect of the
remaining five units owned by the petitioner. The petitioner filed a
common reply opposing all such recovery applications. It is further
the petitioner’s case that Mr. Kamlesh Shah retired from the AOP
in September 2021 after agreeing to settle outstanding dues with
the maintenance agency, and thereafter the commercial suit came
to be withdrawn. Subsequent to such withdrawal, the petitioner
discontinued the services of the earlier maintenance agency and,
from April 2022, engaged Delta Force Security Services LLP for
providing maintenance, security, and housekeeping services. The



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petitioner asserts that despite its efforts, respondent No. 2 failed to
adjudicate upon its application seeking disclosure of relevant
documents.

6.    The petitioner has assailed the order dated 31 December
2024 on the ground that it is unreasoned and appears to have
been passed in undue haste without proper consideration of the
material on record. It is further stated that a writ petition
challenging the said order came to be dismissed by this Court by
judgment dated 05 December 2025 solely on the ground of
maintainability, while granting liberty to the petitioner to approach
respondent No. 1 and keeping all contentions open for
consideration before the said authority.

7.    Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Godbole, appearing on behalf of
the petitioner, submitted that the present writ petitions are being
pursued without prejudice to the petitioner’s rights in the Special
Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court challenging the
judgment dated 05 December 2025, particularly in relation to the
issue of classification of the petitioner vis-à-vis the respondent
society.

8.    Inviting attention to the reply filed by the petitioner in the
proceedings under Section 154B-29 of the Maharashtra Co-
operative Societies Act, it was submitted that despite a specific
request for inspection and supply of the contract entered into
between the respondent society and its maintenance agency, no
such document was furnished, nor did the authority pass any order
directing its production. It was further submitted that the




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petitioner had, in compliance with the consent order dated 24
February 2020, paid substantial amounts towards maintenance to
the said agency, and that the total payments so made exceed the
dues now claimed by the respondent society. It was also contended
that the respondent society has failed to produce any material to
demonstrate that it had made corresponding payments to the
maintenance agency to whom the petitioner had already remitted
amounts.

9.    Mr. Godbole further submitted that the maintenance charges
sought to be recovered by respondent No. 3 are calculated on a per
square foot basis, which is contrary to the binding guidelines
issued by the State Government under Section 79A of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It was urged that
this renders the impugned order manifestly erroneous and
contrary to settled legal position prevailing since the year 2000. It
was contended that the petitioner had raised several substantive
defences before the authority, including issues relating to the
quantum of levy, absence of proper accounts, proof of substantial
payments already made, illegality of the charges, violation of
statutory provisions, inapplicability of certain funds, non-supply of
bills and accounts, dispute regarding the existence of the society,
and instances of alleged double billing. According to the petitioner,
these were not merely formal objections but went to the root of
the claim and required a detailed and reasoned adjudication. It is
submitted that respondent No. 2 failed to consider these material
contentions and ignored vital aspects affecting the petitioner’s
liability, thereby vitiating the decision-making process and



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rendering the impugned order unsustainable in law.

10.   Mr. Godbole, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner, submitted that from April 2022 onwards, the petitioner
has itself undertaken maintenance of its respective units along
with proportionate common areas of the building. On this basis, it
is contended that the petitioner is entitled to claim appropriate
deductions towards the amounts already paid to Delta Force
Security Services LLP (DFMS). It was further submitted that
respondent No. 1 ought to have interfered with the non-speaking
order passed by respondent No. 2 and ought to have remanded the
matter for fresh consideration, particularly after directing
adjudication of the petitioner’s application for inspection of
documents. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 1 failed to
address this fundamental breach of principles of natural justice
and proceeded to affirm the defective order, thereby causing
serious prejudice.

