MAKI HOMI CHIBBER NEE MAKI MODIversusSTATE OF MAHARSHTRA THR ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY AND ORS

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                      AGK
                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     WRIT PETITION NO.4026 OF 2026

                      Maki Homi Chibber nee Maki Modi,
                      Adult, Indian Inhabitant, aged 58 years,
                      residing at 25, Shahid Bhagat Singh Road,
                      Mumbai – 400 039                              … Petitioner

                                            Vs.

ATUL                   1. State of Maharashtra,
GANESH
KULKARNI                  through it’s Principal Secretary,
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
                          Housing Department, Mantralaya,
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.04.28
11:57:06 +0530
                          Mumbai – 400 032
                       2. District Deputy Registrar, Cooperative
                          Societies, Thane, Competent Authority
                          appointed under the MOFA, 1963,
                          having it’s office at First Floor,
                          Gaondevi Vegetable Market Bldg.,
                          Gokhale Road, Thane (West) 400 602
                       3. Model Colony Cooperative Housing
                          Society Limited, claiming to be a
                          Coop. Housing Society registered
                          under the Maharashtra Coop. Societies
                          Act, 1960, claiming to have its address
                          at Survey No.231, Ward No.77,
                          Model Colony, Shastri Nagar, Village
                          Majiwade, Pokharan Road No.1,
                          Thane (West) – 400 606
                       4. Mina Randhya Dunde
                       5. Pandurang Randhya Dunde
                       6. Bhangubai Randhya Dunde
                       7. Chima Randhya Dunde


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 8. Gulab Vishwas Thakur
 9. Bhaskar Soma Konde
 10. Janu Soma Konde
 11. Raju Soma Konde
 12. Anandibai Raghunath Vartha
 13. Ashok Raghunath Vartha
 14. Santosh Raghunath Vartha
 15. Kamal Raju Kode,
     respondent Nos.4 to 15, All Adults
     Indian Inhabitants, r/at Kode Chawl,
     Shastri Nagar, Pokhran Road No.1,
     Post J.K. Gram, Thane (West) 400 606
 16. Shreeram Construction Company,
     through Amrutlal Lalji Patel and
     Mukesh Amrutlal Patel, shown to
     have their office at 304, Doshiwadi,
     Agra Road, Ghatkopar, Mumbai 400 086
 17. Ramaadhar Munai Mourya,
     Adult, Indian Inhabitant, shown to have
     his address at Survey No.231,
     Ward No.77, Shastinagar, Pokhran Road
     No.1, Thane (West) – 400 606              … Respondents


Mr. Pradip Thorat, with Mr. Kapil N. Gor, Mr. Tatsat
Gor, Mr. Satchit Gor, Mr. Amit Chavan and Mr. Aaryan
Gaur i/by Mr. Kapil N. Gor for the petitioner.
Mrs. Mamta Srivastava, AGP for respondent Nos.1 and
2-State.
Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar i/by Mr. S. Anchan for
respondent No.3.
Mr. Deelip Boraste for respondent No.17.




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                    CORAM                : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                    RESERVED ON          : APRIL 8, 2026.

                    PRONOUNCED ON        : APRIL 28, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.   By the present petition instituted under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has called in question
the legality, propriety, and correctness of the order dated 13
February 2026 passed by respondent No.2, whereby the
application preferred by respondent No.3 came to be allowed and
respondent No.2 proceeded to grant unilateral deemed assignment
of lease together with issuance of certificate of entitlement in
favour of respondent No.3 in respect of part of the larger property
admeasuring 5436.80 square metres along with the structure
standing thereon.

2.   The facts, in brief, to the extent material for adjudication of
the present petition, are that late Mr. Manekji Modi, the deceased
father of the petitioner, during his lifetime was the lawful owner
and person otherwise fully entitled to the larger property, having
acquired the same from one Gulvantram in the year 1948.
Consequent upon such purchase, the name of late Manekji Modi
came to be duly entered and recorded as holder and owner of the
said larger property in the relevant revenue record, namely 7/12
extract, vide Mutation Entry No.656. Upon the demise of late
Manekji Modi on 1 September 1962, the names of his sole legal
heirs, namely late Nargis Manekji Modi being his widow, late Dina
Manekji Modi and the present petitioner being his daughters, came



