Allahabad High Court
PAPPU MET @ PAPPUversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
- Decided
- Bench
- VINOD DIWAKAR
Holding
The High Court held that the trial courts must strictly comply with the Supreme Court and its own directions on bail‑surety, charge‑framing and expeditious trial, and accordingly modified bail, ordered speedy disposal of pending cases, and mandated compliance reporting.
Summary
The Allahabad High Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, disposed of four writ petitions concerning systemic delays in criminal trials and non‑compliance with bail‑surety directions. In Pappu Met’s case, the court modified the bail order, reducing the personal bond to Rs 5,000 and allowing a single surety, finding the earlier order contrary to Smt Bacchi Devi and Supreme Court precedents. In Urmila Mishra’s petition, the court directed the trial court to frame charges and dispose of the case within a reasonable time, emphasizing the right to a speedy trial. Similar expeditious‑trial directions were issued in Sarfraj Ahmad’s and V.S. Palitube’s matters, ordering the trial courts to conclude pending proceedings. The court highlighted widespread non‑compliance by district judges, massive case backlogs, staffing shortages, and the need for institutional reforms, while reiterating the importance of judicial accountability and constitutional morality.
Issues considered
- Whether the trial courts’ bail orders requiring two sureties violate the directions in Smt Bacchi Devi and Supreme Court jurisprudence
- Whether the prolonged delay in framing charges and trial disposal infringes the constitutional right to a speedy trial
- Whether the High Court can compel district courts to submit compliance reports and undertake corrective measures under Article 227
- How to ensure institutional accountability and training of judicial officers to prevent systemic delays
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s. 230, 231, 485, 528, 91
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — s. 305, 317(5), 331(4)
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 170, 204, 209, 88
- Indian Penal Code — s. 147, 148, 149, 307, 332, 336, 353, 406, 419, 420, 427, 435, 441, 504, 506
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — s. 138
Subjects
- speedy trial
- judicial accountability
- bail surety
- charge framing
- Article 227
- judicial delay
- judicial discipline
- institutional reform
- constitutional morality
- judicial character
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No.15205 of 2025
Pappu Met @ Pappu …..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and …..Respondent(s)
Another
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Arun Pratap Singh, Kamaluddin
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A.
Connected Matters:
1. A227/12771/2025 V.S. Palitube Vs. State of U.P. and another
2. A227/15004/2025 Urmila Mishra Vs. State of U.P. and 4 others
3. A227/7832/2025 Sarfraj Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. and another
Reserved on : 26.05.2026
Delivered on : 28.09.2026
A.F.R.
Court No. - 38
HON’BLE VINOD DIWAKAR, J.
Judicial appointments to constitutional courts are not patronage-
they fundamentally shape a nation's ideological character, its society, and
the foundations of its credibility in international affairs.
Issues for consideration:
1. Through this common judgment, four writ petitions are being
disposed of, as they raise a shared and systemic concern pertaining to the
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inordinate delay in the adjudication of trial court proceedings, coupled
with the apparent reluctance or failure on the part of the district judiciary
to furnish requisite information when called upon by the High Court. The
issue engages foundational principles of the administration of justice,
including the right to a speedy trial, judicial accountability, and the
efficient functioning of the courts.
Brief Introduction:
2. At the outset, and for the reasons recorded hereinafter, this Court
observes with concern that, in the Pappu Met case, notwithstanding the
directions issued by this Court in Smt. Bacchi Devi v. State of U.P.1,
whereby a structured mechanism was devised to operationalize the
mandates laid down by the Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil v.
CBI2; Siddharth v. State of U.P.3; and In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of
Bail4- the courts below have not adhered to those binding directions.
There has been non-compliance with the procedural framework so
devised, and there has also been a failure on the part of the learned District
Judges concerned to furnish the information repeatedly called for by this
Court. It has therefore become necessary to examine the position in the
context of the constitutional scheme, judicial discipline, institutional
accountability, and the scope for the effective exercise of the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
3. In Urmila Mishra’s case, the petitioner seeks expeditious disposal
of a criminal case pending since 2009, which, despite having been listed
on more than 178 occasions over a span of nearly sixteen years, has not
reached even the stage of framing of charge. Such delay prima-facie
defeats the constitutional guarantee of a fair and speedy trial.
4. In Sarfraj Ahmad’s case, the First Information Report was lodged
in the year 2008, and the charge-sheet was filed in the year 2010. Over the
sixteen years that have since elapsed, the matter has been listed on
1
(2025) SCC OnLine All 5286
2
(2024) 9 SCC 177
3
(2022) 1 SCC 676
4
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1487
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approximately 143 occasions without any meaningful progress in the
proceedings. The accused has accordingly invoked the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court, seeking a direction for the expeditious
conclusion of the trial.
5. In V.S. Palitube’s case, a complaint under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as amended from time to time, was
instituted in the year 2013. Although the accused was summoned in the
year 2019, and the matter has since been listed on more than 100
occasions, no effective order has been passed, the accused having failed
to appear before the court with any regularity. What is more troubling is
that the dispute concerns the dishonour of a cheque for a sum of Rs.
59,000/-. The complainant contends that, notwithstanding the repeated
listings, the proceedings have remained stagnant on account of the non-
appearance of the accused, and that the trial court took no effective steps
to secure his presence.
6. Collectively, the aforesaid cases disclose a concerning pattern of
procedural stagnation before the District Courts, and, equally, no effective
attention has been paid at the level of this Court. It underscores the need
for timely and effective intervention, so that the rule of law is upheld and
the ends of justice are not defeated by mere avoidable delay.
7. It is not an attribute of the individual alone, it reflects the
behavioural pattern of the institution in the dispensation of justice. Several
factors appear to contribute to this state of affairs. There is no notified
national policy governing the administration of justice, nor any settled
procedure or codified rules prescribed for it. Sustained, effective and
result-oriented training and learning programmes for Judges are wanting-
programmes that would bring consistency to judicial pronouncements and
help to build judicial character.
8. Constitutional morality and judicial character are not innate
attributes; they require to be cultivated through sustained training and
learning. Judicial character is not built solely upon the foundations of
integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and diligence, self-
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discipline, and commitment to justice and constitutional values. It rests
also upon institutional supports comprising: (i) sustained programmes of
training and learning; (ii) a mechanism for fixing accountability in respect
of decisions taken on the administrative side; (iii) corrective measures for
breaches of discipline; and (iv) a curriculum directed at cultivating
fraternity and a spirit of brotherhood. Every promotion or elevation should
be followed by a compulsory programme of training, so that the officer
may appreciate the consequences of decisions taken at each level and their
effect upon society.
9. ‘Judicial Character’ requires, further, the removal of influences
those corrupt or undermine it. Two such influences merit particular notice:
the protection of dynastic privilege and nepotism, and the favouritism that
arises from casteism and feudal patronage. The judiciary has neither an
army nor a purse. It possesses only the willingness of citizens to accept its
decisions, and that willingness rests upon the belief that the institution
belongs equally to all.
10. Above all, fraternity- as the Preamble conceives it- is not merely a
sentiment. It is a structural principle of constitutional morality and an
essential foundation of judicial character.
(emphasis supplied)
11. The Supreme Court envisaged a Chief Justice- centric
administration of the High Court that combines strong leadership with a
collaborative, participative & consultative approach, embedded with a
spirit of fraternity. Successive Chief Justices5, however, have not
5
A perusal of the agenda of the last ten meetings of the ‘Full Court’ indicates that
the designation of Senior Advocates was placed before it on two occasions, and
that the designations approved on one of those occasions have been challenged on
the judicial side, which challenge is pending consideration before the Lucknow
Bench of this Court. The remaining items on the agenda were related to the service
conditions of judicial officers. No matter of general policy, no matter affecting the
powers and status of the Court, and no annual report on the administration of
justice has been placed before the Full Court during this period.
(emphasis supplied)
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consistently followed the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. Today, there
is little beeway of conscious and participative dialogue among Judges at
the level of the High Court on matters related to the allocation of business.
Allocation of work is not linked to performance. There are no defined,
codified and notified parameters governing consideration for elevation
and promotion to the next level. Above all, decisions taken on the
administrative side attract no accountability, and are not subjected to audit
by any independent agency, so that accountability may be fixed in cases
of proven favouritism, partisanship, or the operation of other extraneous
considerations. The cumulative effect of the foregoing issues erodes the
conditions in which judicial character forms.
12. Upon a careful consideration of the facts of each case and of the
orders passed therein, it is considered appropriate to delineate the salient
features of each matter separately, so as to maintain clarity and to preserve
the full context. Accordingly, the key aspects of all four cases are first
examined individually; thereafter, a concise synthesis of the material
particulars is set out, before a reasoned conclusion is arrived at by taking
reference from seminal work by jurist, scholar, academician, and
constitutional scheme.
I- Pappu Met @ Pappu v. State of U.P. & Another
13. In this case, the petitioner has invoked Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to assail the order dated 19.11.2025 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bareilly, upon an application for
modification of the order dated 18.11.2025, whereby the petitioner had
been granted bail on his executing a personal bond of Rs.1,00,000/- and
furnishing two sureties, each in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the
court concerned. The petitioner is aggrieved by the conditions so imposed,
The administrative business of the High Court is at present transacted through 84
Committees. It is noticed that, over the last three and a half years, a majority of
these Committees have been chaired by two or three senior Judges of the Court,
who at the same time discharge judicial work on rosters that are themselves
demanding of time.
(emphasis supplied)
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contending that they are in disregard of the directions issued by the
Supreme Court In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (supra) and by
this court in Smt. Bacchi Devi v. State of U.P. (supra).
14. Briefly stated the facts are that an FIR No. 340 of 2024, under
Sections 305, 317(5) and 331(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,
was lodged at P.S. Bithri Chainpur, district Bareilly, against unknown
persons, alleging the theft of two buffaloes and one calf belonging to the
informant. During the course of investigation, the buffaloes were
recovered from the possession of the co-accused Hafeej Ahmad, Toufil
Ahmad, and Mohd. Kasif. The name of the petitioner surfaced during the
investigation; he was arrested and sent to jail, and was arrayed as an
accused in the charge-sheet. Upon filing the charge-sheet, the petitioner
preferred a regular bail application, which was allowed by the impugned
order with the condition to pay Rs.1,00,000/- as surety amount.
15. Upon the merits, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
co-accused, including those from whose possession the case property,
namely the two buffaloes and one calf, was recovered, were enlarged on
bail by the learned trial court upon executing a personal bond of Rs.
25,000/- and furnishing two sureties each in the like amount, whereas the
petitioner was directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs.1,00,000/- and
two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court
concerned. It is contended that the petitioner is a person of extremely
limited means and is unable to furnish sureties of that magnitude, and that
the impugned bail order therefore requires to be modified so as to enable
him to be released from custody.
16. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment and order
dated 15.03.2024 of the Supreme Court in Ashok Sandeep Singh v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh6, whereby the quantum of surety fixed at Rs.
10,00,000/- was reduced to Rs. 25,000/-. In that case, the direction under
challenge had required the release of the convict upon furnishing "heavy
surety" - an expression unknown to the jurisprudence of bail.
6
SLP (Crl) No. 3314 of 2024
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17. Learned counsel has further relied upon the judgment of this Court
in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra), whereby comprehensive directions were
issued to the judicial officers of the district judiciary with respect to the
grant of bail and the sureties to be furnished by an accused. It is submitted
that the impugned order is in disregard of the law laid down in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab7; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of
Delhi)8; Siddharth v. State of U.P. (supra); Satender Kumar Antil (supra);
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.9; as also
of the directions contained in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra).
18. While admitting the present petition, this Court passed a detailed
order dated 11.12.2025, with a view to explore the ways and means by
which such lapses may be addressed, so that public confidence in the
institution of the judiciary remains unimpaired and the discipline essential
to the judicial hierarchy is maintained in its letter and spirit. The relevant
excerpts from the order dated 11.12.2025 are reproduced hereunder:
“7. It is an admitted position that the co-accused Mohd. Kasif was
released on bail vide order dated 10.9.2024 with the direction to furnish
a personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- along with two sureties each in the like
amount to the satisfaction of the Court, whereas the petitioner in the
present case was directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000/-
along with two sureties each in the like amount.
8. It's a matter of record that that the Registrar General of this Court,
vide DO Letter No. 14293/Admin.G-II dated 4.11.2025, forwarded a
copy of the order/judgment dated 12.8.2025 passed in Criminal Misc.
Application u/s 528 BNSS No. 6400 of 2024, titled Smt. Bacchi Devi v.
State of U.P. & Anr. (supra), to all the District Judges to ensure strict
compliance in letter and spirit. All the District Judges were further
requested to send compliance report, as directed by this Court in
paragraph 38 (10) and 38 (XI), to the High Court upon receipt of the DO
letter through e-mail.
9. On perusal of the impugned order and the order dated 10.9.2024,
referred herein above, it is prima facie observed that the learned
7
(1980) 2 SCC 565
8
(2018) 7 SCC 731
9
(1978) 1 SCC 240
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Additional District and Sessions Judge has either not comprehended the
directions properly, or has misunderstood the same, or is otherwise not
willing to adhere to the directions, for reasons best known to them. This
is not a stand-alone case; this Court regularly receives applications
seeking modification of bail orders passed by the district courts in
clear defiance of Bacchi Devi (supra), and even prior to Bacchi Devi
(supra), in disregard of the several orders/judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court relied upon therein. The judgments of the Supreme
Court referred to in Bacchi Devi (supra) have not been reproduced
herein for the sake of brevity.
10. Based on the aforesaid deliberations, an explanation is sought from
the learned Judges, through the District Judge, Bareilly, who have
passed the impugned order and the order dated 10.9.2024 referred to
hereinabove, as to why the guidelines have not been followed by them,
and if they have been followed, the same may be duly explained. A
report is also called from the learned District Judge, Bareilly, regarding
all such orders wherein the learned Judges of the District Court,
Bareilly, have directed the release of accused(s) on two sureties post
12.8.2025. The report shall further indicate the date on which a
compliance report was communicated to the High Court in compliance
with DO Letter No. 14293/Admin.G-II dated 4.11.2025, referred to
hereinabove.
11. Assistance of the High Court, through the Registrar General, is also
required to ascertain whether the learned Judges have committed
'contempt of this Court' or 'of its own court' by not following the
directions in Bacchi Devi (supra), or whether it falls within their
discretion to interpret the judgments of the Constitutional Courts
according to their personal understanding of law based on old,
redundant practices having no legal sanction. Further, in case a wilful,
negligent, or callous approach is ex facie observed, indicating that the
learned Judges are intentionally not following the judgment(s) for
reasons best known to them, what remedial action is proposed to be
taken by this Court under its supervisory jurisdiction on judicial side.
11.1 This Court is conscious that it is indeed distressing - even
inconsistent with dignity - for this Court to so much as whisper about
initiating contempt proceedings against its own judicial officers, who
enjoy a distinct and elevated status in society and are entrusted with the
solemn jurisdiction to pronounce even capital punishment, where the
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law so requires and the accused is found guilty. However, the
persistent and repeated defiance of the orders passed by Constitutional
Court(s) has compelled this Court to consider appropriate measures to
address such continued contumacy. Judicial discipline is not a matter of
choice; it is a constitutional imperative that sustains the hierarchy of
courts and ensures coherence and certainty in the administration of
justice.
12. Judicial morality demands that every Judge, irrespective of rank,
faithfully follows the law declared by the Constitutional Courts. The
conduct of Judges does not remain confined to the four walls of the
courtroom; it shapes public perception of the justice-delivery system
and, in turn, moulds the moral fabric of society. When judicial orders
are disregarded, not only is the rule of law undermined, but the faith of
the people - on which the very foundations of a healthy democracy rest
- stands shaken.”
19. As the order dated 11.12.2025 was not complied with, this Court,
on the next date i.e. 18.12.2025, passed a further order setting out its
directions with greater clarity. The relevant excerpts thereof are
reproduced hereunder:
“1. This order shall be read in continuation of the order dated
11.12.2025, whereby explanations were sought from the learned
Judicial Officers who had passed the impugned order dated 10.09.2024.
By the said order, a report was also called for from the learned District
& Sessions Judge, Bareilly, with regard to all such orders passed by
the learned Judges of the District Court, Bareilly, directing the release
of accused persons on two sureties after 12.08.2025. Further, details
were sought regarding the date on which the compliance report was
communicated to this Court in pursuance of D.O. Letter No.
14293/Admin.G-II dated 04.11.2025.
2. The assistance of the High Court, through the Registrar General, was
also sought to examine whether the learned Judicial Officers had
committed "contempt of this Court" or "contempt of their own Court"
by not adhering to the directions issued in Smt. Bacchi Devi v. State of
U.P. and Another [2025 SCC OnLine All 5286].
3. In compliance with the order dated 11.12.2025, a letter dated
17.12.2025 has been received from the learned District & Sessions
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Judge, Bareilly. Upon perusal thereof, it is noted that one legal
awareness camp has so far been conducted by the District Legal
Services Authority, Bareilly, with members of the Bar of the Bareilly
Judgeship on 16.12.2025 at 01:30 p.m. The said communication further
encloses a list indicating that as many as 2,326 bail orders have been
passed after 12.08.2025 directing the release of accused persons on two
sureties. The contents of the letter dated 17.12.2025 prima facie indicate
that the directions issued by this Court in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra), as
well as the stipulations contained in the D.O. Letter dated 04.11.2025,
were not adhered to by the learned Judges of the District Court, Bareilly,
until a response was sought pursuant to the earlier order passed by this
Court.
4. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 3,
Bareilly, who had passed the impugned order dated 18.11.2025, has
stated in his reply dated 11.12.2025 that reliance was placed upon the
order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Criminal)
No. 4 of 2021, which lays down directions and procedures to be
followed for relaxation of bail/surety conditions in cases where the
accused is not released within a period of seven days from the date of
grant of bail.
5. In the aforesaid backdrop, the learned Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Bareilly, is further directed to: (i) furnish
copies of the order(s) upon which reliance was placed while directing
the accused to furnish two sureties each in the amount of Rs.1,00,000/-;
(ii) specify the issue involved before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Writ
Petition (Criminal) No. 4 of 2021; and (iii) submit a brief, date-wise
synopsis of all effective orders passed in the said writ petition till date.
6. The purpose of seeking the aforesaid details is to arrive at a logical
conclusion as to whether the learned Judge was justified in placing
reliance upon the said writ petition in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. This exercise shall also assist the Court in removing any
ambiguity or confusion.
7. Shri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Sudhir
Mehrotra, learned counsel for the High Court, seeks and is granted one
week's time to obtain instructions and to suggest an appropriate course
of action in situations where this Court finds that the directions issued
by Constitutional Courts have been ex facie disregarded by learned
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Judicial Officers. Shri Manish Goyal is also requested to examine the
directions and orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid writ petition and to assist the Court by way of written
submissions.
8. Shri Manish Goyal shall also furnish, district-wise, the number of bail
orders - both anticipatory and regular - passed by learned Judges after
12.08.2025 wherein accused persons were directed to furnish two
sureties, within one week.”
20. For clarity, it would be appropriate to set out briefly the
background of Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra), so that the context in which the
information came to be sought from the trial courts may be appreciated
and justified.
21. By order dated 12.08.2025, this Court, in exercise of its powers
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, issued a comprehensive
set of directions addressing a recurring procedural infirmity noticed
across the trial courts in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The infirmity lay in
the practice of remanding an accused to judicial custody upon his
appearance in answer to summons, in cases where no arrest had been
effected during the investigation. The accused was thus subjected to what
was, in substance, a formal arrest, followed by release after a fortnight or
a month. The consequence was that accused persons, apprehending
arrest, stayed away from the trial court for years together- in a substantial
number of cases as long as two decades- rather than appear and seek a
formal order of bail to facilitate the trial.
22. This Court held such remands to be contrary to the guarantee of
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, and inconsistent
with the binding directions of the Supreme Court passed in Satender
Kumar Antil (supra), Siddharth (supra), and Musheer Alam v. State of
U.P.10, among others. The relevant set of directions issued in Smt. Bacchi
Devi (supra) is also reproduced below:
10
2025 SCC OnLine SC 116
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“Directions:
38. Based on the foregoing deliberations, and to give effect to the
constitutional guarantees under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
this Court, in exercise of the powers vested in it under Article 227 of the
Constitution and Section 528 of the BNSS, and to secure the ends of
justice as well as to implement the directions issued in Satender
Kumar Antil (supra), hereby directs as follows:
(i) All District Judges shall ensure that, in cases where the charge-
sheet has been filed without arrest- whether because custodial
interrogation was not effected during investigation by Investigating
Officer, or the accused had secured anticipatory bail/protective orders
under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 528 of the BNSS and
duly cooperated during investigation- the trial court shall not remand the
accused to judicial custody upon appearance pursuant to summons, nor
insist upon filing of regular or anticipatory bail applications. The
accused shall be permitted to appear and furnish a personal bond at the
first instance, in terms of Musheer Alam (supra) and Satender Kumar
Antil (supra). The requirement of surety under Section 91 BNSS may be
considered subsequently at the court's discretion to ensure appearance
of the accused.
(ii). At the stage of proceedings under Sections 88, 170, 204, and 209
Cr.P.C. (corresponding sections 91, 190, 227 and 232 of BNSS), the trial
court- whether presided over by a District Judge, Additional District and
Sessions Judge, or Magistrate- shall inform the accused of his right to
furnish a personal bond at the first instance, and may require surety
subsequently, if necessary.
(iii). Immediately after appearance of accused in response to
summons, the court shall comply with Sections 230 and 231 of BNSS,
2023, committing the case to the court of session when exclusively
triable by it, and proceed to the next trial stage without unnecessary
delay.
(iv). For the sake of clarity, when the trial court encounters such
anticipatory bail or protective orders under Article 226 or Section 528
BNSS specifying protection till the filing of the charge-sheet, or direct
that "no coercive action"/"stay on arrest shall operate until filing of
charge sheet", these protections shall be deemed to continue until the
conclusion of trial, in line with Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra), Sushila
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Aggarwal (supra), Sidharth (supra), Satender Kumar Antil (supra), and
Musheer Alam (supra) unless supported by with cogent reasons, making
out an exceptional case. This direction aligns with the consistent
position adopted by the Supreme Court, beginning with Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia (supra), affirmed in Sushila Aggarwal (supra), clarified in
Sidharth (supra), and reiterated in Satender Kumar Antil (supra) and
Musheer Alam (supra). A reference may be invited to paragraphs 43, 44,
46 and 47 of the order dated 11.7.2022; paragraph no.3 of order dated
7.10.2021; paragraph no.6 of order dated 16.12.2021; paragraph no.4, 5
and 6 of order dated 21.3.2023; paragraph nos.7(ii) of order dated
2.5.2023; paragraph nos.229 to 239 of the order dated 13.2.2024;
paragraph nos.79 to 85 of the order dated 6.8.2024 passed in Satender
Kumar Antil v. CBI, [all the orders mentioned hereinabove have been
passed by Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No.5191 of 2021].
(v). The Joint Director (Prosecution) in each district shall maintain
detailed records of all such cases where trial courts remanded accused
persons to custody, despite charge-sheets being filed without prior
arrest, contrary to the Supreme Court directives in Arnesh Kumar
(supra), Sidharth (supra), Satender Kumar Antil (supra), and
observation made in Musheer Alam (supra).
(vi). All Jail Superintendents shall maintain corresponding records of
such cases. The record shall be maintained in a register documenting
cases along with a remand order where an accused has been sent to jail
by the trial court despite not being arrested during the investigation
and the judicial remand is contrary to the judgments mentioned in
preceding paragraph.
(vii). The Additional Director General of Police (Prosecution),
Directorate of Prosecution, Lucknow, shall compile an annual,
centralised record of all such instances, based on data from Joint
Directors (Prosecution), and Jail Superintendents. This record shall be
reviewed periodically, submitted to higher authorities, including the
Registrar General of the High Court. It shall be used to assess the
conduct of Judicial and Prosecuting Officers. The Directorate of
Prosecution shall promote compliance with binding directions, protect
the constitutional right to liberty, and preserve the integrity of the
criminal justice system. The objective is to establish an additional
layer of oversight at the zonal and regional levels, complementing the
centralised data maintained by the Directorate of Prosecution.
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(viii). The Director, JTRI, Lucknow, shall ensure sustained training
programmes for judicial officers to secure compliance with this order.
(ix). The Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, in coordination
with District Court Bar Associations, shall conduct regular legal
awareness camps to educate and sensitise advocates on these directions.
(x). District Judges shall submit monthly reports to the High Court
containing: (a) the number of cases in which judicial remand was
ordered despite no prior arrest; (b) feedback on judicial training and
compliance with these directions; and (c) details of legal awareness
camps conducted. A reference is invited to paragraph 11(d) of the
order dated 21.1.2025 passed in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI.
(xi). It is noted that Sidharth (supra) was delivered on 16.08.2021 and
reinforced in Satender Kumar Antil (supra) by order dated 11.7.2022.
Despite this, violations persisted by the learned trial courts, leading the
Supreme Court to direct skill enhancement training for a District Judge
nearly a year after Satender Kumar Antil and two years after Sidharth.
The Supreme Court also expressed concern that judges in other districts
of Uttar Pradesh remained unaware or indifferent to these directions,
therefore, it can safely be observed that the long-standing practice of
District Judges merely endorsing 'seen' on the cover page of
circulation letters for judgments has lost its efficacy. Therefore, the
learned District Judges shall endorse: “Read, understood, and discussed
with fellow judges of the district”, and, after deliberating on this
judgment with their fellow judges, submit a report to this effect to the
Registrar General of this Court immediately upon receipt of a copy of
this order.
Further Directions:
46. Accordingly, it is hereby directed that the mandatory requirement of
two sureties are dispensed with, and henceforth, (i) the
accused(s)/convict(s), as the case may be, shall be released on a "single
surety", subject to the satisfaction of the Magistrate or the court
concerned - the satisfaction shall drive from the socio- economic
condition of the accused- and that the surety bond amount be fixed in
accordance with the financial strength of the accused. In case, the
accused(s) is unable to produce sound surety within seven days from the
date of grant of bail, it would be the duty of the Superintendent of Jail
to inform the Secretary, DLSA who may depute from para legal
15
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
volunteer or jail visiting advocate to interact with the prisoner and assist
the prisoner in all ways possible for his release, besides other directions
contained in order dated 31.1.2023 passed in In Re: Policy Strategy for
Grant of Bail (supra), and (ii) if the accused has been booked in multiple
cases (FIRs) even across many states, the court shall forthwith release
the accused -if secures bail in all cases- in the light of Girish Gandhi v.
State of U.P. and Others (supra).
47. In view of the aforesaid deliberations, the Registrar General of this
Court is directed to place a copy of this order before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice, with a request to consider issuing fresh guidelines, in
supersession of Circular No. 44/98 dated 20.8.1998 and Circular No.
4258/Admin. ‘G-II’ dated 17.4.2020, as His Lordship may deem fit and
appropriate, for directing the subordinate courts on the verification of
sureties and bail bonds. The aforesaid circulars have lost their relevance
in light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in In Re: Policy
Strategy for Grant of Bail (supra) and other judgments discussed
hereinabove.
52. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to forthwith transmit a
copy of this order to all the District Judges, who shall, in turn,
circulate the same to all Judicial Officers of the District Courts; to the
Director General of Police, who shall circulate it to all Commissioners
of Police, Senior Superintendents of Police, and Superintendents of
Police; to the Additional Director General (Prosecution), who shall
circulate it to all Joint Directors in the districts; and to the Director,
Judicial Training & Research Institute, Lucknow, for record and
ensuring effective compliance.”
23. In compliance with the orders dated 11.12.2025 and 18.12.2025,
the learned trial Judge who passed the impugned order has submitted his
explanation. A perusal thereof discloses that reliance has been placed upon
Section 485 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and upon
the order passed by the Supreme Court In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of
Bail (supra).
24. The explanation does not meet the requirements of the order dated
18.12.2025. It proceeds upon a misunderstanding of the directions
contained in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra), particularly those in paragraphs
38(x), 38(xi) & 46. It does not indicate that the directions of the Supreme
16
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
Court issued In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (supra) were borne
in mind when the impugned order came to be passed. The directions
contained in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra) and in In Re: Policy Strategy for
Grant of Bail (supra) have both been misunderstood and erroneously
applied.
25. The purpose of calling for a second explanation was to sensitize
the officer, so that he would be vigilant in furnishing an explanation to this
Court that addresses the issue raised, in future. An explanation ought not
to contain extraneous or irrelevant material, since the inclusion of such
material tends to invite an adverse view. An explanation is not called for
from a judicial officer as a matter of course; it is sought for a purpose to
enhance his academic excellence in judicial working, and the officer is
expected to appreciate the reason for which it is required.
26. The information furnished by the learned District Judge, Bareilly,
discloses that Administrative Order No. 1336 of 2025, dated 16.12.2025,
was issued by him directing all judicial officers of the Judgeship to comply
with the directions contained in paragraphs 38(x) and 38(xi) of Smt.
Bacchi Devi (supra), and to furnish the number of cases in which orders
of judicial remand were passed although no arrest had been effected
during investigation, together with particulars of the awareness camps
organized in that behalf. The said Administrative Order dated 16.12.2025
is reproduced hereunder:
Order
"Under the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 6400/2025, Section
528 B.N.S.S., Smt. Bacchi Devi vs. State of U.P., the Honourable High
Court has passed the following directions in Paras 38 (X):"
38 (X)" District Judges shall submit monthly reports to the High Court
containing: (a) the number of cases in which judicial remand was
ordered despite no prior arrest; (b) feedback on judicial training and
compliance with these directions; and (c) details of legal awareness
camps conducted. A reference is invited to paragraph 11(d) of the
order dated 21.1.2025 passed in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI."
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A 227 No.15205 of 2025
"In compliance with the above directions, the Administrative Officer,
Bareilly, is hereby directed to collect data from all courts conducting
criminal cases on the following points by the 10th day of each month and
submit it along with a report for presentation before the Hon’ble High
Court:
1. The number of cases in which judicial remand orders were passed
despite no prior arrest.
2. Awareness camps organized in relation to the decisions."
27. The explanation also refers to Administrative Order No. 1158,
dated 13.11.2025, issued by the learned District Judge pursuant to letter
No. JTRI 1435(5) dated 06.10.2023 of the Judicial Training and Research
Institute, Lucknow, concerning the development of an environment of
continuous learning for judicial officers and staff. It is stated that a
committee of judicial officers of the District Court, Bareilly, was
constituted by Administrative Order No. 816A/2025 dated 11.08.2025,
and was entrusted with the task of organizing an interactive session every
Tuesday and Friday from 4:45 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. in the meeting hall in
order to equip, apprise and acquaint them of the law on the subject.
28. The interactive sessions are to cover, inter alia, the following:
(a) Subjects relating to the day-to-day working of the courts-
(i) business rules, including the General Rules (Civil) and the General
Rules (Criminal), the directions issued by this Court from time to time,
and general letters and circulars;
(ii) the provisions of procedural law, civil and criminal, required in the
day-to-day functioning of the courts;
(iii) relevant substantive law, including the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
the penal law, the Court Fees Act, and local laws;
(iv) training in technology, including hands-on experience of the
Ubuntu operating system, the Case Information System, the e-Courts
project as implemented in the district courts, video conferencing, the
handling of electronic evidence, and cyber safety;
18
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
(v) the relevant provisions of the revenue laws;
(vi) the role and functioning of the Court Amin;
(vii) alternative dispute resolution, legal aid and legal awareness, and
the role of the court staff; and
(viii) the manner of dealing with vulnerable witnesses.
(b) Subjects relating to behaviour and personality development-
(i) interpersonal relationships and skills, communication, personality
development, leadership skills, team building, and ethical foundations;
(ii) behaviour, manners and etiquette;
(iii) wellness and health;
(iv) stress management; and
(v) financial management, together with such other areas as require
skill enhancement and familiarization, namely, mental health, nutrition,
leadership skills, time management, emotional intelligence, motivation,
sensitization, deliberation upon social issues, interaction with
stakeholders, yoga, physical activity and sports, meditation, decision-
making, the sharing of experience, and appropriate dress.
29. In compliance with the orders dated 11.12.2025 and 18.12.2025
passed in Pappu Met, the learned District Judge, Bareilly, has reported
that, subsequent to the decision in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra), the directions
contained therein were not adhered to in 2,326 cases across the 47 courts
of the Judgeship. Table-I discloses that no judicial officer of the Bareilly
Judgeship, from the District Judge to the Munsif Magistrate, complied
with the directions referred to hereinabove, or with Administrative Order
No. 1336 of 2025 dated 16.12.2025.