11.   In support of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Godbole placed
reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4089
of 2025 decided on 5 December 2025 in the case of George Alex
Fernandes and Another vs. Chairman/Secretary, Alankar Tower
Cooperative Housing Society and Others, as well as the judgment
in Writ Petition No. 14996 of 2024 and connected matters decided
on 19 September 2025 in the case of Saraf Kaskar Industrial
Premises Cooperative Society Limited vs. District Deputy Registrar,
Cooperative Societies and Another. Reliance was also placed on the
decision of this Court in Venus Cooperative Housing Society and
Another vs. Dr. J.Y. Detwani and Others, reported in 2022 SCC



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OnLine Bom 1457.

12.   Per contra, Mr. Kamat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent No. 3, opposed the petitions and submitted
that the petitioner itself was instrumental in the formation of the
respondent society through various proceedings initiated before
the authorities under the Act as well as before this Court. It was
further submitted that the present writ petition represents the fifth
round of litigation between the parties arising out of disputes
concerning the petitioner, thereby indicating a continuing pattern
of litigation on substantially similar issues.

13.   Inviting attention to page 104 of the writ petition, Mr. Kamat
referred to the no-dues certificate issued by Prominent Facility
Management Services in favour of the petitioner and submitted
that the said document does not disclose the particulars of
payments allegedly made by the petitioner to the maintenance
agency. It was further submitted that the petitioner owns multiple
premises within the society and that any payment made by the
petitioner to the maintenance agency constitutes an independent
transaction between the petitioner and such agency. According to
respondent No. 3, in the absence of any direction issued by the
society requiring the petitioner to make payments directly to the
maintenance agency, the petitioner cannot claim adjustment or set-
off of such amounts against the maintenance dues lawfully claimed
by the society. It was contended that if the petitioner has any
grievance regarding such payments, the appropriate remedy lies in
pursuing independent proceedings against the maintenance
agency.



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14.   Mr. Kamat further invited attention to the definition of
“dues” under Section 154B-1(12) of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960, and submitted that the authority exercising
powers under Section 154B-29 is competent to determine and
recover dues of the society, including charges towards repairs,
maintenance, and other heads as contemplated under the statute.
It was submitted that while the provision contemplates submission
of a statement of accounts and relevant documents, in the absence
of specific rules framed under the Act, the authority is required to
adjudicate upon the basis of documents produced by the society. It
was further contended that the scope of such proceedings does not
extend to examining whether the society has actually disbursed
amounts to third parties or agencies to whom payments are
claimed to have been made. According to the respondent,
permitting such an inquiry would open the floodgates for members
to dispute every payment made by the society to its employees or
contractors, thereby imposing an unworkable burden on the
society to establish each such transaction before recovery can be
effected. Such an approach, it was urged, is neither contemplated
by the statute nor permissible in law.

15.   It was further submitted by Mr. Kamat that the contention
regarding alleged non-compliance with Section 79A of the Act
raises a mixed question of law and fact and cannot be permitted to
be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction. It was argued that
the petitioner has failed to place any material on record to
establish that the amounts allegedly paid by it to the maintenance
agency were in fact towards maintenance of the society premises.



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It was further submitted that all other members of the society have
paid maintenance charges at the rate of Rs. 8 per square foot and
that even during the period when the petitioner was managing the
affairs of the society in its capacity as developer, it had itself levied
maintenance at the same rate. It was also contended that there is
no specific plea before the authority that the petitioner had failed
to pay maintenance charges to the agency. On these grounds, it
was urged that the writ petitions are devoid of merit and deserve
to be dismissed.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

16.   I have heard the learned Senior Advocates for the parties at
length and I have perused the material placed on record. The
petitioner says that it has already paid substantial amounts to
Delta Force Security Services LLP towards maintenance and related
services, and therefore the society cannot again recover the same
amount from it. The society says that the petitioner cannot claim
such deduction in these proceedings, because the liability claimed
by the society is its own independent claim under the Act and any
amount paid by the petitioner to a third party is a separate matter
between the petitioner and that agency. After considering the rival
submissions, I find no reason to interfere with the orders under
challenge.