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to be mutated in the revenue records as holders and owners of the
larger property vide Mutation Entry No.1205 in the relevant 7/12
extract. It is the case of the petitioner that over passage of time
approximately 80% of the larger property comprising various
survey numbers came to be encroached upon by slum dwellers,
who erected several unauthorized hutments and structures
thereon. It is further the case of the petitioner that subsequently,
and without the knowledge or consent of late Nargis Manekji
Modi, late Dina Manekji Modi and the petitioner, being the
recorded owners of the larger property, the name of respondent
No.16, namely M/s. Shreeram Construction Company through late
Mr. Amrutlal Lalji Patel, came to be entered in the ‘Other Rights’
column of the relevant 7/12 extract vide Mutation Entry No.1889
on the basis of a purported registered Indenture of Lease dated 17
December 1981, registered on 3 May 1983, allegedly executed by
Mangibai Govind Vartha and Raghunath Govind Vartha, original
opponent Nos.4 and 5, in favour of respondent No.16 for a term of
95 years commencing from 17 December 1981. It is material to
note that respondent No.3 had not initially placed on record a
copy of the said purported Indenture of Lease dated 17 December
1981 along with the application in question. The said document
was subsequently brought on record by respondent No.3 along
with its affidavit in reply dated 8 April 2025 filed in Writ Petition
No.4408 of 2025. During the rehearing of the matter before
respondent No.2 after remand, respondent No.3 placed reliance
upon the said purported registered Indenture of Lease dated 17
December 1981 in support of its claim.




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3.     It further appears from the record that the Grampanchayat,
Majiwade, issued a purported permission dated 22 September
1982    in   favour   of   respondent   No.16   authorising   certain
construction activities on the subject property. A copy of the said
permission was annexed to the application at page 53 thereof. It is
pointed out that the said permission is stated to have been issued
even prior to the registration of the alleged Indenture of Lease
dated 17 December 1981. After the demise of late Nargis Manekji
Modi on 5 May 2000 and thereafter upon the demise of late Dina
Manekji Modi, the petitioner claims to have become the sole owner
and person exclusively entitled to the larger property. On an
application made by the petitioner, the Sub Divisional Officer,
Thane by order dated 25 August 2007 was pleased to cancel
Mutation Entry No.1889, by which the name of respondent No.16
had been entered in the ‘Other Rights’ column of the relevant 7/12
extract. Pursuant thereto, Mutation Entry No.2649 came to be
effected deleting the name of respondent No.16 from the said
column. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.16 preferred an appeal
before the Additional Collector, Thane under Section 247 of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 challenging the said order
dated 25 August 2007. Thereafter, by a registered Development
Agreement dated 16 June 2009 executed between the petitioner as
owner and M/s. Om Shri Sai Construction through its partners as
developers, the petitioner granted development rights in respect
of, inter alia, a portion of the larger property admeasuring 1
Hectare 38 Ares and 80 points equivalent to 13,880 square metres
upon the terms and conditions recorded therein. In furtherance




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thereof, the petitioner also executed a Specific Power of Attorney
dated 16 June 2009 in favour of the said developers authorising
them to undertake acts and deeds in relation to development of
the concerned property.

4.       Subsequently, by a registered Deed of Rectification Without
Additional Consideration dated 27 January 2010 executed
between the petitioner and the said developers, certain clauses of
the Development Agreement dated 16 June 2009 came to be
rectified. Thereafter, by order dated 3 January 2017, the
Additional Collector, Thane allowed the appeal preferred by
respondent No.16 under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and set aside the order dated 25 August 2007
passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Thane. Consequent thereto,
the name of respondent No.16 again came to be reflected in the
‘Other Rights’ column of the relevant 7/12 extract. Being
aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a Revision Application before
the Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division challenging the said
order.

5.       On 19 January 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding
came to be executed between the petitioner and the said
developers      concerning   development    of   the   balance     land
admeasuring 10,000 square meters forming part of the larger
property owned by the petitioner, upon the terms and conditions
mutually agreed and recorded therein. On or about 27 August
2018, approximately 108 individuals claiming themselves to be
purchasers of rooms in chawls standing upon the subject property
instituted Special Civil Suit No.450 of 2018 before the Court of



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Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane against the petitioner, the legal
heirs of late Amrutlal Lalji Patel and Surabhi Co operative Housing
Society Limited, purportedly formed by flat purchasers of Building
No.K situated on the said property. By the said suit, the plaintiffs
sought, inter alia, a declaration that they along with Surabhi
Society had been jointly, openly and uninterruptedly using and
occupying the property adverse to the title of the petitioner since
the year 1983 to 1984 and had thereby acquired ownership rights
in the property by adverse possession.

6.    Despite pendency of the aforesaid Special Civil Suit No.450
of 2018, wherein the plaintiffs, who are stated to be members of
respondent No.3 society, had claimed declaration of ownership by
adverse possession in respect of the subject property, respondent
No.3 through its Advocate addressed a notice dated 25 July 2020
calling upon the petitioner, inter alia, to execute conveyance of the
said property in favour of respondent No.3, failing which
respondent No.3 stated that it would approach respondent No.2
for obtaining deemed conveyance in respect thereof under Section
11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act. Nearly two years after
issuance of the aforesaid notice dated 25 July 2020, and
notwithstanding pendency of the said Special Civil Suit No.450 of
2018 as well as receipt of the petitioner’s reply dated 2 September
2020, respondent No.3 filed the application before respondent
No.2 on 29 March 2022 seeking issuance of certificate declaring
that respondent No.3 was entitled to execute and register deed of
conveyance by way of assignment of the purported leasehold rights
in respect of the said property under Section 11 of the



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Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act. According to the petitioner, copy
of the said application was never served upon her, and she came to
know of the same only in the first week of March 2025.

7.    On 14 June 2022, respondent No.2 proceeded to pass an
order allowing the application filed by respondent No.3 and issued
certificate of entitlement of unilateral deemed conveyance in
favour of respondent No.3 in respect of the said property. It is the
petitioner’s grievance that copy of the said order was also not
served upon her, and she acquired knowledge thereof only in the
first week of March 2025. After the aforesaid first order was
passed by respondent No.2, the plaintiffs in Special Civil Suit
No.450 of 2018 moved an application before the Court of Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Thane seeking withdrawal of the suit, and
accordingly by order dated 22 June 2023 the learned Civil Judge
permitted unconditional withdrawal of the said suit. Thereafter,
upon hearing the parties, respondent No.2 passed the impugned
order dated 13 February 2026 whereby the application of
respondent No.3 again came to be allowed and respondent No.2
granted unilateral deemed assignment of lease together with
issuance of certificate of entitlement of unilateral deemed
assignment of lease in favour of respondent No.3 in respect of the
subject property along with the building standing thereon. Being
aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has instituted the present writ
petition.

8.    Mr. Thorat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner, submitted that respondent No.2 has ex facie failed to
appreciate that none of the documents annexed to the impugned



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application constituted agreements for sale within the meaning of
Section 4 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963.
According to him, respondent No.16 neither was, nor in law could
be regarded as, a “promoter” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of
the said Act. It was urged that respondent No.16 admittedly had
no authority whatsoever from the owners of the larger property or
the subject property, whether under any registered development
agreement or otherwise, to undertake construction of chawls or
buildings upon the said property. Learned counsel submitted that,
on the contrary, pursuant to the orders passed by the competent
revenue authorities, the name of respondent No.16 had been
deleted from the relevant 7/12 extract pertaining to the larger
property. He further contended that in earlier proceedings it had
already been concluded that original opponent Nos.4 and 5
themselves had no right, title or interest in the said property and,
therefore, the question of the said original opponent Nos.4 and 5
executing any valid lease deed in favour of respondent No.16 did
not arise at all.

9.    Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.2
committed manifest error in placing reliance upon the purported
commencement certificate dated 22 September 1982 allegedly
issued by the Grampanchayat, Majiwade, without considering the
settled legal position that a Grampanchayat has no jurisdiction in
law to grant construction permissions or building approvals of
such nature. It was further contended that none of the units or
rooms allegedly sold by respondent No.16 in the chawls or
buildings could fall within the definition of “flat” as contemplated



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under Section 2(a-1) of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act.

10.   It was next submitted that the documents annexed to the
impugned application were merely third party agreements and
were not agreements executed and registered in the form
prescribed and mandated under the provisions of the Maharashtra
Ownership Flats Act. According to learned counsel, respondent
No.2 gravely erred in relying upon such documents, which could
by no stretch be equated with duly registered agreements
contemplated under the statutory scheme of the Act. It was further
urged that in the absence of any occupation certificate, it is evident
that the chawls and buildings standing upon the property were
unauthorized and illegal constructions, and consequently, no order
granting unilateral deemed conveyance in respect thereof could
have lawfully been passed by respondent No.2.

11.   Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.3
instituted the impugned proceedings seeking unilateral deemed
conveyance despite the pendency of Special Civil Suit No.450 of
2018 before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane, filed
by persons who were members of respondent No.3 itself, wherein
ownership in respect of the very same property had been claimed
by way of adverse possession. It was, therefore, contended that
respondent    No.3   could   not    have   simultaneously       pursued
inconsistent remedies in relation to the same property.

