PANNALAL CHUNILAL JAINversusRAGHUVEER WAMAN DINDORKAR AND ANR.

2026:BHC-AS:10858



                    Diksha Rane                                             25 WP 4933 2001.doc




                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                                    25 WP/4933/2001

                    PANNALAL CHUNILAL JAIN                           ..PETITIONER
                          VS
                    RAGHUVEER WAMAN DINDORKAR & ANR                  ..RESPONDENTS
                                                 ------------
                    Adv. Rukmini Khairnar i/b. Adv. Pramod Joshi for petitioner.
                    Adv. R. D. Soni a/w. Adv. Amey Deshpande, Adv. Vandana Bait for
                    respondent no.3.
                                                 ------------

                                                                 CORAM :     RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

                                                                 DATE   :    4 MARCH 2026.

                    P.C. :

                    1)            Present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the

                    Constitution of India, by the defendants challenging the judgment

                    and decree passed by the Appellate Court.

                    2)            Respondent nos.1 and 2 had filed the suit for eviction against

                    the predecessor in title of the petitioner one Mr. Pannalal Jain on

                    three grounds of eviction – (a) default in payment of rent;

                    (b)bonafide requirement and (c) permanent alterations.

                    3)            The Demand Notice was of the year 1981 and the eviction suit

                    was filed in the year 1984. After the Notice was issued, the original

                    defendant – Mr. Pannalal Jain filed an application for fixation of the


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Diksha Rane                                           25 WP 4933 2001.doc




standard rent on 27/4/1981. Learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner/tenant informed this Court that the petitioner has been

regularly paying the rent in Darkhast Court and as per her

information the rent has been deposited till December 2025. She has

not taken a fresh instructions as far as rent of month of January 2026

and February 2026 is concerned.

4)            The trial Court after hearing the parties passed a decree of

eviction only on one ground i.e. default in payment of rent. All other

grounds of eviction were rejected. Only tenant filed a appeal against

the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The landlord

preferred appeal challenging the grounds which were rejected for

eviction. The Appellate Court after hearing the parties set aside the

ground of default in payment of rent on which the decree of eviction

was passed by trial Court, and passed decree on ground of bonafide

requirement. Against the said ground of “b onafide requirement”, the

original defendant/tenant has filed a writ petition before this Court.

There are no cross objections filed by the landlord before this Court.

It is also pertinent to note that in the meanwhile, the original

landlord i.e. respondent nos.1 and 2 have sold the suit premises in

the year 2006 to respondent no.3 during the pendency of this writ

petition.

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Diksha Rane                                             25 WP 4933 2001.doc




5)            Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred following two

judgments :-

              i)   Laxmibai Gangaram Bachal and Anr. Versus Yashwant
              Moreshwar Rajwade and Ors.1;
              ii)   Sheikh Jehangir Versus Smt. S. Kaushilyabai and Others2.


6)            Mr. Soni, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has

submitted before this Court that during pendency of this writ

petition, a Court Commissioner was appointed in order to inspect the

condition of the suit premises. He submitted that the said report

states that the premises has not become inhabitable. He further

submitted that the original tenant has died in the year 2010 during

pendency of the suit and now the legal heirs are brought on record

pursuant to the present default. He submits that due to change in

circumstances, this Court should consider the said fact of eviction and

the decree of eviction be sustained. Cross appeals were filed before

the Appellate Court by the landlord. The same are rejected by the

Appellate Court.

7)            Mr. Soni referred to the judgment of Full Bench in Babulal s/o.

Fakirchand Agrawal vs. Suresh s/o Kedarnath Malpani and others3.


1    1996 SCC OnLine Bom 630
2    1987 Supp SCC 630.
3    2017(4) Mh.L.J. 406

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Diksha Rane                                             25 WP 4933 2001.doc




8)            Admittedly, a tenant has not filed any cross appeal or separate

writ petition challenging the judgment and decree passed by the

Appellate Court. As far as issue argued by Mr. Soni with regard to the

ground i.e. the suit premises is inhabitable and the tenant’s legal

heirs are not using the same, I would have to consider the ground of

eviction only on “bonafide requirement”. The ground “default in

payment of rent” and “permanent alteration” have been negated by

Appellate Court. There is no ground of “non user” of suit premises. I

am only supposed to deal with the grounds which have been sought

by the landlord for eviction.

9)            As far as third ground i.e. “permanent alterations” is

concerned, both the Courts are against the landlord. As far as ground

of delay in payment of rent is concerned, the Appellate Court has

reversed the said ground. So also, they preferred an application for

standard rent on 27/4/1981 i.e. before the eviction suit was filed,

and it has been submitted by the advocate for the petitioner that the

tenant from that date till today has been regularly paying rent and in

any case, the Appellate Court has reversed the decree on the ground

of delay in paying rent. On behalf of respondents they were not able

to show that petitioners were irregular in depositing rent.



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Diksha Rane                                        25 WP 4933 2001.doc




9.1) Supreme Court in the judgment of Mohan Laxman Hede Vs.

Noormohamed Adam Shaikh4 held that rent to be deposited in Court

means, it has to be reasonable, a delay of few days would not be fatal

to grant decree of eviction.

9.2) Full Bench in the case of Babulal s/o. Fakirchand Agrawal

(supra), was considering the issue referred to it : “If the tenant

complies the notice issued by the landlord demanding arrears of rent

and pays the entire amount as demanded within the time stipulated

under section 15(2) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, then

whether the landlord can still file a suit for eviction on the ground of

arrears of rent and whether the eviction can be ordered by invoking

provisions of section 15(3) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act?” In

my view, hence, the findings recorded in the said judgment would not

have any bearing on the present proceedings.

10) As far as bonafide requirement is concerned, it is a matter of

record as admitted by the respondent that pending the writ petition

in the year 2006, the original landlord who had filed the suit for

eviction, sold the suit premises to respondent no.3. Therefore, on the

said ground has eclipsed, hence eviction relief cannot granted to the

landlord.

4    (1988) 2 SCC 481

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         Diksha Rane                                      25 WP 4933 2001.doc




         10.1) The petitioner has referred to the Supreme Court judgment of

         Sheikh Jehangir (supra) which held that bonafide requirement of

         landlord cannot survive after he has sold out the premises. The ratio

         of this judgment squarely applies to the present proceeding.

         10.2) As per order dated 27/3/2002, the Commissioner was

         appointed in the present proceeding to inspect another premises

         alleged to be available to the tenant. As the tenant disputed the

         condition of the said another premises being dilapidated. Hence, the

         Commissioner was appointed to examine the condition. In my view,

         the same issue would have no bearing to the ground of bonafide

         requirement in the present proceeding.

         11) Hence, this writ petition needs to be allowed.

         12) Rule is made absolute.

         13) The impugned judgment and decree passed by the Additional

         District Judge, Malegaon, on 4/7/2001 in Civil Appeal No.14/1991,

         so also, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court

         on 31/12/1990 in Regular Civil Suit No.289/1984, the C.J.J.D. at

         Manmad, Nashik, are quashed and set aside.

                                                             (Rajesh S. Patil, J.)




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Signed by: Diksha Rane
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/03/2026 21:21:31