17.   The first and main difficulty for the petitioner is that the
proceedings before the authority were strictly confined to recovery
of dues under the statutory scheme. The authority was required to
examine whether the society had a valid claim for its maintenance




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dues based on the documents and material placed before it. It was
not expected to travel beyond that limited scope. It was also not
sitting as a civil court to decide all possible disputes between the
petitioner and third parties. The authority had a narrow role and it
had to decide only whether the society was entitled to recover the
amounts claimed by it under law.

18.    When the petitioner argues that it has already made
payments to Delta Force Security Services LLP and therefore such
payments should be adjusted, the argument at first may appear
reasonable. But on closer examination, it lacks the required legal
support. For claiming a set off or adjustment, the petitioner must
show clearly that such payments were made in discharge of the
very same liability which the society is now claiming. There has to
be a direct and established connection. It is not enough to merely
say that some payments were made for maintenance in general.
The law requires a clear basis showing that the payment was made
on behalf of the society or under its authority so that it can reduce
the liability.

19.    In the present case, that necessary link is missing. There is
no material to show that the society had directed the petitioner to
make payments directly to the said maintenance agency in place of
payment to the society. In absence of such direction or
arrangement, the payments made by the petitioner remain, in
effect, independent transactions between the petitioner and the
agency. Because of this, those payments cannot be automatically
treated as satisfaction of the society’s dues. It must also be
understood that the claim of the society and the alleged payments



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to the agency operate in two different fields. The society’s claim
arises under the statutory scheme governing maintenance and
common expenses. On the other hand, the petitioner’s payments to
the agency arise out of its own arrangement or understanding with
that agency. These two cannot be mixed up unless there is strong
material   connecting    them.   Therefore,    merely     because       the
petitioner has made certain payments to a maintenance agency, it
does not follow, as a matter of law, that its liability towards the
society stands reduced or extinguished. The petitioner was
required to establish this position with clarity and supporting
material. Since that has not been done, the contention of
adjustment or set off cannot be accepted.

20.   The petitioner has attempted to place considerable reliance
on the consent order dated 24 February 2020 and also on the
subsequent conduct of the parties after passing of that order. A
consent order must be read for what it actually directs and not for
what is later assumed from it. The petitioner cannot stretch the
effect of that order beyond its clear terms. It is true that the record
indicates that the petitioner had made certain payments, first to
the earlier maintenance agency and thereafter to Delta Force
Security Services LLP.    But the real and important question is
slightly different and more specific. The question is whether those
very payments can be said to have been made towards discharge of
the exact dues which respondent No. 3 is now claiming in the
present statutory proceedings. Unless that connection is clearly
shown, the payments remain only general payments for some
services and not necessarily payments which legally satisfy the



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society’s demand. On this crucial aspect, the petitioner has not
placed material of sufficient strength and clarity. The authority
could not have simply accepted the petitioner’s statement and
granted full adjustment. There must be proper proof showing that
the payments correspond in amount, in period, and in purpose
with the dues now demanded by the society. In absence of such
matching details, it becomes difficult to conclude that the liability
stands reduced or wiped out.

21.   The petitioner has relied upon a no dues certificate issued by
the earlier maintenance agency. However, this document, when
seen carefully, does not answer the real issues. It does not clearly
state what exact payments were made, for which specific period
those payments relate, which particular units or common areas
they covered, and most importantly, whether those payments were
made in place of payment to the society. It also does not establish
any legal link showing that the society had accepted or recognised
those payments as discharge of its own dues. A certificate which is
general in nature and lacking these necessary particulars cannot be
treated as proof in favour of the petitioner. The authority was
justified in not placing decisive reliance on such a document.
Therefore, the petitioner’s case, even when supported by the
consent order and the certificate, remains incomplete and
insufficient to claim a full set off against the dues claimed by the
society.