12.   Per contra, Mr. Khandeparkar, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.3, submitted that there exist in all 53 documents
evidencing transactions under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats




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Act, out of which seven are direct agreements executed by the
promoter in favour of flat purchasers, three are certificates issued
by the promoter in favour of flat purchasers for the purpose of
securing loans, and 35 are payment receipts issued by the
promoter. He further submitted that certain structures were
constructed by vendors or contractors engaged by respondent
No.16 promoter firm, including S.D. Construction through its
proprietor Mr. S.D. Marne, and the recitals in such documents
specifically record that portions of the subject property were
developed for sale of residential premises admeasuring 240 square
feet built up area. According to him, there are eight such
agreements on record, which clearly demonstrate the involvement
of respondent No.16 in development of the subject property.
Learned counsel further submitted that, apart from the aforesaid
documents, there are 14 non-agricultural tax bills raised in the
name of the promoter annexed to sale agreements entered into
inter se between flat purchasers, as well as seven electricity bills
standing in the name of the promoter. According to him, these 21
documents     conclusively   establish   that    respondent     No.16
functioned as the promoter in respect of the subject property. He
submitted that all 74 documents forming part of the compilation
unmistakably indicate the nexus of respondent No.16 with the
project, whether in the nature of agreements, confirmation deeds,
letters, non-agricultural tax receipts or electricity bills. He lastly
submitted that the photographs on record clearly depict that the
buildings comprising respondent society are authorised structures
constructed pursuant to approval granted by the Gram Panchayat,




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as reflected in the sanctioned plans.

13.   Mr. Khandeparkar, placing reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State
of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465, submitted that even
according to the petitioner’s own case, the petitioner does not
claim to be a promoter. He contended that proceedings under the
Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act arise solely from rights created
under the said statute, and the remedies provided therein are
intended only for enforcement of rights conferred upon flat
purchasers under the Act. According to him, the petitioner cannot
seek to enforce alleged civil or proprietary rights under the guise
of challenging proceedings under the Act by invoking writ
jurisdiction. He submitted that if the petitioner seeks enforcement
of independent civil rights based upon title or ownership, the
appropriate remedy available is by way of civil suit. In support of
the said submission, reliance was also placed on the decisions of
this Court in Shimmering Heights CHS Ltd & Ors. vs. State of
Maharashtra (Writ petition No.3129 of 2016, decided on 6 April
2016), Zainul Abedin Yusufali Massawalla & Ors. vs. Competent
Authority, District Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Housing
Societies, Mumbai & Ors, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 6028, and P.R.
Enterprises & Anr. vs. Competent Authority & Anr. (Writ Petition
No.1125 of 2016, decided on 27 November 2018).

14.   Referring specifically to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the aforesaid
judgment, learned counsel submitted that the expression “person
aggrieved” has been judicially interpreted to mean a person whose
legal right or legally protected interest stands affected or



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jeopardised. Proceeding on the said basis, he submitted that the
petitioner cannot be treated as a person aggrieved in the present
proceedings and that, in any event, the petitioner’s proper remedy
lies in approaching the competent Civil Court for adjudication of
his alleged civil rights.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

15.   I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the
learned advocates appearing for the respective parties.

16.   The statutory provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats
Act are required to be read as legislative scheme framed for curing
a social and economic mischief prevailing in the State. The
opening recital records that due to acute shortage of housing in
various parts of Maharashtra, many abuses, malpractices and
difficulties had arisen in relation to promotion of construction,
sale, management, and transfer of flats on ownership basis. Thus,
the Legislature proceeded after noticing hardship suffered by
ordinary purchasers who were paying monies for homes, yet
remaining exposed to exploitation. The preamble further shows
that the State Government had appointed a Committee in the year
1960 to suggest corrective measures. Only after examining such
recommendations was the present enactment brought into force.
This legislative history demonstrates that the Act is a beneficial
legislation intended to discipline the housing market and to
protect flat takers from stronger parties. Therefore, whenever
ambiguity arises interpretation must lean in favour of advancing
the remedy and suppressing the mischief which the Legislature had




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noticed. Therefore, while construing the provisions it must be
ensured that genuine purchasers receive protection.

17.   Section 2(a-1) defines the expression “flat”. The definition
means a separate and self-contained set of premises used or
intended for residence, office, showroom, shop, godown or even
carrying on industry or business. It includes garage and apartment.
It indicates that the Act was not confined only to residential
apartments in modern buildings. Premises sold in mixed use
buildings, commercial units, small tenements and other forms of
occupation were common. The explanation to Section 2(a-1) states
that even where sanitary, washing, bathing or other conveniences
are common to two or more premises, such premises shall still be
deemed separate and self-contained. In many older constructions,
chawls, or budget housing, common toilets or common utility
spaces are ordinary features. If common amenities alone were
treated as disqualification, large classes of purchasers would fall
outside statutory protection. In matters where parties contend that
rooms, chawls, blocks or compact units are not flats, the Court
must examine substance. If premises are separately occupied,
separately sold, and intended as independent units of use, then the
nomenclature used in old documents may not be decisive. A
promoter cannot escape the Act merely by calling the premises a
room, chawl portion, cabin or unit.

18.   Section 2(c) defines “promoter”. This definition includes an
individual person, partnership firm, body, or association whether
registered or not, who constructs or causes to be constructed a
block or building of flats for the purpose of selling some or all of



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them. It includes assignees. It further clarifies that where the
builder and seller are different persons, both are included. The
words “constructs or causes to be constructed” are of importance.
They cover not only a person raising the structure, but also one
who gets it developed through contractors or agents. Therefore, a
person cannot say that since labour was employed through others,
he is outside the statute. A person dealing with the public as
developer and seller of flats may attract statutory obligations.

19.   Section 4 requires that before accepting advance payment,
the promoter must enter into a written agreement for sale with
each purchaser, and such agreement must be registered and in
prescribed form. Registration is insisted upon as it carries
authenticity and public notice. It reduces disputes about
consideration, area, possession date, amenities or title promises.
However, statutory requirement under Section 4 is tempered by
Section 4A. This provision states that where an agreement for sale
remains unregistered for any reason, it may still be received in
evidence for specified purposes, such as specific performance, part
performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, or
collateral transactions. Section 4A recognises that an agreement
though unregistered may still be receivable for certain purposes.
The legislative policy therefore does not treat non-registration as
extinguishment of transaction. It acknowledges rights. Hence,when
Section 11(3) is applied the authority must read procedural
requirements in the light of the object of Act. Accordingly, where
documentary material shows that flats were sold, consideration
was accepted, possession was handed over, society was formed and



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members entered occupation, the Competent Authority is entitled
to examine entitlement. The deemed conveyance mechanism is
welfare legislation. The promoter’s signature on conveyance is
required because title must pass through instrument. But where
such signature is withheld, the statute creates a legal process. The
Competent Authority certifies entitlement and unilateral deemed
conveyance is executed.

20.   Sub-section (3) of Section 11 provides a remedy in a
situation where the promoter fails to execute conveyance in favour
of the co-operative society, company, association of flat purchasers
or apartment owners. This provision is of importance because the
Legislature   was   conscious   that   many   promoters    complete
construction, collect full consideration, hand over possession, and
thereafter postpone transfer of title. In such cases, the society
remains in possession of the building but without ownership of
land and structure. Therefore, the Legislature created a remedy
enabling members of the society or other recognised body to
approach the Competent Authority for issuance of certificate
entitling them to unilateral deemed conveyance. The scheme of
sub-section (3) also shows that the Legislature did not intend
purchasers to remain helpless till promoter cooperates. Therefore,
once the statutory conditions are satisfied, the authority is
expected to complete the transfer process.

21.   The expression “other relevant documents” occurring in sub-
section (3) carries significance. The Legislature intentionally did
not restrict the applicant only to one type of evidence. It
recognised that housing projects differ in age and nature.



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Therefore, the section permits production of “other relevant
documents”. These words allow the authority to consider
documents such as allotment letters, possession receipts, share
certificates, payment receipts, approved plans, tax records,
occupation evidence and other surrounding material depending
upon facts of each case. If “other relevant documents” are read in a
restricted manner, the words become otiose. Courts avoid
construction rendering statutory words otiose. Hence, where
applicants produce documentary material connecting them to the
project and showing promoter’s obligations, the authority must
consider the same. The section also refers to occupation certificate,
if any. These two words, namely “if any”, are of clear consequence.
They indicate that the Legislature was aware that in some cases
occupation certificate may not have been issued or may not be
available. Therefore, where occupation certificate is unavailable,
remedy under Section 11(3) does not collapse. The authority must
then examine other evidence to ascertain whether building was
completed, occupied, or otherwise delivered to purchasers. The
Court cannot read “if any” out of the statute. Those words were
inserted to avoid injustice.

22.   Though sub-section (3) mentions true copies of registered
agreements for sale executed with the promoter, this requirement
must be read harmoniously with the object of the Act and with
Section 4A. Section 4 imposes duty upon promoter to execute
registered agreements. If promoter breaches that duty, it would be
unjust to deny remedy to purchasers on the ground created by
promoter’s own wrongdoing. Such interpretation would defeat



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legislative purpose. If promoter executes no agreements, destroys
records, withholds papers and later says society cannot seek
conveyance because registered agreements are absent, then
statutory protection becomes illusory. Therefore, while registered
agreements are important, their absence due to promoter default
cannot conclude the matter against purchasers.