30. The data furnished in respect of the judicial officers of the Bareilly
Judgeship is set out hereunder:
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A 227 No.15205 of 2025
Table-I
Sl. Name of Court Number of Bail Orders,
No. passed after 12.08.2025, in
recalcitrance of Smt. Bacchi
Devi (supra)
1. District Judge 325
From 12.08.2025 to 06.10.2025
2. District Judge 56
From 07.10.2025 to 12.12.2025
3. ADJ-Ist 111
4. Spl. Judge (SC/ST Act) 94
5. ADJ-IIIrd 105
6. ADJ-IVth/Spl. Judge (E.C. Act) 158
7. ADJ/Spl. Judge POCSO Act 37
8. ADJ-Vth 53
9. ADJ-VIth 27
10. ADJ/Spl. Judge POCSO Act-1 67
11. ADJ-IXth 80
12. ADJ/Spl. Judge, POCSO Act-3 40
13. Spl. Judge (P.C. Act) Spl. Court No. 2 34
14. ADJ/Spl. Judge POCSO Act-2 31
15. ADJ/FTC 50
16. ADJ/FTC-I 78
17. J.S.C.C. 12
18. C.J.M. 40
19. ACJM-1 21
20. A.C.J.M.-2 34
21. Addl. Cl. Judge (S.D.)-2 3
22. A.C.J.M.-3 105
23. A.C.J.M.-4 140
24. Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.)-3 2
25. Addl. Cl. Judge (S.D.)-1 30
26. A.C.J.M. (N.R.) 82
27. Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.)-4 2
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28. A.C.J.M. (N.E.R.) 9
29. A.C.J.M.-5 106
30. Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.)-6 30
31. Civil Judge (S.D.)/F.T.C. 0
32. J.M.-I 67
33. J.M.-II 32
34. Civil Judge (J. Div.) Baheri 8
35. Addl. Civil Judge (JD)-II 8
36. J.M.-III 25
37. Civil Judge (JD), Aonla 5
38. Civil Judge (J. Div.), Faridpur 10
39. Addl. Civil Judge (JD)-V/JJB 3
40. Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C.-1 6
41. Addl. Civil Judge (JD) Aonla 7
42. Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C. 3
43. Gram Nyayalay, Meerganj 14
44. Addl. Court N.I. Act 25
45. Spl. J.M.-II 30
46. Addl. Civil Judge (JD)-III 20
47. Spl. Judge (P.C. Act), Spl. Court No. 1 101
Total 2326
31. Finding the matter to be one of serious concern, this Court
directed all the learned District Judges to submit reports with respect to
compliance of the judgment of Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra). The reports
disclose that the position prevailing in the other district judiciaries of the
State is not materially different. In order that the gravity of the matter may
be appreciated, the particulars are set out hereunder:
Table-II
The number of bail orders, both anticipatory and regular, passed by learned
Judges after 12.8.2025, wherein accused persons were directed to furnish
two sureties in the District Courts of Uttar Pradesh in recalcitrance of Smt.
Bacchi Devi (supra), are delineated hereinbelow:
Sl. Name of District Number of Anticipatory Number of Regular
No. Bail Orders Bail Orders
1. Agra 370 3047
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A 227 No.15205 of 2025
2. Aligarh 149 2087
3. Ambedkar Nagar 155 3536
4. Amroha 161 1770
5. Auraiya 54 1476
6. Ayodhya 58 3856
7. Azamgarh 430 2632
8. Baghpat 128 2295
9. Bahraich 175 3695
10. Ballia 91 633
11. Balrampur 38 1648
12. Banda 4 2779
13. Barabanki 38 3107
14. Bareilly 364 2434
15. Basti 89 1137
16. Bhadohi 48 640
17. Bijnor 414 653
18. Budaun 138 3839
19. Bulandshahr 456 4825
20. Chandauli 65 1109
21. Chitrakoot 41 715
22. Deoria 15 2372
23. Etah 226 1767
24. Etawah 19 918
25. Farrukhabad 13 684
26. Fatehpur 18 3361
27. Firozabad 168 2502
28. Gautam Buddh Nagar 264 2784
29. Ghaziabad 1024 2454
30. Ghazipur 60 1674
31. Gonda 177 3025
32. Gorakhpur 198 3656
33. Hamirpur 24 2001
34. Hapur 0 0
35. Hardoi 22 2021
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36. Hathras 13 636
37. Jalaun 47 968
38. Jaunpur 197 2137
39. Jhansi 20 2379
40. Kannauj 36 1847
41. Kanpur Dehat 18 2318
42. Kanpur Nagar 190 3274
43. Kasganj 16 2264
44. Kaushambi 1 1439
45. Kushinagar 85 3863
46. Lakhimpur Kheri 98 1673
47. Lalitpur 3 1012
48. Lucknow 625 3087
49. Maharajganj 36 341
50. Mahoba 6 332
51. Mainpuri 59 2596
52. Mathura 176 3035
53. Mau 89 1043
54. Meerut 183 1090
55. Mirzapur 33 1167
56. Moradabad 235 3843
57. Muzaffar Nagar 213 2925
58. Pilibhit 60 549
59. Pratapgarh 85 3268
60. Prayagraj 93 2125
61. Rae Bareli 42 3086
62. Rampur 20 1268
63. Saharanpur 382 4170
64. Sambhal 55 1610
65. Sant Kabeer Nagar 15 208
66. Shahjahanpur 35 2786
67. Shamli 33 1239
68. Shravasti 27 1903
69. Siddharth Nagar 26 2001
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70. Sitapur 196 5959
71. Sonbhadra 146 527
72. Sultanpur 127 1115
73. Unnao 128 3306
74. Varanasi 232 634
Total 9775 156155
32. Shri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri
Sudhir Mehrotra, appeared for the High Court and placed before the Court
certain official notings dated 20.12.2025, 14.01.2026, 17.01.2026 and
03.01.2026, recorded by the Joint Registrar (Services), the Joint Registrar
(Administration, E-1, E-2 and FTC), the Registrar (J) (Confidential) and
the Joint Registrar (J) (Inspection) respectively. In substance, the noting
relate to: (i) whether any training programme has been undertaken at the
Judicial Training and Research Institute, or otherwise, in the aforesaid
regard; (ii) the obtaining of instructions, and the suggestion of an
appropriate course of action, in cases where this Court finds that judicial
officers have disregarded, ex-facie, directions issued by the constitutional
courts; and (iii) a request to Shri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Counsel,
to examine the directions and orders passed by the Supreme Court in this
behalf, and to assist this Court by way of written submissions containing
his suggestions.
33. Upon a perusal of the said notings, this Court is of the view that it
would not be in the interest of the institution to set out their contents in
full. A limited examination of the notings recorded in the several sections
of the Registry, and of the correspondence between the Registrar General
and the learned District Judges, is nonetheless necessary, in order to
understand the extent to which the directions of this Court have been
carried into effect across the State.
34. By D.O. letter No. 14293/Admin G-II dated 04.11.2025, the
Registrar General of this Court forwarded a copy of the judgment dated
12.08.2025 in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra) to all the learned District Judges,
with a request to ensure strict compliance therewith in letter and spirit.
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The Registrar General also requested that the compliance report
contemplated by paragraphs 38(x) and 38(xi) of Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra)
be transmitted to the High Court by electronic mail upon receipt of the
said letter.
35. Pursuant to letter No. 16570/Admin. E-II Section/Allahabad dated
20.12.2025, and the reminder letter No. 16582/Admin. E-II
Section/Allahabad dated 24.12.2025, issued by the Registrar General, the
noting dated 03.01.2026 records that data has been received from all the
District Courts by electronic mail and has been compiled by the office.
The data sets out, district-wise, the number of orders granting bail- both
anticipatory and regular- passed by the trial courts after the decision in
Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra), that is to say, on and after 12.08.2025, in which
the accused were directed to furnish two sureties.
36. The office note dated 03.01.2026 records that the Joint Registrar
(J) (Inspection) submitted a note upon receipt of a communication from
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court, seeking the
particulars called for in compliance with the order dated 18.12.2025,
whereby a compliance report had been required from the learned District
Judges with respect to the directions issued in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra).
37. Pursuant thereto, the learned District Judges of 25 districts-
namely, Azamgarh, Bahraich, Balrampur, Banda, Barabanki, Basti,
Budaun, Chandauli, Etah, Etawah, Gautam Buddh Nagar, Hapur, Hardoi,
Jalaun at Orai, Jaunpur, Jhansi, Kannauj, Lakhimpur Kheri, Maharajganj,
Mirzapur, Prayagraj, Raebareli, Saharanpur, Shamli and Sultanpur- have
transmitted their reports to this Court through the Registrar General.
38. Upon a perusal of those reports, however, it is apparent that none
of them contains the complete particulars called for by this Court through
the Registrar General, notwithstanding the reminders issued.
39. The learned District Judges of Prayagraj, Mirzapur, Raebareli,
Kannauj, Maharajganj, Bahraich, Jaunpur and Etawah have furnished
satisfactory reports, but only in respect of the month of November 2025,
though the report was sought for the period from 12.08.2025 onwards.
25
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
Those reports contain the minutes of the meetings held by the learned
District Judge with the other judicial officers, and particulars of the legal
awareness camps organized with the assistance of the District Legal
Services Authority and of the training programmes conducted for judicial
officers with respect to compliance with Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra).
40. The reports received from the remaining 49 districts 11 are
unsatisfactory, notwithstanding the fact that the Registrar General of this
Court had written to the learned District Judges on two occasions. The
noting dated 17.01.2026 records that, having regard to the urgency of the
matter, the office of the Joint Registrar (J) (Inspection) devised a Google
Form for obtaining the report for the month of December 2025; even then,
the complete information was not received.
41. An examination of the reports compiled through the Google Form
discloses that, for the month of December 2025, all the learned District
Judges have stated that there has been partial compliance with paragraph
38(x) and full compliance with paragraph 38(xi) of Smt. Bacchi Devi
(supra).
42. The learned District Judges of Aligarh, Ambedkar Nagar, Bareilly,
Basti, Bijnor, Balrampur, Ghazipur, Gorakhpur, Hamirpur, Hardoi,
Kanpur Dehat, and Sitapur offered no comment upon compliance with
paragraph 38(x), which relates to the training of judicial officers. The
learned District Judges of Gonda and Hathras have stated that training
could not be conducted in December 2025, and that a workshop will be
held at the earliest.
11
Agra, Aligarh, Ambedkar Nagar, Amroha, Auraiya, Ayodhya, Baghpat, Ballia,
Bareilly, Bhadohi (Sant Ravidas Nagar), Bijnor, Bulandshahr, Chitrakoot, Deoria,
Farrukhabad, Fatehpur, Firozabad, Ghaziabad, Ghazipur, Gonda, Gorakhpur,
Hamirpur, Hathras, Kanpur Nagar, Kasganj, Kaushambi, Kushinagar, Lalitpur,
Lucknow, Mahoba, Mainpuri, Mathura, Mau, Meerut, Moradabad, Muzaffarnagar,
Pilibhit, Pratapgarh, Kanpur Dehat, Rampur, Sambhal, Sant Kabir Nagar,
Shahjahanpur, Shravasti, Siddharthnagar, Sitapur, Sonbhadra, Unnao, Varansi.
26
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43. In District Firozabad, Hamirpur, Mathura, Kanpur Dehat,
Balrampur, Meerut, Gonda, no legal awareness camp was organized by
respective district judges.
44. The learned District Judge, Kaushambi, has conducted 55 legal
awareness camps, the highest in the State, followed by Raebareli, where
30 such camps were held during November and December 2025, and
Maharajganj, where 13 camps were held. In Mau and Jalaun, seven such
camps were conducted during the same period.
45. The position in district Hamirpur calls for particular notice. The
report discloses that the directions issued in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra)
have not been complied with in any respect, and that the letters addressed
by the Registrar General have not been responded to.
46. Upon a perusal of the particulars transmitted by the learned
District Judges, one thing is clear: none of them has filed a compliance
report in terms of the directions contained in the order dated 18.12.2025
passed in Pappu Met despite repeated orders and reminders. No District
Judge has properly furnished the number of cases in which judicial
remand was ordered although no arrest had been effected during
investigation. What has been furnished is confined to the particulars of
cases in which the accused were released upon furnishing two sureties.
(emphasis supplied)
47. This Court is conscious that compliance with such directions is not
a single event but a continuing obligation. The monthly reporting
mechanism contemplated by paragraph 38(x) was designed precisely to
ensure that the High Court retains a view of the position obtaining on the
ground, and that a formal compliance in one month is not followed by a
reversion to the earlier practice thereafter.
48. It is also to be noticed that, save for limited correspondence with
the Judicial Training and Research Institute, Lucknow, regarding the
imparting of training to judicial officers, and internal correspondence
between the Registry and the courts below, no suggestions or written
submissions have been placed before this Court on behalf of the High
27
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
Court through its counsel despite specific requests and thereafter judicial
orders.
(emphasis supplied)
II - Urmila Mishra v. State of U.P. and Others
49. By means of the present petition, the petitioner-complainant seeks
a direction to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj,
to decide, within a fixed time frame, Case No. 2080 of 2010, State v.
Rajendra Prasad Mishra and others, arising out of Case Crime No. 105 of
2009, under Sections 406, 419, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,
registered at Police Station Naini, District Prayagraj.
50. In order to appreciate what was called for by this Court and what
was in fact furnished by the court below, the relevant excerpts of the order
dated 16.12.2025 are reproduced hereunder:
“....3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proceedings in
the present case have been pending since 2009 without any substantial
progress. It is contended that upon completion of the investigation, the
charge-sheet was duly submitted and thereafter cognizance was taken
by the learned court concerned on 27.01.2010. However, despite more
than 16 years having passed, charges have yet to be framed against the
accused persons.
3.1. It is further submitted that applications seeking personal exemption
have been allowed repeatedly, without assigning any reasons, thereby
contributing to the inordinate delay in the proceedings.
4. The record suggests that on 27.1.2010, the case was registered and
summons were issued to the accused persons. The case was listed 18
times while the accused were in jail, and thereafter 160 times after their
release from jail. During this prolonged period, one of the co-accused
has died, and the other accused, namely, Umesh Tiwari, hardly appeared
on few occasions.
5. This is not an isolated instance where the trial court has failed to frame
charges despite the lapse of more than 16 years since the filing of the
charge-sheet. This Court is frequently confronted with matters of a
similar nature. Indeed, petitions seeking expeditious disposal are
routinely placed before this Court in cases where charges have not been
28
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
framed even after two decades from the date of filing of the charge-
sheet.
6. Even though the matter was heard and disposed of, while dictating
the order in chamber, this Court finds it necessary, in the larger interest
of effective judicial administration and the orderly dispensation of
justice, to seek certain factual details from the courts subordinate to it.
7. This Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, possesses the inherent authority to
supervise the functioning of the trial courts within its territorial
jurisdiction and to call for their records. Accordingly, information is
called for from the following courts functioning within the respective
judgeships of Uttar Pradesh: (i) the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
and / or Special Court; (ii) the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate; (iii) the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate; (iv) the learned Judicial
Magistrate; (v) the Juvenile Justice Board; and any other court
conducting trials in criminal cases.
7.1. The details shall be furnished year-wise, in descending order, for
the last twenty years, i.e., from 2004 to 2024, in the manner indicated
herein below of each Court separately. For the purpose of clarity and
illustration, the following table is provided to demonstrate the format in
which the information is required to be submitted, year-wise, as directed
by this Court.
For illustration, the following table has been prepared.
Total number of charge- 50 1. In 10 cases charges In the year 1998-
sheets filed by the police have been framed 5 cases;
during before the CJM, (provide details year- In the year 1999-
ACJM,JM , and the wise) 2 cases;
Juvenile Justice Board. In the year 2002-3
The data shall include cases.
both original and
2. In 25 cases charge (s)
supplementary charge-
have ‘not’ been framed.
sheets
3. 15 cases were triable
by the Sessions Court.
3.1 Out of 15, 05 cases 02 cases in 2006;
have been committed to 03 cases in 2008.
the Session (year-wise
committal).
3.2. 10 cases are still
lying with the Court.
Total number of charge- 20 1. In 10 cases in which In 01 case in the
sheets filed by the police the charges have been year 2008,
29
A 227 No.15205 of 2025
before the Court of framed
Session and/or the Special In 05 cases in the
Court. The data shall year 2009,
include both original and
supplementary charge- In 04 cases in the
sheets. year 2010.
In 10 cases charge (s)
have ‘not’ been framed
yet.
51. The particulars were called for from each court separately, year-
wise and in descending order, for the twenty years from 2004 to 2024, in
the manner indicated in the table set out in paragraph -7.1 of the order
dated 16.12.2025. For clarity, a specimen table was also provided to
demonstrate the format in which the information was to be furnished. It
was clarified immediately below the table that the particulars were to be
furnished in the manner so indicated for the year 2004 and for each
subsequent year up to 2024. It was further directed that where any case
instituted prior to the year 2004 remains pending before the courts below
and charge has not been framed therein, particulars of such cases were
also to be furnished in the same manner.
52. The report was to be submitted through the learned District Judge
concerned, within one week of receipt of a copy of the order dated
16.12.2025, and was to be transmitted to this Court through the Registrar
General. The learned District Judges were required to ensure strict
compliance with the directions, in letter and spirit.
53. The learned District Judges were also reminded that this Court is
conscious that quarterly inspections of the courts are conducted each year
by the judicial officers concerned; that the learned District Judge
undertakes an annual inspection of all the courts within the Judgeship; and
that an annual inspection is also carried out by the learned Administrative
Judge of the district. Having regard to these periodic inspections, the
particulars called for ought to have been readily available with every court
concerned.
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54. The Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, was also directed to
furnish year-wise and district-wise particulars of the number of charge-
sheets filed during the last five years before the courts referred to above,
namely, the Special Courts, the Courts of Session, the Chief Judicial
Magistrates, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates, the Judicial
Magistrates, and the Juvenile Justice Boards.
55. On the next date of hearing, that is, 11.02.2026, this Court
observed that the directions contained in the order dated 16.12.2025 were
explicit and self-explanatory, and for that reason they were not reproduced
in the order of that date. Notwithstanding this, the directions have not been
complied with. The relevant excerpts of the order dated 11.02.2026 are set
out hereunder:
“….3. Pursuant thereto, reports have been received from 49 out of 75
districts, while two districts namely Gonda and Bareilly sought
extension with regard to the compliance of order dated 16.12.2025.
