MASERS RAJASTHAN MOTORSversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 2 OTHERS

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
          MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 10317 of 2026

Masers Rajasthan Motors
                                                              …..Petitioner(s)

                                   Versus

State of U.P. and 2 others
                                                            …..Respondent(s)


Counsel for Petitioner(s)            : Brajesh Kumar Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s)            : Ankush Tandon, C.S.C.


                                                                         AFR
Court No. - 35

             HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.


      Heard Sri Brajesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Sri Ankush Tandon, learned counsel for the respondent.
2.    The present petition has been filed assailing the order dated 16.07.2026
passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 9, in Misc. Civil
Appeal No. 98 of 2026 (Messers Rajasthan Motors through its Proprietor
Ramesh Kumar Sharma Vs. Hari Shankar Gupta). By the order impugned, the
appellate court has partly allowed the application, Paper No. 23-Ga, filed by
the petitioner-tenant seeking a report from the Ameen and has directed the
petitioner to deposit fifty percent of the monthly rent as determined under the
order dated 30.01.2026 passed in Case No. 328 of 2023, which order is the
subject matter of challenge in the appeal.

3.    Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner, at the
time of filing the appeal, had already made the requisite pre-deposit
contemplated under the proviso to Section 35(1) of the Uttar Pradesh
Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021)
and, consequently, no further deposit could have been directed by the appellate
court during the pendency of the appeal. It is contended that the requirement
contemplated by the proviso is a condition precedent for institution of the
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appeal and stands satisfied once fifty percent of the amount payable under the
impugned order is deposited at the stage of filing the appeal.

4.        Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand,
submits that the deposit made at the stage of institution of the appeal does not
exhaust the statutory obligation where the order under challenge gives rise to a
recurring liability. According to him, the expression “entire payable amount”
occurring in the proviso to Section 35(1) has to be understood with reference
to the nature of the liability created by the order under challenge. Where such
liability accrues periodically, the statutory requirement correspondingly
operates in respect of the amount becoming payable during the pendency of
the appeal. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court in
Hemant Kumar Garg Vs. Pulkit Garg1, wherein the question whether the
requirement of pre-deposit under the proviso to Section 35(1) is confined to a
one-time deposit calculated up to the date of institution of the appeal or
extends to recurring liabilities accruing during its pendency was considered in
detail.

5.        The submission gives rise to a short question as to the true scope and
operation of the proviso to Section 35(1) of U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 in a case
where the order of the Rent Authority determines a recurring liability.

6.        Section 35(1) of U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 provides for an appeal against
an order passed by the Rent Authority. Section 35(1), including the proviso
thereto, reads as follows:

       “35. Appeal.- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent
       Authority may prefer an appeal along with a certified copy of such order
       to the Rent Tribunal within the local limits of which the premises is
       situated, within a period of thirty days from the date of that order:

       Provided that no appeal shall lie unless the appellant has deposited fifty
       per cent of the entire payable amount under the impugned order of the
       rent authority.”

7.        The proviso thus makes the pre-deposit a condition precedent to the
maintainability of the appeal. The expression “no appeal shall lie unless”
makes the deposit contemplated therein a condition precedent to the
maintainability of the statutory appeal. The right of appeal, being a creature of

1    2026 (8) ADJ 21
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statute, is available subject to the conditions imposed by the legislature for its
exercise. The requirement of pre-deposit is thus not a matter resting upon the
discretion of the appellate authority, but a statutory condition governing the
right to invoke the appellate jurisdiction.

8.     The question, however, is not whether the requirement of pre-deposit is
mandatory. That position is not in dispute. The question is as to the point of
time up to which the amount contemplated by the expression “entire payable
amount” is to be computed where the liability under the impugned order is not
a one-time liability but continues to accrue periodically.

9.     The answer must necessarily depend upon the nature of the liability
created by the order under challenge. Where the order determines a liability
which becomes payable once and for all, the computation of the amount for
purposes of the proviso may ordinarily be made with reference to the liability
so determined. The position is materially different where the order determines
or revises an amount payable periodically, such as rent payable from month to
month.

10.    In the latter situation, the liability cannot be regarded as a static amount
crystallised on the date on which the appeal is instituted. The order under
challenge continues to operate and gives rise to a corresponding liability as
each succeeding period expires. The expression “entire payable amount” must,
therefore, be understood in the context of the character of the liability created
by the order and cannot, in the case of a recurring liability, be artificially
frozen as on the date of filing of the appeal.

11.    The contrary construction would lead to an anomalous result. A tenant
could deposit fifty percent of the amount payable up to the date of institution
of the appeal and, thereafter, during the entire pendency of the appellate
proceedings, continue to retain the premises without depositing even the
statutory proportion of the rent which becomes payable from month to month
pursuant to the order under challenge. Such an interpretation would effectively
sever the statutory requirement from the continuing operation of the very
order against which the appeal is pending.