23.   First submission canvassed by Mr. Thorat for the petitioner
deserves consideration that proceedings under the Maharashtra
Ownership Flats Act must rest upon legal documents. The statute
contemplates a promoter, flat purchasers, agreements for sale, and
obligations arising from it. Mr. Thorat has also pointed out that
respondent No.16 had no registered development agreement, no
express authorization, and no documented authority from the
owners to raise construction upon the land. The further submission
regarding correction of revenue records and deletion of the name
of respondent No.16 from the relevant 7/12 extract also requires
consideration. It is true that revenue entries do not by themselves
confer title nor extinguish title. Yet such entries are relevant to
indicate possession.

24.   Still while considering the petitioner’s objections, this Court
cannot lose sight of the material placed on behalf of respondent
No.3. Mr. Khandeparkar has produced agreements, certificates,
receipts, non-agricultural tax bills, electricity bills and allied
papers. Seven direct agreements, three certificates issued for loan
purposes, thirty-five payment receipts, eight agreements relating to
structures developed through contractors or vendors connected
with respondent No.16, fourteen non-agricultural tax bills and



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seven electricity bills are relied upon. These documents are
projected as showing a continuous and connected relationship of
respondent No.16 with the development activity. Though all such
documents indicate that respondent No.16 was not a stranger to
the project. They show involvement in construction activity, receipt
of monies from purchasers, issuance of papers for finance
purposes, and dealings with authorities regarding taxes and
utilities. Therefore, such material cannot be discarded merely
because one would prefer a ideal documentary chain. Summary
authorities are entitled to look at surrounding conduct and
practical dealings.

25.   The submission that respondent No.16 acted as promoter
also gets support from the manner in which these documents came
into existence. The Court must look to substance and not merely
headings of documents. If a person issues certificates to
purchasers, receives consideration from them, deals with taxes and
electricity matters in relation to the premises, permits occupation
and is associated with construction, then a inference may arise that
such person had assumed a position akin to promoter. Such
inference may not settle title or ownership, but for purposes of
summary proceedings under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act,
it carries relevance. Therefore, respondent No.2 cannot be said to
have acted upon no material.

26.   The petitioner’s argument is that the Grampanchayat lacked
authority to grant construction permission. In the present case the
existence of such permission appears to be one component of the
material considered by respondent No.2 and not the sole basis of



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the impugned order. Even if one keeps aside that permission
altogether, there still remain several other documents indicating
transactions and developmental connection between respondent
No.16, the purchasers and the property. Hence, the impugned
order cannot be invalidated merely because one item of material is
questioned. The real enquiry is whether there existed material
enabling exercise of jurisdiction. On that test, the record does not
disclose absence of basis.

27.   The contention that the units sold by respondent No.16 were
chawls and not flats within Section 2(a-1) also requires
consideration. Such submission cannot be accepted in mechanical
manner. The statutory expression must be understood with
reference to nature of the premises and transactions. If residential
accommodation of built-up area was sold for consideration and
purchasers were dealt with as allottees of premises, then the mere
use of the word chawl may not exclude operation of the Act.
Substance of occupation and transaction is relevant.

28.   There is also force in the submission of respondent No.3 that
the petitioner cannot convert the present writ petition into a
fullfledged title suit. In that context I have carefully examined the
law declared by the Supreme Court in Arunkumar H. Shah v. Avon
Arcade Premises Coop. Society Ltd., reported in (2025) 7 SCC 249 .
The said pronouncement furnishes guidance on the true scope,
extent, limitation and character of the powers exercisable by the
competent authority under Section 11 of the Maharashtra
Ownership Flats Act. Once the Supreme Court has interpreted the
statutory provision in clear terms, this Court while exercising



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jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 cannot proceed on any
wider assumption inconsistent with such declaration. Therefore,
the present petition must be examined through the lens of the law
so declared.

29.   The Supreme Court has explained that Section 11(1) casts a
obligation upon the promoter to complete all title formalities and
thereafter convey right, title, and interest in the land and building
in favour of the society, company, association of flat takers or
apartment owners, as the case may be. Thus, the object of Section
11 is not to create a new title, but to enforce an already existing
statutory duty resting upon the promoter. The competent authority
does not sit as a regular civil court to pronounce ownership or to
settle claim between contesting parties. Its function is narrower. It
ensures that purchasers, who have already acquired flats and
formed their legal body, are not deprived of the conveyance which
the promoter was under legal obligation to execute. The Supreme
Court has held that Section 11(3) provides a remedy to the society
in cases where the promoter fails to discharge the obligation
contained in Section 11(1).