Upon scrutiny, the reports submitted by the learned District Judges of
Agra, Bulandshahr, Farrukhabad, and Ayodhya are found to be in due
compliance with the terms of the order dated 16.12.2025, learned
District Judge Agra has made commendable efforts and needs
appreciation.
4. In respect of the remaining 45 districts from which reports have been
received, it is observed as follows: (i) The reports submitted by the
learned District Judges of Hamirpur, Mathura, Banda, Amroha, Hapur,
Pilibhit, Unnao, Azamgarh, Muzaffarnagar, Bhadohi, Sultanpur,
Raebareli, and Maharajganj are incomplete and do not fully satisfy the
directions contained in the order dated 16.12.2025, particularly year-
wise, the total number of charge-sheets in which the charges have not
been framed by respective criminal courts (separately) has not been
mentioned, and (ii) The reports submitted by the learned District Judges
of Basti, Ambedkar Nagar, Chitrakoot, Fatehpur, Orai, Lucknow,
Mirzapur, Moradabad, Saharanpur, Siddharthnagar, Hardoi, Auraiya,
Mau, Kushinagar, Kannauj, Bahraich, Balrampur, Rampur, Aligarh,
Lalitpur, Sant Kabir Nagar, Shrawasti, Sitapur, Ghaziabad, Mahoba,
Ghazipur, Lakhimpur, Kanpur, and Bijnor are in complete disregard of
the specific directions issued by this Court. The total number of cases
pending unattended, in which charges have not been framed since
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couple of decades, have not been mentioned and it seems to be done
deliberately.
5. Prima facie, the nature of the reports reflects either a failure to
properly comprehend the clear and unambiguous directions issued by
this Court or a failure to furnish the requisite information in the manner
directed. In either eventuality, such conduct has serious institutional
implications, as it affects judicial discipline, the hierarchy of courts, and
the orderly administration of justice, which are foundational to the rule
of law.
6. It was specifically directed that the report be submitted by the
respective learned District Judge, being the head of the district judiciary
and responsible for maintaining judicial discipline, recording
confidential reports, and recommending departmental proceedings
where warranted. However, the reports from Unnao, Kushinagar,
Kannauj, Sant Kabir Nagar, Shrawasti, Sitapur, Ghaziabad, and Hapur
have been submitted through an Officer-in-Charge, purportedly under
delegated authority. Whether such action amounts to dereliction of duty
or constitutes contempt of the order of this Court shall be considered at
an appropriate stage, after affording the concerned officers an
opportunity of hearing.
7. With regard to the remaining 26 districts, no report has been received.
The respective learned District Judges except of District Bareilly and
Gonda, have neither sought extension of time nor complied with the
directions issued vide order dated 16.12.2025. Though the conduct
prima facie warrants appropriate action, this Court, in the 'larger
institutional interest', grants one further opportunity of one week to
comply strictly with the directions contained in the order dated
16.12.2025. The issue with regard to non-compliance shall be
considered thereafter, whether the learned District Judges require
upgradation of administrative and judicial capabilities or otherwise.
8. Paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2 of the order dated 16.12.2025 clearly mandate
that each criminal court within the district shall furnish, inter alia, the
total number of charge-sheets in which charges have not been framed
from the year 2004 to 2024, along with a year-wise break-up for each
court in the district. The reports received indicate that in several
instances the directions have not been understood or implemented in
their true letter and spirit. This Court refrains from making further
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observations regarding administrative or judicial capacity; however, it
is observed that the learned District Judges may, if necessary, seek
guidance from the learned District Judge, Agra, whose report has been
found upto the mark. The learned District Judge, Agra, may extend
assistance if approached in that regard.
9. The question as to whether submission of a report by an Officer-in-
Charge, in the face of a specific direction to the learned District Judge
by a Constitutional Court, constitutes negligence or contempt is left
open for determination at an appropriate stage.
10. Except for the learned District Judges of Agra, Bulandshahr,
Farrukhabad, and Ayodhya, all other learned District Judges shall
furnish a report strictly in terms of the order dated 16.12.2025 on or
before 27.02.2026.
11. Insofar as the learned District Judge, Amethi, has informed this
Court that since 30.08.2011, the District Court has not been functioning
from its own building and that the foundation stone for the new District
Court building was laid on 17.01.2026, no report is presently required
from the District Court, Amethi.
12. List on 27.02.2026 at 02:00 p.m., as fresh and tied up.
13. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to transmit a copy of this
order to all the learned District Judges of the Uttar Pradesh except Agra,
Bulandshahr, Farrukhabad, and Ayodhya forthwith for compliance.
14. Ms. Pratima Vishwakarma, Advocate & Ms. Juveriya Kazmi,
Advocate are hereby appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court in
the matter, and shall coordinate with Mr. Jatin Rana, Research
Associate.”
56. Upon a perusal of the reports submitted by the learned District
Judges, it emerges that four cases instituted in the year 1981 remain
pending in the district of Mirzapur. The position for the succeeding years,
in which charge has not been framed and which remain pending before
the courts of the learned Magistrates, is as follows: 1983- 10 cases; 1984-
5; 1985- 8; 1986- 7; 1987- 9; 1988- 14; 1989- 25; 1990- 13; 1991- 21;
1992- 33; 1993- 29; 1994- 37; 1995- 40; 1996- 110; 1997- 110; 1998- 122;
1999- 184; 2000- 230; 2001- 314; 2002- 414; and 2003- 434.
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57. A further examination of the particulars discloses that 14,08,134
cases instituted since the year 1981 are pending trial before the Chief
Judicial Magistrates, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates and the
Judicial Magistrates, and that 2,07,521 cases are pending before the
Courts of District and Sessions Judge, in which charge has not yet been
framed. The year-wise break-up from the year 1981 is set out in the table
below:
Consolidated Data on Cases in the State of Uttar Pradesh Where Charges Have Not
Been Framed
S. No. Sessions Court Magisterial Total Pending Year
Court Cases
1. 0 4 4 1981
2. 0 10 10 1983
3. 0 5 5 1984
4. 0 8 8 1985
5. 0 7 7 1986
6. 0 9 9 1987
7. 0 14 14 1988
8. 0 25 25 1989
9. 0 13 13 1990
10. 0 21 21 1991
11. 0 33 33 1992
12. 0 29 29 1993
13. 0 37 37 1994
14. 0 40 40 1995
15. 0 110 110 1996
16. 0 110 110 1997
17. 0 122 122 1998
18. 0 184 184 1999
19. 0 230 230 2000
20. 0 314 314 2001
21. 0 414 414 2002
22. 0 434 434 2003
23. 72 12,967 13,039 2004
24. 87 12,571 12,658 2005
25. 149 14,597 14,746 2006
26. 328 17,279 17,607 2007
27. 558 21,077 21,635 2008
28. 732 22,690 23,422 2009
29. 644 28,047 28,691 2010
30. 947 29,419 30,366 2011
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31. 1658 38,343 40,001 2012
32. 2644 39,029 41,673 2013
33. 2672 35,500 38,172 2014
34. 3660 48,759 52,419 2015
35. 11,139 59,102 70,241 2016
36. 12,461 58,968 71,429 2017
37. 20,326 79,883 1,00,209 2018
38. 29,955 97,843 1,27,798 2019
39. 14,838 1,06,945 1,21,783 2020
40. 19,889 1,27,689 1,47,578 2021
41. 20,538 1,55,565 1,76,103 2022
42. 27,719 1,91,645 2,19,364 2023
43. 36,505 2,08,043 2,44,548 2024
Total 2,07,521 14,08,134 16,15,655
58. In compliance therewith, the office of the Director General of
Police has submitted its report. The report discloses that, during the period
from 01.01.2021 to 31.12.2025, charge-sheets were filed before the courts
in Uttar Pradesh in the following numbers: District Judges- 13,408;
Additional District Judges- 1,34,499; Chief Judicial Magistrates-
5,25,547; Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates- 7,85,784; Judicial
Magistrates- 5,70,991; Juvenile Justice Boards- 39,169; and other courts-
1,82,231. The zone-wise break-up is set out in the table below:
Details of the charge- sheets filed by police between 01.01.2021-
31.12.2025
Sl. Zone DJ ADJ CJM ACJM JM JJB Other Total
No. Courts
1. Meerut 9798 21387 40266 60045 40420 4539 24493 200948
2. Agra 202 11372 58414 69804 59304 2993 16988 219077
3. Kanpur 190 8109 44317 35649 40626 1403 15002 145296
4. Bareilly 9 14941 71320 102774 121034 2586 9879 322543
5. Lucknow 398 22517 81617 154065 72969 5957 31754 369277
6. Gorakhpur 430 14042 74874 96532 93431 8214 16915 304438
7. Prayagraj 192 7873 34324 26638 37479 1296 12870 120672
8. Varanasi 500 13409 46486 58666 63887 6191 24726 213865
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Sl. Commissio DJ ADJ CJM ACJM JM JJB Other Total
No. narate Courts
1. Lucknow 821 3886 10702 34634 6162 1604 4280 62089
2. Gautam 0 4025 14314 26386 3513 757 1278 50273
Buddh
Nagar
3. Kanpur 87 3145 12127 17401 10600 698 6558 50616
Nagar
4. Varanasi 210 2009 1787 13953 4148 770 6417 29294
5. Prayagraj 475 1583 4694 28596 3927 823 1874 41972
6. Agra 3 2647 14220 24958 6882 653 3059 52422
7. Ghaziabad 0 2862 14918 29338 5995 608 2430 56151
DJ ADJ CJM ACJM JM JJB Other Courts Total
GRP 93 692 1167 6345 614 77 3708 12696
DJ ADJ CJM ACJM JM JJB Other Total
Courts
State of 13408 134499 525547 785784 570991 39169 182231 2251629
Uttar
Pradesh
III - Sarfraj Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Another
59. A First Information Report No. 1044 of 2008, under Sections 147
and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, was registered against the petitioner at
Police Station Loni, District Ghaziabad, on dated 26.07.2008. Upon
completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against him on
11.05.2010 in the court of the First Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Ghaziabad, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 332, 336, 353, 427, 435,
441 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 7 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act, 1932, and Section 3/4 of the Prevention of Damage
to Public Property Act, 1984. Since the filing of the charge-sheet, the case
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has been listed on 143 occasions, but has not reached the stage of framing
of charge.
60. The petitioner-accused has approached this Court seeking a
direction to the learned trial court to frame charge and to conclude the trial
at the earliest.
IV- V.S. Palitube v. State of U.P. and Another
61. The present petition has been filed seeking a direction to the
learned trial court to decide, within a fixed time frame, Complaint Case
No. 1738 of 2013, V.S. Palitube, through its Partner Vinod Kumar
Prajapati v. Shekhar Sachan.
62. Shri Rajeev Sawhney, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted
that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, registered as Complaint Case No. 1738 of 2013, was instituted on
18.04.2013 against respondent no. 2, and that, notwithstanding the lapse
of considerable time, no effective order has been passed therein. The
petitioner accordingly approached this Court by Application under
Section 482 No. 16588 of 2023, which was disposed of by order dated
26.05.2023, directing the learned trial court to decide the complaint case
preferably within six months of the production of a certified copy of that
order, and without granting unnecessary adjournment to either party.
63. It is further contended that the learned trial court was duly
apprised of the order dated 26.05.2023 by an application dated
29.08.2023. Even then, no effective order has been passed, and the matter
is still at the stage of summoning the accused.
64. Upon hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, and upon a
perusal of the record, this Court, vide order dated 03.11.2025, directed the
learned trial court to furnish the following particulars in tabular form,
through the Registrar General of this Court:
(i) the date of registration of the complaint;
(ii) the dates on which the matter was listed;
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(iii) the orders passed on each such date;
(iv) particulars of the report or reports of the process server received
pursuant to the summons issued to the respondent;
(v) the reasons which prevented compliance with the direction contained
in the order dated 26.05.2023; and
(vi) the legal impediment, if any, in the way of such compliance.
65. No report was filed in compliance with the order dated
03.11.2025. The Registrar (Compliance) was therefore directed once
again to communicate a copy of that order to the learned trial court, so as
to enable it to furnish the particulars called for. The office report indicates
that no compliance report had been submitted till 08.12.2025.
Accordingly, by order dated 09.12.2025, this Court directed the learned
District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, to appear through video conferencing,
together with the officer before whom Complaint Case No. 1738 of 2013
is pending, to explain the reasons for the non-compliance. The judicial
officers were heard in chamber and tendered an unconditional apology,
whereupon he was excused from further appearance.
66. By subsequent orders, learned counsel for the petitioner was
directed to place on record certified copies of all the orders passed in the
complaint case from 18.04.2013 to date, together with true typed copies
thereof. Shri Rajeev Sawhney, learned counsel for the petitioner, has
accordingly filed the certified copies by way of a supplementary affidavit
dated 10.02.2026.
67. The report submitted by the learned Magistrate discloses that the
complaint case was registered on 18.04.2013 and has since been listed on
more than 100 occasions.
The examination of the position disclosed in Pappu Met
68. Pursuant to the communications of the Registrar General dated
20.12.2025 and 24.12.2025, district-wise data was compiled in respect of
orders granting bail passed after 12.08.2025 in apparent non-compliance
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with Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra). The compiled data discloses that, in 9,775
orders granting anticipatory bail and 1,56,155 orders granting regular bail
passed after that date, the accused were directed to furnish two sureties by
the judicial officers.
69. The district-wise position discloses that the departure was not
confined to any one part of the State. Among the higher figures returned
are Ghaziabad (1,024 orders of anticipatory bail), Lucknow (625 such
orders), Sitapur (5,959 orders of regular bail), Bulandshahr (4,825 such
orders) and Saharanpur (4,170 such orders).
70. Of the districts from which reports were called for, only 25
submitted reports at all, and those were largely incomplete
notwithstanding repeated reminders. Only eight learned District Judges -
of Prayagraj, Mirzapur, Raebareli, Kannauj, Maharajganj, Bahraich,
Jaunpur and Etawah - furnished material that was satisfactory, and that too
confined to the month of November 2025. The reports received from the
remaining districts were deficient.
71. Even after the corrective measure adopted on 17.01.2026 pursuant
to the orders of this Court, the deficiencies persisted. Remands contrary
to the directions in Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra) were reported in 36 cases in
Hamirpur, in 07 cases in Ghaziabad and in one case in Gonda, alongside
a failure to conduct judicial training and legal awareness programmes in
several districts. Significantly, the reports do not disclose full compliance
with paragraphs 38(x) and 38(xi) of Smt. Bacchi Devi (supra) in any
district.
The examination of the position disclosed in Urmila Mishra case
72. The directions contained in the order dated 16.12.2025 met with a
similar response. Of the 75 learned District Judges, only 04 furnished
complete data; 23 furnished none at all; and 45 furnished material that was
defective. It became necessary to pass a further order on 11.02.2026,
whereafter the number of districts responding rose to approximately 60.
Even so, 10 learned District Judges did not furnish, in the prescribed
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format, the year-wise and court-wise data of cases in which charge has not
yet been framed.
73. Taken together, the material discloses a structural difficulty of
considerable magnitude. In all, 16,15,655 cases are pending in which
charge has not been framed- 14,08,134 before the Magistrates and
2,07,521 before the Courts of Session- the pendency extending back to the
year 1981.
74. Against this, the police filed 22,51,629 charge-sheets in the 05
years between 2021 and 2025. The comparison indicates a widening gap
between the volume of cases entering the criminal courts and the rate at
which charge is framed in them, and points to an institutional capacity that
has not kept pace with the burden placed upon it.
75. The individual cases before this Court reflect the same position. In
Sarfraj Ahmad, the First Information Report was registered on 26.07.2008
and the charge-sheet was filed on 11.05.2010; the case has since been
listed on 143 occasions without charge being framed. In V.S. Palitube, a
complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
instituted in the year 2013 has been listed on more than 100 occasions,
and remains at the stage of summoning the accused, notwithstanding the
direction of this Court dated 26.05.2023 that it is to be decided within six
months.
76. The data and the illustrations, read together, disclose not isolated
lapses but a persistent difficulty in securing timely compliance, the
framing of charge, and the progression of criminal trials to their logical
end, besides other infrastructural and judicial behaviour patterns.
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Examining the correlation between judicial behaviour, legal traditions and
social impact, as it emerges from the empirical data gathered from the
courts below:
77. Two intertwined concerns emerge from the facts of the cases
discussed hereinabove, from the compliance reports furnished by the
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learned District Judges, from the empirical data examined, and from the
records and orders perused. The first is the manner in which information
called for by this Court has been responded to by the courts below, coupled
with an apparent difficulty in comprehending and applying the judgments
of the constitutional courts. The second is that these difficulties are
compounded by wider structural factors - among them the limitations of
judicial self-governance, the vulnerabilities arising from internal
dependence, deficiencies in institutional resources, and the absence of a
congenial atmosphere for a coherent work culture.
78. The difficulty experienced by a trial court in comprehending and
applying the judgments of the constitutional courts is not merely an
individual shortcoming. It is a systemic issue, rooted in institutional
arrangements, legal education, the design of judicial training programmes,
and institutions’ behavioural patterns. A principal reason lies in systemic
institutional constraints and psychological and behavioural patterns that
to shape and contribute judicial behaviour.
