KAMAL GAJENDRA JAISWALversusGODAVARI GANGARAM PAMNANI AND ORS

                                                                       20-WP3699-2026.DOC

                                                                                  Santosh

                            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                     WRIT PETITION NO. 3699 OF 2026

                      Kamal Gajendra Jaiswal                                ...Petitioner
                                      Versus
                      Godavari Gangaram Pamnani and ors.                 …Respondents

                      Mr. A. R. Gole, a/w Vishwali Botle, for the Petitioner.
SANTOSH
SUBHASH               Mr. J. S. Kini, a/w Aum Kini, i/b Suresh Dubey, for
KULKARNI                    Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH SUBHASH       Mr. S. G. Mahamuni, for Respondent Nos.3 and 4.
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.04.07
14:59:06 +0530

                                                         CORAM:     N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                                                         DATED:     2nd APRIL, 2026

                      Order:-

                      1.   Heard Mr. Gole, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and

                      Mr. Kini, the learned Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2.


                      2.   By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of

                      India the petitioner – claimant in the arbitral proceeding before

                      the sole Arbitrator assails an order dated 13 th February, 2026

                      passed by the learned District Judge, Thane, thereby extending

                      the mandate of the Arbitrator by a period of six months under

                      Section 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.


                      3.   Mr. Gole, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted

                      that the petitioner is not averse to the extension of the mandate

                      of the Arbitrator. However, in the peculiar facts of the case, the
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learned District Judge ought to have exercised the power under

Section 29-A(b) of the Act, 1996 so as to substitute the

Arbitrator as the petitioner has serious apprehension that the

arbitral proceeding would not be decided in a fair and just

manner.


4.   Amplifying the submission, Mr. Gole would urge that, on

4th October, 2024, the learned Arbitrator had allowed an

unknown lady to attend the arbitral proceeding inspect the

original record and even discuss the matter pertaining to the

arbitration in the presence of the learned Advocate for the

claimant. On 4th October, 2024, itself, the claimant had Bled an

application seeking a direction to the respondents to reveal the

identity of that lady and also the purpose for which the said

lady attended the arbitral proceedings.    That application was

not decided. Subsequently, the said lady was examined as a

witness for the opponent. Therefore, when the claimant has a

genuine apprehension about the conduct of the Arbitrator and

the fairness of the arbitral proceedings, the learned District

Judge ought to have substituted the Arbitrator.


5.   In opposition to this, Mr. Kini, the learned Counsel for the

respondents, submitted that the petitioner has approached the

Court with unclean hands. The learned Arbitrator had already

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passed an order on the application dated 4th October, 2025 Bled

by the claimant and, yet, the petitioner has approached the

Court with a case that no order was passed on the said

application.   Taking the Court through the progress of the

arbitral proceedings thereafter, Mr. Kini submitted that when

the arbitral proceeding was kept for Bnal arguments after all the

parties Bled written submissions, the claimant Bled a pursis

that the mandate of the learned Arbitrator had expired and that

necessitated the Bling of the application for extension of the

mandate of the Arbitrator under Section 29-A.


6.   From the perusal of the record, it becomes evident that,

the alleged loss of conBdence stems from the incident that had

allegedly occurred on 4th October, 2024.        The subsequent

conduct of the claimant indicates that the claimant did not take

any precipitative action to agitate the issue of fairness of the

procedure and the conduct of the learned Arbitrator but

participated in the further proceedings without any demur.

Witnesses were examined. Written submissions were Bled on

behalf of the parties.   When the matter was posted for Bnal

arguments on 5th July, 2025, well past nine months of the

alleged incident dated 4th October, 2024, the claimant Bled the




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pursis stating that the mandate of the learned Arbitrator had

expired.


7.      In the aforesaid backdrop, the view taken by the learned

District Judge that the objection to the continuation of the

mandate of the learned Arbitrator on the ground of perceived

bias was unsustainable, cannot be faulted at.           Secondly, the

identity of that lady did not remain shrouded in mystery for

long.      Incontestibly, the said lady was examined as the

witnesses for the opponents.           Even at the time of the

examination of the said lady, no objection seems to have been

raised on behalf fo the petitioner on the ground that she had

attended the proceeding at an earlier point in time. Thirdly, it is

only when the issue of extension of the mandate of the

Arbitrator arose, the petitioner made grievances touching upon

the conBdentiality and fairness of the arbitral process. Lastly,

when the learned Arbitrator had concluded the trial in the

arbitral proceeding and the matter was at the stage of hearing of

the Bnal arguments and the consequent award, the prayer for

substituting    the   learned   Arbitrator   on   the   basis   of   an

unfounded apprehension does not merit acceptance.


8.      In any event, at the stage of extending the mandate under

Section 29-A of the Act, 1996, grievance regarding the bias

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cannot be entertained. The object of the provisions contained in

Section 29-A of the Act, 1996 is to ensure the timely completion

of arbitral proceeding while allowing courts the Fexibility

to grant extension when warranted. In the case of Rohan

Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Berger Paints India Limited 1, the

Supreme Court has expounded that the power under section

29-A(5) of the Act, 1996 to extend the time has to be exercised

only in cases where there is sufBcient cause for such extension.

Such extension is not granted mechanically on Bling of the

application.   The Court while adjudicating such extension

application will be guided by the principle of sufBcient cause.


9.   In an application for extension of mandate of the

Arbitrator under Section 29-A of the Act, 1996, there is no

occasion for the court to delve into the question of the conduct

of the Arbitrator, unless it touches upon the cause for the delay

in the conclusion of the arbitral proceeding. In the case of Anay

Kumar Gupta V/s. Jagmeet Singh Bhatia2, a learned Single

Judge of the Delhi High Court has enunciated that, the law is

also well settled that the Court while considering an application

under Section 29-A of the Act, is only concerned with the issue

as to whether the Arbitrator has acted with expedition in the

1    (2025) 10 SCC 802
2    2023 SCC Online Del 3939
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matter; issues relating to the conduct of the Arbitration and/or

arbitral fees are not relevant for the purpose of Section 29-A. A

similar view was expressed in the case of Wadia Techno-

Engineering Services Ltd. V/s. Director General of Married

Accommodation Project and Anr.3


10.   Faced with the aforesaid position, Mr. Gole submitted that,

liberty may be granted to the Petitioner to work out her remedies

under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, 1996.


11.   SufBce to observe that, the Petitioner may avail the

remedies as available in law and for that purpose, this Court’s

liberty is not warrant.


12.   With the aforesaid clariBcation, the Writ Petition stands

dismissed.


                                         [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




3     2023 SCC Online Del 2990
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