22.   Much emphasis was placed by the petitioner on the
allegation that certain documents were not supplied and that its
application for inspection was not properly decided. It is true that



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in legal proceedings, supply of relevant documents is important
and forms part of fair procedure. If a party is denied access to
material which is necessary for defending its case, then it may
affect the fairness of the decision. However, this rule is not to be
applied in a mechanical way in every case. The Court must also see
whether the documents said to be withheld were actually
necessary for deciding the main issue and whether their absence
has caused real and serious prejudice to the party complaining.

23.   In the present case, when the grievance of the petitioner is
examined in that light, it does not appear to go to the root of the
matter. The proceedings before the authority were limited in
scope. The authority was required to decide whether the society
had a valid and recoverable claim for maintenance dues. For this
purpose, the main consideration was the claim made by the society
and the response of the petitioner to that claim. The case was not
of such nature where every internal document or contract had to
be examined in detail before any conclusion could be reached. It is
also important to note that the petitioner was not left without an
opportunity to defend itself. The record shows that the petitioner
had filed its replies. It had raised several objections. These
included contentions regarding alleged payments already made,
claims of double billing, dispute about existence or functioning of
the society, challenge to the method of calculation, and also a plea
regarding violation of Section 79A. All these aspects were brought
to the notice of the authority. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
petitioner was prevented from putting forward its case or that it
was taken by surprise. The petitioner was heard and its



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contentions were available on record for consideration. Merely
because certain documents were not supplied, without showing
how those documents would have changed the outcome in a
material way, the entire decision cannot be set aside. In these
circumstances, the complaint regarding non supply of documents
and inspection does not require this Court to interfere. It is not a
case where the petitioner was completely unheard or excluded
from the process. The basic requirement of opportunity was
satisfied, and therefore the orders cannot be invalidated on this
ground alone.

24.   The contention raised by the petitioner on the basis of
Section 79A also does not carry the matter in its favour in these
writ petitions. The society has clearly stated that the maintenance
charges were being recovered uniformly from all members at the
rate of Rs. 8 per square foot. According to the society, this was the
consistent practice followed in the building. The petitioner,
however, has argued that such recovery is contrary to the
Government guidelines issued under Section 79A. At a general
level, such an argument may appear arguable, but it cannot be
accepted in absence of proper supporting material. This issue
requires comparison of how the charges were levied, what was the
basis adopted by the society, whether the guidelines were
applicable in the given situation, and whether there was any
deviation in actual implementation. All these aspects need
evidence and proper factual foundation. The petitioner has not
placed sufficient material before the authority to clearly
demonstrate that the entire demand raised by the society is illegal



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only because of violation of Section 79A.

25.   There is one more difficulty in accepting this argument at
this stage. The plea based on Section 79A involves both factual and
legal elements together. It is not a pure question of law. Therefore,
it cannot be effectively examined in writ jurisdiction without
adequate record. A general assertion that the charges are contrary
to Government guidelines is not enough. The petitioner must show
with clarity, through documents and details, how the calculation is
wrong and how it directly violates the applicable directions.

26.   Further, even while raising this contention, the petitioner has
not been able to establish a clear link between the amounts
allegedly paid by it to Delta Force Security Services LLP and the
liability now claimed by the society. There is no proper material to
show that those payments were made towards the same charges
and for the same period which are presently under dispute. In
absence of such specific proof, the argument remains incomplete.
For all these reasons, the plea under Section 79A cannot be
accepted as a ground to reject the society’s claim in these
proceedings. It remains a broad contention without necessary
factual backing. Therefore, it does not assist the petitioner in
obtaining relief in the present writ petitions.