79. The material suggests that judicial officers tend to adhere to
established practice and precedent rather than to adopt a fresh
constitutional interpretation, particularly where such interpretation would
materially alter procedural or customary practices. In some instances a
constitutional precedent may have been overlooked; in others, an overly
cautious approach appears to have been taken, so as to minimize the risk
of reversal in appeal. In yet others, constitutional judgments have been
cited formally without their reasoning being applied, resulting in
mechanical rather than substantive compliance.
80. There may well be further reasons. An examination of this
difficulty enables this Court to:
(i) draw attention to a larger issue requiring the consideration of those
charged with the administration of justice, by studying the comparative
judicial behaviour of judicial officers in the light of scholarly writing,
research, and the views of jurists and judges, and by reference to the
empirical data;
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A 227 No.15205 of 2025
(ii) examine the reasons for the persistent problem of delay, which lie in
inadequate infrastructure, in the absence of effective capacity-building
and training and learning programmes, and in an ineffective supervisory
mechanism;
(iii) examine the extent to which this Court has been able to discharge the
responsibility cast upon it by Article 227 of the Constitution; and
(iv) consider why it has become necessary to address, on the judicial side,
matters that ordinarily fall within the administrative functioning of this
Court.
81. These issues touch the foundation of the procedure established by
law, and bear upon the standing of the courts and of the judicial hierarchy.
For a nation that aspires to the status of a developed country, such judicial
inertia and institutional apathy are not merely administrative or attitudinal
lapses; they go to the core of the judicial system.
82. A thorough examination of these issues is required, together with
their redressal, by analyzing judicial behaviour and the incidental
challenges faced by our judicial system, in comparison with the
experience of other jurisdictions. The resolve of the Government to
provide infrastructure, both material and human, plays a pivotal role in
strengthening the justice delivery system, as does the commitment of
judges to the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 200212.
12
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct are an internationally recognized
statement of the standards of ethical conduct expected of judges. They originated
in a draft code prepared at a meeting of Chief Justices convened in Bangalore in
February 2001 under the auspices of the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial
Integrity, a body formed under the United Nations. The draft was revised in
consultation with judges of both the common law and civil law traditions, and was
adopted in its final form at a Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, in November 2002. The United Nations Economic and
Social Council, by Resolution 2006/23, invited member States to encourage their
judiciaries to take the Principles into consideration in formulating rules of
professional conduct. The Principles rest upon six values; (i) independence, (ii)
impartiality, (iii) integrity, (iv) propriety, (v) equality, and (vi) competence and
diligence.
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83. To address the larger issue, briefly outlined hereinabove, it is
useful to refer to ‘Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial
Behaviour’13, which provides a structured overview of common trends in
courts across the world, encompassing the approaches of judges to: (i)
data, methods and technologies; (ii) court staffing, advocacy, litigation
and appellate review; (iii) judicial opinions and institutional relations
within and among courts; (iv) judicial independence, both internal and
external; (v) the relationship between courts and society, including public
support and political and social acceptance; (vi) judicial hierarchy; (vii)
judicial accountability; and (viii) emerging frontiers in comparative
judicial behaviour.
84. The reference to the seminal work rooted in the comparative study
of judicial behaviour, once the sole province of political scientists of the
United States, has now become a global research enterprise, drawing upon
law, administration, history, economics and psychology to illuminate
‘how and why judges make the choices they do, and the consequences of
those choices for society’. Such study opens a window upon the goals and
domains of fair adjudication and institutional functioning, and upon the
securing of timely, impartial and accessible justice in accordance with the
procedure established by law.
(emphasis supplied)
85. The relevant reference from ‘The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Judicial Behaviour’ may assist our various elements of
government and judicial training institutes in formulating national policy
for administration of justice, independent of judicial pronouncements
13
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behaviour is the work of 59 jurists
and professors from around the world. This Handbook is edited by Lee Epstein,
Gunnar Grendstad, Urška Šadl and Keren Weinshall, and published by Oxford
University Press. This book shows us something important: a judge's behaviour is
not shaped by law alone. It is also shaped by race, caste, religion, and identity. It is
shaped by how a judge thinks - their cognitive perspective. And society is shaped
by the choices judges make. In turn, the way judges behave and make choices
influences the nation’s ideological orientation, and thus shapes society.
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from time to time. It is to be noticed that the judicial structure and its
components have largely developed in India through the pronouncements
of the constitutional courts14, and that no scientifically designed policy and
programmes have been framed after considering the views of the several
stakeholders - litigants, research scholars, jurists, economists, data and
social scientists, non-governmental organizations and others. A reference
to the aforesaid work may therefore assist in arriving at a meaningful
conclusion.
86. The significance of the research compiled in The Oxford Handbook
of Comparative Judicial Behaviour lies principally in its systematic
approach to understanding judicial behaviour. It examines the factors that
influence judicial decision-making, the role of institutional arrangements
in shaping judicial choices, and the broader impact of judicial conduct on
society. The research underscores that judicial institutions are not shaped
by rules and structures alone, but also by the conduct, values and
professional capacities of those who serve within them. It therefore
highlights the importance of sustained judicial training, continuous
learning, capacity-building and appropriate mechanisms of accountability
in fostering a judiciary that is independent, impartial, competent and
responsive to its institutional responsibilities.
14
The Supreme Court has, in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, W.P.
(C) No. 1022 of 1989, exercised a continuing supervision since 1989 over the
service conditions, infrastructure and efficiency of the district judiciary.
Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission , (2008) 17 SCC 703. By
order dated 04.01.2007, the Supreme Court prescribed a uniform, time-bound
framework for filling vacancies at every level of the subordinate judiciary.
Subsequently, by order dated 22.10.2018, in exercise of its powers under Article
142 of the Constitution, the Court directed all High Courts and State Governments
to report the manner in which vacancies were being filled, and whether the process
would be completed within the time schedule so prescribed. Both the petitions are
pending consideration before the Supreme Court and various directions have been
issued with respect to administration of justice and judicial establishment.
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87. In their quest to explain ‘judicial choices’, the scholars and
contributors to ‘Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behaviour’
laboured within five key approaches comprising:
(i) Legalism (traditional version; judges find the meaning of legal
rules in true- politically- neutral methods; law– as– an–inst: law (broadly
defined) constrains judges from acting on their personal preferences,
institutions, biases, and emotions;
(ii) Attitudinal Model (political science, psychology)-judges’ votes
reflect their policy preferences towards case facts;
(iii) Rational Choice Accounts (economics, political science): Labour
Market Model- judges are motivated and constrained by (mostly) non-
pecuniary costs (e.g. effort, criticism) and benefits (e.g. esteem, influence,
self-expression); Strategic Analysis: Judges are strategic actors who
realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on the preferences
of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the
institutional context in which they interact;
(iv) Identity Accounts (psychology, sociology): Judges’ biographies,
professional backgrounds, personal characteristics, and identities affect
their choices; and
(v) ‘Thinking Fast’ Judging (psychology, behavioural economics):
Judges rely on heuristics, intuitions, and the choices (e.g.‘hunches’) to
make fast and effortless decisions.
88. In India, judges by and large follow the traditional ‘legalist
approach’. It is therefore apt to refer to the introductory chapter of the
Handbook for an analysis of that approach, its implications for the justice
delivery system, and its bearing upon the outcome of cases.
89. The Handbook draws upon Jowett's account of the trial of
Socrates, who, on trial for his life, declined to appeal to the ‘emotion’ of
judges, believing that the judge ‘has sworn that he will judge according to
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the laws and not according to his own good pleasure15. That outlook is
described as ‘legalism’. In its simplest form, legalism holds that law exists
independently of judges, free of morals and politics; that legal rules are
determinate; and that the legal system is complete’16.
(emphasis supplied)
90. The traditional conception of the legalist outlook requires judges
to ‘find’ or discover the meaning of legal rules through politically neutral
methods, independent of career considerations, ideology and emotion -
just as Socrates proclaimed. It engages scholars, particularly within the
civil law tradition, in the construction of a rationalized ideal: the
systematic organization of legal sources, including judicial decisions, into
a coherent, unified whole.
91. Legalism continues to permeate theories of judicial behaviour,
though usually in a weaker or more modern form. The dominant
approaches today tend to reject the stronger legalist assertion that the
rationality, neutrality and objectivity of law alone guide judicial choice.
Contemporary accounts - described by the editors of the Handbook as
‘law-as-an-institution’ approaches - proceed upon the footing that law
‘matters’, but with a qualification: law, broadly defined to include
constitutional provisions, statutes and past judicial decisions, is one
among several institutions that structure judicial behaviour, whether by
constraining choice or by shaping shared judicial preferences.
92. Further study is required of how, why and in what circumstances
‘law’ shapes judicial decisions across national legal systems and
international regimes, and of how the weight of precedent may be
measured - proceeding upon the understanding that law is not a static or
formalistic concept but a dynamic institution that structures and constrains
judicial reasoning.
15
Jowett, Benjamin, trans. 2020. ‘The Apology of Socrates’. The Center for Hellenic
Studies, Harvard University, Washington, DC.
16
Maitland, Frederic William. 1898. ‘A Prologue to a History of English Law’. Law
Quarterly Review 14:13-33.
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93. The path-breaking research of Gretchen Helmke17 on the Supreme
Court of Argentina illustrates the value of ‘vote’ and ‘outcomes studies’.
She demonstrates that, although both the Argentine and US Constitutions
allow judges to ‘hold their office during good behaviour,’ the rule is a
parchment in the Argentine; ‘good behaviour’ does not mean life tenure
as understood and practiced in the US, but tenure for life in the appointing
regime. Helmke observes that incoming Governments of Argentina
routinely get rid of their predecessors’ judges despite constitutional
guarantees. She theorized and empirically demonstrated that Argentine
judges, fearing for their jobs or even their lives, rationally anticipate the
threat and ‘strategically defeat’, that is, what against the existing regime
once it begins losing power. Therefore, there may be a different ‘outcome’
based on the value of ‘vote’.
94. The Handbook also engages with the study of judicial institutions
- the formal and informal rules and procedures governing the selection
and retention of judges, and the means by which judicial decisions may
be undone. Constitutional arrangements ordinarily provide the mechanism
for the appointment of judges and prescribe the procedures by which
judicial decisions may be displaced. The comparative study of
constitutional provisions, appointment mechanisms, statutes, treaties and
case law suggests that the choices made by judges shape their decisions,
and that those choices in turn influence the appointment procedures
themselves, which thereafter bear upon the decisions that follow.
17
Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. ‘The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive
Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy.’ American Political
Science Review 96:291-303.
Helmke, Gretchen. 2005. Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and
Presidents in Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gretchen Helmke is the Thomas H. Jackson Distinguished University Professor
in the department of Political Science at the University of Rochester. Helmke’s
research spans political institutions, judicial politics and the rule of law, informal
institutions and norms and democratic erosion in Latin America and the United
States.
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95. Other work on judicial behaviour considers the consequences of
internal institutional arrangements - such as rules permitting the Chief
Justice to determine the size and composition of a Bench, as in the
Supreme Courts of India and Canada; norms that permit, and indeed
encourage, dissent, as in the Supreme Courts of the United States and
Australia18; and the manner in which control of the docket shapes judicial
behaviour19. Here again, the idea is to explore how institutions drive
judicial choices and, ultimately, what effect those choices have on society
and on judicial institutions themselves.
96. Among other concerns, one issue that has emerged in the aforesaid
cases20 is the non-compliance by trial court judges with orders passed by
constitutional courts. A critical examination of judicial hierarchy, with
reference to the Handbook, would help explain why trial court judges may
hesitate to follow such orders in letter and spirit. Hierarchical logic
manifests across diverse contexts - in both the design and operation of the
judicial process and in shaping the drivers of judicial behaviour.
97. Hierarchy is everywhere in the administration of justice. Indeed,
any structural formulation of adjudication as a principal-agent scenario
expresses the understanding that an agency ‘problem’ is inherent in the
hierarchy of justice. While this is mostly framed as a systemic bug to be
minimised, can the structural differentiation between higher and lower
courts be framed as a feature to be optimised, if not maximised? An
inversion of the fundamental judicial pyramid can be traced in the diverse
strategies that lower-court judges may exploit to avoid or disregard upper-
court review. Tracing these strategies reveals a murkier institutional reality
than the one gleaned from pyramidal depictions of judicial systems.
18
Alarie, Benjamin, and Andrew J. Green. 2014. ‘ Policy Preferences and Expertise
in Canadian Tax Adjudication.’ Canadian Tax Journal 62:985-1027
19
Skiple, Jon Kare, Mark Jonathan McKenzie, and Henrik Litlere Bentsen. 2021.
‘How Docket Control Shapes Judicial Behaviour: A Comparative Analysis of the
Norwegian and Danish Supreme Courts’. Journal of Law and Courts 9 (1):111-36.
20
Pappu Met (supra) and V.S. Palitube (supra)
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98. The lower court judges have similar interpretive leeway in
applying High Court decrees to future decisions 21. When the High Court
corrects a specific legal error in a certain case and remands for re-
adjudication under the corrected norms, and when it sets a general
precedent for a class of future cases, trial judges are the ones entrusted
with effectuating the High Court’s mandate. They can thus selectively cite,
distinguish, or interpret it to more closely satisfy their understanding of
the legal issue or their competing policy preferences22.
99. In some systems, upper court judges also affect, and sometimes
govern, judicial selection and promotion, impacting the extent of what
terms 'internal judicial independence23'. The judicial leadership positions
may affect colleagues' decision-making behaviour and this has been
evident in the tendency and capacity of chief judges to promote consensus
in their courts to bolster their legitimacy and improve internal working
relations24. On specific panels, the positions of presiding judges have been
shown to have an outsize effect on the votes of other panel members25.
100. Hierarchy in the judiciary differs from hierarchies in other
branches of state power- hierarchical executive bodies-cabinets,
21
Reynolds, G. H., and B. P. Denning. 2000. ‘Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came’.
Wisconsin Law Review 2000 (2): 369-402
22
Baum, L. 1978. ‘Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions:
Reconsidering a Negative Picture.’ The Justice System Journal (3): 208-19.
Baum, L. 1994. ‘Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and
Lower Federal Courts.’ Political Research Quarterly 47(3): 693.
23
Rios-Figueroa, J. 2019. ‘Independence in Judicial hierarchies: Civil Law Systems’.
In Research Handbook on Law and Courts, S.M. Sterett and L. D. Walker, 105-13.
Cheltenham: Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.`
24
Bentsen, H. L., and J. K. Skiple. 2023. ‘Leadership in Courts’. In The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behaviour, edited by L. Epstein, G. Grendstad,
U. Sadl, and K. Weinshall. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25
Eisenberg, T., T. Fisher, and I. Rosen-Zvi. 2013 . ‘Group Decision Making on
Appellate Panels: Presiding Justice and Opinion Justice Influence in the Israel
Supreme Court’ Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 19(3): 282-96.
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ministries, agencies, municipalities, militaries, police forces - reflect in
their structure the location of political legitimacy with the topmost
principal, which is then devolved to its multiple agents (be it the initial
design or the result of centralized processes). This means that any act of
an agent within a public organization-high-level manager and street-level
bureaucrat alike- is perceived as if it were signed off by the organization’s
principal, who can instruct the agent on the decision to be taken, decide to
revoke or replace it, and is ultimately publicly (and sometimes legally)
accountable for it.
101. Ori Aronson26 in Chapter 32 of ‘The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Judicial Behaviour’, writes about ‘Hierarchies of Justice’,
and observes that the judicial power works differently: it is presumably
located, in its entirety, with each judge and each court individually. The
validity of a trial court's decision is not contingent upon appellate court
approval. The appellate court cannot instruct the trial court on how to
decide a pending case, nor is it held accountable for the trial court's
decision. This means that hierarchy in adjudication impacts judicial
behaviour.
102. Hierarchies generate economies of power, status, and effort that
are reflected in judicial behaviour. Given the complex purposes
underlying judicial hierarchy and the intricate mechanisms through which
it operates, it is important to examine how this hierarchy shapes decision-
making in both superior and subordinate courts. While hierarchical
structures confer authority, they also shape the incentives and constraints
within which judges’ function.
103. Ostensibly, judges of higher courts enjoy comparatively less
institutional accountability than those in lower courts, as they are not
26
Ori Aronson is an associate professor of law at the Bar- Ilan University Faculty of
Law, where he also serves as the deputy director of the Menomadin Center for
Jewish and Democratic Law and the co-director of the Program for the
Advancement of Arab Law Students. Ori served as clerk and legal assistant to the
Chief Justice of the Israel Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, and as law clerk to
Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Judge, Jon Newman.
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subject- at least not to the same extent- to further review by a superior
forum, a notion reflected in the observation of Jackson, J., in Brown v.
Allen 344 US 443 (1953): “We are not final because we are infallible, but
we are infallible only because we are final.” Yet, higher court judges
remain concerned with the effective implementation of their decisions,
which depends significantly on compliance by lower courts. This
interdependence makes subordinate courts an important audience for
appellate rulings, encouraging higher courts to craft clear, precise, and
easily applicable opinions. Such clarity not only facilitates compliance but
also signals to prospective litigants the likely outcomes of similar appeals,
thereby helping manage appellate caseloads.