30.   The procedure under the Rules has also been noticed in
detail by the Supreme Court. The procedure remains limited,
expedited and document oriented. It is not comparable to a civil
trial involving oral evidence and cross examination of witnesses,
framing of issues, and adjudication of title disputes. The legislature
created a faster route because delay in conveyance itself was the
mischief requiring remedy. The Supreme Court has held that
though quasi judicial powers are conferred, the proceedings



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continue to be summary in character. Since cross-examination is
barred and the process is intended to be time-bound, the
competent authority cannot conclusively determine disputed
questions of title. This principle answers many contentions urged
in such matters. Where rival parties seek pronouncement on
ownership, derivative rights, succession claims, or inter se
proprietary disputes, such matters belong to the jurisdiction of a
civil court. The competent authority under Section 11 cannot
transform itself into a court of title adjudication. Its findings in
summary proceedings cannot substitute a civil decree rendered
after evidence.

31.   Therefore, when the petitioner contends that respondent
No.16 had no title, that predecessor parties had no competence to
execute any lease, that revenue entries were deleted, or that the
structures were unauthorized, they touch questions of legal source,
ownership and legality of possession. However, in light of the
Supreme Court pronouncement, such issues cannot be expected to
be finally decided by respondent No.2 in proceedings under
Section 11. The authority could only examine whether sufficient
prima facie material existed to grant or refuse deemed conveyance.
Therefore, failure to decide such disputes cannot by itself
invalidate the proceedings.

32.   The Supreme Court has also stated that reasons must be
recorded by the competent authority while passing an order under
Section 11. Reasons demonstrate application of mind. Reasons
show that objections were considered. Reasons enable parties to
understand why they succeeded or failed. Reasons also permit



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judicial review by higher courts. In absence of reasons an order
may appear arbitrary. Therefore, while this Court will not
substitute its own view for that of the authority merely because
another conclusion is possible, it must still examine whether the
impugned order discloses consideration of relevant material and
whether reasons are furnished for the conclusion reached.

33.   Most importantly, the Supreme Court in paragraph 45.3 has
held that in writ jurisdiction the Court should not interfere with an
order granting deemed conveyance unless the same is manifestly
illegal, and that the writ court should generally remain slow in
interfering with such orders. The reason supplied by the Supreme
Court is weighty. Even after an order under Section 11(4),
aggrieved parties retain the remedy of filing a civil suit for
establishing their rights. Thus, the statutory arrangement balances
interests in a practical manner. Purchasers obtain a statutory
remedy for conveyance, while rival claimants are not shut out from
asserting title in civil court. Hence, extraordinary writ jurisdiction
is not intended to unsettle such orders.

34.   This principle bears relevance to the present petition. The
petitioner seeks reopening of several disputed factual matters
concerning ownership of the property, competence of executants of
the lease deed, legality of construction, effect of revenue entries,
and promoter status of respondent No.16. Many of these matters
may indeed require evidence and trial. But once civil remedy
remains available in law, writ jurisdiction is not intended to
become a substitute for a suit. Unless the impugned order is shown
to be manifestly illegal, wholly without jurisdiction, passed in



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breach of natural justice, or based on no material whatsoever,
interference would run contrary to the caution administered by the
Supreme Court.

35.     The Supreme Court has clarified that the expression
“promoter” under Section 2(c) includes a person, partnership firm,
body or association which constructs or causes to be constructed a
building consisting of flats or apartments. Therefore, promoter
status is not confined to owner of land. A person who undertakes
construction,    causes      construction   through   others,   manages
development activity, enters into transactions with purchasers, or
otherwise functions in that capacity may fall within its ambit.
Ownership and promoter status may overlap, but they are not
always identical.

36.     Applying these principles, if respondent No.2 considered
agreements, receipts, certificates, tax records, electricity bills and
other    documents    indicating     developmental     involvement       of
respondent No.16, it cannot be said that the authority acted on no
evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to establish title is an
entirely different matter. But for summary proceedings under
Section 11, the authority was entitled to examine whether the
material disclosed existence of a promoter purchaser relationship
sufficient to invoke the statutory remedy. If some relevant material
existed, mere disagreement on weight of evidence would not
justify writ interference.

37.     Likewise, the petitioner’s objections regarding validity of
lease deed, entitlement of predecessor parties, source of title and




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legality of occupation are not rendered meaningless by dismissal of
writ challenge. They may be pursued before the civil forum where
oral and documentary evidence can be led, witnesses tested, and
disputed facts adjudicated. The Supreme Court has preserved such
remedy. Therefore, refusal to interfere in writ jurisdiction would
not amount to extinguishment of proprietary claims.

38.   Thus, the test before this Court is whether the impugned
order is manifestly illegal. Whether respondent No.2 travelled
beyond statutory limits. Whether reasons are absent. Whether the
order rests on absence of material. Whether principles of natural
justice were breached causing prejudice. Whether the authority
ignored mandatory statutory conditions. Unless such grounds are
established, interference in supervisory jurisdiction must remain
restrained. Writ review is concerned with legality of decision-
making process, not re trial of factual controversy.

39.   Having regard to the record and the law laid down in
Arunkumar H. Shah, the present controversy cannot be
approached as if respondent No.2 was required to render a final
judgment on title between all claimants. The authority was
required only to decide a summary statutory application intended
for benefit of flat purchasers under the scheme of the Act. The
petitioner’s broader civil disputes remain open before appropriate
forum in accordance with law.

40.   The decision in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan explains that
a person aggrieved is one whose legal right or interest is affected.
Decisions of this Court in Shimmering Heights CHS Ltd. v. State of




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Maharashtra, Zainul Abedin Yusufali Massawalla v. Competent
Authority and P.R. Enterprises v. Competent Authority indicate that
where grievance concerns civil rights, title or ownership, remedy
may lie in civil forum and not always by writ proceedings. The
petitioner asserts ownership, disputes leasehold source, contests
promoter status and challenges legality of construction. These are
matters requiring evidence, testing of documents, and possibly oral
proof. Such matters are not ordinarily capable of final adjudication
in supervisory jurisdiction.

41.   At the same time, this Court is not laying down that every
order under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act is beyond
challenge. If the competent authority acts upon wholly irrelevant
material, ignores statutory requirements, violates natural justice,
or grants relief in excess of jurisdiction, the writ court can
interfere. However, that is not the situation emerging here. The
impugned order is supported by a bundle of documents which
collectively disclose presence of respondent No.16 as a person
associated with development and purchasers who have been
dealing with the property over a considerable period. Whether
such material ultimately establishes title is another matter, but it
does provide basis for summary consideration.

42.   The dispute regarding validity of lease deed, original
ownership, legality of structures, and plea of adverse possession all
raise mixed questions of fact and law. They require detailed
enquiry and perhaps evidence. Respondent No.2, while exercising
powers under Section 11, was not expected to determine the entire
title dispute for all times to come. The pendency of Special Civil



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Suit No.450 of 2018 also does not nullify proceedings under the
Act. It does show that civil controversy existed. It shows that some
persons associated with respondent No.3 had taken a plea of
adverse possession. Once the suit came to be withdrawn and once
the authority had before it documentary material indicating
promoter like dealings, respondent No.2 cannot be said to have
lost jurisdiction.

43.   The petitioner has emphasized that several documents are
third party documents and not proper registered agreements under
the Act. The authority is entitled to consider totality of conduct
and records. Where there are direct agreements, receipts,
certificates, tax bills and electricity bills, it cannot be said that
nothing existed on record. The issue is whether respondent No.2
had some relevant material to arrive at a conclusion. In the facts of
present matter, the answer must be in the affirmative.

44.   Having considered the controversy in its legal setting, this
Court finds that the petitioner has invited this Court to
reappreciate the dispute relating to title, authority, lease source,
promoter status and legality of construction. Such an exercise
travels beyond the limits of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227
when the statutory authority has acted upon a material and where
the controversy itself is factual.

45.   For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the challenge to the impugned order cannot succeed.
The reasoning adopted by respondent No.2 cannot be described as
so unreasonable, perverse, or unsupported by record as to justify




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quashing in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The petition,
therefore, does not merit acceptance and is liable to be dismissed.

46.   In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
recorded hereinabove, the following order is passed:

      (i)    The writ petition stands dismissed;

      (ii)   Rule is discharged;

      (iii) The impugned order dated 13 February 2026 passed by
      respondent No.2 granting certificate of entitlement of
      unilateral deemed assignment of lease in favour of
      respondent No.3 is upheld, subject to observations made in
      this judgment;

      (iv) It is clarified that the findings recorded by respondent
      No.2 and the observations contained in the present judgment
      are confined to the limited scrutiny of proceedings under
      Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act and shall
      not be construed as final adjudication of title, ownership,
      validity of leasehold rights, succession claims, or any other
      proprietary dispute inter se the parties;

      (v)    It is further clarified that all contentions of the
      petitioner and of the contesting respondents on questions of
      title, authority, possession, legality of structures, and all
      connected civil rights are expressly kept open to be agitated
      before the competent civil forum, if so advised, in
      accordance with law;




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(vi) If any civil proceedings are instituted, the competent
forum shall decide the same on their own merits and in
accordance with law, uninfluenced by the observations made
in the impugned order or in the present judgment, except to
the extent of the limited statutory scope under the
Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act;

(vii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
be no order as to costs;

(viii) Pending interim applications, if any, do not survive and
stand disposed of accordingly.

                                       (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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