27.   The submission advanced on behalf of respondent No. 3 on
this aspect appears to be correct and deserves acceptance. If the
scheme of Section 154B-29 is properly understood, it becomes
clear that the proceedings are meant for recovery of dues of the
society in a summary manner based on the material produced. If,




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in every such proceeding, each member is allowed to question the
society’s claim by insisting that the society must first prove, in
detail, that it has paid each worker, contractor, or maintenance
agency, then the entire purpose of the provision will get defeated.
The proceeding will become long, complicated, and practically
unworkable. It will lose its limited and focused nature. The statute
does not require such an exercise to be undertaken. What the
authority is expected to see whether the society has placed on
record its statement of dues and the basic supporting material to
justify its claim. Once that is done, the authority can proceed to
determine the liability. It is not required to go into every internal
transaction of the society or to verify each payment made by the
society to third parties. That kind of detailed inquiry belongs to a
different type of proceeding.

28.   I also find substance in the submission that the petitioner
cannot, in these writ petitions, claim a broad adjustment of
amounts allegedly paid to Delta Force Security Services LLP and at
the same time expect this Court to examine in detail the
correctness, nature, and accounting of those payments. The
petitioner itself states that it has made such payments. If those
payments were made under a separate understanding with the
agency, or if there is any dispute as to whether the agency has
properly utilised or accounted for those amounts, that gives rise to
a separate cause of action. The proper remedy for the petitioner in
such a situation is to proceed against the said agency in
accordance with law. This Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction,
is not expected to conduct a detailed examination of such



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independent disputes. The petitioner may have a valid claim to
recover some amount from Delta Force Security Services LLP, but
that claim stands on its own footing. It cannot be mixed up with
the present proceedings so as to defeat or reduce the society’s
claim, unless there is a clear and established legal connection.
Treating both disputes as one would not be correct in law.

29.   The petitioner has not been able to show that the authorities
acted beyond their jurisdiction. It has not been demonstrated that
the claim of the society is barred under any provision of law. It has
also not been established that the payments allegedly made to
DFMS were required, as a matter of legal right, to be deducted
from the dues claimed by the society in these proceedings. Further,
no such serious procedural irregularity or denial of fair
opportunity is shown which would compel interference under
Article 226.

30.   The judgments relied upon by the petitioner also do not
assist its case in the present factual situation. The general
principles laid down in those judgments are well accepted. It is
correct that orders should be reasoned and that parties must be
given an opportunity of hearing. However, these principles are
always applied in the context of the facts of each case. In the
present matter, the petitioner was given opportunity to place its
case. It filed replies and raised all its contentions. The authority
considered the matter within the scope of the proceedings. Merely
because the authority did not accept the petitioner’s submissions, it
cannot be said that there is violation of those principles. Similarly,
the judgments cited cannot be read to mean that in every dispute



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relating to maintenance charges, the authority must decide all
independent claims between a member and third party service
providers. That would stretch the principle beyond its proper
limits. Such an interpretation is not supported either by the
statutory scheme or by the judgments relied upon.

31.   In the result, the following order is passed:

      (i)    All the writ petitions stand dismissed;

      (ii)   The orders dated 31 December 2024 passed by
      respondent No. 2 and 23 February 2026 passed by
      respondent No. 1 are upheld;

      (iii) The notices issued by respondent No. 4, including the
      notices before attachment dated 15 April 2025 and 21
      January 2026, are sustained;

      (iv) It is clarified that if the petitioner claims to have paid
      any amounts to Delta Force Security Services LLP towards
      maintenance or related services, it shall be open to the
      petitioner to initiate appropriate proceedings against the said
      agency for recovery of such amounts, in accordance with
      law;

      (v)    It is further clarified that any such proceedings, if
      initiated, shall be decided on their own merits and in
      accordance with law, without being influenced by any
      observations made in the present judgment;

      (vi) There shall be no order as to costs.

                                                  (AMIT BORKAR, J.)



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32.   At this stage, learned Advocate for the petitioner seeks stay
of the judgment and order. However, for the reasons recorded in
this judgment, the prayer for stay of judgment stands rejected.



                                            (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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