104. At the same time, lower court judges are not merely passive
recipients within this hierarchy. They possess certain avenues to avoid or
subtly circumvent appellate review, particularly because appeals tend to
focus on legal determinations. Trial judges may frame their decisions
through fact-specific findings and contextual nuances, thereby shaping the
practical application of higher court directives. Consequently, judicial
hierarchy operates not as a rigid chain of command, but as a dynamic
system of interaction, negotiation, and influence across different levels of
the judiciary27.
105. There is another element which affects the judicial behaviour -
‘judicial independence’ - the concept finds its roots in both the forces that
motivate and those that discourage court-curbing. On the one hand,
motivations for court-curbing include ideological pillarisation, political
self-defence, the pursuit of court-curbing policies irrespective of their
realistic prospects of enactment, and broader public and scholarly
concerns often framed in terms of “populism.” On the other hand, several
factors operate to discourage court-curbing, including constitutional
27
Baum, L. 1978. ‘Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions:
Reconsidering a Negative Picture.’ The Justice System Journal (3): 208-19.
Westerland, C., J. A. Segal, L. Epstein, C. M. Cameron, and S. Comparato. 2010.
‘Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S.’ Courts of Appeals. American
Journal of Political Science 54 (4): 891-905
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impediments, the presence of veto players, political fragmentation, and
sustained public support for the judiciary. Courts around the world have
been found to enjoy high levels of public esteem relative to the political
branches28.
106. Public support for the judiciary is often expected to insulate judges
from court-curbing attacks, at least in consolidated democracies where
political elites need to worry about winning popular elections29. This
expectation presumes that the judiciary enjoys some instrumental
legitimacy (also known as ‘diffuse support’) that is relatively robust to
fluctuations in public (dis-)satisfaction with judicial decisions. There is
some evidence to show that, despite political polarization, widespread
commitments to broader democratic and constitutional values underpin
public support for the US Supreme Court30.
107. Frans van Dijk31 in the 35th Chapter- ‘Conceptualizing and
Measuring Judicial Independence’ - of the Handbook describes
independence as a state forward notion. The independence of the judiciary
apparently matters to people. In the European Union, an annual survey of
the general public and companies is conducted specifically on this topic.
The survey shows that people often have strong opinions about judicial
28
Gibson, James L., Gregory K. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. 1998. ‘On the
Legitimacy of National High Courts’. American Political Science Review 92(2):
343- 358.
29
Vanverg, Georg. 2015. ‘Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A
Theoretical Assessment’. Annual Review of Political Science 18: 167- 85.
30
Gibson, James L., Gregory K. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. 1998. ‘On the
Legitimacy of National High Courts’. American Political Science Review 92(2):
343- 358.
Gibson, James L., Gregory K. Caldeira. 2011. ‘Has Legal Realism Damaged the
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?’. Law & Society Review 45(1): 195- 219.
31
Frans van Dijk is professor of Empirical Analysis of legal systems at Montaigne
Centre of Utrecht University, advisor of the Netherlands Council of the Judiciary
and project leader, Independence and Accountability of the European Network of
Councils for the Judiciary'.
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independence. Judicial independence is captured in a multi-dimensional
profile to assess the performance of the judicial system. Judiciaries,
governments, and non-governmental organisations highlight the need for
multidimensional insight into the independence of judiciaries in a regional
context (ABA 2022; EC 2022; ENCJ 2023, page 781).
108. Dijk considers that independent behaviour and independent
decisions are two components that help to measure judicial independence.
Whether judges are guided solely by the law and not by political and
economic interests should be demonstrated in court through how they treat
the parties in court, their procedural decisions, and their final judgments
should be free from any improper influence, and they should appear show
to be so reasonable observer and, more generally, to the parties/societies
in general. Independence in the sense of authority should be shown by the
actual implementation of judgements by the parties. The common
approach to measurement is surveying the perceptions in society on those
matters, either of general population or of specific group, or of experts.
(emphasis supplied)
109. In addition, European Network of Councils for the Judiciary
(ENCJ) organizes regularly (currently every three years) a survey among
the judges of Europe about their independence. It contains questions on
how they rate their own independence and that of all judges in their
country, their perception of the implementation of judicial decisions by
government that is against its interests and asks judges about the respect
for judicial independence of political actors, parties/lawyers in
procedures, and the leadership of the judiciary. In addition, it addresses
intermediate results, such as whether judges are appointed solely based on
knowledge and experience. These surveys are restricted to the
professional judges. A separate survey has been conducted about the
perceptions of independence of lay judges. The perceptions of
professional and lay judges proved similar. The ENCJ has also organized
surveys among lawyers, together with the Council of Bars and Law
Societies of Europe.
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(emphasis supplied)
110. The comparative study of judicial behaviour, as set out,
underscores that judicial independence is not a monolithic ideal but the
product of institutional arrangements that balance autonomy against
accountability. In the Indian context, the ‘collegium system’ has
strengthened external independence by insulating appointments from
political influence. It has, at the same time, given rise to questions
concerning internal independence, it being suggested that the
concentration of the appointing power in a small body of senior Judges
may not sufficiently provide for transparency and institutional
accountability.
111. In contrast, judicial appointment processes in the United States
and Europe, and other developed countries reflect different calibrations of
this balance. In the United States, the model combines executive
nomination with legislative confirmation, embedding democratic
accountability within the process while exposing it to overt politicization.
European jurisdictions, by contrast, often rely on judicial councils or
hybrid bodies that include judges, legal professionals, and lay members,
thereby diffusing power and promoting transparency. These systems
recognize that while judicial independence is essential, it must coexist
with procedural legitimacy and public confidence - values that are
reinforced through clear, rule-based mechanisms rather than informal,
fluid conventions or shifting norms.
112. With utmost respect and reverence for the powers vested in the
Supreme Court under Articles 129, 141, 142, and 144 of the Constitution
of India, and other similarly situated provisions, alongwith judicial
innovations made in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association
v. Union of India32, In Re: Presidential Reference33, and Supreme Court
Advocate-on-Record Assn. Case (2015)34, which collectively reinforce the
doctrines of binding precedent and judicial discipline, the sole objective
32
(1993) 4 SCC 441
33
(1998) 7 SCC 739
34
(2015) SCC OnLine SC 964
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is rather to identify underlying causes through a considered engagement
with national and international standards governing the establishment and
functioning of courts.
113. In India, the independence of the judiciary is not merely an
institutional arrangement but a foundational constitutional value,
embedded in doctrines such as the ‘basic structure principle 35’ and
reinforced through judicial innovations in public interest litigation.
However, unlike the relatively stable and homogeneous political
environments often examined in Western scholarship, the Indian judiciary
operates amid complex social hierarchies, economic disparities, and
administrative challenges. Consequently, while Epstein’s comparative
jurisprudence highlights how courts calibrate their behaviour strategically,
Indian courts often adopt an expansive and interventionist role, stepping
into governance gaps to uphold rights and ensure accountability.
114. Another unique feature of Indian judiciary is that when the political
branches lack the wherewithal to overturn their constitutional court’s
decision or otherwise retaliate against the court and its judges, perhaps
because of gridlock or disagreement over the ‘right course of action,’
judges ignore the government and the public. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v.
35
The Kesavananda Bharti judgment, delivered on 24th April, 1973, is a landmark
judgment of the Supreme Court of India. The case was filed by Sri Kesavananda
Bharti, the head of Hindu religious Mutt in Kerala, challenging the constitutional
validity of the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments to the Indian Constitution, which
sought to curtail the powers of the judiciary and the fundamental rights of citizens.
The significance of the Kesavananda Bharti case lies in the fact that it established
the doctrine of basic structure of the Indian constitution. The basic structured
doctrine holds that certain fundamental features of the Constitution, such as
supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, and the independence of the
judiciary, cannot be amended or abrogated by the Parliament through a
constitutional amendment. The Kesavananda Bharti case has thus had far -
reaching consequences for the constitutional development of India, making it one
of the most significant case in Indian constitutional law. 1973 SCC OnLine SC
156.
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Raj Narain36, the Supreme Court struck down clause (4) of Article 329-A,
introduced by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975,
which sought to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond judicial
scrutiny. In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India37, the Supreme Court
struck down clauses in the 42nd Amendment that conferred unlimited
amending power of constitution to the Parliament and excluded judicial
review.
115. Likewise, the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014,
commonly known as the National Judicial Appointments Commission
(NJAC) Act38, received the President’s assent on 31.12.2014 and was
struck down by the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Assn. v. Union of India (supra). The Constitutional Bench
judgment suggests that it has exhibited a historic level of independence,
not only a strong penchant for judicial supremacy, but also a high degree
of institutional independence in the matter of judicial appointments and
establishment, and deference to constitutionalism and the rule of law.
116. The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding that, while
performing its judicial function stricto sensu, the judiciary is not to be
equated with the other organs of the State, namely, the executive and the
legislature. That position accords with the doctrine of separation of
powers, and leaves the courts free to examine dispassionately the
constitutionality of State action said to curtail fundamental rights, those
guaranteed by the Constitution. Accordingly, while acting on the judicial
36
1975 Supp. SCC 1
37
(1980) 3 SCC 625
38
The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 (NJAC) was passed by the
Lok Sabha on 13.08.2014 and by the Rajya Sabha on 14.08.2014, and was
thereafter ratified by sixteen State Legislatures. In each House it was passed with
near-unanimous support cutting across party lines, no vote being recorded against
it. Under Article 368 of the Constitution, an amendment of this description requires
a majority of the total membership of the House and a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the members present and voting, besides ratification by the
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States; each of these requirements was
satisfied.
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side, the courts are not comprehended within the definition of "the State"
under Article 12. It is only when the courts deal with their employees, or
act in other matters in a purely administrative capacity, that they fall within
that definition39.
117. At the same time, the increasing globalization of law and
commerce necessitates that Indian courts remain attentive to international
best practices. The demands of a modern economy - particularly strict
regulatory compliance, reliable enforcement of mercantile and
commercial contracts, and the efficient resolution of disputes - require a
judiciary that is not only independent but also institutionally effective and
responsive with strong judicial character.
118. Persistent issues such as judicial delays, procedural inefficiencies,
and inconsistencies in enforcement of contracts40 continue to undermine
confidence of international business community in Indian judiciary.
Moreover, the effective functioning of arbitration regimes and the creation
of a predictable, investor-friendly legal environment depend on the courts
exercising restraint, respecting party autonomy, and ensuring minimal
interference, time-bound arbitral processes, and unquestionable integrity
of arbitrators41.
39
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 (nine-Judge
Bench), reaffirmed in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 (five-
Judge Bench). See also Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 461
40
In Ease of Doing Business, India improved its position by 79 places, moving from
142nd in 2014 to 63rd in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking 2020.
However, Enforcing Contracts remains a significant weak spot, with India ranking
at 163 out of 190 countries: Reference; Ministry of Law and Justice, Government
of India; https://dashboard.doj.gov.in/eodb/#.
41
In 2025, Queen Mary University of London’s School of International Arbitration,
in collaboration with White & Case LLP, conducted a survey on the most preferred
seats of arbitration. The survey reveals that the most preferred seat is London
(34%), followed by Singapore and Hong Kong (31% each), Beijing (20%) and
Paris (19%). Approximately 2% of respondents in the Queen Mary and White &
Case LLP survey identified India as a preferred seat of arbitration. At the same
time, Indian parties routinely rank among the highest-volume foreign users of the
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119. Arbitration is not merely a process of alternative dispute
resolution. It is also a measure of the confidence which the international
business community reposes in our judicial system, and of the respect
commanded by our constitutional institutions.
120. Thus, the challenge for institutional development in India lies in
reconciling its unique constitutional and social context with the
imperatives of a globalized legal order. While comparative judicial
behaviour scholarship provides valuable insights into how courts function
within systems of power, the Indian experience demonstrates that judicial
independence must also be responsive to developmental needs and
societal expectations. Strengthening institutional capacity, ensuring
timely dispensation of justice, maintaining law and order, and fostering a
coherent legal framework for commerce are essential for aligning India’s
judiciary with both domestic aspirations and global standards.
121. Comparative research indicates that judicial behaviour in turn
influences the development of the law and of judicial institutions. In India,
judges select judges and set norms for the judges. The entire mechanism
of selection, performance, and outcome is controlled and supervised by
the Judges. The infrastructure, structural, and human resource issues are
managed by the various committees constituted by the Chief Justice. The
judges are not only independent in the dispensation of justice but also in
the appointment of judges and in setting norms for the functional judicial
establishment. A distinctive feature that has emerged through judicial
innovation, grounded in the choices of judges who have administered -
and continue to administer - justice. Therefore, an inference can be drawn
that the choices judges made have shaped, and continue to shape, the
society. It may safely be concluded that India's judicial establishment
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), established in 1991.
Reference: 2025 International Arbitration Survey, The Path Forward: Realities and
Opportunities in Arbitration; Queen Mary University of London, School of
International Arbitration, White & Case;
https://www.qmul.ac.uk/arbitration/media/arbitration/docs/White-
CaseQMUL-2025-International- Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf.
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today is the outcome of the choices made by our judges, who were charged
with, and responsible for, the development of the judicial institutions.
122. The question of judicial appointments in India lies at the intersection
of constitutional design, democratic legitimacy and judicial interpretation.
The Constitution originally envisaged a consultative process between the
executive and the judiciary for the appointment of Judges. The collegium
system, evolved through the decisions in the Second and Third Judges
cases42, altered that balance, the Supreme Court holding that primacy in
the matter of appointments rests with the judiciary, as an incident of the
independence of the judiciary forming part of the basic structure. The
arrangement has been the subject of academic and institutional comment,
and proposals for reform have been advanced from time to time. It is not
necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to enter upon that question.
123. In the Indian context, particularly with reference to the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, it is argued that the High Court’s
administrative machinery largely operates through unwritten norms and
confidential deliberations, that struggles to meet these standards of
transparency and institutional clarity. The absence of formal rule-bound
procedure, the non-disclosure of reasons, and the lack of external
oversight and internal independence have led to criticisms that the system
perpetuates elitism and undermines diversity within the judiciary.
Moreover, the Chief Justice’s control over appointments and internal
administration of the High Court consolidates significant institutional
power, raising questions about the separation of powers and the potential
erosion of checks and balances. Jurists and students of law also recognize
this duality, noting that while the judiciary espouses internal equality,
institutional realities often reflect a centralized administrative model.
124. The Law Commission of India has prepared a number of reports,
which do not appear to have received the consideration they merit. The
Commission is ordinarily chaired by a former Chief Justice of India, or by
a former Judge of the Supreme Court. The reasons for the limited
42
(1993) 4 SCC 441 & (1998) 7 SCC 739
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engagement with its reports merit examination, as does the question why
recommendations made by the same individuals carry differing weight
according to the office they hold at the time.
125. The Chief Justice of a High Court is regarded as primus inter
pares - first among equals - within the collegiate structure of the judiciary.
This conception reflects the constitutional design under Articles 214-231
of the Constitution of India, which does not confer adjudicatory
superiority of the Chief Justice over companion judges. However, in
practice, the institutional functioning of High Courts tends to be markedly
Chief Justice-centric. The Chief Justice exercises exclusive administrative
prerogatives; this concentration of administrative control, coupled with
influence over judicial assignments and the management of the court’s
resources, renders the office structurally dominant (over-centralized),
thereby creating a functional hierarchy that is incompatible with the
formal ideal of judicial equality and constitutional morality.
126. The management of internal administrative affairs by the Chief
Justice of the High Court further complicates this landscape. While
administrative autonomy is a necessary component of judicial
independence, excessive centralization within the higher judiciary can
blur the distinction between independence and insulation. International
standards - reflected in instruments such as the basic principles on the
independence of the judiciary - emphasize not only freedom from external
interference but also the need for objective criteria, transparency, and
accountability in judicial governance. From this perspective, the Indian
system appears to fall short, as it relies heavily on fluid conventions rather
than codified rules and procedures.
127. The challenge for India, therefore, lies in re-imagining a system
that preserves the core of judicial independence while aligning with global
standards of transparency, accountability, and procedural fairness.
Comparative experience suggests that no single model offers a perfect
solution; rather, effective systems balance competing values through
institutional design. Incorporating elements such as independent
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commissions, clearly articulated selection criteria established in
accordance with due procedure based on codified rules, greater public
disclosure, and effective participation by all homogeneous sections of
society could help bridge the gap between independence and
accountability.
128. Our judicial system, though evolved judicially, lacks a clear
constitutional or statutory framework and operates largely through
internal fluid conventions. This insularity limits external oversight and
weakens formal mechanisms of accountability. At the same time, the
judiciary’s role in developing procedural norms and institutional practices
through case law means it effectively acts as both a rule-maker and an
adjudicator. In such a system, traditional democratic checks - such as
legislative scrutiny or executive control - are intentionally minimized to
protect independence. Still, the absence of rule-based internal
accountability mechanisms creates a structural imbalance.
129. In conclusion, our judicial system illustrates both the possibilities
of judicial independence and the pitfalls of judicial self-governance.
While it has fortified external independence, it has also exposed
vulnerabilities in internal independence and institutional legitimacy. As
India engages with global legal norms and seeks to strengthen its rule of
law framework, reforming judicial appointments and internal governance
remains an urgent priority - one that must reconcile constitutional
principles with the demands of a modern, transparent, and accountable
judiciary.
130. The question of judicial accountability in India becomes
particularly complex considering two structural features: the collegium
system of appointments and the judiciary’s expansive role in shaping
development through its own pronouncements. Together, these create a
system in which the judiciary not only interprets the law but also
significantly determines its own institutional composition and evolution.
While this has been justified as essential for preserving independence, it
raises a difficult question: when outcomes fall short, whether in terms of
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efficiency, transparency, or alignment with international standards - who
shall bear the responsibility?
131. When we comparatively analyze international standards of judicial
independence, the result is a paradox: our judiciary is constitutionally
independent but institutionally insulated. When our courts struggle to
meet international standards, such as timely justice delivery, efficient
contract enforcement, or predictable legal processes, the diffusion of
responsibility becomes evident. The executive may cite judicial backlog;
the judiciary may point to inadequate infrastructure or legislative gaps.
Yet, in a system where the judiciary controls appointments and
significantly influences internal institutional norms, the judiciary cannot
entirely disclaim responsibility.
132. Ultimately, accountability in such a framework must be re-
conceptualized not only as shared but also as structured responsibility. The
judiciary must strengthen internal transparency and adopt clearer criteria
and processes, while the legislature and executive must support
institutional capacity without encroaching on independence. Without such
re-calibration, the risk remains that independence, instead of enabling
institutional excellence, may inadvertently shield systemic inefficiencies
from meaningful reform.
133. There is another aspect, “who judges the judge,” where judges act
in an administrative capacity and are alleged to have exercised discretion
in an arbitrarily or discriminatory manner, thereby undermining standards
of internal judicial independence. In the Indian context, administrative
powers - such as roster allocation, case listing, conduct of the business of
the High Court through its Committees, non-adherence to the High Court
Rules by the Chief Justice and Members of the Administrative Committee
of the High Court or unfit recommendations within the collegium system-
are largely insulated from external and internal review on the ground that
judicial independence must be preserved from executive or legislative
interference. However, this insulation creates a doctrinal gap: while
judicial decisions are subject to appeal and review, judges' administrative
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decisions often escape structured scrutiny, even when they have profound
consequences for fairness, equality, and institutional integrity. As a result,
accountability for erroneous or discriminatory administrative conduct is
largely internal, resting on conventions of self-regulation, peer scrutiny,
and the ethical expectations of the office.
134. From a normative and comparative perspective, this concentration
of administrative authority without corresponding accountability
mechanisms raises concerns about the erosion of internal judicial
independence, where judges within the system may themselves be subject
to opaque or unequal treatment. As scholars Lee Epstein, Gunnar
Grendstad, Urska Sadl, and Keren Weinshall highlight in their seminal
work, ‘The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behaviour,’
institutional legitimacy depends not only on independence from external
actors but also on transparent, rule-bound governance within the judiciary.
Courts around the world have been found to enjoy higher public esteem
relative to the political branches. In a participatory democratic framework,
the extent of political and social acceptance of the courts serves as a
benchmark for assessing their effectiveness and the degree of public
reverence they command.
135. In the absence of formal review structures, the burden of judging
the judge shifts informally to the institution itself - through full-court
deliberations, internal checks, and, increasingly, public scrutiny. Yet such
diffuse accountability is often insufficient. A more credible framework
would require the development of clearly articulated administrative
standards, reason-giving obligations, and limited but meaningful review
mechanisms based on rule-bound procedure, ensuring that the exercise of
judicial discretion, even in administrative matters, remains consistent with
constitutional values of equality and fairness.
136. The High Court’s administrative business is discharged in
accordance with the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. These Rules are
made by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in exercise of the
powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India and all other
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powers enabling it in that behalf. Chapter-III deals with the executive and
administrative business of the Court, wherein there are rules for
appointment of Administrative Judges, Administrative Committee,
allocation of Administrative work, matters to be placed before the Chief
Justice, Administrative Judges, Administrative Committee and the Full
Court.
137. For illustration, Chapter III(d) of the Allahabad High Court Rules
pertains to matters relating to the affairs of the ‘Full Court’. Rule 8 of
Chapter III mandates that the Chief Justice shall convene a meeting of the
Full Court once every three months, excluding the summer vacation. It
further provides that if a request is made to the Hon’ble Chief Justice by
not less than five Judges to call such a meeting, the same shall be convened
within one week of the request.
(emphasis supplied)
138. However, over the past ten years, only 16 Full Court meetings
have been convened by the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The High Court Rules
mandate that general policy matters and matters affecting the powers and
status of the Court, as well as the consideration of the general annual
report on the administration of justice to be submitted to the Government,
shall be placed before the Full Court, at least quarterly. However, for last
ten years no general policy matter affecting the powers and status of the
Court has ever been placed before the ‘Full Court 43’ meetings. Likewise,
the general annual reports on the administration of justice have neither
been laid before the Full Court nor forwarded to the Government, as
required under the Rules. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the
43
It was given an impression that last two Full Court meetings of this Court were
stage-managed in the manner of a government whipping its members through a
confidence vote, and this affronts the dignity of a Judge's office. It is also to be
noticed that the proceedings of the Full Court do not record the concurrence or
dissent of individual Judges. Where a collegiate body resolves without recording
the views of its members, the deliberation which the forum exists to secure is not
evidenced on its record.
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prevailing state of functioning, working, and administrative culture in the
High Court.
139. The rationale behind convening the Full Court is founded on the
principle of ‘mutual recognition44’ of the individual views of its Judges.
140. The chilling effect of the unstructured discretion vested in the
office of the Chief Justice is that the learned senior most Judge of this
Court was entrusted with the charge- the Chairman- of 18 Committees 45
44
Gillian Rose- A British social philosopher developed her own version of
recognition rooted in the work of George Hegel- has suggested a comparable, very
strong interpretation of the concept of ‘mutual recognition’, according to which it
designates a relationship ‘which does not dominate or suppress but recognizes the
difference and sameness of the other’. See, The Struggle for Recognition- The
Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts by Axel Honneth (The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts; Published in 1996); Gillian Rose, Hegel contra Sociology (London:
Athlone, 1981), p.69.
45
(i) The Administrative Committee, (ii) Committee for the Designation of Senior
Advocates, (iii) Rules Committee, (iv) Committee constituted to Monitor the
progress of the matters of the High Court and the courts sub-ordinate of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad pending with the State Government, (v) Security
Committee for the Allahabad, (vi) Museum and Archives Committee at Allahabad,
(vii) Committee for the Management and Arbitration Centre at Allahabad and
Lucknow, (viii) Committee to Explore the possibility of developing a robust and
fail safe software for automatic listing of cases, (ix) Committee to examine the
status and progress of Infrastructure in District Judiciary to ensure compliance of
the directions of Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, (x) Committee for the
maintenance of Convention Centre, Museum and Arbitration Centre at Allahabad,
(xi) Expenditure Committee, (xii) Budget and Finance Committee, (xiii) State
Court Management Committee, (xiv) Committee to consider the transfer of Staff
from Allahabad to Lucknow and vise- versa, (xv) Committee to deal with the
following subjects: A. HJS Selection and Appointments, B. Committee of Judges
constituted under Rule 27 of the UP Judicial Officers Rules, 2001, C. Examine the
Matter of inter-se seniority of the HJS officers, (xvi) Committee to deal with
following matters: A. Grant of Super Times Scales to the Officers in the HJS Cadre,
B. Grant of Selection Grade to the Officers in HJS Cadre, C. Grant of Financial
Benefits to Judicial Officers, including advance increments to the Officers with
LL.M. Degree, grant of ACP Scales, and grant of 1st increment, D. Vigilance, E. To
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out of 76 Committees, who was subsequently elevated as Chief Justice of
a High Court.
141. The minutes of these Committees, or any of the Committee
constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice have never been communicated
to the ‘Full Court’, giving the impression that their functioning is
independent of the High Court itself. Consequently, there exists no
institutional forum within the High Court to raise such issues, except by
addressing them through judicial orders. Otherwise, the Judges would left
to endure and lead a frustrating professional life in an environment that is
neither conducive to judicial work nor reflective of the dignity of this great
institution.
142. The next chilling effect of this unstructured discretion on the
administration of justice in Uttar Pradesh is reflected in the acute shortage
of staff in the District Judiciary, which is functioning with a shortfall of
7,834 vacancies against a sanctioned strength of 28,552 posts, along with
31 additional/ad-hoc posts in the cadres of stenographers and drivers. The
vacancies include 5,253 posts in the clerical/office cadre, 520 in the
stenographer cadre, 75 in the driver cadre, and 1986 in the Group-D cadre.
143. As per the September 2026 position, the total existing sanctioned
strength in the Judicial Officer cadre is 4,625, including 900 newly
sanctioned posts in September 2026, whereas the present working strength
designate Additional District Judges as District Judges, Note: Matters pertaining to
counting of previous services, fixation of pay and equalization of pay of judicial
officers will also be dealt by above mentioned Committee, (xvii) Committee for
Monitoring the situation of strike/abstinence from judicial work by learned
Advocates of all the District Bar Associations in the State of Uttar Pradesh-
constituted vide order dated 6.1.2025 of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice in the light
of para-9 of the order dated 20.12.2024 passed in SLP (Civil) No.19804-19805 of
2024, (xviii) Committee for ensuring the construction and availability of separate
toilet facilities for males, females, PwD and Transgender persons in the Court
premises and Tribunals with Principal Secretary Law & LR, Chief Secretary
Government of UP, Finance Secretary Government of UP, PWD Secretary
Government of UP, Registrar (J) Infrastructure- High Court, Registrar (J)
Infrastructure- District Court, Secretary High Court Bar Association of Allahabad.
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is 2,603. There are 1,122 vacancies in the Judicial Officers cadre. If all
900 newly sanctioned posts are treated as presently unfilled, the
corresponding vacancy figure would be 2,022. The 900 newly sanctioned
judicial posts comprise 237 HJS posts, 391 Civil Judge (Senior Division)
posts, and 272 Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts.
144. As on September, 2026, so far as the High Court is concerned, the
High Court Registry’s total sanctioned strength is 4,138. The sanctioned
strength comprises 2,904 posts in the General Office Cadre, 652 in the
Private Secretary Cadre, 465 in the Bench Secretary Cadre, 37 in the
Computer Cadre, and 80 in the Miscellaneous Cadre. Against the
sanctioned strength of 4,138, the Registry is presently functioning with
2,742 officers and employees across the aforesaid cadres. There is a
vacancy of 949 posts in the General Office Cadre, 255 in the Private
Secretary Cadre, 131 in the Bench Secretary Cadre, 14 in the Computer
Cadre, and 47 in the Miscellaneous Cadre. Thus, a total of 1,396 vacancies
exist in the High Court Registry against the sanctioned strength of 4,138.
The Private Secretary Cadre alone accounts for 255 vacancies against a
sanctioned strength of 652, with a present working strength of 397.
145. As on September 2026, there are a total of 10,352 vacancies in the
High Court Registry and the District Judiciary, comprising 1,122
vacancies in the Judicial Officers cadre, 7,834 vacancies in the District
Judiciary staff, and 1,396 vacancies in the High Court Registry.
146. Approximately 27 per cent of the sanctioned posts across all
cadres of the district judiciary staff remain unfilled. In the High Court
Registry, approximately 34 per cent of the sanctioned posts are vacant.
Within that overall figure, the shortfall is most acute in the Private
Secretary Cadre, where 39 per cent of the posts remain unfilled, and in the
Bench Secretary Cadre, where 28 per cent are vacant – both are essential
components, and thus the lifeline of the courts.
147. No appointment has been made in the Private Secretary, Registry,
Review Officer, Assistant Review Officer and Computer Assistant cadres
since the year 2022. The last advertisements in respect of these vacancies
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were issued on 17.08.2021 and 20.09.2021, and the final results were
declared on 02.03.2022 and 03.12.2022 respectively. Recently,
advertisements have been issued on 12.03.2026 and 01.06.2026 for
recruitment to the posts of Private Secretary, Grade-I (2026) and of
Review Officer, Assistant Review Officer and Computer Assistant, for
195 and 543 posts respectively. It is, however, to be noticed that few
recruitment was undertaken in the years 2022 and 2024 for the posts of
Stenographer, Group-C, Driver Grade-IV and Group-D.
148. In the HJS Cadre, 83 posts for direct recruitment were notified on
22.12.2023, and the written examination was conducted in August 2026;
the result of the written examination is awaited. No appointment in the
HJS Cadre has been made since 12.09.2022, pursuant to a notification
issued on 18.01.2021. It took 19 months and 25 days to complete the
recruitment cycle. The last notification for Civil Judge (Junior Division)
was issued on 10.12.2022 for 303 posts, and the result was declared on
30.08.2023. No recruitment has been conducted for Civil Judge (Junior
Division) since 30.08.2023.
149. There are certain Administrative Committees in the High Court in
respect of which no meeting regarding the business entrusted to those
Committees has been held for the last more than three and a half years, for
reasons best known to their respective Chairmen.
150. In Uttar Pradesh, in many districts, the Judicial Magistrates still
write orders by hand. One Stenographer is provided to an Additional
District and Sessions Judge, and, in case of leave, the Stenographers are
shared among Judges.
151. The position stands in instructive contrast to the procedure for the
appointment of Judges of the High Court, which is accorded institutional
priority. During the same period in which recruitment to the establishment
of the High Court Registry and to the district judiciary made no progress,
the process relating to the appointment of Judges continued without
interruption: four meetings of the collegium have been held since 2022,
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and six Judges of this Court have been appointed as Chief Justices of High
Courts.
152. The point is not why those appointments were made; they were
made in accordance with the settled procedure, and no question
concerning them arises here. The point is that the institution has been able
to sustain one process and not the other. The appointment of Judges is
indispensable, but a Judge cannot function without a Bench Secretary, a
stenographer, a record-keeper, other clerical staff, besides court rooms and
other establishment as per their entitlement. Where 1,396 posts of a
sanctioned 4,138 lie vacant in the High Court Registry, and no
appointment has been made in several cadres since 2022, the attention
given to the one side of the institution has plainly not been given to the
other.
153. The new High Court Complex at Lucknow, was inaugurated on
19.03.2016, it spans in 40 acres and houses 57 court rooms, and half of
the court rooms lying unused since 2016, whereas the Principal Bench at
Prayagraj has been facing serious issues with respect to infrastructure.
There is no vacant space of court room. This disparity highlights the fact
that institutional processes have not kept pace with the development of
institutional infrastructure.
154. The foregoing details demonstrate that the absence of a structured
framework governing the exercise of administrative discretion has
significant consequences, including its bearing upon the administration of
justice in the High Court and in the District Courts.
155. No administrative machinery could be set to be effective and
efficient, which is based on unfettered and unconstrained discretion and
works on the pleasure of the administrator. Following John Adams’
dictum that the government should be “of laws, and not of men”, the
rule of law is normally taken to prohibit various forms of arbitrariness in
the use of state power.
(emphasis supplied)
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156. In the international context, the United Nations has defined the
rule of law even more broadly;
“For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance
in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including
the States themselves, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law,
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation
in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and
procedural and legal transparency46.”
157. In the words of Philip Pettit47, there is an inherent tension between
discretion and justice, because the only thing that can defeat the
arbitrariness, in his view, is some kind of democratic procedure. The most
sustained philosophical discussion of discretion to date has been by Robert
Goodin48, who also views it as deeply problematic and calls for curtailing
it whenever possible. He outlines four specific objections;
(emphasis supplied)
158. Goodin’s first concern is that discretion serves as an illicit source of
power for administrative officials, which they may use to manipulate or
46
The Machinery of Government by Joseph Heath, Chapter VI (Administrative
Discretion and Rule of Law, page 254)
47
Philip Pettit is L.S. Rockefeller University Professor of Human Values at Princeton
University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Australian National
University. A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and
Companion of the Order of Australia, he works in moral and political theory.
Distinguished author, and his recent books include The Robust Demands of the
Good (OUP 2015), The Birth of Ethics (OUP 2019), and The State (PUP 2023).
48
Robert Goodin is a distinguished professor of philosophy at the Research School
of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University, where he has taught
since 1989. Prior to that, he spent a decade teaching government at the University
of Essex.
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exploit citizens. Goodin’s second major objection is that administrative
officials are not obliged to give reasons for their decisions, which makes
it impossible to ensure that the decisions are justifiable or even rational.
The third concern is that discretion also has the potential to make
administrative decisions unpredictable, which undermines legal certainty,
and finally, Goodin expresses the concern that discretion frees public
officials from having to respect individual privacy.
159. Lon L. Fuller's49 account of the internal morality of law carries the
point further. Among the eight principles he identified, the eighth is
congruence between the rule as declared and the rule as administered. A
system may promulgate clear and prospective rules and still fail, because
those who apply them do not in fact apply them. Fidelity to law, in Fuller's
sense, is not knowledge of the rule but the disposition to be bound by the
rule one has found, including where the result is unwelcome. That
disposition is a quality of persons, not of texts.
160. The repercussions of unfettered, unguided discretion have had a
devastating effect on the administration of justice. “Discretion”
necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty; there is always
a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear
departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud and
corruption50....
(emphasis supplied)
49
Lon Luvois Fuller (June 15, 1902- April 8, 1978) was an American legal
philosopher best known as a proponent of a secular and procedural form of natural
law theory. Fuller was a professor of law at Harvard Law School for many years,
and is noted in American law for his contributions to both jurisprudence and the
law of contracts.
50
Excerpt from “The Machinery of Government- Public Administration and Liberal
State” by Joseph Heath, p. 209; Ivan Rand, J.E. Bickenbach, Keith C. Culver, and
Michael Giudice, Canadian Cases in the Philosophy of Law, 5th ed. (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2018.
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161. As a result, “discretion, in practice, amounts to what is commonly
known as discrimination”51.
162. With utmost respect, the purpose is not to test the ‘subjective
satisfaction’ of the Chief Justice, nor to cast any aspersion on the working
of the office of Chief Justice. The sole concern of this Court is the manner
in which the High Court discharges its administrative functions in
defiance of the provisions of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, and
the need to streamline them by adopting a rule-bound procedure with
greater transparency and objectivity.
163. There is another aspect attached to this proposition, namely, the
‘personal identity’ and ‘dignity’ associated with the office of a Judge.
When these are compromised, they may influence judicial behaviour.
Instances of disregarding the Rules of Court, 1952, and failing to record
individual concurrence or dissent in Full Court meetings may give rise to
a perception of disrespect towards an individual’s personal identity and
dignity. If such instances are not addressed with restraint, they carry the
potential risk of eroding institutional discipline and undermining the rule
of law. Any tendency to respond on the basis of personal affront or
subjective considerations of identity may lead to arbitrariness, bias, and a
departure from established legal norms. Such reactions are incompatible
with the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice and may
ultimately weaken public confidence in judicial institutions.
164. As we see, a person’s ‘honour’, ‘dignity’, or, to use the modern
term, ‘status’ refers to the degree of social esteem accorded to their manner
of self-realization within a society's inherited cultural horizon. In
psychoanalytic terms, this means that what is negatively affected by the
action-inhibiting violation of a moral norm is not the superego 52 but the
51
M. P. Baumgartner, “The Myth of Discretion”, in Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses
of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 129-162 at 157
52
Superego is the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud. It is the ethical
component of the personality and provides the moral standards by which the ego
operates.
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subject’s ego-denials. In Honneth’s view, lack of recognition is a real
injustice that must be addressed53.
165. Although the foregoing paragraphs are not directly relevant to the
disposition of the present petition, but they may illuminate how
administrative decisions in the High Court influence judicial functioning
of District Courts. The behaviour of the Judges responsible for carrying
out the administrative affairs of the High Court shapes the institution's
judicial behaviour. These administrative choices, in turn, establish
behavioral patterns that define the judicial institution itself.
166. Despite explicit directives from both the Supreme Court and this
Court, District Court judges have consistently failed to comply. Again,
this non-compliance reflects a fundamental institutional reality: although
the judicial hierarchy operates as a rigid, centralized structure, it remains
vulnerable to informal resistance and manipulation at lower levels.
Compliance failures therefore originate not from simple oversight, but
from behavioral patterns embedded in the institutional culture itself.
167. If we take the capacity of lower courts, and all stakeholders,
seriously to produce valuable normative information- through
experimenting in doctrinal innovation, identifying social pathologies,
flagging legal inconsistencies, and reflecting local knowledge and
sensibilities- the Court system can be reimagined as a discursive learning
network. In the long run, learning from ‘mistakes’ could be more valuable
than eliminating them54.
168. The central impediment to India's judicial system is not only limited
to huge pendency of cases, shortage of judges, or lack of infrastructure
and establishment. Rather, it also lies in institutional behaviour and
judicial innovations: specifically, the discretionary choices judges make
53
Personal Identity- A reference from Chapter 6, Personal Identity and Disrespect
from ‘The Struggle for Recognition- The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict’ by
Axel Honneth.
54
Box- Steffensmier et al. 2016, pg.718 oxford handbook.
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and their institutional consequences. The behavioral patterns of the Judges
of the Constitutional Courts determine the system's functional capacity.
169. The institution remains Chief Justice–centered, with little space
for participative governance. The judiciary, being a self-regulated
institution, must maintain effective checks and balances on its
administrative side to ensure that administrative discretion is never
misused and is exercised strictly in accordance with the procedure
established by law and duly notified rules. This becomes all the more
necessary in view of the criticism that civil society often directs at us-
criticism rooted in concerns over dynastic privilege, nepotism, casteism,
and feudal patronage influencing judicial appointments, compounded
further by excessive ambition among judges themselves.
170. The prevailing Chief Justice-centric model of High Court
administration requires recalibration in favour of a more deliberative and
institutionally balanced approach. The marginal role of puisne judges in
administrative matters runs counter to broader administrative theories that
emphasise participatory decision-making and institutional accountability.
171. Participative management is a sine qua non of collective decision-
making, bringing economy, efficiency and transparency to the judicial and
administrative working of the Court. The proposition is not novel. In
Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral Science Approach55, Robert
Tannenbaum, Irving Weschler and Fred Massarik advanced the view that
leadership is not a fixed attribute of office but a range of behaviours,
extending from decisions announced by the person in authority to
decisions arrived at through the participation of those who must carry
them out. Their contribution lay in demonstrating that the choice between
these modes is not merely a question of style. Participative decisions draw
upon a wider body of information, anticipate difficulties of
implementation and secure the commitment of those responsible for
giving them effect, whereas decisions announced from above may be
55
Robert Tannenbaum, Irving R. Weschler and Fred Massarik, Leadership and
Organization: A Behavioral Science Approach (McGraw-Hill, 1961)
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reached more quickly but are often based on incomplete information and
more frequently encounter resistance in their implementation.
172. A High Court is not an organization in which authority descends
through a chain of subordinates. Its Judges are equals in the discharge of
the judicial function, and the administrative decisions taken in its name -
including the allocation of work, the framing of policy and the
management of establishment and infrastructure - directly affect the
manner in which every Judge performs that function. Participative
management, therefore, assumes particular significance in the institutional
framework of a High Court, where collective deliberation enables the
diverse experience and perspectives of its Judges to inform administrative
decisions. It promotes transparency, fosters institutional confidence and
facilitates the effective implementation of decisions, while ensuring that
the administration of the Court remains consistent with the collective
character of its judicial institution.
173. As Simon56 articulated, administrative behaviour is not merely a
function of formal authority but also involves navigating constraints,
processing information, and making reasoned choices within complex
institutional settings. The exclusion of puisne judges from meaningful
participation in administrative processes is therefore inconsistent with
these well-established principles of modern administrative governance.
174. The law's delay is among the ills that Hamlet enumerates in the
"To be, or not to be" soliloquy, listed alongside the oppressor's wrong and
the insolence of office57. The Prince of Denmark, contemplating the nature
of existence, asks why people bear the wrongs they do - oppression, the
contumely of the proud, unrequited love, the law's delay, and the
arrogance of authority - and concludes that it is the fear of what lies
56
Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making
Processes in Administrative Organization (Macmillan, 1947; 4th edn., The Free
Press, 1997).Herbert A. Simon was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences in 1978 for his research into decision-making within economic
organisations.
57
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene
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beyond death that makes them endure lives of misery rather than end
them. Four centuries later, the same frustration finds expression in the
familiar lament of dates followed by dates followed by dates. The two
forms of expression are far removed from one another, yet they are united
in articulating a single grievance: that justice delayed is justice denied.
175. Time is of the essence, and litigants such as Urmila Mishra cannot
be left waiting indefinitely, asking even for the framing of charges.
176. The purpose of taking the discussion to the next level is not to cast
aspersions on any individual or to undermine the authority vested in the
office of the Chief Justice, but to initiate a constructive dialogue aimed at
reaching a logical conclusion informed by fresh perspectives and new
ideas.
177. This concern finds resonance in George Grote's concept of
'constitutional morality,' developed in his book 'A History of Greece' - a
paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, sustained not by
natural instinct but by deliberate cultivation. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, invoking
this very idea before the Constituent Assembly, reminded us that
constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment; it has to be cultivated,
and our people have yet to fully learn it. Constitutional morality, therefore,
is not merely a principle to be professed - it must be reflected in our
conduct. The relevance of good conduct and righteous thought can be best
traced from our own civilizational heritage.
178. Kautilya, in the Arthashastra58, identifies four sources of law:
dharma, vyavahara, charitra, and the edicts of the King. Of these,
vyavahara - settled procedure and the usage of the courts - and charitra,
the customary established practice of a community, furnish the foundation
upon which ‘judicial character’ is built, shaped in turn by accountability
and by sustained training and learning directed at securing consistency,
clarity and coherence in adjudication, without fear or favour, affection or
58
Kautilya's Arthashastra, painstakingly compiled in Sanskrit and first brought to the
world by Dr. R. Shamasastry in 1909, translated into English in 1915
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ill will. What the modern State describes as ‘constitutional morality’ rests
upon the same understanding.
179. Returning to the issue from where this Court started, and at the
cost of repetition, certain facts merit reiteration for clarity. The empirical
record summoned from the trial court in Pappu Met @ Pappu vividly
demonstrates that, despite the binding precedent in Smt. Bacchi Devi
(supra) and repeated administrative directions, trial courts across Uttar
Pradesh continued to insist on two sureties in 9,775 anticipatory bail and
1,56,155 regular bail orders. Notably, only 25 districts responded, of
which merely 8 reflected limited compliance, while 49 submitted deficient
reports. No District Judge has complied with paragraphs 38(x) and 38(xi)
of Smt. Bacchi Devi case (supra), despite two reminders issued by the
Registrar General pursuant to orders of the High Court.
180. The necessity of a second judicial intervention in Urmila Mishra
case underscores deeper structural concerns. The scale of delay itself
reveals entrenched determinants of judicial behaviour: 16,15,655 cases
remain pending without charge framing (including 14,08,134 before
Magistrates), with pendency in some instances dating back to 1981. This
is further compounded by a disconnect between investigation and
adjudication, notwithstanding the filing of 22,51,629 charge sheets
between 2021 and 2025. Micro-level instances mirror this systemic
pattern: in Sarfraj Ahmad, 143 listings occurred without charges being
framed, while in V. S. Palitube, over 100 hearings followed despite a High
Court directive to conclude proceedings within six months, without any
effective order.
181. Institutional deficiencies aggravate these concerns. The High
Court and the courts below continue to function amid acute shortages of
staff, particularly of stenographers and record-keepers, and with
inadequate infrastructure. According to the National Judicial Data Grid,
approximately 1.43 crore cases are pending before the district courts in
Uttar Pradesh, the highest for any State in the country. Of the cases
pending for more than ten years, about 82 per cent are criminal cases.
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Approximately 12 lakh cases are pending before this Court. The position
is grim, but it is capable of improvement through consultative and
concerted effort, guided by a larger institutional vision and a commitment
to the institution. That requires aligning judicial behaviour with the
expectations of the institution, and placing the interests of the institution
above those of the individual.
182. The data set out hereinabove is intended solely to highlight the
concern, and every possible endeavour has been made to provide correct
details in the foregoing paragraphs. Any discrepancy or mismatch in the
data, if found, may be attributable to the non-availability of accurate and
complete information and to limitations in the information available.
183. This Court places on record its appreciation of the assistance
rendered by Ms. Pratima Vishwakarma and Ms. Juveriya Kazmi, learned
Amici Curiae, and by Shri Jatin Rana, Research Associate, attached to this
Court.
184. Inspired by the words of Dushyant Kumar 59, this Court concludes
by taking the liberty of expressing it thus, in its own words, which may
resonate profoundly in the present context: It’s aim is not merely to create
an uproar, but to rouse this judicial inertia into motion. If not through its
judgment, then through yours- wherever it may arise - let there be a true
awakening: a sense of responsibility joined with accountability. The flame
must endure; it must continue to ignite.
185. His lines are not a call by a rebel, an empty rhetoric; they are a call
to conscience - urging that change must not remain an abstract ideal but
become a living force, kindled in every heart willing to bear responsibility
and act with accountability.
59
Dushyant Kumar (1933–1975)- a leading voice of modern Hindi poetry. He is
celebrated for his powerful, socially conscious verse that challenged complacency
and stirred a spirit of awakening. Writing primarily in the form of the Hindi ghazal,
he brought poetry closer to the concerns of ordinary people- the common man-
following lines call for meaningful change rather than empty noise- urging that the
“fire” of awareness, courage, and action must exist somewhere, in someone, to
transform society.
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ORDER AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS - CASE-WISE
I. Pappu Met @ Pappu v. State of U.P. and Others
The prayer made in the petition has already been allowed by order dated
11.12.2025, whereby the impugned order dated 18.11.2025 was directed
to be modified to the extent that the petitioner be released upon his
executing a personal bond of Rs. 5,000/- and furnishing one surety in the
like amount, to the satisfaction of the court concerned. The petition
accordingly stands allowed.
II. Urmila Mishra v. State of U.P. and four Others
The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj, is directed to
decide Case No. 2080 of 2010, State v. Rajendra Prasad Mishra and others,
arising out of Case Crime No. 105 of 2009, under Sections 406, 419, 420,
504 and 506 of IPC, Police Station Naini, District Prayagraj, in a time-
bound manner, subject to the following:
(i) Applications for personal exemption filed by an accused shall be
disposed of by reasoned orders. Repetitive applications for personal
exemption be not entertained in a routine manner, and where filed, shall
be dismissed with reasonable costs.
(ii) If the situation so warrants, the bail bonds of the accused(s) shall
be forfeited, and, upon the accused being taken into judicial custody, the
trial court shall proceed to conclude the trial at the earliest within a
reasonable period.
(iii) Necessary action shall also be taken against the erring police
officers responsible for the failure to effect proper service of summons,
bailable warrants and non-bailable warrants upon the accused.
(iv) With the aforesaid directions, the petition stands allowed.
III. Sarfraj Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Another
The trial shall be conducted in accordance with the directions
contained in Urmila Mishra (supra). The petition accordingly stands
disposed of.
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IV. V.S. Palitube v. State of U.P. and Another
The learned trial court is directed to expedite the trial of
Complaint Case No. 1738 of 2013, under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, and to conclude the same at the earliest, subject to
the following:
(i) The accused shall be bound down to appear before the trial court
on each date fixed, or as may be directed.
(ii) In the event the accused fails to appear, the Senior Superintendent
of Police, Kanpur Nagar, shall ensure his presence before the learned trial
court.
(iii) If, after exhausting the procedure prescribed for a summary trial,
the accused still fails to appear, the trial shall be concluded after taking
the accused into judicial custody.
(iv) With the aforesaid directions, the petitions stand allowed.
186. This Court concludes this judgment by referring to the first para-
graph of Dr. Jaya Thakur and Others v. Union of India and others, wherein
Dipankar Datta, J., the Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court, speaking for
the Bench, began the judgment thus: "It is a foundational principle of our
constitutional scheme that ours is a government of laws, not of men, where
the rulers are bound by the law; they can never be above the law. It is in
this larger constitutional context that the implications of the present
opinion must necessarily be weighed. While the significance of a judicial
opinion is not always to be measured by the controversy that occasions it,
the present matter calls for an approach alive to the possibility that the
opinion of this Court may well outlive the immediate controversy."60
(emphasis supplied)
187. This Court, thus, takes the opportunity of requesting Hon'ble the
Chief Justice to explore the necessity of convening Full Courts, and of
opening the dialogue for ensuring compliance with the High Court Rules,
60
Dr. Jaya Thakur and others v. Union of India and others; Writ Petition (Civil)
No.14 of 2024.
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1952. This is not something novel that this Court is requesting. The issues
raised and deliberated upon in the foregoing paragraphs have been opined
upon time and again by Judges of this Court, and, once again, this Court
simply endorses the opinion. Given that resolving constitutional issues -
constitutional morality and judicial character - is the primary task of the
Judges of this Court, it must remain our Court's priority. Pendency of cases
for more than twenty years, awaiting charges to be framed, and in some
cases for more than forty years to be decided, does not reflect well on our
institution. It is time that the institution addressed the issue with the
urgency and promptitude it deserves.
188. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to place a copy of this
judgment, through the Registrar General of this Court, before the Hon'ble
the Chief Justice, for His Lordship's kind perusal and for such further steps
as His Lordship may deem fit and appropriate in respect of the issues no-
ticed herein.
189. A copy of this judgment shall also be transmitted to the Secretary,
Department of Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India,
who may place the same, together with such note as may be prepared upon
the issues noticed in the foregoing paragraphs, before the Hon'ble Minis-
ter of State (Independent Charge) for Law and Justice, for consideration;
and a copy of the note may also be forwarded to the Cabinet Secretary,
Union of India.
190. The Registrar General is directed to ensure that the entire record
of these cases is digitized, including the particulars furnished by the
learned trial courts and by the State, the case files, and such other docu-
ments as form part of the record.
Order Date: 28.09.2026
Anil K. Sharma
(Vinod Diwakar, J.)
Digitally signed by :-
ANIL KUMAR SHARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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