12.    The question came up for consideration before this Court in Hemant
Kumar Garg. In that case also, the order under challenge had given rise to a
recurring liability by way of revised rent. The contention raised on behalf of
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the appellant was that the requirement of deposit stood satisfied upon deposit
of fifty percent of the amount due as on the date of filing of the appeal and
that no further direction for deposit during the pendency of the appeal could
be made. Upon examining the language of the proviso to Section 35(1), this
Court held that the expression “entire payable amount” could not, in the case
of a recurring liability, be confined to the amount quantified as on the date of
institution of the appeal.

13.    The Court held that where the impugned order gives rise to a recurring
or continuing liability, the statutory requirement of deposit necessarily extends
to such continuing accruals and is not exhausted by the initial deposit made at
the time of filing the appeal. The obligation, in such circumstances, continues
so long as the liability under the impugned order continues to accrue during
the pendency of the appeal. The Court further held that a direction requiring
deposit of fifty percent of the recurring liability during the pendency of the
appeal is not an additional or extraneous condition imposed by the appellate
authority, but is in furtherance of the statutory mandate contained in the
proviso to Section 35(1).

14.    The aforesaid construction is consistent with the language employed by
the legislature. The expression “entire payable amount” cannot be read in
isolation from the words “under the impugned order”. The amount payable
under an order has to be determined with reference to the nature of the liability
which that order creates. If the liability is recurring, the amount payable under
the order correspondingly continues to accrue. The statutory requirement of
deposit must, therefore, operate with reference to such accruals.

15.    It is also relevant that the deposit contemplated under the proviso is not
a direction for full satisfaction of the order under challenge. The statutory
requirement is confined to fifty percent of the payable amount. A direction
requiring deposit of fifty percent of the recurring rent, therefore, does not
amount to execution of the order under challenge. It merely ensures continued
compliance with the statutory condition attached to the appellate remedy and
secures, to the extent prescribed by the legislature, the interest of the party in
whose favour the impugned order operates.

16.    The distinction between the initial deposit and the subsequent deposits
is thus one of timing and the nature of the liability, and not of the existence of
two independent conditions. The initial deposit is necessary for the appeal to
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lie. Where the liability under the impugned order continues to accrue during
the pendency of the appeal, the statutory requirement correspondingly
continues to operate in respect of such accruals. The subsequent direction for
periodic deposit is consequently not a fresh condition added by the appellate
authority but a means of giving continuing effect to the statutory condition
already imposed by the proviso.

17.   Such an interpretation also accords with the object of the provision. The
legislature, while conferring a right of appeal, has simultaneously required the
appellant to secure fifty percent of the amount payable under the impugned
order. The provision thereby balances the right to pursue an appellate remedy
with the interest of the party in whose favour the order has been passed. If the
obligation were treated as exhausted on the date of filing of the appeal even in
cases involving a continuing liability, the statutory protection afforded to the
successful party would substantially cease to operate during the pendency of
the appeal.

18.   It follows that the pendency of an appeal cannot, by itself, have the
effect of suspending the recurring liability created by the order under
challenge. Unless the operation of such order has been otherwise stayed or
modified in accordance with law, the liability flowing from it continues to
accrue. Where the statutory scheme requires fifty percent of such liability to
be deposited for maintaining the appellate remedy, the appellate authority is
competent to issue appropriate directions to secure compliance with that
requirement during the pendency of the appeal.

19.   In the present case, the order dated 30.01.2026, which is under
challenge before the appellate court, determines the monthly rent payable in
respect of the premises in question. The liability is consequently recurring in
nature. The initial deposit made by the petitioner at the time of filing the
appeal cannot, in view of the aforesaid legal position, be treated as exhausting
the requirement under the proviso to Section 35(1). The appellate court was,
therefore, justified in directing the petitioner to deposit fifty percent of the
monthly rent during the pendency of the appeal.

20.   Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any
distinguishing feature which may take the present case outside the principle
laid down in Hemant Kumar Garg (supra). Nor has any submission been
advanced to demonstrate that the monthly liability determined under the order
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                            dated 30.01.2026 ceased to be operative or that the appellate court lacked
                            jurisdiction to issue directions for securing compliance with the statutory
                            requirement during pendency of the appeal.

                            21.         The direction contained in the order impugned, therefore, cannot be
                            characterised either as an additional condition for maintaining the appeal or as
                            an impermissible step towards execution of the order under challenge. It is
                            referable to, and flows from, the continuing operation of the statutory
                            requirement contained in the proviso to Section 35(1).

                            22.         No jurisdictional error or other infirmity has been demonstrated in the
                            order impugned warranting interference in exercise of the supervisory
                            jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

                            23.         The petition is, accordingly, devoid of merit and is dismissed.


                                                                       (Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)

                            September 21, 2026
                            Aiman




Digitally signed by :-
AIMAN FAROOQUI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad